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Regional integration processes are meant to provide a peaceful 
arena in which sovereign countries voluntarily combine their efforts 
in  areas  of  mutual  concern,  creating  common  regional  interests 
and objectives.  Models and ideas, however, do not always result 
in concrete actions or signiﬁcant accomplishments. Even the most 
developed institutional exercise of regional integration, the European 
Union (EU), is commonly overwhelmed by the contradictions and 
obstacles of the institutional architecture and the interests of the 
member states. The construction of the EU has continued for more 
than ﬁve decades and remains an unﬁnished project. Despite its ebbs 
and ﬂows, the assessment of the European integration process is 
positive and still at the forefront of regional integration experiences. 
In that regard, what lessons can be learned in the Americas from the 
European experience? What are the peculiarities and prospects of 
the integration processes in the Western Hemisphere? What are the 
conditions necessary for developing integration processes?
Some ideas and responses to these questions are provided in 
the  articles  of  this  book,  grouped  in  four  sections:  hemispheric 
integration, North America, Central America and the Caribbean, and 
South America.  The contributors demonstrate that integration in 
the sub-regions of the Americas has progressed in varying degrees, 
and  that  each  integration  process  is  characterized  by  particular 
circumstances  that  constrain  further  institutional  developments, 
legitimacy and credibility. Regional integration in both Europe and 
the Americas is a work in progress, and therefore, scholarly exercises 
of the kind included in this book serve not only as a reﬂection and 
analysis of what currently exists and how it has developed, but also 
as a consideration for future developments.
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Joaquín Roy and Roberto Domínguez 
 
 
Regional Integration: A Flexible Concept 
  
The aspiration of regional integration processes is t o become a space of 
conciliation between the creation of regional common goods and national 
interests, cultures, practices and policies.  Models and ideas, however, do not 
always sublimate in concrete actions; even the most developed institutional 
exercise of regional integration, the European Union (EU), is commonly 
overwhelmed by the contradictions and obstacles of the institutional architecture 
and the interests of the member states. The construction of the EU has taken 
more than five decades and is still an unfinished project aimed at the creation of 
welfare. Despite its flows, the assessment of the European integration process is 
positive and still at the forefront of regional integration experiences. In that 
regard, what lessons can be learnt in the Americas from the European 
experience? What are the peculiarities and prospects of the integration processes 
in the Western Hemisphere? How many models of integration are there? What 
are the conditions for developing integration processes? 
Some tentative answers are drawn in the articles of the present book, which 
is the result of the conference “The European Union and Regional Integration: A 
Comparative Perspective and Lessons for the Americas,” held on April 8, 2005, 
at the University of Miami, under the sponsorship of the European Commission.  
Each one of the contributors shows that integration in the sub-regions of the 
Americas has several degrees of progress as well as different particular 
circumstances which constrain further institutional developments, legitimacy and 
credibility. From the perspective of this introduction, assuming that the EU can 
provide some positive ideas for the integration in the Americas, three key 
conceptualizations can be pondered as crucial in the institutional development of 
the EU: state, region and integration. 
The first element has to do with the political practices in the state. Having in 
mind the horrors and the human suffering of the wars during the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries, the European state has voluntarily pooled sovereignty in a 
number of areas as a shield against the external world. Scholars have indeed 
contributed to this debate by proposing the post or neo-modern European state. 
Under those lenses, the basic premises of the European state can be summarized 8  Roy and Domínguez 
 
as follows: a) a breakdown of the distinction between domestic and foreign 
affairs; b) mutual interference in traditional domestic affairs and mutual 
surveillance; c) rejection of force for resolving disputes and the consequent 
codification of rules of behavior; d) growing irrelevance of borders; and e) 
security based on transparency, mutual openness, interdependence and mutual 
vulnerability. The question that arises in this aspect is whether or not a more 
flexible conceptualization of sovereignty is needed in the Western hemisphere to 
move forward in the regional cooperation and integration processes. 
The second element debated in the chapters is the conceptualization of 
region. The predominant perception of regions not only from some academic 
perspectives,  but also from specialized media, emphasizes their economic 
criterion. For instance, the idea of region in the Western Hemisphere is 
automatically linked to the Free Trade Area of the Americas. Likewise, the fault 
lines in the integration processes in South America are the result of the 
convulsive economies in that area. Certainly, a region can be hardly described if 
the driving force of the economy is neglected. Nevertheless, the paradox of the 
European regionalism is that the European experience was designed to pursue 
further objectives and the role of the economy was a means instead of an end. 
This is why some of the chapters emphasize the role of security, inequality or 
political preferences as relevant themes in the integration processes. In this 
regard, the new regionalism is a useful analytical tool to describe the 
multidimensional forms of integration, which include economic, political, social, 
and cultural aspects and consequently goes far beyond the goal of creating 
regional free trade agreements or security alliances. 
The third element is the experience of the integration process. Traditional 
literature on integration
1 indicates that it would be expected that free trade 
projects will progressively move forward step by step toward a complete 
economic integration.
2 Nevertheless, the process of integration, beyond economic 
implications, has had several impacts on a myriad of areas and policies. From the 
                                                 
1 Bela Balassa, The Theory of Economic Integration (Homewood, Ill.: R. D. Irwin, 1961). 
2 The first phase is the free trade area, which is the simplest level of integration and allows 
only free movement of goods. This is the case of the European Free Trade Area Association 
(EFTA) and the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA). The second level of integration is the 
customs union, which is characterized by the harmonization of external tariffs; despite its numerous 
difficulties, this is the case of MERCOSUR. The third level of surrendering economic sovereignty 
to integration is the common market, which was reached by the EU at the beginning of the 1990s; 
this level allows free mobility of capital, labor and services. The fourth stage is the harmonization 
of economic policies and is known as the economic union; to some extent, the experience of the 
euro has indirectly obliged the EU to adopt some of such characteristics in specific sectors. The 
final stage is the complete economic integration, in which central institutions substitute for national 
ministries in the policy-making process. There is currently no regional experience at this level, 
although it remains to be seen whether the future evolution of the European Central Bank, the 
closest institutions to this final stage, will enhance its power and will be an example to be followed 
by other institutions in different sectors. Introduction  9 
 
conceptualization of integration by Karl Deutsch, who argued a “sense of 
community” in Europe, to Ernst Haas’ vision of integration as a process whereby 
political actors are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political 
activities to a new center, a more pluralistic debate has nourished the discourse 
on integration. After five decades in the making of integration theory and based 
on the evolution of the EU, Amitai Etzioni has revisited the concepts of 
supranational and integration. In his assessment, Etzioni indirectly questions 
utopian views of integration and states that the European Commission and 
Parliament are largely international or regional bodies and not truly supranational 
ones, and adds that currently the EU is a “halfway integration” process.
3 
Numerous examples support this less idealistic view of integration. One of the 
most recent events with regard to the fallacy of the “shifting of loyalties” was the 
low turnout in the 2004 European Parliament elections, the French and Dutch 
rejection to the Constitutional Treaty in 2005 and the disagreements about the 
2007-2013 EU budget.  
Nevertheless, integration in Europe is simultaneously a reality and an idea. In 
the construction of Europe, today the EU –like all national political systems – has 
a set of formal rules for collective decision-making, i.e., an EU legislation that 
defines and regulates the main aspects of the political and government 
institutions. Likewise, the office-holders, collective political actors and ordinary 
citizens take part in EU politics and policy making to defend interests and uphold 
ideologies and values. On the other hand, despite the small EU budget size, the 
classic concept of politics as the authoritative allocation of values and resources 
also applies to the EU. Structural and cohesion funds give the EU the power to 
redistribute some financial resources among disadvantaged regions and areas.  
All these elements are part of the distinct levels of governance, either local, 
national or European. Even with the failure of the ratification of the project of the 
EU Constitution, the institutional structure is set to remain solidly anchored in an 
existing legal framework. It is a series of Treaties that includes the Schuman 
Declaration “of interdependence,” the Treaties of Rome,
  the Single European 
Act, Maastricht,  Amsterdam and the Treaty of Nice of 2000, in addition to the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights and the decisive Laeken Declaration. They form, 
in the absence of another text that reforms, frames or replaces them, as it was the 
purpose of the Constitutional Treaty, the existing European “Constitution” that 
governs this Community of law.  This long road towards “an ever closer union” 
reveals one of the crucial innate characteristics of the EU. In the words of 
Jacques Delors, a Tour de France fan, it is like cycling --if one stops, one falls.  
As a consequence, the proper procedure to observe the present anatomy of 
the EU and its reverberation in the Americas is not by photographing it, like in a 
sort of juridical static scholarship exercise. There is also a need to record it like in 
                                                 
3 Amitai Etzioni,  Political Unification Revisited. On Building Supranational Communities 
(Maryland: Lexington Books, 2001). 10  Roy and Domínguez 
 
a film, by applying the more dynamic tools of international relations, with an 
open end.        
 
An Open Future 
 
On the basis of the established arguments and speculative dimensions regarding 
the profile of the EU and its role in the world, it is feasible, and possibly most 
convenient i n view of the international uncertainties to offer three potential 
scenarios for the second decade of the twenty-first century.  
 
The Victory of Free Trade 
 
In the first place, according to the most pessimistic calculations based on the 
collapse of the constitutional project, the European experiment may become a 
marooned ship, without direction or identifiable objectives. This euro skeptic 
vision, shouldered by a prevalent, and supposedly realist U.S. vision, which is 
based on strength and hard power, would welcome an alleged European 
incapacity to reach a level of integration that goes beyond economics and trade.  
In the event of this negative scenario becoming a reality, by the end of the 
second decade of the twenty-first century, two possible outcomes are plausible on 
the base of the panorama before the collapse of the EU constitutional project. The 
first, feared by an anti-immigrant sector that voted against, was a EU composed 
of 40 members (which would mirror the composition of the Council of Europe). 
This EU would paradoxically represent the triumph of the European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA), ironically favored by the business-prone sector that was 
afraid of a too socially-inclined Europe. Deprived of in depth supranationalism, 
this typically intergovernmental British alternative was historically explicitly 
endorsed by Margaret Thatcher in her epoch-making speech given in 1988 at the 
College of Europe in Bruges. In this scenario, the euro would then be maintained 
as a common currency for pragmatic reasons and because the benefits of 
maintaining it as legal tender would outweigh the costs of transitioning back to 
national currencies. However, the message heard in France and the Netherlands 
would make further enlargement of the EU a doubtful prospect, beyond the 
scheduled accession of Romania and Bulgaria.  
This Europe, united as a glorified trade area, with the applause of the voters 
that feared a loss of national identity, would have many of its competences 
reverted to the national governments by a process similar to devolution, without 
ever crossing the line towards a true common foreign and security policy and or 
the implementation of a common defense mechanism. The United Kingdom, 
without bothering to go through the motion of holding a referendum on the 
Constitution, would fit very well. In this context, the functionalist process would 
be exhausted and no other competences would be incorporated into the common 
pool. After the dismantling (due to the resistance of the net contributing states) of Introduction  11 
 
the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), to the dismay of the same voters that in 
the interior of France were the main actors of the derailment of the constitutional 
scheme, the European Economic Community would have resurrected out of its 
ashes and simultaneously contribute to the termination of the EU, as envisioned 
since Maastricht. 
The politicians who, at the start of the new millennium, inherited the reins of 
Europe from the federalists of the last two decades of the twentieth century (with 
Helmut Kohl, François Mitterrand and Felipe González in the lead) would most 
benefit from this outcome. Equally satisfied with the new panorama would be the 
representatives of commercial interests who have witnessed the collapse of the 
last economic barriers to a real single market.  The advocates of nationalism 
elevating shouts of alarm in response to the dual invasion from Brussels and 
Europe’s southern and eastern periphery would praise these results. Meanwhile, 
on the borders of Europe, immigration would appear to be uncontainable, 
sentiments of resentment would increase (especially in Turkey and some Balkan 
republics), and European cities would become terrorist targets. 
Following this script, on its own, the United States had decided to 
concentrate its energies on its zones of special influence in Latin America and 
Asia, leaving security in Europe adrift. The planned Rapid Reaction Force would 
be reduced to a theoretical framework buried in the file cabinets stored in the 
empty offices of the Justus Lipsius building (located in front of the Commission 
site, the refurbished Berlaymont, at last free from asbestos, the cause for the 
decade-long exile of its staff). The Council of the European Community, 
deprived of its competences, would be connected by distant communication 
technologies. Strong governments would manage to impose their wishes, 
sidelining the protests of the weakest. 
On the American continent, as a confirmation of the erratic history of 
regional integration, the FTAA would already have been converted into a reality, 
strictly limited to trade, still with many exceptions on  certain “sensitive” 
products.  MERCOSUR would be reduced to a free trade area, granting 
membership to the rest of the South American subcontinent, along the model of 
NAFTA and the FTAA, but not following the grandiose scheme proposed by the 
South American Union announced in Cuzco. The Andean Community had 
disappeared, as a result of the endemic economic and political illnesses of its 
members. Central American integration, an area where the EU had invested more 
time and energy than in any other part of the world in the 1980s, had vanished, 
and CARICOM continued oscillating between inter-insular quarrels and closer 
relations with the United States. CAFTA-DR had become a reality. In sum, in the 
New World, the European model of integration as reflected in the successive 
stages towards the Maastricht Treaty had disappeared as an obligatory point of 
reference.    
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An Ever-Closer Union 
 
The second European scenario would be very different. It would be composed of 
two simultaneous effects. On the one hand there would be a positive European 
reaction to the crisis generated by the failure of the Constitution and, on the 
other, a corresponding positive United States response to an ever closer union.  In 
a Messina-like action, the EU leadership had decided to put together the pieces of 
the disaster and move forward with energy similar to the one used to launch the 
EC by the Treaty of Rome. Simultaneously, this change would also be provoked 
by a change in perceptions of the EU process and a different outcome of the 
referendum process.  In this setting, Washington changed course when facing the 
complexity of the new international circumstances dictated by the September 11 
attacks and the feeling of an upgraded sense of increased insecurity. Isolation 
increased as a result of U.S. unilateral policies (rejection of the International 
Court of Justice, confrontations on environmental issues).  With the possibility of 
a military disaster in the Middle East and the costly maintenance of the 
occupation forces, Washington opted for a sudden change with respect to the EU. 
This change was the triumph of observers and officials who in the U.S. 
Mission to the EU had proceeded to review the errors in perception prior to 
Maastricht.  According to this self-correcting analysis, at the time Washington 
was not able to detect the subtle yet significant linguistic change from the 
European Community to the EU.  The change was interpreted as cosmetic rather 
than substantive. Although Washington responded to the perception of “Fortress 
Europe” (represented by the completion of the Single Market) with the creation 
of NAFTA, and later with the FTAA, U.S. officials did not know how to respond 
in the political field.  In some ways, the United States had missed the train to 
Maastricht, believing that it was a simple replica of the Single European Act.  
When they realized that the experiment was serious and that the euro was not a 
fake currency for kids to play with, and that the creation of the Rapid Reaction 
Force was a legitimate possibility (which did not look the same as the modest 
Eurocorps, dependent on the good will of individual governments) they decided 
to follow the process more closely. If the new experiment failed, U.S. officials 
could always say that this was just another project of the unruly and incompetent 
Europeans.  In case they were successful, however, it was better to be well 
informed. 
According to this new perception, the United States had decided after 
President Bush’s visit to  Brussels in February 2005 to embrace the European 
resources in NATO, to back the new Franco-British initiative, in line with the 
historic decision of Saint Malo, to support the creation of a clearly autonomous 
European rapid reaction and intervention force.  In the peace maintenance and 
reconstruction activities, the soldiers of at least twenty-one countries of the EU 
would have coordinated arms and would wear a flag of the EU on their sleeve.  
The global strategy of the United States had become enmeshed with the Introduction  13 
 
European. Thanks to some military efforts with limited human casualties, some 
threatening or bothersome regimes had fallen one after the other, and the rest had 
been left as fossils undeserving of the attention of either Brussels or Washington.  
The neurological center of the federal government of Europe was not only 
already functioning, but the Commission had been converted into a body with the 
executive powers necessary to administer the increasing competences that had 
passed to the first pillar, while the second and third had functionally disappeared.  
The rest of the planet could no longer play the double card, asking for strategic 
favors from the United States (or fighting against them), and hoping the EU 
would take care of their economic problems. 
The United States having overstretched its worldwide hegemony and its total 
economic dominance in the Americas, had decided to take the step that in the 
1990s had been the object of speculation or sarcastic commentaries: the petition 
for its full membership in the EU, after a period of preferential association.  
Naturally, this scenario assumes that the United States would have overcome 
three monumental obstacles to comply with the acquis: the abolition of the death 
penalty, the acceptance of the supremacy of EC law and the decisions of the 
European Court of Justice, and the elimination of the gargantuan budget deficit. 
Moreover, this rosy setting did not take into account the referendum disaster and 
the simultaneous policy of the United States to carve a part of the Western 
Hemisphere through CAFTA-DR and wait for less rainy days in the FTAA.          
 
Reasonable Realism 
 
The third optional scenario is more realistic, less utopian than the second one, 
and at the same time more hopeful for the future of the EU. According to this 
vision, the EU would still be a really unique creature, and cease to be accused of 
being a hybrid according to a traditional analysis, in which reasonable 
supranational ambitions would coexist without stridencies or friction with the 
intergovernmental realities. From a traditional federal perspective observers 
could say that the language continues to be hypocritical and prudent, always 
avoiding constitutional expressions that may indicate the limit of states’ 
sovereignty in “hard” competences. The document, a sort of Nice-Plus, that will 
precede this building, shaky for some, solid for others, will be known as another 
treaty, devoid of the fearful constitutional references.  
This Europe (in which the expression European Union will be consolidated) 
would be managed by an institutional framework very similar to the one existing 
at the end of the twentieth century.  The European Council will continue to be the 
protagonist, but would continue to delegate numerous detailed functions to the 
rest of the institutions.  The six-month rotating presidency will continue leading 
most of the Council of Ministers formats in order to preserve the national 
tradition. In exchange, there will be a new position with a mandate of two years 
and a half, as in the case of the Parliament, renewable for another term.  Much 14  Roy and Domínguez 
 
along the lines envisioned in the constitutional project, this position will be filled 
by a political personality, selected by the European Council, but ratified by the 
Parliament.  In an exercise of compromise, the president of the Council of 
Ministers would be of an ideological leaning different than the president of the 
Parliament for the same period of time.  The European Council would name the 
President of the Commission for a period of five years according to the tradition.  
The College of Commissioners will be made up of one member per State, with a 
distribution of portfolios that respects collective effectiveness and national 
dignity. It remains to be seen how a reduction of the number of commissioners 
will be done once the number of countries reaches 27. By means of ingenious 
formulas, the national representation in diverse competences would be obtained 
by means of a sub-regional system, that at the same time would provide 
geographic cohesion (Nordic, Mediterranean, Central Europe, Baltic, former 
Yugoslavia, etc.). 
The evolution and consolidation of this European model could be fruitfully 
adapted in other regions of the world. Although there are reasonable doubts 
regarding its success in the African continent, and prospects for the Middle East 
will be subject to the disappearance of political regimes diametrically opposed to 
the Western style rule of law and separation of powers, the future for a Latin 
American adaptation appears optimistic. 
A positive review of the European experience as a whole would convince the 
United States, especially the reluctant sectors in Congress and unions that feel 
their interests threatened by free trade and uncontrolled immigration that some 
European mechanisms are adaptable to the circumstances of the Americas. As 
Mexican President Vicente Fox proposed back in 2001, well before September 
11, two European experiences were urgent candidates for implementation: 
structural funds and regional policies, and labor mobility. The best way to reduce 
the threat from immigration is to promote development in the vicinity through the 
transferring of funds for the improvement of infrastructure, to create jobs and to 
promote higher quality living in the native lands as an alternative to migration. 
As history shows, illegal immigration is unstoppable. The best solution is to 
channel migration flows through generous quotas that help to reduce the 
demographic and economic pressures, and at the same time to provide needed 
labor for certain sectors. The European experience of the 1960s and 1970s is 
perfectly transferable to the dimensions of the Americas, but this requires the 
establishment of a network similar to the European Community, with the 
implementation of association agreements beyond the mere exchange of goods. 
For the time being, the FTAA, NAFTA and the diverse formulas in the 
Caribbean and Central America do not explicitly include this ambition. 
Once the convenience of supranational sovereignty and shared administration 
with joint decision-making has been assimilated (something that will take many 
years to happen), the application of the method of the qualified majority plus the 
call for a demographic clause, the networks of regional integration in the Introduction  15 
 
Americas would avoid the thorny taboo of supranationalism.  Countries such as 
the United States and Brazil (as reflections of Germany in Europe) could 
preserve their protagonism based on the force of their weighted votes.  The small 
countries would be forced to form effective  coalitions to obtain blocking 
minorities.  By means of the preservation of the European method of attempting a 
consensual vote in international forums (like in the United Nations), the small 
Latin American and Caribbean countries would be able to make their voices 
heard with an inter-American profile in a more effective and coherent fashion, 
with respect to the United States as well as to Europe. 
 
About the book 
 
This book is a collection of articles, which hopefully formulate some interesting 
ideas and thoughts. The chapters are grouped in four sections, which analyze the 
integration processes in the different regions of the Western Hemisphere. 
The first section covers the current developments of the integration process 
in North America. Roberto Domínguez p rovides an overview of the debates 
about the future of NAFTA. The author argues that NAFTA has unleashed an 
intense conversation that goes beyond mere free trade debates. Although NAFTA 
is distant from the EU architecture, the discussion in North America reflects the 
need to deepen the institutional developments in the region. The agreement 
among the distinct variants of the debate is that unresolved problems in the 
region such as migration, security and development demand from the three 
governments and societies of North America to propose coordinated approaches 
and policies in order to reach effective results in the implementation of policies. 
One of the main proponents of deepening integration in North America is 
Robert Pastor, who presents in the second  article of the book a suggestive 
definition of the current agenda that faces North America. He addresses the 
question as to which of three approaches he analyzes (three sovereign nations, a 
trilateral partnership, or a community) offers the best vehicle for serving the 
long-term interests of the people of North America. He explains the impact of 
NAFTA and its strengths and flaws of both commission and, more importantly, 
omission. In this regard, he describes what could be the future architecture of 
NAFTA with institutions such as a Council, Parliamentary Group and a 
Permanent Court on Trade and Investment. 
Alejandro Chanona follows this line of reasoning and states that  North 
America has become a region as a result of security concerns, economic 
advantages a nd political interests. By focusing on security issues, Chanona 
argues that the three countries must recognize that common problems regarding 
security and transnational threats cannot be treated independently and North 
America is currently a nascent security community. In his perspective, security 
has become an important element of integration.   16  Roy and Domínguez 
 
Gustavo Vega emphasizes that although NAFTA and the EU share important 
commonalties in terms of the extent and depth of integration, they are also very 
different in terms of origins, goals, scope, and degree of institutionalization and 
centralization. In that regard, despite the fact that the EU’s social policies are not 
likely to emerge in North America, September 11
th opens a possibility to advance 
the process of integration in the trade and migration fronts, Vega asserts.  
From the Canadian perspective, Steven B. Wolinetz states that examining the 
EU in comparative context is worthwhile because it gives a clear sense of what 
the EU is and how it has changed over time. Likewise, Wolinetz considers, such 
regional systems like the EU are likely to become more common in an 
interdependent world. Nevertheless, thus far the EU and NAFTA models are 
sufficiently different in their governance and politics that all comparisons in most 
areas can do little more than highlight the difference.  
The second section of the book is centered on Central America and the 
Caribbean. Fernando Rueda argues that the interest in regional integration in 
Central America has been revived on a new basis, in which the creation of a 
regional market and the improvement of its role in the international 
competitiveness are key elements. However, the integration in Central America is 
subject to serious limitations such as the excessive dominance of extra regional 
trade, the inequitable distribution of benefits and the absence of a real common 
trade policy. Rueda’s analysis warns that if these limitations are not overcome by 
implementing suitable economic and institutional policies, the new regional 
integration will not be able to contribute effectively to the Central American 
economic development process. 
On the other hand, Eric Jacobstein explains the importance of the U.S.-
Central America free trade agreement and the complexities of its ratification 
process by the U.S. Congress. The author contends that the real question for 
those voting on CAFTA is whether Central America will be better off with or 
without the agreement. In this regard, as a result of the expiration of the Multi-
fiber agreement, the passage of CAFTA appears to be increasingly urgent and 
necessary for the subregion. Jacobstein argues that the vote on CAFTA will mean 
the negotiation of agreements similar in content to CAFTA while rejection may 
lead to a reassessment of U.S. trade agreements and more likely to a general 
delay in the advancement of hemispheric trade and U.S. trade more broadly. This 
would mean delays in the free trade agreements being negotiated with Panama, 
Colombia, Ecuador and Peru and a future Free Trade Area of the Americas 
(FTAA).  
Three articles deal with the Caribbean. Joaquín Roy states that the experience 
of the Cuba-European Union relations reveals a mixed picture. It is composed of 
a coherent series of EU measures intended in the first place to maintain the lines 
of communication open, and secondly to contribute to facilitating the conditions 
for a sort of “soft landing” in the terrain of democracy and market economy in 
the event of a peaceful transition. This strategy has not come free of charge, he Introduction  17 
 
argues, as demonstrated by the persistent negative vote on Cuba at the UN 
Commission for Human Rights, and the maintenance of the Common Position 
imposed in 1996, conditioning any special cooperation and aid package upon the 
implementation of political reforms.  
With regard to CARICOM, Wendy Grenade gives an overview of the 
regional governance arrangements within the Community, showing the shift from 
the old to the emerging paradigm. The author argues that while global realities 
are pushing the small states in the Caribbean to modify and redesign the regional 
project to achieve deeper levels of integration, the emerging framework also 
reflects the political culture within member states and the tension between 
domestic forces and regional integration. Within this context, therefore, Grenade 
asserts that regional integration is both necessary and problematic and that 
effective governance mechanisms are necessary to enhance the viability of 
regional integration movements.   
David Hinds examines the linkages between internal politics and regional 
integration in the Caribbean.  Hinds contends that in spite of a more aggressive 
approach to regional integration of the Anglophone Caribbean in the past decade, 
political divisions within member countries have stalled this movement. Those 
divisions, asserts the author, are in essence a reflection of the adversarial nature 
of the Caribbean political culture that runs counter to the notion of unity and 
cooperation which underpins regional integration. Hinds argues that integration 
at the d omestic level is integral to regional integration.  In his view, regional 
unity will falter if it is not premised on democratic practices both at the regional 
level and within the member states. He emphasizes that forms of shared 
democratic governance have to be worked out within the member countries if 
regional unity is to be effective. Hinds proposes that one way to begin to address 
the problem is for the member countries to move in the direction of power 
sharing based on shared democratic governance to c ompliment the evolving 
power sharing model at the regional level. 
The third section of the book comprises four articles on the integration 
processes in South America. Aimee Kanner argues that the potential problems 
associated with deepening EU-Andean Community relations are fundamentally 
related to issues of governance. Currently, she asserts, deepening Andean 
integration and EU-Andean relations is the most promising option for the Andean 
countries and the Andean Community in moving towards what will be an 
undoubtedly difficult process of developing good governance.  Therefore, the EU 
should move quickly and efficiently towards beginning the negotiations for a 
fourth generation association agreement with the Andean Community. 
Roberto Domínguez, on the other hand, applies networks approaches to the 
EU foreign policy towards Latin America, taking the case of the EU participation 
in the pacification of the domestic conflict in Colombia. In the explanation of this 
case, the author argues that interests groups must be aware that in order to attract 
the attention of the EU, the parties involved or affected by the conflict have 18  Roy and Domínguez 
 
lobbied the three main EU institutions as well as the some European 
governments. In light of the external capabilities of the EU, the EU is 
contributing to the pacification process in Colombia through the active 
participation of NGOs. 
Félix Peña analyzes the present and future Mercosur based on four 
conceptualizations: regional reality, strategic idea, formal economic integration 
process and image. The reflections of the author lead him to conclude that most 
of the existing problems in the strategic idea of Mercosur have reasonable 
solutions; they depend on the willingness to move forward in the institutional 
development as well as on the strong collective political leadership, technical 
imagination and creative participation of the civil society. From the combination 
of these elements,   the future scenarios of Mercosur will vary from an irrelevant 
and diluted integration process to a consolidated integration unit.  
Marcos Guedes argues that in the last ten years Mercosur has become a 
viable instrument for the creation of a South American pole of economic 
development and integration as well as to enhance regional power in the face of 
inter-regional and global negotiations. Despite the Europeans’ views that ponder 
the limitations of Mercosur or North-Americans’ criticisms that consider it as 
nothing more than a regional political arrangement in order to better negotiate 
with the United States, Guedes contends that Mercosur is developing as an 
integration process. He discusses key aspects that Mercosur shares with the EU 
and stresses the particularities that have produced and maintained Mercosur as an 
original regional integration model. 
The fourth section of the book focuses on Hemispheric integration. After 
analyzing the rules of the game, the structure and organization of the FTAA 
negotiations, Joaquín Roy takes the EU example of institutional regional 
integration and speculates about a FTAA architecture conceived under a 
European design. The author certainly acknowledges that a political union in the 
Americas remains a utopia; however, he suggests that it is a political challenge to 
face the unresolved promise of spreading prosperity in the Americas in the 
absence of schemes of regional integration of any sort.  
The historical overview of Hemispheric integration is provided by Ambler 
Moss. He contents that despite the existence of wars between states in the 
Western Hemisphere during the past two centuries, no one has suggested integra-
tion as a necessary way to insure international peace. Moss argues that the idea of 
integration has been around in the Western Hemisphere since the independence 
of these republics; however, their initiatives have been motivated by other sets of 
mutual interests and the FTAA is only a recent event in that chain.  
On the other hand, Jeffrey Schott states that due to the numerous interests in-
cluded, it is not surprising that the negotiation of a Free Trade Area of the 
Americas (FTAA), comprising 34 democratic countries in the Western Hemi-
sphere, has struggled to advance over the past decade. In order to succeed, the 
FTAA deal would have to include both liberalization of trade barriers and rule-Introduction  19 
 
making reforms in areas such as services, investment, government procurement, 
and intellectual property rights. Likewise, he considers that the United States and 
Brazil must lead the way to a comprehensive package of trade reforms, or the 
FTAA will join a long line of failed integration initiatives in the hemisphere. 
The closing article of the book is coming from the European continent. Karl 
Buck presents a comprehensive analysis about the security challenges in Latin 
America and the role of the EU. After explaining the major elements  of the 
European Security Strategy, Buck delves into the political, economic and social 
causes of security problems in Latin America: fight against terrorism, drug 
trafficking, weak democratic institutions, underdevelopment and inequality. All 
of these issues are analyzed in light of their impact on the region as well as on the 
EU strategies and contributions to the region. Social cohesion plays a relevant 
role and is the major item in the agenda EU-Latin America. In this process 
regional integration is one of the avenues to contribute to the social cohesion in 
the region. 
We want to express our sincerest thanks to the contributors to this volume 
and our appreciation to their efforts to develop depth analysis and suggestive 
ideas. The support from the Jean Monnet Chair, the European Commission and 
the University of Miami has been crucial to pave the way for publishing this 
book. Likewise, the participation of Wendy Grenade in the reviewing process of 
the originals has been of great value to the successful publication of this book. 
 
October 2005  
 
 
 
 
 
North America  
 
NAFTA: Assessments 
and  Institutional Development  
 
 
 
 
Roberto Domínguez 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This paper looks at two different ways of assessing NAFTA.  The first one is a 
quantitative approach based upon trade and investment growth statistics, which 
suggest that NAFTA has been a success.  Further analysis raises questions, 
however, about the distribution of benefits.  The second perspective is based on 
the assumption that NAFTA has accomplished some of its goals; nonetheless, the 
North American agenda indicates that there is an ongoing discussion with regard 
to the future of the region and several proposals have been introduced in the 
debate.  The paper argues that although North America remains regionally weak 
in institutional terms, there is an informal process of regionalization, which has 
given rise to a debate that ranges from proposals for minimal modifications to 
NAFTA to propositions to create a North American Community. 
 
The Idea of Community 
 
During the free trade negotiations between Canada, Mexico and the United States 
in 1992, Jerry Rosenberg was enthusiastic about the prospects of an American 
Community initially composed of the North American countries and including 
other Latin American countries few years later.  In his view, the future of the 
American Community would depend primarily on the success of Mexico as part 
of the free trade area of North America.  Rosenberg stated that,  
 
The New American Community will initially involve only three 
nations, of which Mexico will represent the example of a lesser economy 
to start with an explosive potential to follow.  As this troika prospers and 
functions effectively, so will the remaining plan flower… If Mexico 
illustrates to the other Latin American nations that she is able to benefit 
from the alliance with Canada and the United States without being 24  Domínguez 
 
swallowed or made to play a secondary role, then others will rush to 
participate.
1 
 
Fourteen years after Rosenberg’s wish list was written, there are no prospects 
for a Free Trade Area of the Americas.  Rather, President Bush has pursued a 
twofold trade strategy: a) looking for ways to pressure big trading nations to 
agree to a new global trade deal, and b) opening separate negotiations for free-
trade pacts with small nations and regional groupings.
2 
Latin America’s transformations during the 1990s did not deliver the 
expected results.  Despite a decade of reforms, the gap between rich and poor is 
widening. Today only 9 to 15 percent of total income goes to  the poorest 40 
percent of households. Politically there is a danger that “people’s faith in 
democracy will be eroded if they consider that institutional and market reforms 
have failed to deliver a better quality of life.”
3  
 
NAFTA: Numbers and debates 
 
In the 1990, Mexico revealed its intention to negotiate a free trade agreement 
with the United States. This decision challenged “all previous conceptions of 
Mexico-U.S. relations.”
4 Fifteen years later, NAFTA has lost its uniqueness since 
both Mexico and the United States have implemented a network of free trade 
agreements with other countries and regions.  On the other hand, it has become 
clear that creating winners and losers is the natural consequence of the logic of 
free markets, and NAFTA is not the exception. Sidney Weintraub has said that 
“NAFTA has not been a panacea… it must be assessed for what it is…. a trade 
and investment agreement that succeeded in its central purpose.”
5 
Most of the publications in this field recognize the successes of NAFTA.  
Between 1993 and 2000, for instance, trade in the NAFTA region increased from 
$289 billion to $659 billion.  Trade flows between the United States and Canada 
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reached $411 billion and between Mexico and the United States. $263 billion in 
2000. Mexican exports to the United States and Canada grew by an outstanding 
234 percent and 203 percent respectively between 1993 and 2002.
6  Today, 
twenty-two U.S. states have Mexico as either the first or second market for their 
exports. For nine others Mexico is their third most important export destination.
7 
With regard to total FDI flows between the three countries, they amounted to $63 
billion between 1989 and 1994; during 1995-2000, total flows increased to $202 
billion, tripling in dollar volume. 
On the other hand, the c onnection between trade liberalization and 
investment growth is illustrated by three sectors where commercial ties have 
been relatively more extensive: the automotive industry, textiles and clothing, 
and the electronic industry. “In these three sectors, deeper integration is clearly 
evident between the three economies.”
8 
However, despite the success indicated by the macroeconomic data, some 
criticisms emerge in the interpretation of these numbers.  For instance, “in the 12 
years since NAFTA was ratified, the yearly U.S. trade deficit with Mexico and 
Canada has grown from $9.1 billion to $110.8 billion.”
9 In this vein, a study 
conducted by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace shows the 
following findings: a) NAFTA has not helped the Mexican economy keep pace 
with the growing demand for jobs (500,000 jobs were created in manufacturing 
from 1994 to 2002, while the agricultural sector has lost 1.3 million jobs since 
1994); b) real wages for most Mexicans today are lower than when NAFTA took 
place (caused by the peso crisis); c) there has been an increase in the number of 
migrants to the United States (although not necessarily as a result of NAFTA).
10  
From the U.S. government’s perspective, officials have admitted the 
qualified success of NAFTA.  As one U.S. official pointed out, “In fact, the result 
is that NAFTA has been virtually job neutral.  Given what most reputable 
economist say about the employment effects on NAFTA, that finding is not 
surprising.”
11 
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Perhaps one of the assessments in which most of the analysts agree is with 
regard to Mexico. Whereas wages in Mexican export-related industries are 37 
percent higher than the rest of the economy,
12 the gap that existed when NAFTA 
came into effect widened instead of narrowed. In 2001, seven years after the 
implementation of NAFTA, “Mexican manufacturing salaries went from $2.10 
an hour versus $11.7 an hour in the United States to $1.90 an hour versus $13.80 
an hour in the United States.”
13  In March 2005, in the context of the Tri-national 
Summit, Harold Meyerson stated: “Since NAFTA was enacted, real wages for 
Mexicans have declined, the nation’s poverty rate has increased, and illegal 
immigration to the United States has soared. For both Mexican and American 
workers, NAFTA has been a lose-lose proposition. For the U.S. corporations that 
have outsourced their work to Mexico, though, NAFTA has been a clear profit 
center.”
14 
 
Side Agreements 
 
With regard to the side agreements, most scholars agree that the environmental 
one - the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC)
15 
- has had a limited impact on the region since it was not designed to significantly 
reverse the environmental consequences of economic growth in Mexico.  
However, it may be taken into account as a pilot project to examine the effectives 
of institutions designed for Mexico and other nations where trade-led growth 
needs to be channeled in a more environmentally-friendly fashion. 
One of the parameters for assessing the environmental side agreement is 
through  its institutional performance. The NACEC has two mechanisms that 
provide additional means to monitor the enforcement of environmental laws in 
North America.  The first mechanism is through Article 14 and 15. Under this 
mechanism, 43 cases have been filed under articles 14 and 15 as of February 
2004.  There were 7 active files against Mexico, 4 against Canada, and none 
against the United States.  With regard to the closed files, 14 were against 
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Mexico, 10 against Canada and 8 against the United States.
16 The second 
mechanism is Article 22, which allows any of the three NAFTA governments to 
enter into a dispute resolution process with parties that persistently fail to enforce 
environmental laws.  According to Article 22, nations found in violation can be 
fined and after a long process can eventually have NAFTA privileges suspended. 
However, this Article has never been invoked.
17   
In addition to the mechanisms, few NACEC’s programs have modestly 
contributed to increased funding, monitoring, and citizen participation.  
NACEC’s Fund for Pollution Prevention Projects in Mexican Small and Medium 
Size Enterprises (FIPREV), and its North America Fund for Environmental 
Cooperation (NAFEC) are both sources of funds for industry and communities.
18 
In light of the modest contributions of the environmental side agreement, 
Hufbauer and Schott have stated that “without NAFTA, the Mexican government 
would have had less incentive to pass environmental legislation or to improve its 
enforcements efforts, and the achievements, modest though they are, of 
Commission on Environmental Cooperation, NADBank, and BECC would not 
exist.”
19   
On the other hand, the Commission for Labor Cooperation was created under 
the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC).
20 The 
outcomes of the NAALC have been rather disappointing due to both their design 
as well as implementation.  Some of the obstacles are the following: a) there is no 
intent to harmonize worker’s rights, which allows each country to maintain its 
respective comparative advantages; b) there are no independent powers to 
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supervise national authorities in the enforcement of labor laws and regulations; c) 
restrictions on protecting the 11 NAALC principles limit the application of 
sanctions to only three cases (child labor, minimum salaries, and safety and 
hygiene standards in the workplace) and leave collective rights unprotected; d) 
slowness of the arbitration process, and e) procedural disparity in each of the 
National Administrative Office (NAO).
21     
The NAOs have received a total of 25 complaints.  The distribution of the 
total number of complaints by country from 1995 to 2001 supports the initial 
assumption that Mexico is the country with the greatest challenges in complying 
with labor laws (16 complaints), followed by the United States (7 complaints) 
and Canada (2 complaints). The decrease in the number of complaints (4 in 1994, 
one in 1995, 2 in 1996, 3 in 1997, 10 in 1998, 2 in 1999, one in 2000, 2 in 2001, 
and none in 2002) demonstrates the loss of interest by trade union organizations 
in Mexico and the United States in testing the effectiveness of this instrument.  In 
1998, the NAALC became more dynamic because of the intensification of 
transborder labor union cooperation.
22  
Some of the concrete achievements resulting from the labor agreement are: 
pressure on Mexican authorities to implement a public registry of collective 
contracts; the imposition of a fine by Mexican authorities against a company 
(Hang Young) due to a violation of safety and hygiene standards; easing of the 
pregnancy testing requirement in  maquiladoras; easing the practice of 
denouncing a worker’s migratory status by work inspectors in the United 
States.
23 
 
Looking Towards the Future 
 
In the middle of the first decade of the 21
st Century, there is a pervasive 
perception that free trade is not enough for North America. Unlike the late 1990s, 
this debate is not confined to university classrooms.  Under different scientific 
assumptions and political motivations, most of the epistemic communities 
conceive a new stage in North America’s regional development; this phase could 
be predicted in a minimalist fashion, namely, proposing a superficial adaptation 
of NAFTA, or in maximalist mode suggesting a European Union like entity, or a 
combination of both.   
At the decision-making or governmental level, the prescription is that North 
America needs a cautious adaptation.  On March 23, 2005, Presidents Bush and 
Fox and Prime Minister Martin announced the establishment of the “Security and 
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Prosperity Partnership for North America.”
24  Unlike lofty official declarations, it 
is remarkable that ministerial-level working groups were established to identify 
concrete, measurable and achievable steps towards the Partnership’s goals.  By 
June 2005, the ministers will issue their initial reports and thereafter the groups 
will report semi-annually.  
One of the most relevant statements of the Partnership is the “Two-Speed 
European Style.” The document considers that “The Partnership is trilateral in 
concept; while allowing any two countries to move forward on an issue, it will 
create a path for the third to join later.” Likewise, the official proposal does not 
include any reference to migration or institutional development of any kind.  
As indicated in its title, the North American partnership is divided into two 
sections. The first focuses on common security encompassing the following as-
pects: a) implementing common border security and bio-protection strategies; b) 
enhancing critical infrastructure protection, and implementing a common ap-
proach to emergency response; c) implementing improvements in aviation and 
maritime security, combating transnational threats and enhancing intelligence, 
and d) implementing a border-facilitation strategy to improve the legitimate flow 
of people and cargo. The second part of the partnership highlights four aspects of 
economic prosperity: a) improving productivity through regulatory cooperation 
to generate growth; b) promoting collaboration in energy, transportation, finan-
cial services, technology; c) reducing the cost of trade through the efficient 
movement of goods and people; and d) creating safer and more reliable food 
supply while facilitating agricultural trade and enhancing the stewardship of the 
regional environment. 
In the academic world, the debate on North American integration has been 
nurtured by a variety of scholars. Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Gustavo Vega-
Cánovas elaborated the concept of the Common Frontier, which “… should be a 
work in progress for at least a decade, to foster closer integration of North 
America while preserving the essential sovereignty of each partner.”
25  Their 
proposal encompasses three main topics: border management, defence alliance 
and immigration. 
With regard to border management, the premise is that security must start at 
the point of origin, rather than at the point of destination.  This assumption has 
been indirectly applied in North America in cases such as the U.S. meat 
inspectors that routinely visit Canadian packing plants or the U.S. agricultural 
inspectors posted at Mexican avocado orchards.  The second point develops the 
idea of a strong defence for all modes of entry into the perimeter (NAFTA area), 
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considering four aspects: a) intelligence sharing is a precursor of everything else; 
b) NAFTA partners should seek agreement on circumstances that justify 
electronic surveillance of suspects within the common frontier; c) NAFTA 
partners should define circumstances when a NAFTA arrest warrant can be 
issued to detain a suspect anywhere within the common frontier; and c)  NAFTA 
coast guard services need to enhance their cooperation. 
Although immigration is not part the official trilateral agenda, Hufbauer and 
Vega-Cánovas provide a pragmatic approach to enhance cooperation in order to 
diminish the automatic link between Mexican undocumented migrants and 
insecurity.  They consider an initial division between non-NAFTA and NAFTA 
citizens.  In the case of non-NAFTA nationals, the authors state that NAFTA 
partners should a) revise their visa policies jointly with the intention to 
synchronize program criteria, agreeing on an acceptable country list and length of 
stay, and b) create a special NAFTA force to handle all third country immigration 
controls at the individual’s first airport of entry into NAFTA space.  On the other 
hand, at least three options are considered for NAFTA nationals: a) creating an 
efficient system for handling legitimate travelers among the three NAFTA 
countries, b) making it easier for NAFTA citizens to retire anywhere in North 
America, and c) increasing the number of legal visas (300,000) on skills basis. 
In Canada, the debate on the future of North America has been triggered by 
the Big Idea, proposed by Wendy Dobson.
26 She argues that Canada and Mexico 
should facilitate U.S security goals, and in return the United States should com-
mit to maintaining open borders even in the aftermath of an attack. Specifically, 
she recommends the consideration of a “strategic bargain,” a “pragmatic mix of 
customs-union-like and common market-like proposals plus Canadian initiatives” 
in areas of strength that are of particular interests for Americans. In the case of 
the U.S.-Canadian security relationship, Dobson proposes the following: a) in-
vesting in the border in order to have a more secure border with less obstacles; b) 
mutual recognition of the security of immigration from third countries; c) energy 
as part of bilateral security; and d) more active role for Canada on bilateral mili-
tary defence.
27 On the other hand, she states that “we (Canadians) should proceed 
bilaterally but be open to including Mexico when it makes sense.”
28 
Contrary to Dobson, Charles Barnett and Hugh Williams
29 have rejected the 
Big Idea approach.  They submit that engaging in high-profile bilateral 
negotiations may well be a disadvantage for the weaker state, Canada.  They urge 
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a bilateral process where the issues are addressed in an incremental and 
pragmatic manner.  In this regard, they summarize their approach by focusing on 
the following areas: a) expanding successful approaches, such as the Smart 
Border Declaration; b) encouraging security cooperation; c) working towards a 
common external tariff; and d) identifying mutual interest in international trade 
negotiations. 
Along the same lines, in 2003 the Canadian Council of Chief Executives 
(CCCE) presented a strategy for advancing the Canadian-United States 
relationship.  This strategy, entitled “Security and Prosperity: The Dynamics of a 
New Canada-United States Partnership in North America” or “Treaty of North 
America,” is based on five interlocking pillars: reinventing the border; 
maximizing economic efficiencies; building on resource security; sharing in 
continental and global security; and developing new institutions for managing the 
bilateral relationship.   
For the CCCE, a European-style institutional arrangement characterized by 
supranational institutions is not the option. Under intergovernmental premises, 
they suggest three elements in the future institutional framework of North 
America. First, at the political level it must have the direct involvement of the 
President and the Prime Minister. Second, it should not create bureaucratic su-
perstructures. Third, based upon the International Joint Commission for Bound-
ary Waters between Canada and the United States, the creation of specialized 
joint commissions to foster bilateral cooperation.
30 Another remarkable feature of 
the CCCE proposal is the exclusion, at least temporarily, of Mexico. In view of 
one of its architects, “we (Canadians) recognize that in the post-9/11 world, the 
United States faces distinctly different challenges along its northern border with 
Canada than along the Rio Grande… In the longer term, trilateral solutions may 
be feasible even for difficult issues such as immigration controls, and all three 
partners certainly should continue efforts to build on NAFTA.  The reality, 
though, is that the most urgent issues confronting Canada and the United States 
must be handled in the near term on bilateral basis.”
31 
Gary Hufbauer and Jeffrey Schott have also reacted to Dobson’s approach.  
They have offered “more than  enough advice on the substance of a North 
American initiative.”
32 In their view, rather than the ambitious vision of 
Dobson’s strategic bargain, the United States “will remain focused primarily on 
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security issues, and to lesser extent on energy policy.” Thus, a practical step 
forward for North American integration could include: a) a common external 
tariff, b) U.S. and Canadian joint cooperation work to enhance energy supply, c) 
financial assistance to tackle environmental problems on the Mexican side of the 
border, and d) a joint Canadian-Mexican proposal for deeper economic 
integration. 
On the other hand, there are other ideas regarding the transformation of 
NAFTA on very specific issues.  One of them surrounds the issue of energy in 
North America, which has been present in the agendas of the presidents of 
Mexico and the United States and in some of the above mentioned proposals.  
When George Bush and Vicente Fox met in Guanajuato, Mexico, in February 
2001, they issued a joint statement that called for “a North American approach to 
the important issue of energy resources.” What does this mean? It has been 
acknowledged that the creation of a North American energy area would lessen 
the US dependency on Middle East as well as Venezuelan oil.  In order t o 
surmount this obstacle, Castañeda and Garnels propose “a North American 
Energy Security Fund, overseen by an independent and transparent board, which 
could be established to issue  $75 billion of securities backed by oil revenues (not 
the oil itself) to finance the rapid expansion of Mexico’s oil production, leading 
to the doubling of exports by 2010.”
33  
Contrary to minimalist approaches to integration in North America, in a very 
comprehensive proposal, Robert Pastor presents the North American 
Community. Considering the pros and cons of European integration, the North 
American Community would emphasize institutional development at the regional 
level as well as the creation of compensatory mechanisms to reduce the gap 
between Mexico and its two NAFTA partners.  In this regard, three institutions 
could be created.  Unlike the European Commission, a North American 
Commission should be “lean and advisory, made up of just 15 distinguished 
individuals, five from each country.”  Likewise, a single North American Inter-
Parliamentary Group would merge the bilateral inter-parliamentary groups with a 
problem solving approach.  The third institution would be a Permanent Court on 
Trade and Investment, which would “permit the accumulation of precedent.” 
Along with these institutions, a North American Customs Union and a North 
American Customs and Immigration Force would contribute to enhance trade 
exchanges and security.  Perhaps one of the most important features of this 
proposal is the North American Investment Fund that would invest $200 billion 
in infrastructure over the next decade on the condition that Mexico increases its 
tax revenues from 11 to 16 percent of its GDP.
34 
                                                 
33 Jorge Castañeda and Nathan Gardels, “How to tap Mexico’s potential,” Financial Times, 
March 8, 2005. 
34 Robert Pastor, Toward a North American Community: Lessons from the Old Word to the 
New (Washington D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 2001). NAFTA: Assessments and Institutional Development    33 
 
 
INSERT Table  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 34  Domínguez 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 NAFTA: Assessments and Institutional Development    35 
 
Final thoughts  
 
Twenty years ago, the intent of this volume perhaps would be centered on the 
problematic cooperation between North and South as reflected in the relationship 
between Mexico and the United States.  A decade ago, the inquiries might have 
been focused on the uncertainties of the nascent North American Free Trade 
Agreement.  In 2005, it is accepted by most scholars and decision-makers that 
NAFTA must be revisited. 
The options for North America analyzed in this paper resemble the old and 
new European debates about regional integration.  On the one hand, there are the 
skeptical ideas which reject regional formulas entailing any evolution beyond 
free trade.  Historically, sooner or later, such ideas eroded and were eventually 
replaced by more integration-oriented approaches in the European experience.  
On the other hand, regionally oriented perspectives that privilege collective 
solutions for facing the challenges of an interdependent world have shown that 
integration is possible.  A similar debate along these lines is currently taking 
place in North America. 
Despite the disagreements in the proposals for North America, there is also 
some consensus that we can foresee as taking place in the short term.  A 
“selective customs union” and further cooperation in the security seem to be at 
the forefront of the pragmatic agenda.  Other attempts in this direction may have 
already started in an embryonic fashion, such as the reports to the three 
Executives that will be delivered next June in the context of the North American 
Partnership. Perhaps in 2010 the substance of a book like this will be different, 
hopefully more focused in deepening integration in North America.  
  
 
North America: Three Nations, 
a Partnership, or a Community? 
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Introduction 
 
On the first day of January of 1994, the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) came into effect.  If one judges a free-trade area by the size of its 
product and territory, North America became the largest in the world, larger than 
the European Union (EU). Yet that fact escaped all but a few analysts.  It is 
widely known that the United States has the world’s largest economy, but North 
America also includes the eighth (Canada) and ninth (Mexico) largest economies 
as well. 
1 Within a decade, trade and investment among the three countries had 
nearly tripled, and North America had achieved a level of integration (defined as 
intra-regional trade as a per cent of world trade) that approached Europe’s - 57.6 
percent as compared to 61 percent.  In other words, North America had become a 
formidable and integrated region, comparable in some respects to the EU.   
And yet few in North America or outside view the region as anything more 
than three sovereign countries  – a global superpower and two uncomfortable 
neighbors. It is not hard to explain this perception.  The United States accounts 
for 85 percent of the gross product of the region and a much higher percentage of 
the region’s military power and reach.  The other two countries of North America 
are very dependent on the United States economically, and partly because of that, 
have used their foreign policies to define their distance and separateness from the 
United States.  The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which can 
be considered a kind of draft constitution for an emerging  region, dismantled 
most trade and investment barriers and has accelerated social and economic inte-
gration.  That compelling fact and the security implications that flow from “Sep-
tember 11th” brought the leaders of the three countries of North America to-
gether for a Summit Meeting in Texas on March 23, 2005 where they proclaimed 
a new “Security and Prosperity Partnership,” a framework of an agreement that is 
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“trilateral in concept” but barren of vision and incremental and dual -bilateral in 
fact. 
2  
In contrast, the Council on Foreign Relations sponsored a trinational Task 
Force on the “Future of North America”, which, in an initial statement among the 
Chairs of the group, proposed a Community, “based on the premise that each 
member benefits from its neighbor’s success and is diminished by its problems.”
3 
In this paper, we will begin by explaining the origin of this confusion.   Why 
is North America viewed as just three nations?   What are the characteristics of 
this emerging region?   Then, I will explain  the impact of NAFTA and its 
strengths and flaws of both commission and, more importantly, omission.   
Finally, I will define the current agenda that faces North America and address the 
question as to which of the three approaches – three sovereign nations, a trilateral 
partnership, or a community – offer the best vehicle for serving the long-term 
interests of the people of North America.  
 
The Awkward Birth of North America 
 
For each of the three nations of North America, the decision to negotiate and sign 
a North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) represented a sharp turn – 
almost a reversal – from previous policy.  Canada and Mexico had long defined 
their vital interests in terms of autonomy from the great power next door.   Both 
tried to keep their rel ationship with the United States at arms-length for fear that 
a close embrace would be suffocating.   Mexico constructed trade and investment 
barriers and championed a political doctrine of non-intervention to keep the 
United States from interfering in its internal affairs. Canada considered free trade 
at several moments in the 20
th century, but each time, retreated, fearing that the 
United States would dominate and its companies would purchase the country’s 
assets. The United States also resisted the idea of a regional free trading area 
because it believed that the optimal trading system was a global one, and as the 
world’s wealthiest country and the initiator of the General Agreements on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT) after World War II, the U.S. government did  not want to 
contribute to any initiative that could undermine the global trading system.    
While NAFTA was a departure from past policy for the three governments, 
in a paradoxical way, it also represented a wholly natural response to the logic of 
integration. The three nations already were major trading partners of each other, 
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and the international trading system had evolved in an unusual way.  Instead of 
one world, there were actually three distinct trading regions: the European Union, 
East Asia, and North America. Most of each region’s trade with the world was 
actually within each region. Sixty-one percent of the EU’s trade with the world 
was intra-regional, and 58 percent of North America’s trade with the world was 
among the three nations. Together, however, all three trading regions were re-
sponsible for about 80 percent of the world’s gross product and trade.
4 In other 
words, the post-imperial world trading system that aspired to be global discov-
ered the benefits of proximity, and the three countries of North America recog-
nized that their prosperity and competitiveness required a higher level of integra-
tion.  NAFTA was a means to achieve that goal.  
In 1990, when Mexico’s President Carlos Salinas proposed a free trade 
agreement with the United States, two years after the Canada-U.S. Free Trade 
Agreement came into force, the gross domestic product of the United States was 
about twenty times larger than Mexico’s and ten times larger than Canada’s. 
Asymmetry, whether in size of the economy or power of the military, is the 
defining characteristic of the relationship of North America’s three states, and 
history has provided reinforcement of this unevenness. In contrast to Europe, 
where its catastrophic wars propelled its post-World War II leaders to unify, 
North America has been divided by its history and, more precisely, by its 
memory of historical conflicts and interventions. 
“Americans do not know, but Canadians cannot forget,” writes Seymour 
Martin Lipset, “that two nations, not one, came out of the American Revolution.” 
The United States emerged confident and proud of its revolution, whereas 
Canada defined itself to a considerable extent as ‘that part of British North 
America that did not support the [American] Revolution.”
5  In 1812, the United 
States tried, but failed, to annex Canada, and the fear in 1865 that the formidable 
Union army might trek north to try again to expel the British was the principal 
reason why Canadians sought independence, and why the British accepted it in 
1867 in the form of  Dominion within the British Empire. Both judged correctly 
that the United States was less likely to make war against an independent 
Canada.
6  
Canadians remained wary of a close relationship with the United States.  In 
1911, the Canadian Prime Minister, Wilfred Laurier, lost an election for 
concluding a free trade agreement with the United States.  Thirty-seven years 
later, Prime Minister William Lyon McKenzie King refused, at the last minute, to 
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approve a freer trade agreement with the United States, evidently fearing a 
similar political result.   
Having lost its war and one-third of its territory to the United States in the 
nineteenth century and having suffered several military interventions in the early 
twentieth century, Mexico’s distrust of the United States was deeper than 
Canada’s.   Because it has been less stable, prosperous, and democratic, Mexico 
also bears a heavier sense of inferiority and thus was averse to any proposal that 
would bring Mexico into closer contact with the United States. For this reason, 
any proposal from the United States to reduce trade or investment barriers was 
usually met with a curt rejection when officials deigned to respond.  
Given the history and the imbalance in power, perhaps the only way to have 
reached a North American F ree Trade Agreement was for the United States’ 
neighbors to lead.  And, of course, that is what occurred, starting in Canada.   In 
1984, a national election brought the Progressive Conservative Party under Brian 
Mulroney to power with a large majority. Although his party had opposed free 
trade with the United States, Mulroney recognized a change in the public mood 
in favor of experimenting with more open trade with the United States. Trade had 
already increased, and a second reason for pursuing an agreement was to prevent 
the US from arbitrarily shutting it down.  President Ronald Reagan responded 
positively, and the two governments negotiated and signed a free trade agreement 
in 1988.
7 In the same year, Mulroney called an election, and the free trade 
agreement was hotly debated, with the Liberals strongly opposed.  Mulroney won 
re-election, but by a narrower margin.     
The reversal on free trade by Mexico and its President Carlos Salinas was 
even m ore startling than Mulroney’s.  But when the debt crisis threatened to 
bankrupt the country in 1982, its leaders reassessed their development strategy 
and embarked on an export-oriented policy. The government imposed fiscal 
discipline, sharply reduced tariffs and limitations on foreign investment, and 
privatized state corporations.   
When Salinas took office in December 1988, he understood that the success 
of the Mexican economy depended on whether it could attract large sums of 
private investment, and neither Europe nor Japan were prepared to invest. He 
turned to Washington for a free trade agreement and for the key that he hoped 
would unlock the door of foreign investment.
8 The agreement was signed on 
December 1992 and came into force on January 1, 1994. 
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The Impact of NAFTA – Sins of Commission and Omission 
 
NAFTA aimed to eliminate all trade and investment barriers and level the play-
ing field on procurement, telecommunications, banking, services, and other sec-
tors.
9 To secure the market, the three governments created a dispute-settlement 
mechanism. The agreement was a minimum one that reflected the Canadian and 
Mexican fear of being dominated by the United States and the U.S. antipathy to-
ward bureaucracy and supra-national organizations. It was an “invisible hand,” 
classical liberal framework whose principal shared goal was the elimination of 
impediments to trade.  
There is a vast literature on the consequences of NAFTA which reflects to a 
certain extent the debate that preceded it.
10 In an astute review of the debate, Sid-
ney Weintraub shows that many of the arguments of both advocates and oppo-
nents use similar criteria – related to the balance of payments or the gain and loss 
of jobs. Weintraub argues persuasively that these criteria are misleading and that 
a more useful assessment of NAFTA’s progress would be based on its effect on 
total trade, productivity, intra-industry specialization, industrial competitiveness, 
the environment, and institution-building.
11  
With regard to NAFTA’s principal goals on trade and investment, the 
agreement has been a resounding success.  In 1993, Mexican tariffs averaged 
about 10 percent, 2.5 times those of the United States.  By 1999, Mexican tariffs 
fell to 2 percent while import licensing and other non-tariff barriers were 
eliminated.  Today, nearly all goods traded between the United States, Mexico, 
and Canada enter each country duty-free.  Agricultural products are the most 
sensitive and thus freer trade in this area is delayed until 2008. 
As barriers declined, trade and investment soared in all three directions. U.S. 
exports to Mexico increased threefold, from $36 billion in 1990 to $114 billion in 
2003, and exports to Canada doubled, from $100 billion in 1990 to $197 billion 
in 2003.  Annual flows of U.S. direct investment to Mexico went from $1.3 
billion in 1992 to $15 billion in 2001. U.S. investment flows in Canada increased 
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from $2 billion in 1994 to $16 billion in 2000, while Canadian investment flows 
to the United States grew from $4.6 billion to $27 billion over the same period.  
More than 36 percent of the total energy imports of the United States now come 
from its two neighbors. Travel and immigration among the three countries also 
increased dramatically. In 2000 alone, people crossed the two borders legally 
about 400 million times. But the most profound impact came from those people 
who crossed and stayed. The 2000 census estimated that there were 22 million 
people of Mexican origin living in the United States. Nearly two-thirds of them 
arrived in the last two decades.  As many as 600,000 Americans living in Canada 
were eligible to vote in the 2004 U.S. election, – more than those voting in six 
U.S. states.
12  
Intra-regional exports as a percentage of total exports  – an index of 
integration – climbed from around 30 percent in 1982 to 58 percent in 2002.  As 
in the auto industry, which makes up nearly 40 percent of North American trade, 
much of this exchange is either intra-industry or intra-firm – two other indicators 
of an increasingly integrated economy.   Many industries and firms have become 
truly North American.     
There are still other signs of an increasingly integrated community.   After 
seventy-five years of single-party rule in Mexico, in the year 2000, a highly 
professional electoral service, trained in part by Canadian election officials, 
conducted an election that was very closely contested.  The result was an 
unprecedented acceptance of the process and outcome by all Mexican parties and 
the international community and a peaceful transfer of power.   Indeed, the 
Mexican election was much more effectively administered than the one in the 
United States in the same year.
13  
The signatories of NAFTA deliberately wanted to avoid establishing any 
bureaucratic or supra-national institutions.  The core of the agreement was 
therefore self-executing or designed to be implemented by  each government.   
With regard to the dispute-settlement mechanism, William Davey, a Canadian 
scholar, concluded that it “worked reasonably well … the basic goal of trade 
dispute settlement … is to enforce the agreed-upon rules. By and large, these 
dispute settlement mechanisms have done that.”
14  
Both the Commission for Labor Cooperation (CLC) and the Commission for 
Environmental Cooperation (CEC) provide citizens, corporations, unions, and 
non-governmental organizations an avenue for presenting their complaints. In the 
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case of the labor agreement, since 1994, the Commission have received 23 com-
plaints – 14 were directed against Mexico, seven against the United States, and 
two against Canada.
15 Both Commissions have done some useful work, and non-
governmental organizations from the United States and Canada have helped their 
counterparts in Mexico to  develop and pursue complaints. Both Commissions 
reflect the caution of their governments. No one has criticized the Commissions 
for being too aggressive or trying to forge common responses on difficult ques-
tions such as pollution on the border or labor rights in the apparel industry.
16 
Nonetheless, Mexico’s environmental standards and capacity have actually im-
proved faster than those of the United States or Canada, not surprising given the 
initial level, but encouraging nonetheless.   
Another institution established under NAFTA was the North American 
Development Bank (NADBank), which has channeled funds into the border area 
to improve the environment. On a parallel track, the United States and Mexico 
negotiated the establishment of a Border Environment Cooperation Commission 
(BECC) to assist border states and local communities to design and coordinate 
environmental infrastructure projects.  The BECC, based in C iudad Juarez, 
Chihuahua, involves local communities in the development of projects and then 
seeks financing from the private sector and NADBank, which is based in San 
Antonio, Texas.  Mexico and the United States have each contributed $225 
million of paid-in capital, which gives the bank a lending capacity of $2 billion.  
The combination of chronic poverty and rapid urbanization and industrialization 
on the border have created a multiplicity of health problems, involving water and 
waste treatment, solid and toxic wastes, and air pollution. The two institutions 
were very slow in getting organized, but by 2000, 29 projects had begun or been 
completed.  
During the past decade, Mexico has changed from an oil-dependent economy 
to an urban one based on manufactured exports.  The impact on Canada was also 
quite pronounced.   NAFTA deepened Canada’s dependence on the U.S. market, 
but it also helped diversify and internationalize its economy.   Canada’s trade as a 
percentage of its GDP expanded from 52.4 percent in 1990 to 89 percent in 2002 
– making it the most trade-oriented country with the best economic performance 
in the G-7/8.
17  
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As for the United States, its total trade as a percent of GDP increased by 25 
percent during the 1990s. Those who predicted substantial job losses were wrong 
as the 1990s witnessed the fastest expansion of U.S. employment in decades.  
While Mexico and Canada grew more dependent on the United States – up to 90 
percent of its trade and with exports accounting for roughly 40 percent of each 
GDP – the United States also grew more dependent on its two neighbors. More 
than one-third of the total trade of the U.S. is now with its two neighbors. More 
broadly, many firms became continental and more competitive.   
An evaluation of NAFTA should not be confined just to trade and investment 
criteria or the side agreements. One needs to view NAFTA as the centre of a 
unique social and economic integration process and of an effort to redefine the 
relationship between two advanced countries and a developing one.  The flows of 
people, cultures, food, music, and sports across the two borders have accelerated 
even more than the trade in goods and services.  In 1996, the first destination for 
most American tourists abroad was Mexico; 20 million Americans went. The 
second most popular destination for American tourists was Canada; 13 million 
traveled there. In 2003, the same pattern held, although fewer Americans traveled 
abroad – only 15.8 million to Mexico. Of the millions of tourists who visit the 
United States each year, the vast majority (20 million) come from Canada.  The 
second source is Mexico (7.5 million in 1996 and 10 million in 2003).
18  
The increase in numbers of immigrants understates their social impact.  
While the overall population of the United States grew by 13.2 percent in the last 
decade of the twentieth century, the Hispanic population increased by 57.9 
percent (from 22.4 million to 35.3 million) and of Mexicans, by 52.9 percent 
(from 13.5 million to 20.6 million). About 30 percent of all immigrants living in 
the United States today are from Mexico.
19 While half of all Hispanics live in 
California and Texas, during the past decade, the Hispanic population in Oregon 
doubled; in Minnesota, tripled; in Georgia, quadrupled; and in North Carolina, 
quintupled.
20   
Remittances have played an increasingly important role in the relationship 
between Mexicans in the United States and their relatives. The most recent 
Mexican government report estimates that Mexican workers send their families 
about $17 million a day, and in 2000, that amounted to $6.2 billion – in the last 
decade, $45 billion.
21 A recent survey found that 61 percent of Mexicans had 
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19 Philip Martin and Elizabeth Midgley, “Immigration: Shaping and Reshaping America,” 
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relatives living outside the country, mostly in the United States, and 21 percent 
received remittances from family members working in the United States.
22  
The result of the social and economic integration of North America is that the 
region now represents the largest free-trade area in the world in gross product 
and territory.  In addition, North America is almost as integrated after one decade 
as the EU is after five decades. There has been a lack of compliance in some 
areas – notably the US imposes limitations on Mexican trucks, vegetables, and 
sugar and duties on Canadian softwood lumber and wheat. Mexico restricts high-
fructose corn syrup from the US. The principal problem with NAFTA, however, 
is not the lack of compliance but the lack of imagination or rather political will to 
address some difficult questions.   
First, NAFTA was silent on the development gap separating Mexico from its 
two northern neighbors, and that gap has widened.  Second, NAFTA did not plan 
for its success; and inadequate roads and infrastructure cannot cope with 
increased traffic.  The resulting delays have raised the transaction costs of 
regional trade more than the elimination of tariffs has reduced them. Third, 
NAFTA did not address immigration, and the number of undocumented workers 
in the United States jumped.  Fourth, NAFTA did not address energy issues, and 
eastern Canada and northeastern United States suffered a catastrophic power 
black-out in August 2003, even while Mexico imports natural gas from the 
United States. Fifth, NAFTA made no attempt to coordinate macro-economic 
policy, leaving the region with no way to prevent market catastrophes such as the 
Mexican peso crisis.  Finally, NAFTA was silent about security, and 9/11 
threatens to cripple the North American integration process by placing new and 
formidable barriers in the path of trade and movement of people.  
 
North America’s Second Decade Agenda – The Community Option 
 
The thread that connects many of these omissions is the lack of institutions.   
Meetings of the three leaders of North America, whether in Quebec City in 2001, 
in Monterrey in 2004 or in Texas on March 23, 2005, are largely “photo-
opportunities” because there are no institutions to prepare a common North 
American agenda or to monitor or critique the government’s work.  Rhetoric 
notwithstanding, North America is not a trilateral partnership; it is characterized 
by dual -bilateralism (U.S.-Mexico, U.S.-Canada).   Even when the governments 
negotiated a so-called “smart” border strategy, they duplicated virtually the same 
agreements.   
This failure to construct North American institutions was deliberate.   Canada 
has long believed that it could get a better deal bilaterally, though there is 
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22 Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, CIDE, and Consejo Mexicano de Asuntos 
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substantial evidence to question that.   The United States is not exactly in a 
multilateral mood during the administration of George W. Bush.  Mexico has 
been pursuing a broader vision of a North America, though its specific goal has 
varied from “common market,” to “customs union” to “community,” but no one 
is paying attention to them.  The architects of NAFTA also seemed determined to 
make the opposite mistake to that of the EU, which they view as being over-
institutionalized, excessively bureaucratic, and interventionist, by creating no 
institutions.     
There are good reasons to avoid the European example, but there is little 
chance of this happening. The two models of integration are quite different.  In 
contrast to Europe, North America’s model has been more market-driven, 
resistant to bureaucratic answers, pragmatic, and deferential to national 
autonomy.   Nonetheless, North America should learn from the EU’s fifty years 
of experience – not only what it should try to avoid, but what it should try to 
adapt.   It should avoid excessive bureaucracy and a common agricultural policy, 
but if the three countries of North America are to become a community, and if 
illegal migration from Mexico is to be curtailed, there is no goal more important 
than reducing the development gap, and the European experience is valuable in 
this area.    
During the last 15 years, the income gap between the poorest and the richest 
countries of Europe shrank substantially,  and migration was reduced.   From 
1986-2002, the per capita GDP of the four poorest countries of the EU—Spain, 
Portugal, Ireland and Greece-—rose from 65 percent to 80 percent of the EU 
average.  The progress was due to free trade, foreign investment, and a huge 
transfer of aid at a level that ranged from 2 -4 percent of the recipient’s GDP.   
Good policies by the recipients, and conditioning aid on these policies, also made 
a substantial difference, as one can see in comparing the spectacular success of 
Ireland with the mediocre progress of Greece.   
Among the lessons to be learned are, first, that the number of institutions for 
providing aid should be limited and have a “sunset” provision.   Second, the most 
effective projects were in infrastructure and post-secondary education 
(community colleges in rural areas).  Third, funds should be concentrated in the 
poorer countries (half went to the poor regions of the richer EU countries).  
Fourth, macro-economic policy coordination and resources are essential to 
cushion the effects of volatility of the poorer countries. Finally, a community 
requires that all members assist each other because problems cannot be 
contained, and growth in one can help others.   
There was a moment at the beginning of the Fox and Bush Administrations 
when the two leaders appeared to accept these points.  In February 2001, Presi-
dent Vicente Fox invited President George W. Bush to his home, and together 
they endorsed the “Guanajuato Proposal,” which read: “After consultation with 
our Canadian partners, we will strive to consolidate a North American economic 
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extend to the most vulnerable social groups in our countries.”
23  Unfortunately, 
they never translated that sentiment into policy.   
A community in North America is simply not possible while the people of 
one of the nations earn, on average, one-sixth of the income of people living next 
door. Actually, the gap is much wider because one-third of the people of Mexico 
live  in deep poverty.  Mexico’s under-development is not only a threat to its 
stability and, therefore, to its neighbors, but its growth offers its neighbors the 
most promising market.   
In the absence of an explicit development strategy, 90 percent of new foreign 
investment in Mexico went to just four states, three of them in the north, which 
grew roughly ten times faster than the south.
24 The border became a magnet for 
emigrants from the southern part of Mexico. Why do companies invest in the 
border area where labor is three times as expensive as in the south, labor turnover 
is 100 percent after a year, and congestion and pollution is chronic? The answer 
is, because the roads to the south are poor, and infrastructure (roads, 
communications) is worse.  The World Bank estimates that Mexico needs to 
spend $20 billion per year for at least ten years to meet the infrastructural deficit. 
The lack of infrastructure, combined with a third world fiscal system, an energy 
sector that is one of the world’s most inefficient and unreliable, and rigid labor 
laws, have resulted in a drop in Mexico’s competitiveness, and a diversion of 
foreign investment to China.   
Mexico needs to grow at 6 percent per year for ten years in order to reduce 
the development gap with the United States by 20 percent. A long journey would 
still be needed to close the gap, but a consistent strategy  that reduces it each year 
would alter the perceptions of Mexico and by Mexicans.  A North American 
Investment Fund is needed to fill this infrastructural gap by investing $20 billion 
per year for ten years. 
25  The United States would provide $9 billion; Canada, $1 
                                                 
23 Gobierno de la República de México, 2001 
24 The estimates on the gap between northern and southern Mexico vary.  Luis Ernesto 
Derbez, a World Bank Economist, who became Mexico’s Minister of the Economy and then of 
Foreign Relations, estimated that during the 1990s, the export-oriented North grew at annual rates 
of 5.9 percent, while the South barely grew at 4 percent - more than 10 times faster.  (Cited in 
Henry Tricks, “Free Trade Still Rules in Mexico,” Financial Times, 27 February 2001, 6.)    Rafael 
Tamayo-Flores also concluded that the gap in income between northern and southern Mexico had 
widened significantly since NAFTA even while the population in the poorer part of Mexico 
declined vis-à-vis the North.   (See his “Mexico in the Context of the North American Integration: 
Major Regional Trends and Performance of Backward Regions,”  Journal of Latin American 
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billion; and Mexico, $10 billion by gradually increasing its tax revenues from 11 
percent to 16 percent of its GDP during the course of the decade. This is less than 
half of what the Europeans have been investing in the south of their continent.  
Fox, of course, tried unsuccessfully to persuade the Mexican Congress to 
approve fiscal reform, but if he, or a successor, had the leverage of $10 billion 
per year from neighbors, the Mexican Congress might be more amenable.      
A new agency is not needed.  The money could be managed by the World 
Bank.   If roads were built, then investors would come to the center and the south 
of the country, and immigration levels and disparities in income would decline.   
The weakest link in North America is the lack of credible institutions, and 
the three governments should begin to fix that by establishing a North American 
Advisory Council, as outlined in the Council on Foreign Relations Task Force.   
Unlike the sprawling and intrusive European Commission, which manages and 
administers European policy, the Council would be lean and advisory – just 15 
distinguished individuals, 5 from each country.   Its principal purpose would be 
to prepare an agenda on “North American issues” for the three leaders to 
consider at annual Summits and then to monitor the implementation of the 
decisions and plans.  The Council would have an office that would gather 
statistics from the three governments, and it would commission studies of 
different sectors, like transportation, electricity, or technology. These studies 
would ask what could be done to facilitate economic integration in these sectors 
on a continental basis, and then, it would submit these analyses with specific 
options to the Prime Minister and the two Presidents.    
The Council would encourage the three governments to respond to a 
continental vision.  For example, in agriculture, farmers in a few areas cannot 
compete, and their representatives use all the legal and political channels possible 
to protect themselves. The three countries can continue aggravating each other, 
and subverting NAFTA, or they could negotiate North American rules to modify 
the three regulatory schemes.  
A second institution would represent a merging of two bilateral legislative 
groups into a North American Parliamentary Group. The U.S. Congress is the 
most insular and clearly the most powerful and autonomous of the three 
legislatures.  The approval in July 2001 of legislation to ban Mexican trucks from 
U.S. highways and a Congressional Resolution aimed at prying open Mexico’s 
nationalized oil industry are just two examples of many that offend America’s 
neighbors.  It is possible that a North American Parliamentary Group might 
become a mechanism for the three Parliaments to deal with each differently than 
they have in the past.    
The third institution should be a Permanent Court on Trade and Investment.  
The dispute panels established under NAFTA are ad hoc, and it is proving 
difficult to recruit experts who do not have a conflict of interest.  The hearings 
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scope of Chapter 11 panels on foreign investment is also needed to prevent the 
erosion of environmental rules. 
Canada and Mexico have long organized their governments to give priority 
to bilateral issues with the United States, and Canada has recently established a 
Director-General for North American Affairs. Only the United States is poorly 
organized to address North American issues. In 1997, the Canada office was fi-
nally moved out of the Bureau of European Affairs and into the Bureau of West-
ern Hemisphere Affairs in the Department of State, and in 2002, a Deputy As-
sistant Secretary was appointed to handle North American Affairs, but this offi-
cial cannot negotiate on a par with domestic Cabinet officers or Congressional 
leaders.  
The United States needs to establish a White House Advisor to the President 
for North American Affairs.  That person would need to bridge the National 
Security, Domestic Policy, and Homeland Security Councils and chair a Cabinet-
level Inter-Agency Task Force on North America.   No President can have much 
of an effect on U.S. policy toward North America without such a wholesale 
reorganization.    
Institutions are key to structuring the way governments function and address 
issues on a routine basis, but what would a North American policy look like?    
The first set of issues that the NAC should consider relates to transportation.   
“Crossing the border,” concludes a May 2000 report by a Canadian Member of 
Parliament, “has actually gotten more difficult over the past five years.”   The 
causes are twofold.   “While continental trade has skyrocketed, the physical 
infrastructure enabling the movement of these goods has not.”  And second, the 
bureaucratic barriers that confront cross-border business make the infrastructural 
problems seem “minor in comparison.”
26  
While some people have been critical of the United States for imposing U.S. 
safety standards on Mexican trucks, the true problem is that there are 64 different 
sets of safety regulations in North America, 51 of which are in the United States.   
A NAFTA Subcommittee struggled to propose a uniform standard and concluded 
that “there is no prospect” of accomplishing that.
27 The elected leaders of the 
three countries should have been embarrassed and would have been, if anyone 
had been paying attention.  
The North American Council should review this issue and develop an 
integrated continental plan for transportation and infrastructure.   The first step is 
for the United States and Canada each to develop national standards on weight, 
safety, and configuration of trucking and then negotiate with Mexico on a single 
set of standards.  Second, the governments should eliminate feather-bedding 
schemes that increase the cost of transporting goods across the borders.   Third, 
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the governments should plan and finance new highway corridors on the Pacific 
Coast and into Mexico.  Fourth, the regulatory agencies should negotiate a plan 
that would permit mergers of the railroads and development of high-speed rail 
corridors between Canada and the United States.  
The establishment of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security represents 
as great a threat to North American integration as does the terrorism it is 
designed to confront.    In the immediate aftermath of the September 11 attacks, 
the United States responded by virtually shutting down the border.  Within hours, 
trucks on the Canadian side of the border were backed up as far as 25 miles.   
Companies that relied on “just-in-time” production began to shut their plants.  
Canada responded first, by negotiating a 30-point “smart border” agreement with 
the United States.   The essence of the strategy, which had been developed before 
9/11, is to separate low-risk goods and people and expedite their transit with 
transponders, sealed containers, pre-clearance, and other techniques, and 
concentrate inspection resources on the high-risk traffic.   Mexico followed a few 
months later with a similar agreement with the United States.    
This strategy is too narrow to be a serious or enduring solution to what is 
fundamentally the same integration dilemma:  how to facilitate the legitimate 
flows of people while protecting ourselves from terrorists and smugglers. What is 
needed is a broader approach to continental integration, first, by negotiating a 
Customs Union with a Common External Tariff (CET).  This would significantly 
reduce inspections at the border and would eliminate the cumbersome rules-of-
origin provisions.  Mexico will have the most difficulty because its tariffs are the 
highest, but fortunately, Mexico’s President Fox, the most visionary of North 
America’s leaders, proposed a customs union and more. The negotiations would 
be very difficult, but not beyond the reach of the three countries, and it would 
accelerate integration.  
The problem of transaction costs reaches beyond the issue of trucks and 
transportation.  As the three countries deepen their integration, their three 
regulatory regimes have raised additional impediments, which are evident in the 
divergent approaches to trade in pharmaceuticals, mad cow disease, and 
softwood lumber.  Part of the problem stems from the many regulations that 
customs officials need to administer on the border.   The Canadians, for example, 
have to enforce 96 statutory regulations on the border, and U.S. customs 
inspectors are responsible for 400 separate statutory requirements.  Regulatory 
standards – from product safety to pollution to business competition – all affect 
the flow of goods.  New approaches are needed to reduce the protectionist 
dimension while assuring health, safety, and security.  These might involve new 
North American regulatory agencies or coordinated subcommittees of existing 
national agencies.   The second decade of NAFTA, however, will need to address 
the emerging regulatory agenda.   
The United States and Canada should also negotiate a convergence of their 
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Mexico until the development gap is reduced, but in the meantime, all three 
governments could negotiate a “North American Passport or Border Pass,” which 
could be extended to a wider group of citizens of the three countries each year.    
For security reasons, all three governments need to focus more on the 
continental perimeter, and one way to do that, while at the same time eliminating 
the duplication of documents that comes with crossing the border, would be to 
establish a single “North American Customs and Immigration Force.”  This force 
would be composed of officials from the three governments and trained together 
in a North American professional school.   Most important, if the Department of 
Homeland Security is not to become a fortress and an insult to America’s 
neighbors, Mexican and Canadian perspectives and personnel need to be 
incorporated in some way.  
Finally, our three governments could learn from the EU’s project to fund 15 
EU Centers in the United States. These Centers stimulate research and awareness 
in the United States of the EU. The three governments of North America should 
sponsor Centers for North American Studies in each of the countries to help all 
understand the problems and the potential of North America and view each other 
as both nationals of each country and also as North Americans.  
Is any of this feasible? Since NAFTA came into effect, the opposition to free 
trade agreements has grown.  Some people fear that they could lose their jobs to 
countries with low wages. Others fear that global development will have an 
adverse effect on the environment. Still others fear that a free trading system will 
be dominated by U.S.-based multinational corporations. Efforts to deepen North 
American integration will undoubtedly provoke the same groups plus others in 
Canada and Mexico who worry that steps toward a community could diminish 
each country’s identity or accentuate their vulnerability.     
Are these concerns legitimate? Some of the concerns stem from a fear of 
globalization.  Certainly, as global competition increases, wealthier countries will 
lose unskilled or manufacturing jobs to China, India, and  other middle-income 
countries.  To the extent that workers cannot move up the value ladder, they will 
lose out as “producers”, even while they benefit as consumers. Of course, the 
essence of globalization in the modern world is that there is nowhere to hide.   
Canada and the United States did not lose many jobs to Mexico though they 
gained some  higher value jobs.  At the same time, all three countries have 
probably lost more jobs to China. The fear of cultural domination that one hears 
in Canada has a similar ring, though in Canada, the workers want to be free to 
consume products from around the world, and a part of the intellectual elite, 
supported by magazine and movie producers that seek protection for old-
fashioned economic reasons, resist freer trade.    
In an age of increasing integration, national governments should assure that 
the gains of trade are redistributed to those who lose the competition, and that 
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American idea” is that the public of all three countries would be far better off 
forging rules to deepen integration than to rebuild barriers to trade.  
Are the three governments prepared to give up their sovereignty for a wider 
community? The term “sovereignty” is one of the most widely used, abused, and 
least understood in the diplomatic lexicon.  “Sovereignty” is not a fixed or 
immutable concept. Three decades ago, Canada interpreted sovereignty to restrict 
U.S. oil companies from investing in Canada. Mexico used it to ban international 
election monitors, and the United States used it to insist on “states rights” rather 
than human or voting rights. In each case, sovereignty was used to defend bad 
policies, and yet changing these policies enhanced the prestige and prosperity of 
the country.  Sovereignty, in brief, is a misleading if not a mistaken defense 
against an increasingly open and integrated world.   
The question is whether the people of the three countries are ready for a 
different relationship, and public opinion surveys suggest that the answer is 
affirmative and, indeed, that the people are way ahead of their leaders.   A survey 
of the attitudes of people in the three countries during the past twenty years 
demonstrates an extraordinary convergence of values – on personal and family 
issues as well as public policy.  Each nation has very positive feelings about their 
neighbors (although this has changed somewhat since the war in Iraq).   In all 
three countries, the public’s views on NAFTA shifted in the 1990s.  There is now 
modest net support, but a neat consensus: each nation agrees that the others 
benefited more than they have!    
The most interesting surveys, however, show that a majority of the public in 
all three countries is prepared to join a larger North American country if they 
thought it would improve their standard of living and environment a nd not 
threaten their culture.   Mexicans and Canadians do not want to be incorporated 
into the United States, and they are ambivalent about adopting the American 
dollar, but they are more willing to become part of a single country of North 
America and of  a unified currency, like the “Amero,” proposed by Herbert 
Grubel.
28 The “Amero” would be equivalent of the American dollar, and the two 
other currencies would be exchanged at the rate in which they are then traded for 
the U.S. dollar.  In other words, at the outset, the wealth of all three countries 
would be unchanged, and the power to manage the currency would be roughly 
proportional to the existing wealth.  The three governments remain zealous 
defenders of an aging conception of sovereignty whereas the people seem ready 
to entertain new approaches.   
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Other surveys by Ekos of Canada suggest that people in all three countries 
have begun to think of themselves as part of a larger community.   In Europe, 
instead of renouncing nationhood, Frenchmen and Germans a lso think of 
themselves as Europeans.   Similarly, 58 percent of Canadians and 69 percent of 
the U.S. public feel a “strong” attachment to North America, and most surprising, 
34 percent of Mexicans consider themselves “North American,” though that term 
in  Spanish has referred to the United States.  The surveys also outline a “North 
American model” that is quite different from that of the EU.  For example, in 
considering 12 values, people in all three countries gave the highest priority to 
“freedom” and the lowest to government size and “redistribution of wealth.”
29   
The October 2003 survey by Ekos found that a clear majority (56-62 percent) 
believe that a North American Economic Union is likely to be established in the 
next ten years.  An overwhelming majority of the public in all three countries 
favored more integrated North American – rather than separate – policies on the 
environment, transportation, and defense, with more modest majorities in favor 
of common policies on energy and banking.  And on the issue of whether to 
develop a common security perimeter for North America, both Americans and 
Canadians favored it by 3:1 and Mexicans by 2:1.  
Despite this convergence and a popular desire to experiment, the three gov-
ernments have devoted so much effort to defining differences that they have not 
found the time or energy to expand what they have in common. The market has 
advanced integration; it is time for the political leaders to address its externalities 
– including currency crises, development gaps, environmental degradation, ter-
rorist threats, and infrastructural impediments. That is the challenge of the North 
American Commission, – to sketch an alternative future for the entire continent 
that the people will embrace and the politicians will feel obligated to accept.     
NAFTA built an economic foundation under a formidable regional entity.  
North America needs leaders who can articulate and pursue a broader vision.    
North America’s second decade poses three distinct challenges – one for each 
country to take the lead.   The first is for Canada – to take the lead in replacing 
the dual-bilateralism of the past with rule-based North American institutions.   If 
Canada leads, Mexico will support it, and the United States will accept it.  The 
second challenge is for Mexico to demonstrate how it would contribute and use a 
North American Investment Fund to double its growth rate and lift its economy.   
If Mexico and North America succeed, then Latin America would have reason to 
ride the train toward a Free Trade Area of the Americas, but if the development 
gap cannot be narrowed in North America, then the prospects are bleak for other 
middle-income countries. 
The third challenge is for the United States to redefine its leadership in the 
21
st century to inspire support rather than resentment, fear, or unease. If the 
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United States can adjust its interests to those of our neighbors, the world will 
look to the United States in more positive ways than it has since Iraq.    
These three challenges constitute an agenda of the greatest consequence for 
North America in its second decade. A successful pursuit of the three challenges 
would produce a Community in spirit and substance as well as in word.   It would 
not only energize the continent; it would infuse hope throughout the world.   
 
  
 
North American Security: A Community or an Identity? 
 
 
 
 
Alejandro Chanona 
 
Introduction 
 
North America has become a real region due to reasons of security, economic 
advantages and political interests, generating the idea of consolidating a North 
America Community
 by means of the deepening of NAFTA. The events of 9/11 
put pressure on the countries of North America to seek a shared viewpoint about 
security issues and the regional vision is gradually being acquired. The three 
countries recognize common problems regarding security and the existence of 
transnational threats that cannot be treated independently. Security has become 
an important element of integration; the main question is if North America is 
building a security community or an identity in security issues after 9/11?  
 
The Theoretical Debate about Security Communities Building: 
A Community or an Identity? 
 
The classic concept of security
1 centered on the military vision, on the viability 
and safekeeping (survival) of the State,
  has evolved, giving rise to a broader 
concept by incorporating new elements, although the State continues to be the 
main reference point.
2  
As Buzan indicates, in addition to meaning survival when the existence of the 
State or a society is threatened, security “has to do with conditions of existence 
and includes States’ ability to maintain their independent identity, their integrity 
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and functionality against forces seen as hostile.”
3 Threats would be defined as 
anything that undermines the stability, viability  and existence of any sphere of 
security. Besides traditional threats centered on the State (like external military 
aggression), threats of a transnational character also arise from non-State actors 
like international organized crime, terrorism, drug and illegal arms traffickers, 
corruption, money laundering and the links among them.  
We know that optimal regional integration implies the consolidation of a 
common identity in matters of foreign policy, security and the harmonization of 
the administration of j ustice. Without a doubt, the transnational nature of the 
threats and challenges to domestic and international security has generated an 
ever greater interdependence among states in this matter. 
According to Charles Tilly, a community is defined by three characteristics: 
a) members of a community have shared identities, values and meanings; b) 
those in a community have many-sided and direct relations; and c) communities 
exhibit reciprocity (expressing some degree of long-term interest derived from 
knowledge  of those with whom one interacts) and perhaps even altruism 
(understood as a sense of obligation and responsibility).
4  
A sense of belonging appears to be closely interrelated with membership in a 
political community that seems to offer protection from external threats.
5 Identity 
and security are relational concepts that imply the existence of an “other” against 
which the notion of a collective self and conditions of insecurity are articulated.
6 
States identify positively with one another so that the security of each is 
perceived as the responsibility of all. Identity implies a shared view about 
security, defense and threats and a close sense of cohesion and solidarity. 
Deutsch’s reflections are among the first attempts after World War II that 
consider the possibility of pacific change in international relations. According to 
Deutsch, 
 
“A security community...is a group that has become integrated, where integration is 
defined as the attainment of a sense of community, accompanied by formal or informal 
institutions or practices, sufficiently strong and widespread to assure peaceful change 
among members of a group with reasonable certainty over a long period of time.” 
 
                                                 
3 Barry Buzan, “New Patterns of Global Security”, International Affairs 67, no. 3 (1991): 432. 
4 Charles Tilly, cit.pos. Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, “A framework for the study of 
security communities” in Security Communities, ed.  Adler and Barnett (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), 31.  
5 M. Clarke, New Perspectives on Security (London: Brassey’s, 1993), xi. 
6  Robert Lipschutz, “Negociating the Boundaries of Difference and Security a t the 
Millenium’s End,” in On Security, ed. Lipschutz,  (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 
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Collective identities are the agents of pacific change, which explains why 
interdependence and mutual responsibility among the States grow, finally leading 
to not considering the use of physical violence among them a legitimate 
mechanism for the resolution of conflicts.
7  
Authors from the European School, like Waever and Buzan, have worked on 
the idea of security communities, developing the concept of regional security 
complexes, through which they highlight the importance of the regions in 
structuring security levels.
  
The regional security systems theory starts from an assessment guided by 
political realism of the international system’s anarchic nature and the 
interdependence among States in security matters. According to this vision, 
thanks to regional integration, we go from a group of anarchic States to stability 
when a single actor is constituted in the international system. 
According to Buzan, a regional security complex is made up of a group of 
States “whose main security perceptions and references are interconnected; there-
fore, they cannot be reasonably analyzed or solved some of them independently 
from others” and “whose securities are not sufficiently interdependent to render 
them a kind of subsystem within the general model of international security.”
8  
The construction and dynamics of security systems are the result of the 
interdependence of their members, of the security perception each of them has, of 
the distribution of power among them and of the friendship-enmity relationships 
among them.  
In this way, regional security systems may be built and may function based 
on: a) the members’ n egative vision, where interdependence arises from fear, 
distrust and rivalry; b) an intermediate position, in which States perceive threats 
among themselves but reach agreements to reduce security problems amongst 
themselves and coming from abroad. This model corresponds to the beginnings 
of the European Union construction; and c) a positive vision, in which the states 
have no expectations or intentions of using force among themselves. This 
describes the development of security identity in North America.
9 
Adler and Barnett
10 acknowledge that there is great skepticism about political 
actors being able to share values and standards and to come together in diverse 
and reciprocal interactions that reflect long-term interests. These authors 
distinguish between amalgamated security communities, characterized by the 
                                                 
7 Karl W Deutsch, cit.pos. Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, “A framework for the study 
of security communities,” in  Security Communities, ed. Adler and Barnett (UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998).  
8 Barry Buzan, The European Security Order Recast, (London: Printer Publishers, 1990), 13-
14. 
9 See: Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Japp de Wilde, op.cit. 
10 See: Adler and Barnet, op. cit. 58  Chanona 
 
political merger of their members, toward which the EU is moving, and 
pluralistic security communities, in which the states maintain their independence 
and sovereignty, such as the case of North America. 
Also, they distinguish between two ideal types of pluralistic security 
communities: the “loosely coupled” and the “tightly coupled”. While the loosely 
coupled security community has a minimal definition (a transnational region 
made up of sovereign States whose people maintain dependable expectations of 
peaceful change, like NAFTA), the tightly coupled one is more demanding in 
two respects: a) it has a “mutual aid” society in which collective security system 
arrangements are made; and b) it possesses a regimen endowed with common 
supranational and transnational institutions and some form of a collective 
security system (like in the European case).  
To explain how the development of a security community in general affects 
relations among the member states and  in particular their security policies, the 
authors developed a security community model of evolution in three phases, 
which I shall use to analyze the development of the security community in North 
America. 
 
a)  Nascent 
 
The governments do not make an explicit effort to achieve the construction of 
a security community, but they aspire to coordinate their relations to improve 
their respective security situation, to reduce their transaction costs and to promote 
trade and other interactions that benefit both parties. The States involved create 
organizations and institutions both to strengthen interaction and to create 
controlling bodies that enable compliance with mutual obligations. 
 
b)  Ascendant 
 
This phase is characterized by a strengthening of bonding networks, by new 
institutions and organizations, as well as by the coordination and collaboration of 
the armed forces of the States cooperating with one another. Mutual trust 
increases and common identities arise. Both of these help consolidate the 
expectation of peaceful change and of the development of mutual responsibility. 
 
c)  Mature 
 
This is a community of States that share a security identity, as well as 
institutions and mechanisms to defend it. The process is consolidated, as security 
is perceived increasingly as a common good. 
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Is NAFTA a Nascent Pluralistic Security Community since 9/11? 
 
North American integration undoubtedly has peculiar characteristics, such as the 
asymmetry among its members, the clear hegemony of the United States and the 
preeminence of bilateral relations (United States-Canada/United States-Mexico) 
over trilateral ones. North America has become a real region due to reasons of 
security, economic advantages and political interests, generating the idea of 
consolidating a North American Community by deepening NAFTA.
11 
The events of 9/11 put pressure on the countries of North America to seek a 
shared viewpoint, and that regional vision is gradually being acquired. The three 
countries recognize common problems regarding security and the existence o f 
transnational threats that cannot be treated independently, although it is true they 
have opted for paused, thematic, practical and immediate work at a bilateral level 
(United States-Canada/United States-Mexico) encouraged by the United States’ 
immediate needs. 
We can argue that in North America, a pluralistic security community, 
understood as a transnational region formed by sovereign States that maintain 
expectations of pacific changes, is being developed.
12  The regional security 
system in North America will be built starting from mutual confidence and 
interdependence, but it will respond, in principle, to the United States’ immediate 
needs: safeguarding U.S. territory, especially from a potential terrorist attack.  
In North America, the differentiated u se the United States makes of its 
hegemony is clear: when dealing with regions like Africa or the Middle East it 
has favored, and even carried out, actions, unilaterally exercising its military 
strength, whereas with its North American partners it has successfully moved 
toward the search for plans to cooperate, generating channels for dialogue in an 
effort to reach viable agreements. Mexico and Canada have taken advantage of 
this in negotiations in order to prevent the unilateral measures of U.S. hegemony 
from affecting vital areas such as trade and personal life, due to the virtual 
closing of the borders.
13  
                                                 
11 Concerning this idea of the emergence of a North American Community, see: Robert A., 
Pastor, Toward a North American Community (Washington: Institute for International Economics, 
2001); Helen Milner, “Regional economic cooperation, global markets and domestic politics: a 
comparison of the NAFTA and the Maastricht Treaty,” in  Regionalism and Global Economic 
Integration, ed. William Coleman and Geofrey Hunderhill (UK: Routledge, 1998); John 
McCormick, Understanding the European Union, (UK: Palgrave, 1999)  and Alejandro Chanona, 
“Hacia la construcción de una perspectiva comparada: Unión Europea-TLCAN. Un acercamiento a 
la teoría liberal intergubernamentalista,” in La Unión Europea y el TLCAN. Integración regional 
comparada y relaciones mutuas, ed. Alejandro Chanona, Joaquín Roy and Roberto Domínguez 
(Mexico: UNAM-University of Miami-Citesa), 93-140. 
12 Adler and Barnet, op.cit. 30. 
13 However, Mexico-U.S. relations have been under high tension recently. Both Condoleezza 
Rice’s announcement, Tony Garza’s letter to the Mexican government and the CIA director’s 
statement about the possibility of political and social instability during the coming presidential 60  Chanona 
 
Historically, Canada
14 and Mexico
15 have designed their national sovereignty 
and survival principles without disputing U.S. hegemony, although they tend to 
remain distant with respect to certain regional or hemisphere questions when 
their independence is at stake. Mexico and Canada share some positions like the 
multidimensional concept of security, the promotion of multilateralism or the 
struggle against antipersonnel land mines.  
Canada’s North American identity is firmly established, and it clearly 
recognizes U.S. leadership in the region. For the United States, Canada is a 
trustworthy partner. Relations between the United States and Canada in security 
and defense matters have historically been characterized by proximity and 
cooperation,
16 as demonstrated by the more than 80 agreements about defense 
that the two countries have signed (although they maintain some differences such 
as the position on Cuba and t he conception of human security, one of the 
principal axes of Canadian foreign policy).  
What is more ambiguous is Mexico’s North American identity. This country 
has been part of the North America concept only for the last decade, an identity 
ratified with the signing of NAFTA. At present, no matter what issue we analyze 
                                                                                                                         
campaign have caused a lot of trouble for the Mexican government.  
14 Traditionally Canada has determined its defense strategy taking into account at least five 
points: 
1) Canada defines itself as "non-militarist", preferring peaceful means for solving 
controversies; 2) Canadian strategy does not develop the classic elements of self-sufficiency in 
defense matters; 3) The role of the Canadian armed forces is to support internal bodies, that is, the 
army’s objectives are not only military; 4) Canada is aware of the need for strong cooperation with 
the United States in matters of defense, due to its geographic location; and 5) Canada designs its 
defense policy without autonomy vis-à-vis U.S. defense policy. See: Douglas Murray, “Canada,” in 
The Defense Policies of Nations: A Comparative Study, ed. Douglas Murriy and Paul R. Viotti 
(Washington: The John Hopkins University Press, 1994), 57-59. 
15 Historically, Mexico’s security and defense policies have been nationalist and defensive. 
Throughout the twentieth century it has developed its foreign policies based on the principles of 
non-intervention and respect for the sovereignty of States and international law, thus maintaining 
its diplomatic independence in the international realm and at the same time protecting its special 
relation with the United States. 
16 Canada has maintained cooperative relations in security matters with its southern neighbor. 
Mechanisms like the North America Defense Treaty, the Bilateral Consultant Group on 
Cooperation against Terrorism, the Terrorist Interception Program of both countries (TIP), the 
United States and Canada Forum on Trans-Border Crime, the groups directed by the immigration 
service and customs known as Border Vision and the information exchange agreements between 
the United States Drug Control Administration and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police are proof 
of this close cooperation. The Bilateral Consultation Group for Antiterrorist Cooperation has 
coordinated efforts in the struggle against terrorism. The establishment of the Ad-Hoc Committee 
of Ministers in Public Security and Anti-terrorism, presided over by Minister of Foreign Affairs 
John Manley, and the approval of the Antiterrorist Act, in September and December 2001, 
respectively, were clear signs of the Canadian commitment to the antiterrorist struggle.  North American Security  61 
 
within the context of Mexico-U.S. relations, national security predominates in re-
lation to all the matters of high politics.  
In security matters, the most complete representation of the construction of a 
North American bloc is seen in the smart border agreements. They go far beyond 
the technical aspects that supposedly support them and imply collaboration in 
intelligence and migration policies that guarantee security in the territorial 
proximity of the United States, which enables it to project its military power to 
the rest of the world.  
 
A Shared North American Point of View about Security and Threats? 
 
Although there is no shared vision of the North American countries on security 
and t he threats to security, we can find minimum agreements in the matter, 
derived from the United States’ immediate needs, such as the importance of 
border security and the struggle against transnational organized crime (terrorism, 
drug and arms trafficking).  
Mexico and Canada share a multidimensional vision of security. In the case 
of Mexico, according to the 2000-2006 National Development Plan, “The main 
objectives of national security are to ensure the protection and conservation of 
the collective interest, avoiding as far as possible or minimizing any risk or threat 
to the physical integrity of the population and to institutions.”
  
Ratifying the multidimensional vision of security, the National Development 
Plan points out that “the real threats to institutions and national security are 
poverty and inequality, the vulnerability of the population faced with natural 
disasters, environmental destruction, criminality, organized crime and illegal 
drug trafficking.…At present the Mexican State is not aware of any risks to its 
sovereignty as a result of external threats of the traditional type.” 
Faced with this, the U.S. hegemonic vision appears and, using political 
realism to read the international system, sustains that the construction of 
worldwide security and the defense of the liberal order rests on the exercise of 
power and military might, preferring coercion and unilateralism.
17  
After the events of 9/11, the United States initiated a new security doctrine 
that for the first time centers its attention on the security and defense of its 
territory  (homeland security and homeland defense), restructuring its domestic 
and international systems to deal with non-conventional threats to its security, 
specifically terrorism. Homeland security implies the prevention, prediction of, 
                                                 
17 Political realism is based on the existence of a structurally anarchic (Hobbesian) 
international system, where survival is one of the main objectives of all States: the struggle for 
power and the use of force are key elements of the international system. The international system’s 
organizational principle is sovereignty; the States’ first concern should be their security, and this 
should be guaranteed by means of political power and military force. Likewise, in a multi-polar 
system, states’ security can be maintained more effectively by means of alliances and balances of 
power, thus opening up the possibility for cooperation.  62  Chanona 
 
elimination and defense against any aggression to the territory, sovereignty, 
population and infrastructure of the United States, as well as the management of 
crises and other national emergencies, which the new National Territory Security 
Office will be in charge of. 
The new U.S. military doctrine is not based on nuclear threats but rather on a 
measure of the military capacity to prevent and react against any unexpected 
threat or attack. In this doctrine, what the United States accepts is the new nature 
of its enemies. Terrorists are not afraid of nuclear dissuasion; as a result, the 
country has developed new forms and more effective means of dissuading.
18 
The United States has identified terrorism as the main threat against its 
security, together  with the traditional transnational threats such as organized 
crime and drug trafficking. The United States has insisted at international 
meetings that issues like poverty, pandemics and the environment, among others, 
are not part of the security agenda, due to the fact that they “debase” the concept 
of security.  
Nevertheless, Mexico’s case is special. In addition to the primary U.S. 
concern about security on the border with Mexico and the porosity of the 
country’s southern border, the U.S. is also worried about the country’s internal 
security and stability. As Dziedzic points out, “Mexico has become a point of 
contention for various geo-social or transnational problems
19 that do not respect 
national borders....That is why Mexico is –and shall continue being- fundamental 
for the success of the great United States strategy.”
20 
The security agenda for Mexico designed by the Bush administration 
includes: a) traffic in immigrants; b) widespread corruption (which would 
potentially allow terrorist groups to set up in Mexico); c) organized crime (drug 
trafficking, kidnapping, thefts); d) the lack of maritime control on Mexico’s 
borders; e) the possibility of a terrorist attack on strategic points in Mexico, 
especially the oil wells.
21 
                                                 
18 The new strategy contained in the Unified Command Plan is based on the awareness of all 
the weak points in the U.S. defense system, such as the lack of a defense system against ballistic 
missiles, which constitutes in i tself an initiative for the development of weapons of mass 
destruction and the means to start them. See: Donald H. Rumsfeld, “The transformation of the 
armed forces,” Foreign Affairs in Spanish, (Summer 2002):148-149. 
19 Dziedzic understands “geo-social” problems as the new transnational threats to security. 
They include international organized crime, terrorist groups, environmental pollution and the 
massive flow of refugees and disease. See: Michael Dziedzic, “Mexico and the great strategy of the 
United States: geo-strategic basis for security and prosperity,” in Las seguridades de México y 
Estados Unidos en un momento de transición, cords. Sergio Aguayo and John Bailey (Mexico: 
Siglo XXI, 1997), 85-114. 
20 Ibid, 86. 
21 Raúl Benítez Manaut and Georgina Sánchez, “Progress and limits of the participation of 
Mexico in hemispheric security at the beginning of the twenty-first century,” Security and Defense North American Security  63 
 
 
 
Toward a North American Security Perimeter: 
Borders and Cooperation as Key Issues 
 
Smart Borders: The First Step for the Security Community in North America 
 
The borders are key areas for U. S. security. In both cases, United States-Mexico 
and United States-Canada, priorities are different. Whereas in the United States-
Canada relationship, drug trafficking has dominated the agenda, in the case of the 
U.S.-Mexico border, together with drugs, migration is a bi-national security 
matter.  
NAFTA has increased illegal trans-border interactions; this may be attributed 
to trade itself and to deficiencies in U.S. drug detection policies along the 
Mexican border. The debate between trade liberalization and more policing was 
made more flexible in order to not restrict trade growth on the border. 
The numbers speak for themselves: during 2002, 78 percent of a total of 253 
million pedestrian crossings through the 55 ports of entry into Mexico took place 
on the border with the United States. Approximately 89 million private vehicles 
and 4.5 million trucks crossed that border, and 98 percent of bilateral trade, close 
to U.S.$300 billion worth, took place there. In addition, there is the phenomenon 
of undocumented immigration of Mexican workers. The most recent estimates 
calculate that each year approximately 380,000 Mexicans, half of whom have no 
documents, travel to the United States, either to stay permanently or temporarily. 
All this confirms the fact that this is the border with the most crossings in the 
world.
22 According to the most recent estimates, these undocumented immigrants 
send their families in Mexico approximately U.S.$15 billion a year, a sum that 
constitutes the country’s second source of foreign currency, exceeding non-oil 
exports and foreign direct investment. 
Throughout the twentieth century, border relations between the United States 
and Canada have been characterized by cooperation, which has increased since 
NAFTA came into effect.
 23  
                                                                                                                         
Studies Review  4, (2004), Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies  http://www.ndu.edu/chds/ 
journal/PDF/2004/Benitez-Sanchez_article-edited.pdf. 
22 Santiago Creel, “Immigration and security between Mexico and the United States”, Foreign 
Affairs in Spanish  4, no. 2 (2004). 
23 The Canadian government has promoted a considerable number of initiatives in matters of 
border relations with the U. S., among which is the 1995 Agreement between Canada and the 
United States on Our Shared Border. In this initiative, both countries committed themselves to 
work together to achieve the protection against illegal and irregular border activities, to facilitate 
the transit of goods and persons and to promote international trade. Other measures include the 
1997 Border Vision initiative and the 1999 United States-Canada Association, through which both 
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After the September 11 terrorist attacks, the Canadian government questioned 
its ability to face a similar situation, recognizing the need for greater cooperation 
with its southern neighbor, not only for safe, proper functioning at the border, but 
for establishing concrete actions against any possible terrorist act. Just like in the 
Mexican case, the closing of the border and the exhaustive security measures 
implemented afterward by the United States had a great economic impact, due to 
the fact that border crossings were delayed up to 18 hours. Consequently, more 
than 50 companies from various sectors formed the Coalition for Safe and 
Efficient Borders in Trade, declaring at the same time full support for the 
Canadian government to go ahead with the necessary coordination and 
cooperation measures with the United States to guarantee border security.
24 
In the case o f Mexico, the 1991 establishment of the Border Linking 
Mechanism did not imply the development of a long-term vision about border 
management between both countries. Designing border measures as answers to 
immediate problems and the limited scope of the mechanisms have been 
constants. In fact, the trans-border initiatives or cooperation policies between 
Mexico and the United States have traditionally been conceived as part of the 
international policies of border states, which have been developing informally for 
several years. An example of this is the relationship between Tijuana, Baja 
California and San Isidro, California, where their authorities have established 
ample cooperative actions that range from operations to prevent sailors from 
returning intoxicated to the United States, to contingency plans to prevent 
possible attacks with chemical or biological weapons.
25 
The encouragement for creating common border security stemmed from the 
necessities and guidelines marked by U.S. hegemony after the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks. Before its North American partners, the United States has accepted the 
impossibility of unilaterally facing threats to the security of its territory, and has 
decided to encourage cooperation and concretizing agreements in the matter. 
From the Bush administration’s perspective, security on the border “must be 
guided by the principles of co-responsibility, respect to sovereignty, compliance 
with constitutional restrictions and protection of human rights and of private 
                                                                                                                         
policies and actions with respect to the border and increase efficiency in crossings of persons and 
merchandise and in environmental protection.  In addition, corporate, trade and company 
associations will form a regional business coalition named “Americans for Better Borders.” See: 
Jimena Jiménez, Christina Gabriel and Laura Macdonald,  The politics of the North  American 
Security Perimeter: Convergence or Divergence in Border Control Policies (Paper presented at the 
International Studies Association, Oregon, 2003). 
24 See: Perrin Beatty “Canada in North America: Isolation or Integration?" in The Future of 
North American Integration. Beyond NAFTA, ed. Peter Hakim and Robert E. Litan, (Washington: 
Brookings Institution Press, 2002), 43-50. 
25 José María Ramos, Seguridad nacional y fronteriza en el contexto internacional y bilateral 
(Paper presented at the XV Social Sciences International Meeting, The Sociopolitical Dimension of 
Globalization in Latin America,  Mexico, 2001) North American Security  65 
 
life.”
  For his government, the fact that land borders have the type of 
infrastructure and administration systems that facilitate and guarantee the 
sustained integration of the economic region in North America has become “a 
vital necessity”. 
According to Tom Ridge, “in the future the border will be protected through 
international cooperation to increase the participation of intelligence information 
and face more efficiently the threats presented by terrorism, organized crime, the 
illegal traffic of immigrants and narcotics, pests and agricultural diseases, as well 
as the destruction of natural resources.”
26 Consequently, in 2003, approximately 
U.S.$11 billion were assigned to increase border security, U.S.$2.2 billion more 
than in 2002. 
The construction of the so-called smart borders is N orth America’s most 
complete immediate institutional response to the threats to its security. By 
standardizing control procedures, smart borders can contain common threats, 
with which both public security and economic security will be mutually 
reinforced.  
The smart borders initiative is developed through five principles: reinvent the 
border; extend economic efficiency; build security resources; share continental 
and global security; and develop twenty-first-century institutions. 
The agreement to create a smart border with Mexico was signed March 21, 
2002. Unlike the agreement with Canada (which includes 30 specific actions 
under four general headings:  a) ensure the transit of persons; b) ensure the transit 
of goods; c) develop safe infrastructure; and d) c oordinate and exchange 
information to reach these objectives), the action plan for the border between 
Mexico and the United States only includes 22 actions under three general 
headings: a) ensure the transit of persons; b) ensure the transit of goods; and c) 
develop safe infrastructure. 
For Canada, actions aimed at the creation of the smart border appear to 
strengthen the cooperation that already existed with its southern neighbor in this 
matter. Nevertheless, former Prime Minister Chrétien discarded the idea of a 
security perimeter, arguing that its creation “requires a degree of harmonization 
of policies, particularly in the area of migration, and the refugees who might 
infringe Canadian sovereignty.”
27 
The smart border between Mexico and the United States is on its way to 
becoming a reality. To date, a Bilateral Coordinating Committee has been 
established, an orientation framework has been agreed on for the protection of 
infrastructure and sectoral working groups on energy, telecommunications, 
transportation, dams, public health and agriculture have been set up. Mexico’s 
General Administration of Customs and the U.S. Bureau of Customs and Border 
                                                 
26 Tom Ridge “Two countries, one mission” , Foreign Affairs en español 4, no. 2 (2004). 
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Protection created three specialized working groups (on borders, law 
enforcement and technology and customs procedures), which meet every three 
months and whose main purpose is to improve the application of Indicator 
Technology of the Situation of Visitors and Immigrants to the United States (US 
VISIT) program for the control of entries and exits from the United States as of 
December 31, 2003. 
To guarantee the transit of goods along the U.S.-Mexican border the Fast and 
Safe Trade (FAST) program,
28 designed by the U.S. Bureau of Customs and 
Border Protection (CBP) was extended to the El Paso border between Mexico 
and the United States as of December 4, 2003. 
 
The NAFTA Security Perimeter 
 
Although the smart borders strategy is the first step in the creation of the security 
community in North America, it must be pointed out that these are bilateral 
agreements, centered on the legal flows of merchandise and persons, and their 
main objective is to standardize procedures and promote the security of both U.S. 
land borders. This explains the importance of the agreements reached at the 
Waco Summit and of the recommendations by the Independent Task Force on the 
Future of North America, both oriented toward the creation of a North American 
security perimeter that transcends the idea of smart borders, and the definitive 
push for the process of construction of the security community. 
At the March 2005 Waco summit, the three countries’ heads of state signed 
the Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America, which includes the 
creation of a security perimeter to combat internal and external threats to 
security. This will also enable the implementation of a common model of 
response to emergencies that will guarantee the protection of the region’s 
infrastructure and ensure efficiency in moving goods and persons. 
                                                 
28 As of September 2002, the FAST lanes operate at five points of entry on the border between 
the United States and Canada: Detroit and Port Huron, Michigan; Buffalo and Champlain, New 
York; and Blaine, Washington. To be eligible for the FAST lane, manufacturers, importers and 
transportation companies must participate in another program of the CBP against terrorism, the 
Customs–Trade Association against Terrorism (C-TPAT), according to which companies develop 
and implement security plans to improve security operations. Truck drivers must submit 
information that will enable CBP officers to evaluate if the applicant represents any danger. The 
approved applicants receive a FAST Commercial Driver Identification Card. The FAST has 
additional security characteristics on the U.S.-Mexico border. Manufacturers and transportation 
company drivers who participate in the FAST between the United States and Mexico are required 
to use high security mechanical seals on all of the containers or trailers going to the United States. 
Customs and Border Protection shall continue examining these deliveries with X-rays, dogs and 
other equipment to guarantee the integrity of the FAST program. The CBP also expects the 
additional security to improve their continuous efforts to intercept drugs along the border.   North American Security  67 
 
Also, based on the principle that our security and prosperity are mutually 
dependent and complementary, the North American leaders committed to work 
to develop a common approach to security.  
The idea of the North American security perimeter is also present in the 
Independent Task Force on the Future of North America’s Chairmen’s statement, 
released before the Waco meeting. According to the Independent Task Force, it is 
necessary to create an Action Plan for the North American Borders, through 
further agreements on the smart borders, and to include elements such as the joint 
inspection of container vehicles entering North American ports, the creation of a 
common approach in the international negotiations related to global movement of 
people, cargo and vessels, as well as the harmonization of: a) visa and asylum 
policies; b) the procedures of identification and tracking of persons, goods and 
vehicles (identified by biometric characteristics); and c) tracking procedures and 
monitoring of exits and of imports and exports; as well as the sharing of transit 
information.
29 
The proposal also points out the importance of extending cooperation to the 
area of law enforcement and to matters related to defense. However, at least in 
the short term, trilateral agreements are not likely to be signed in these matters, 
given Canada’s ambiguous position on the subject and, above all, due to the 
impossibility of Mexico’s accepting participation in measures such as the 
creation of a trinational intelligence center on threats, joint training of police 
forces or participation in a trinational defense force. 
As an example, we have Mexico and Canada’s reactions to the establishment 
of a Northern Command (NORTHCOM) within the framework of restructuring 
North American security and defense policies.  
In Mexico, the executive, Congress and the army itself refused any Mexican 
participation in NORTHCOM. For the Mexican military, this is normal 
procedure and does not involve the country’s military sovereignty. Given 
tradition in the matter of foreign policy and internal conditions, it is clear that, for 
the time being, Mexico will not risk participating in any security system 
involving direct armed forces participation. Military and security collaboration 
with the United States will continue to happen in the fight against drug 
trafficking and cooperation, but it will not mean, at least in the short term, greater 
participation in international missions, which would be limited to humanitarian 
assistance in case of disasters and to nearby areas.
30  
                                                 
29 Independent Task Force on the Future of North America, Creating a North American Com-
munity, Chairmen’s Statement (2005). 
30 For decades, the Mexican armed forces have systematically helped countries affected by 
hurricanes, earthquakes, storms and forest fires. Mexico’s Senate has authorized the military to 
leave the country for humanitarian missions. Solidarity work beyond Mexico’s borders has been 
clear in recent years in the support given to several Latin American countries: “In 1996, help was 
given to Costa Rica, Nicaragua and Cuba, struck by hurricanes, and to Ecuador after an earthquake. 
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Therefore, today, the armed forces continue their struggle against drug 
trafficking and organized crime, terrorism and  illegal trafficking in arms and 
persons, besides helping to solve “the insufficiencies in the poorest areas of our 
country, where support is needed in social, educational and health areas.”
31  
But Canada’s reaction was ambiguous. In principle, Canada defined the 
command as an internal U.S. policy; however, the government announced it 
would begin a series of consultations with its southern neighbor in this matter. 
The North American Air Space Defense Command (NORAD) has served as a 
framework for surveillance of air routes in the United States and Canada through 
the  Noble Eagle  Operation, which keeps armed airplanes alert for irregular 
patrolling to identify and intercept suspect flights.
32 However, at the same time, 
former Prime Minister Chrétien discarded the idea of a security perimeter, 
arguing that its creation "requires a degree of harmonization of policies, 
especially in the area of immigration and refugees, which might infringe on 
Canadian sovereignty.”  
Finally, Canadian Prime Minister Paul Martin denied any participation of 
Canada in the U.S. ballistic missile defense program, thus putting an end to two 
years of internal discussions on the issue. However, he confirmed Canada’s 
commitment to promoting regional cooperation in security matters, by 
strengthening borders, reinforcing sovereignty in the Arctic and Canada’s 
participation in NORAD.
 33 
 
 
                                                                                                                         
Republic, Honduras, Nicaragua, Guatemala and El Salvador due to hurricanes; in 1999, help was 
given to Colombia because of an earthquake and to Venezuela due to intense rain; and to the 
Republic of Guatemala, from April 28 to May 4, 2001, to put out forest fires on ecological reserves 
in the Department of Petén. In addition to that, the Ministry of the Navy helped Nicaragua, 
Honduras, Guatemala and El Salvador in 1998 after the devastation caused by Hurricane Mitch. 
See Marcos Pablo Moloeznik “Presente y Futuro del papel de las Fuerzas Armadas Mexicanas, 
Aproximación al debate sobre el rol del  instrumento militar en la democracia,” in Security and 
Defense Studies Review  1, (2001):108. http://www3.ndu.edu/chds/Journal/PDF/moloeznik.pdf . 
31 Presidency of the Republic, National Development Plan (Mexico, 2000), 127. 
32 Between September 2001 and March 2003 there were 27,000 flights to dissuade, prevent 
and defend themselves against potential terrorist attacks besides consolidating interagency 
cooperation and carrying out Plan of North America air surveillance, meaning a greater 
coordination of the North American Air Force-Surveillance Council. Also, an agreement to 
establish a Bi-national Planning Group for two years was signed. In this framework NORAD has 
conducted a series of exercise training flights in coordination with the U.S. Federal Aviation 
Administration throughout the United States and Canada. Northcom. General Ralph Eberhart, 
Statement before the House Armed Service Committee United States House of Representatives, 
March 13, 2003.  http;//armedservice.house.gov/openingstat…leases/108thcongress/03-03-13eber 
hart.ht 
33 BBC World, “Canadá dice no al sistema antimisiles”; BBC World, February, 25, 2005, 
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Undocumented Immigration and Drug Trafficking 
 on the Mexico-United States Agenda: The Ghost of Unilateralism 
 
We must also take into consideration the fact that smart border agreements are 
intended to guarantee the legal transit of persons and goods, as well as the 
development of the adequate infrastructure along both U.S. borders. 
Consequently, although it is an important step for the creation of a security 
perimeter in North America, the great pending task will continue to be dealing 
with the issue of the immigration of Mexican workers (“illegal” for United 
States, “undocumented” for Mexico) in which the tendency is that unilateral U.S. 
actions on cooperation and understanding will prevail.  
Without a doubt, the United States and Mexico will have to design an 
ambitious border agenda, which must include migrants, smugglers of people 
(“polleros”), smugglers of goods, o rganized crime, water supply and 
environmental protection. After the events of September 11, 2001 most analysts 
were optimistic in considering that, in exchange for an immigration agreement, 
Mexico could be totally cooperative in seeking effective border security.
34 
However, despite the fact that the United States considers illegal migration 
one of the threats to its security, the struggle against terrorism and practical 
actions concerning border security subordinated a possible immigration 
agreement with Mexico. On the contrary, Tom Ridge has publicly stated that 
“undocumented aliens are as dangerous to the United States as terrorists, drug 
dealers or weapons of mass destruction.”
35 
The latent concern regarding the possibility that Islamic terrorists may enter 
the United States from Mexico became stronger in August 2004 after the arrest of 
Farida Goolam Mohamed Ahmed. According to more recent data, between 
September 1, 2003 and August 2, 2004, the Border Patrol arrested 57,633 non-
Mexican immigrants and, since 9/11, has arrested 700 immigrants related to 
terrorist groups.
36 
U.S. attention is still focused on the porosity of the border and, independently 
of the Agreement on Smart Borders, it is unilaterally promoting its own border 
security agenda by strengthening border controls, which may even lead to the 
exclusion or marginalization of its North American partners’ interests. That is the 
                                                 
34 John Bailey, “México visto desde fuera: nueva arquitectura antiterrorista,” Reforma, July 3, 
2002. 
35 Alberto Nájar, “Los migrantes contra Bush,” La Jornada, August 8, 2004. 
36 Associated Press, “Incidente cuestiona la seguridad de la frontera”, August 6, 2004 and 
David Aponte, “EU: se evitó cruce de 700 presuntos terroristas,” El Universal, April 5, 2005. 70  Chanona 
 
reason for the importance that Mexico and Canada place on the reinforcement of 
the dialogue and cooperation with the United States. 
There are numerous examples of strengthening of border controls and of anti-
migrant actions, such as:  
 
•  Greater control along the border with Mexico, the clearest example of which 
is the Arizona Border Control (ABC), an operation that aims to strengthen 
border surveillance, with a budget of half a million dollars per week. The 
project includes the use of Predator-type spy planes, an increase of 400 
Border Patrol agents, the establishment of a special camp on the Tohono 
Indian reservation to concentrate undocumented migrants and a voluntary 
repatriation program. 
 
The strengthening of controls on the Mexican border includes Border Patrol 
use of rubber bullets and mustard gas against the migrants, apparently agreed 
within the framework of the 2001 Action Plan for Border Security, which has 
recently been the subject of numerous debates within Mexico. 
 
•  The announcement made by former Attorney General Ashcroft concerning 
the possibility of detaining any undocumented migrant "for security reasons" 
indefinitely.  
 
•  The control and even non-recognition of the Mexican consular registry, an 
identification document that over 1,200,000 Mexicans in the United States 
have.  
 
•  The unilateral deportation of undocumented workers detained in Arizona 
(even chaining their hands and feet) within the framework of the Lateral 
Repatriation Program and staging raids in areas where a large number of 
undocumented aliens live, such as California. 
 
•  House of Representatives passage of the Real ID Act, which argues security 
reasons to limit political asylum; modifies a series of uses of the Consular 
Registration (such as making it insufficient for applying for a driver’s license 
and requiring proof of legal residency); authorizes the construction of a 5.5 
km. extension of the San Diego security wall (making it a total of 22.4 km 
long); and requires that the Department of Homeland Security develops and 
implements a pilot program to identify and test land surveillance 
technologies in Tucson, Arizona. 
 
For Mexican authorities, the way to face the challenge of illegal immigration 
between both countries lies in a guest workers’ agreement. However, in the short 
term, the possibility of signing an agreement of this kind seems remote, while North American Security  71 
 
actions against immigrants to strengthen U.S. safety measures will continue to 
increase.  
On the other hand, drug trafficking, and especially the wave of violence that 
has broken out in the last few weeks in Mexican border states, is the other 
difficult issue in the Mexico-U.S. relationship. Drug trafficking, on the bilateral 
agenda since the 1980s, seems to be reaching a point that requires the renewal of 
cooperative efforts by both countries to combat it.  
As I have mentioned before, Mexico’s internal stability is a security issue for 
our northern neighbor. Consequently, the United States government has made 
public announcements regarding the violence generated by drug traffickers, in 
order to “protect” its citizens who travel to Mexico.   
Thus, on January 26, the State Department issued an announcement alerting 
its citizens to the insecurity along the border with Mexico.
37 Later, the U.S. 
ambassador to Mexico sent a letter pointing to the increase in violence in the 
border cities and Mexican authorities’ inability to stop it.
38  
In view of U.S. announcements and the possibility of having Mexico return 
to the list of countries which the United States submits to the process of “anti-
drug certification”, the Mexican government has responded by adhering to its 
foreign policy tradition, demanding from its North American partner respect and 
non-intervention in the internal matters of the country. However, if this reaction 
from the Mexican government is not accompanied by a negotiating strategy, it is 
very likely that the cooperation between both countries will be subordinated and 
threatened by U.S. unilateralism.  
Unfortunately, the disagreements between both governments seem to be 
prevailing over encouragement for new cooperative actions.  Mexico should 
benefit from U.S. concern about the security along its northern border and the 
country’s general stability by proposing new cooperation programs. President 
Fox’s government has the possibility of opening negotiations with our northern 
neighbor, resulting in the contribution of resources and technology, not only to 
combat drug trafficking, but also to shore up attention to other priority issues for 
our country, like social exclusion and unemployment, which tend to foster 
insecurity. 
 
                                                 
37According to the State Department, 27 U.S. citizens have been kidnapped, two were 
murdered and 11 are still missing.  
38Among other things, Ambassador Garza said that, “Although violence in border cities is not 
new, the fight among groups of drug traffickers is increasing and has resulted in drastic increases of 
murder and kidnapping, posing a threat to the integrity of U.S. citizens.” He also expressed his 
concern regarding  “the local police forces’ inability to combat the drug lords. Kidnapping and 
violence in general will have a negative effect on tourism and trade along our borders, which are 
both vital for the region’s prosperity.”  And he denounced impunity, saying, “The criminals have an 
impressive arsenal of weapons, since they know that it is not very likely that they will be caught 
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Conclusions 
 
The events of the 11 of September of 2001 started the building of the security 
community in North America, the security is the main issue of the integration: 
the three North American countries have recognized that is a necessary condition 
for the economic development. Beyond an identity, a community is in the 
making. 
The conformation o f North America on the basis of security matters is 
increasing and the framework for a trilateral convergence is there. Although it is 
in its initial stage, the recognition of the North American security community 
shifts the problem to the definition, conformation and implementation of these 
policies, putting them in their correct context. At the end of the day, even though 
the construction of an identity is debatable, the building of a community is 
unavoidable.  
Reality is proving that national interests and threats go beyond our borders, 
thus expanding the effects of national security to the space of regional security. 
The projection of a regional North American bloc in international politics is far 
from being a fact. However, what is happening is that a regional bloc is coming 
into being with political progress in the coordination and articulation of actions, 
although under U.S. hegemony.  
The security community, in the sense of a common identity and an automatic 
identification of common threats in relations among the North American 
countries, is far from being explicit. In addition to the historic heritage, Mexico is 
trapped in a definition of foreign policy and security; there are differences 
inherent to the asymmetry among the countries, which for economic reasons, 
such as migration and work, foster various opposing forms of nationalism that 
show the divergence of national interests.   
Cooperation of all kinds will deepen among the three nations of North 
America. And, once more, Canada will continue to be ahead in deepening 
cooperation in military matters. In the meantime, Mexico will try to safeguard 
U.S. security by stepping up its efforts to organize smart borders to make sure 
that it honors its interest in supporting its neighbor, as well as by maintaining 
internal stability and a minimum agreement among the country’s political forces. 
Currently, however, disagreements tend to prevail over agreements. 
Nevertheless, one of the highlights of Mexico-U.S. relations is that Mexico’s 
economic, political and social stability is a priority for the United States, a 
situation which, besides requiring increased cooperation on border security 
matters, opens an important window of opportunity for negotiations with the 
Mexican government, including the issues of the m ultidimensional security 
agenda such as the fight against poverty, diseases and the environmental 
deterioration.  
 
The Future of Mexican-U.S. Economic Relations:   
Is the EU a Model for North America? 
 
 
 
 
 
Gustavo Vega Cánovas 
  
Introduction 
 
In the last few years some analysts and observers of North American integration  
in Mexico but also in the Unites States,  have been proposing the need for a 
deepening of North American trade and investment liberalization toward higher 
levels of integration covering social and immigration policies. In these proposals 
normally one finds references to the European Union (EU) as a model of 
integration that North America should follow.
1 
In this paper I will address two questions. First, to what extent is the EU a 
useful model for the near future integration efforts in the North American region. 
Second, what is the likely future evolution of North American integration?  In 
order to answer these two  questions, first,  I will compare the experiences of the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the EU and  will try to 
demonstrate that although NAFTA and the EU share important commonalities in 
terms of extent and depth of integration, they  are also very different  in terms of 
origins, goals, scope, degree of institutionalization and centralization and because 
of this, one important lesson one can draw from the EU experience is that higher 
convergence in the social  field is not likely at least in the short term in North 
America. However, in the second part of the paper, I will argue that September 
11
th opens in my opinion a possibility to advance the process of integration in the 
trade and migration fronts. In order for this to happen a Schengen type of 
agreement would have to be negotiated between Mexico and the United States. 
 
Economic and Political Models which account for Processes of Integration 
 
Economists as well as political scientists have formulated models useful to 
understand processes of integration. These models normally entail categories that 
try to account for the nature and extent of integration, both economic, social and 
political. For instance, in economics there is  a  model  which is normally used to 
                                                 
1 A clear example of this approach is found in Robert Pastor´s book Toward a North American 
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account for regional processes of integration which departs from the assumption 
that integration can be explained on the basis of a continuum which starts from a 
basic "negative" form of integration, (which entails the removal of discrimination 
and of restrictions on the free movement of goods and factors of production 
between countries), and a more advanced  "positive" form, which requires the 
development of common institutions and policies to enable the integrated market 
to function effectively and to promote collective political and economic 
objectives.
2  Bela  Balassa's classic model, for instance, formulates economic 
integration as a process in which three cumulative stages of negative or market 
integration (free trade area, customs union, and common market) are superseded 
by two stages of positive or policy integration (economic union and total 
economic integration).
3  In principle, each stage incorporates all features of the 
preceeding one, plus a new element. 
From this perspective, we can situate integration arrangements like the 
Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC), or the former European 
Free T rade Area (EFTA) and go through arrangements like NAFTA, the 
Southern cone Common Market (MERCOSUR), and reach the EU which from 
this perspective, is the most advanced example of deep positive integration.  
Political scientists, like Peter Smith from the University of San Diego, have 
also proposed models, aimed at comparing integration arrangements according to 
dimensions of  scope, depth, institutionalization, and  centralization.
4 The 
advantages of these categories are that they account not only for the extent of 
economic integration but also for the level of political, social and legal 
integration among countries.   
What one realizes when applying these categories is that among all 
integration arrangements existing at the present time throughout the world, the 
EU is the most ambitious and complete undertaking.  The EU covers a broader 
range of economic, political and social issues, involves deeper policy 
coordination, is more institutionalized and has resulted in more centralized 
decision-making. But where i n this continuum can we place North American 
integration? In order to answer this question, we will use Smith’s categories of 
depth, scope, institutionalization and centralization. 
                                                 
2  Peter Robson, The Economics of International Integration. (London: Allen and Unwin, 
1987), 1. 
3 Bela Balassa, The Theory of Economic Integration (London: Allen and Unwin, 1962). 
4 Peter Smith, “The Politics of Integration: Concepts and Themes” in  The Challenge of 
Integration. Europe and the Americas ed. Peter H. Smith (New Brunswick and London: 
Transaction Publishers 1993),  5 and ff. Scope is defined as the range of issues  and transactions 
falling under the purview of the integration scheme; Depth as the extent of policy coordination or 
harmonization; Institutionalization as the degree to which accommodation and decision making 
take place in organized and predictable ways; and centralization the extent to which there exists a 
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The European Union and NAFTA compared 
 
When one reviews the process of integration that is taking place in North Amer-
ica using the variable of scope,  one has to recognize  that  the three countries of 
North American do enjoy a relationship nearly as wide as those of the EU coun-
tries. The NAFTA is clearly a result of a long-term trend towards integration of 
trade and investment in the North American economy. More than 80 percent of 
Mexican and Canadian trade is with the United States and between 33 and 35 of 
United States trade is with Canada and Mexico. Canada is the largest trading 
partner of the United States while Mexico in 2004 was the third largest. There are 
also substantial U.S. Mexican and U.S. Canadian foreign investment flows. La-
bor market integration between the Mexican and the US economies is also very 
high. Mexican migrant labor has had a large impact on the US economy by in-
creasing the labor supply an effect probably greater that that arising from in-
creased U.S.- Mexican commodity trade, direct foreign investment, or financial 
transactions. At least 10 percent o f the growth of the U.S. labor supply since 
world war two is due to Mexican migrants. Besides all of the above, NAFTA it-
self as a free trade agreement is without doubt  the most profound economic inte-
gration arrangement short of a common market.
5 But here is where similarities 
end between NAFTA and the EU. Despite the obvious affinities, the EU as a 
model provide for deeper integration than does NAFTA.  
The same explanatory variable of scope is extremely useful in highlighting 
the differences between the two arrangements. To begin with, the EU has had 
uniform custom policy since January 1, 1993. In fact, most if not all of the EU 
nations have already eliminated customs checkpoints along their borders. This, 
however, is not the case in North America where each country in NAFTA retains 
its own regulations and have not contemplated a common custom policy.  Next, 
the treaties governing the EU provide for the free movement of persons among 
member nations. Students and laborers are particularly attended to, with 
European youth eligible for up to a year of education at another country's 
national university and uniform labor protection laws covering the entire 
continent. In this dimension NAFTA is also much less ambitious since migration 
provisions only apply to professionals, business persons and investors all of 
whom have the right to transfer temporarily for work in member states. The 
Maastricht Treaty also covers trade policy (the Council of Ministers makes 
decisions applied to all members), consumer protection,  and defense none of 
which are addressed in the NAFTA agreement.  
Institutionalization as criteria for comparison points to further striking 
differences. The EU has implemented coordinated policies regarding: a)  trade 
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agreements with non-member nations (trade agreements are agreed to by the 
Union, not individual countries), b) macroeconomic policy (member states may 
not permit run-away  inflation nor unilaterally devalue their currencies), c) social 
security, d) tax legislation, e) health programs, f) competition and quality  issues, 
and consumer protection. NAFTA countries are free to pursue their own policies 
on all these issues. Furthermore, the EU has established a common currency, an 
instrument which is not likely in the future in North America though i t is only 
used for large inter-member transfers and each country continues to maintain its 
own legal tender. 
Considering the fact that both arrangements exist in the form of a diplomatic 
treaty, it may be unfair to say that one is more institutionalized than the other. 
Nonetheless, the EU allows decision making to take place in more organized and 
predictable ways than NAFTA does. For this reason, I would contend that 
NAFTA is not as formal an organization as the EU. This fact, notwithstanding, 
the very legal nature of both organizations provides for institutionalization far 
more thorough than APEC, the Andean Pact, with the exception of MERCOSUR. 
The argument for centralization is not as ambiguous. The EU clearly has a 
much more advanced central decision-making process: The European 
Commission draws up proposals that are binding on all members. No such body 
exists under the terms of NAFTA. In fact, changes to the treaty are negotiated on 
an ad-hoc basis. Dispute resolution does go to a central trade commission, but its 
decisions are not binding (though one country may retaliate against another that 
continues with policies that have been deemed unfair by a binational panel). The 
North American Free Trade Area also lacks institutions correlate to the European 
Council, Court of Justice or Court of Auditors. Another aspect of EU 
policymaking glaringly missing from NAFTA is the existence of a 
democratically-elected body to assist in its administration.   
Despite the similarities, it is clear, then, that the EU and NAFTA are two 
very different arrangements. Even when one steps away from Smith's 
explanatory variables the differences are clear. In NAFTA one country (the 
United States) is able to overpower the other two through pure economic might 
and a disparately large population. Such is not the case in Europe, where the 
largest country (Germany) contains less than a quarter of the group's people and 
earns less than 35 percent of its gross product. Further, the wage and GNP per 
capita disparities among EU nations (which measure about 3:1, Germany: Spain) 
are much smaller than those in NAFTA (where a 10:1 disparity exists between 
the United States and Mexico). 
The question then arises, why are the two arrangements so different? After 
all, both are integration schemes that involve western countries with a long 
tradition of market-based economic policy. One obvious explanation is that the 
EU is simply much older than NAFTA. Although founded in 1957, the EC did 
not even reach the point of free trade until 1968. If this is taken as a guide, it The Future of Mexican-U.S. Economic Relations  77 
 
might be assumed that in thirty years the North American Continent will be as 
integrated as the European. 
This explanation only goes so far, however. The two treaties rose out of very 
different historical environments. It is perhaps foolish to assume a post-Cold War 
economic pact will develop in the same way one did that was founded during the 
Marshall Plan era. The differing surrounding elements do offer a compelling 
explanation, however. The needs of the European countries in the 1950's were 
markedly different from those of North America in the 1990s. Perhaps the most 
pressing reason for unification in the 1950s was the need to strengthen Western 
Europe to such an extent that it could resist a Soviet-led invasion. Clearly, North 
America faces no such threat today. Further, factories in post-World War II 
Europe needed to find economies of scale if they were to successfully rebuild. 
The productive plants of Canada, Mexico and the Unites States have not faced 
similar destruction since the Mexican Revolution in the 1920s.  
NAFTA was implemented for a unique set of reasons. To begin, with, 
Mexico was saddled with such high debt payments that it had no choice than to 
seek outside capital if it were to develop. It, therefore, sought a trade and 
investment agreement with the most powerful economy in the world. From a 
northern perspective, The United States wanted to help stabilize Mexico's 
economy in order to prevent the negative shocks that would transfer to the States 
of Texas and California if their southern neighbor were to continue experiencing 
economic and political difficulty. Canada simply wished to prevent the United 
States both from granting better trade and financial treatment to Mexico and from 
positioning itself as the only viable conduit to trade in the Americas. 
This being the case, it is perhaps inappropriate to expect the EU and NAFTA 
to be overly similar. They grew out of different eras with different needs and for 
different reasons. In fact, in direct contravention of NAFTA, the EU has always 
been considered a political union first and an economic union second. The two 
treaties were never meant to be considered equal. 
 
Spill over in North America? 
 
There is a long standing debate in the literature about the political and economic 
impacts of economic integration in the countries involved. The question is 
whether once the process of integration is initiated at the lower level, there is a 
tendency to move more or less automatically from one stage to the next. Political 
theories of integration have often asserted such logic, while pure economic 
theory remains more skeptical.
6  Taking the EU example one could argue that 
indeed there is an inexorable logic to economic integration, even though the 
reactions of the Danish, French and English  electorates to deeper stages of 
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integration clearly prove that the progress beyond the customs union is unlikely 
to be smooth. 
However, if one takes other examples like the free trade agreements forged 
on an individual basis between what at that time was the EC and members of the 
European Free Trade Association (EFTA) (Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Finland, 
Austria and Switzerland) one could reasonably argue that free trade areas can 
achieve stable equilibrium at levels that do not entail significant elements of 
supranationality, that is, that economic integration can be managed and contained 
at an early stage at least for a long time as the case of EFTA countries show. 
7 
In principle, it is clear that NAFTA countries have intentionally chosen the 
EFTA rather than the EU route, but what is the likelihood of the NAFTA 
following, albeit over some time the EU path of positive deepening integration? 
In my opinion, this will not happen for the near future. No country in North 
America would accept the erosion of sovereignty involved in the EU model.   
In clear contrast to the EU whose members have been willing to surrender 
their sovereignty in order to achieve common purposes, Mexico, Canada and the 
United States have guarded their sovereignty with great zeal. Mexico is 
extremely sensitive over key economic areas such as petroleum and over its 
autonomy in foreign affairs. Canada’s views are shaped by some of the same 
forces: cultural industries and water resources are to Ottawa what oil is to 
Mexico, while its sensitivity to autonomy in at least foreign economic policy is 
equally strong. 
8  For instance,  both Mexico and Canada  have expressed 
opposition to an integration arrangement in the form of a customs union or a 
common market in the North American context because a  customs union or a 
common market require that a uniform set of trade and commercial policies be 
applied to all non-members.  Mexico and Canada have given clear signs that they 
do not wish to follow U.S. initiatives on trade with the outside world.  Both 
countries have maintained trade relations with Cuba after the United States 
ceased to do so.
9 In other words, Canadian and Mexican strategic elites believe 
                                                 
7 Victoria Curzon Price has aptly demonstrated that the free trade technique very successfully 
managed the relationship between the EC and the EFTA countries where these latter group of 
countries  “had no stomach for the highly intensive form of economic integration on which the EC 
was prepared to embark” and wanted “ to keep a free hand not only in trade policy but in 
...industrial policy.” See her  Free Trade Areas, The European experience. What Lessons for 
Canadian-US Trade Liberalization, Observation no. 31 (Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute, 1987). Of 
course, the recent adhesion of most of EFTA countries to the EU would seem to support the idea 
for the inexorable logic of economic integration. However, the fact that it took such a long time 
would support the notion that free trade areas can be contained  at least for a good number of years.  
8  The contrast between the United States and Canada is, of course, narrowed considerably by 
a shared Anglo-Saxon origin, similar economic level of development, a federal political structure, 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) membership, and an alliance during two world wars. 
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Nicaragua during the Sandinista regime despite strong opposition from the United States.  The Future of Mexican-U.S. Economic Relations  79 
 
that if they are to preserve their autonomy in foreign economic policy, they 
cannot accept a common m arket’s legal restriction on its capacity for 
independent action.
10  
In the case of the United States, it is clear too that U.S. leaders are as 
unwilling to share or surrender sovereignty as its North American counterparts 
are. As an author has said: "The first impulse of great powers when faced with 
threats to the effectiveness of national policy is often to try to reinforce unilateral 
control by asserting extraterritorial jurisdiction, as the United States has sought to 
do.”
11  There are many examples of this U.S. impulse like the October 1992 
"Cuban Democracy Act" i.e.:   the Torricelly Law in the trade field, or the Helms 
Burton Law.  
A second important factor that will prevent NAFTA from following the 
pattern of Europe in the social field soon is the wide income disparities prevalent 
among the three NAFTA countries. These large income disparities would make 
the process of deepening integration very difficult and augment adjustment 
problems. As Hufbauer and Schott have pointed out, the European Community 
(EC) spanned a wide divide when it incorporated Spain and Portugal, countries 
whose per capita GNP levels at the time of accession (January 1986) were $4860 
and $2,250, or 40 percent and 19 percent, respectively, of West German per 
capita GNP. By comparison, Mexico's per capita GNP was is in 2004 only 12 
percent that of the United States and Canada combined.
12  Moreover, there were 
fewer people to accommodate at the lower income levels in the EC case, thus 
limiting the adjustment burden and simplifying the task of paying for adjustment 
assistance.  
In consequence, if these important factors seem to preclude that NAFTA may 
in the near future follow the European pattern in terms of social integration, what 
is the likely future evolution of it? 
13 In order to answer this question, I think it is 
important to present a picture of what impact NAFTA has had for Mexico since it 
entered into force in January, 1994.  Is it achieving the purposes for which it was 
                                                 
10 Mexico, for instance, has continued in the last few years to pursue trade initiatives with 
other regions. It has signed free trade agreements with 42 countries in Latin America, Europe, Asia 
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countries in Latin America and Europe. 
11 Robert Keohane,  Sovereignty, Interdependence and International Institutions  Working 
Paper Series No. 1, Cambridge, Mass.: Centre for International Studies, 1991). 
12 Gary Hufbauer and Jeffrey Schott,  North American Free Trade. Issues and 
Recommendations. (Washington, D.C. Institute for International Economics 1992), 7-8.   
13  The difficulties present in North America to follow the EU route should not preclude the 
possibility that North American integration may take an unprecedented form in which elements of 
policy integration were instituted before lower levels of integration were complete. In fact, as we 
will argue in the following  section,  September 11
th opened the door for this to happen in the 
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negotiated? Can the European experience offer any lessons to  improve the 
integration process in North America? In the next section, I offer answers to 
these questions. 
 
Structural Change in Mexico Since the 1980s 
 
One way to appreciate the impact of NAFTA on the Mexican economy is by 
showing the strong process of structural change that the Mexican economy has 
experienced since the opening of the economy and especially since NAFTA went 
into effect. The following table shows the performance of the economy during 
successive periods, from the administration of President Miguel de la Madrid, 
who initiated the opening of the economy (1983-88). This was followed by 
President Salinas (1989-94), the crisis of 1995, and the successful stabilization 
and growth during the period of President Ernesto Zedillo (1995-2000).  
Table 1 
Economic Performance by Periods 1983-2001 
($ million) 
  1983-88 1989-94  1995  1996-00 2001 
GDP (annual growth %)  1.1  3.9  -6.2  5.5  -0.3 
GDP in manufacturing (annual growth %)  2.3  3.5  -4.8  6.4  -3.9 
Manufacturing employment (annual growth %)  0.9  -1.2  -8.9  2.5  -4.3 
Trade balance ($bn annual avge)  7.0  -12.2  7.1  -2.9  -9.9 
Exports (annual growth %)  16.7  12.2  30.6  16.0  -4.8 
Imports (annual growth %)  12.0  19.1  -8.7  19.3  -3.5 
Manufactured exports ($bn annual avge)  7.3  33.3  66.6  109.7  141.3 
Current account balance ($bn annual avge)  1.8  -10.7  -1.6  -11.6  -17.4 
Foreign direct investment ($bn annual avge)  2.3  4.6  9.5  11.8  27.7 
US GDP (annual growth %)  4.4  2.4  2.7  4.1  1.2 
Foreign debt, end of period ($bn)  101.8  153.6  176.5  173.7  172.2 
Source: INEGI, US Department of Commerce, and Ecanal 
 
Macroeconomic Overview 
 
The changes in the economy from before the NAFTA to after can be easily seen. 
Although Mexico suffered a devaluation and financial crisis in 1995, only one 
year after the NAFTA went into effect, this crisis was not caused by free trade. 
The high current account deficit, which reached $29.7 billion in 1994, or 6.8 
percent of GDP, was caused by heavy overvaluation of the peso exchange rate, as 
the currency had been used since 1989 as an anchor to bring inflation down. The 
NAFTA undoubtedly accelerated trade growth in 1994 and thus indirectly helped 
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occurred in any event, as the economy had accumulated considerable distortions 
from the overvalued peso. 
Free trade was, however, key for Mexico to recover quickly after 1995, as 
the table shows. With high import growth in 1994 having caused the external 
deficit to rise from -$23.4 billion to -$29.7 billion, when the peso adjusted down 
the deficit fell dramatically. There was unprecedented growth in exports, from 
$51.9 billion in 1993 to $166.4 billion in 2000, which helped overcome this crisis 
within a short period. The current account deficit fell to -$1.6 billion in 1995 and 
rose only to -$2.3 billion in 1996.  
Thus, for the first time in more than 30 years Mexico saw a reduction in the 
external current account deficit even in the presence of high import growth, 
which was on average 19.3 percent per year from 1996 to 2000. The current 
account deficit was only  -$11.6 billion on average and never exceeded  -$18 
billion, including in 2001, when exports to the United States fell -5 percent. The 
low current account deficit meant that the economy could grow faster than before 
without suffering bal ance-of-payments crises, as had been the case from the 
1970s through 1994. 
Exports of goods and services jumped from 19.4 percent of GDP in 1985 to 
32.8 percent in 2000. Employment in manufacturing, not having grown for 15 
years, grew 2.5 percent per year, only interrupted in 2001 by the U.S. recession. 
Another significant change was that as Mexico became more integrated with 
North America, in 2001 its economy adjusted downwards following the U.S. 
recession, avoiding an expansion of domestic demand when exports were flat. 
Since 1995, Mexico has had a floating exchange rate, which became 
validated as the appropriate regime, for it allowed Mexico to adjust smoothly to 
external shocks from the Asian and Russian crises of 1997-98. The floating 
exchange rate has been responsible for much of the success of Mexican exports 
and for the control of the trade deficit within manageable limits. 
Privatization was another important change in the macro economy, for 
Mexico had a very large and inefficient state-owned sector engaged in steel, 
fertilizers, hotels, banks, insurance, telephones, and many stakes in 
manufacturing industry. From all of these industries, the state withdrew. 
Privatization was a sound policy, as it reduced the size of the state and budgetary 
transfers. But clearly one problem was that many privatizations during the term 
of Salinas lacked transparency and ended up in bankruptcies after the peso 
devaluation in 1995. 
New privatization projects are now focused on electricity, gas, and a new 
regime for toll roads. President Vicente Fox, however, with the bad experience of 
the 1990s and especially because of the high cost of rescuing the banks that had 
been privatized, must assure the Congress and public opinion that they will not 
repeat past mistakes and vices before obtaining broad support for privatizations.  
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Foreign direct investment 
 
Table I above shows that FDI has jumped after the NAFTA, which has led to 
major changes in ownership across sectors, transforming Mexican companies 
into more efficiently run  firms and changing the way in which management 
operates. FDI was an average of $4.6 billion per year during 1989-94, almost 
trebled to $11.8 billion during 1996-2000, and reached a peak of $27.7 billion in 
2001. 
Apart from the greater flows of capital and  technology, FDI has led to 
qualitative improvements in corporate governance, an area until recently ignored 
by Mexican regulators. That is, for the first time regulations were issued in 2001 
establishing rules for the conduct of boards of directors and for the protection of 
minority rights.
14  
The NAFTA has been instrumental in making Mexico more attractive and 
secure for foreign investors, especially because they know that the free trade 
regime is permanent, therefore removing a possible cause for uncertainty. It also 
amplified the size of the potential market to investors operating in any of the 
three countries. 
The NAFTA contained a precept guaranteeing national treatment status to 
any investor from the region investing in any of the three countries. Moreover, in 
practice it helped create a climate more propitious to relaxing restrictions, as 
foreign investment was more notorious across economic activities and the public 
gradually saw in this an opportunity for more jobs and higher incomes. In 1995, 
the first foreign banks were permitted to increase their equity shares in Mexican 
banks to acquire control, and gas distribution was open to private investors. Later 
on most of the banks were acquired by foreign investors. 
The positive effects of FDI have become clear across sectors of activity. 
Modernization of management and work standards has been visible in all banks 
acquired by foreigners. The contribution of foreign partners to modernize 
management of family-owned businesses has also been substantial. In many of 
the largest public firms, professional managers are now more prominent than 
they were in the early 1990s, while boards of directors are much more active. 
Investors, for their part, demand greater information on the companies’ 
operations.  
Under NAFTA foreign capital flows to Mexico have revitalized older sectors 
and created new ones.  Foreign investment has contributed to the establishment 
of state-of-the-art plants that are internationally competitive. Three industrial 
sectors that stand out -- automobiles, electronics and textiles, which represent 
core sectors from traditional, heavy and high technology industries  -- have 
become more dynamic and competitive since the agreement became effective in 
1994.   
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Other sectors that have not enjoyed the same kind of capital inflows have not 
enjoyed the same kind of success. For example, Mexico’s agriculture sector has 
shown mixed results under NAFTA.  A dynamic export-oriented agribusiness 
sector coexists with a traditional self-subsistence agriculture sector.  The uneven 
performance of agriculture reveals what NAFTA really is  -- an agreement to 
reduce tariff barriers and promote trade and investment flows -- and the limits to 
what it can deliver.  NAFTA is only an instrument that creates opportunities for 
growth in certain economic sectors, not a solution for transforming the entire 
economy. 
 
Labor Markets 
 
The NAFTA caused an increase in industrial and services employment, offsetting 
losses of jobs in farming. In those sectors where employment has increased, 
output has increased at a faster rate, so that productivity is considerably higher 
than it was before the NAFTA. This explains that there has been a steady 
increase in real wages, which continue to catch up with higher levels of wages in 
North America.  
Nevertheless, wages have increased from very low levels after major macro 
crises wiped out almost one half of their purchasing power in the early 1980s. In 
the more recent period of 1998 to 2001, wages have shown a steady upward trend 
despite fluctuations in output and employment.
15  
Labor productivity in the manufacturing industry, measured crudely as the 
ratio of output to employment, grew 38 percent during the 1980s up until 1990, 
that is, by 3.3 percent per year.  From 1990 to 1993, this growth accelerated to 
6.4 percent and from that year to 2001 it slowed down to 4.8 percent.
16   
The NAFTA has been a major catalyst of the increase in productivity, which 
has been highly correlated with exports.
17 (But even with such growth in 
productivity, labor markets in Mexico are still much less flexible than in North 
America. Workers continue to enjoy heavy protection against shedding or 
relocation; collective labor contracts contain a myriad of uneconomic conditions 
for companies; and measures to reduce employment are in p ractice extremely 
difficult to implement. In 2001, the combination of the U.S. recession and a 
strong peso exchange rate led some multinational firms in manufacturing to close 
                                                 
15 Instituto Nacional de Estadística Geografía e Informática (INEGI), various years, various 
statistics, at htpp://www.inegi.gob.mx/ 
16 Rogelio Ramírez De la O., What Has Changed in the Performance of Employment and 
Wages in Mexico after NAFTA?  Incomes and Productivity in North America (Papers from the 
2000 Seminar of the Commission for Labor Cooperation, 2000) 
17 Rogelio Ramírez De la O.,  “The Impact  of NAFTA in the Auto Industry in México”  in 
The North American Auto Industry under NAFTA, Sidney Weintraub and Christopher Sands eds. 
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down operations for the first time in many years, blaming high labor costs.
18 In 
fact, this is one cause for the fall in manufacturing employment of -3.9 last year. 
Sectoral Developments of NAFTA 
 
Table II shows the dramatic increase in exports from Mexico, from $41 
billion in 1990 to $51.9 billion in 1993 (8.1 percent per year) and $166.4 billion 
in 2000 (15 percent per year from 1990 and 18.1 percent from 1993). On this 
measure, the post-NAFTA period recorded most of the growth in exports. 
Table II 
Total Exports of Mexico and selected manufacturers 
($ million) 
   1990  1993  2000 
Exports  41,046  51,886  166,424 
   Crude Oil  8,921  6,485  14,884 
       
Manufactures  29,062  42,500  146,439 
   Textiles  1,291  2,770  12,512 
   Chemicals  1,830  2,558  5,971 
   Glass  258  673  1,561 
   Steel  938  1,399  2,983 
   Transport Equipment  12,876  14,514  51,143 
   Electrical, Electronics  7,022  14,032  49,156 
Source: Bank of Mexico, ‘Indicadores del Sector Externo,’ various years 
 
Table III shows that imports recorded a similarly high increase, so that the 
link between export and import growth became accentuated. 
 
Table III 
Total Imports of Mexico and selected manufacturers 
($ million) 
   1990  1993  2000 
Imports  41,579  65,367  174,480 
   Agriculture  2,265  2,393  4,855 
       
Manufactures  28,341  61,568  165,221 
   Textiles  1,706  3,525  11,425 
   Chemicals  2,929  4,855  5,971 
   Plastics  785  3,404  9,277 
   Steel  1,628  3,312  7,653 
   Transport Equipment  13,821  16,770  44,497 
   Electrical, Electronics  7,265  12,511  44,744 
Source: Bank of Mexico, ‘Indicadores del Sector Externo,’ various years 
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The Auto Sector 
 
The auto sector has been the most dynamic sector in the NAFTA. Mexico’s 
exports, in the table, included as transport equipment, jumped from $12.8 billion 
in 1990 to $14.5 billion in 1993 and $51.1 billion in 2000. Mexico’s export drive 
started before the NAFTA, but it did not go for enough as after the NAFTA.   
The automotive industry plays a crucial role in the economies of Mexico, 
Canada and the United States in terms of exports, employment generation, and 
technological and industrial development. Thus it is not surprising that the 
automotive sector was singled out as particularly sensitive during NAFTA 
negotiations. From the Mexican perspective the sector is not only the largest 
exporter and importer of manufactured goods, but as such it is also a prime 
example of the kind of intra industry trade NAFTA was designed to boost. Free 
trade allows firms that sell in the entire North American market to relocate their 
production facilities among NAFTA countries to minimize costs and take full 
advantage of specialization and economies of scale. 
The auto industry in Mexico has taken full advantage of trade and investment 
policies established under NAFTA.
19  It has gone through a restructuring process 
that has enabled it to increase competitiveness and to successfully integrate into 
the North American and the world auto market. 
The automotive industry has contributed to growth and job creation. 
Although the 1995 peso crisis had a devastating effect on Mexican auto 
production with domestic sales falling 80 percent, NAFTA made it possible for 
the industry to recover with remarkable speed.  Vehicle and auto parts production 
represents 2 percent of Mexico’s GDP and more than 11 percent of Mexico’s 
manufacturing GDP. The auto industry accounts for 20 percent of Mexico’s total 
exports and 22 percent of total manufacture exports.  
Production jumped from 1.055 million units of cars and trucks in 1993 to 
1.854 million in 2001, an annual growth of 7.3 percent. Exports were 493,194 
and 1.382 million respectively, i.e. a growth of 13.8 percent per year. Domestic 
sales of vehicles jumped from 576,025 to 918,835 units, growing 6 percent per 
year despite the deep recession in 1995 when sales plummeted  -69 percent 
followed by only a mild recovery. 
Employment in manufacturing in the auto industry reached 313,157 workers 
in 1993, rising to 432,733 in 2001, i.e. by 4.1 percent per year. Comparing this 
figure with that of output growth, we can infer that there was an annual increase 
in productivity per worker of 3.1 percent per year. While employment in vehicle 
producers only rose mildly from 1993 to 2001, employment in auto parts 
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increased by 4.8 percent per year, significantly higher than the increase of 2.6 
percent per year recorded for the whole manufacturing sector, as was shown in 
Table I. 
Under NAFTA the Mexican auto industry has become highly integrated with 
its Canadian and U.S. counterparts, and vehicles made in Mexico have a high 
United States and Canadian content. Trade in automotive products has 
consequently exploded. U.S.-Mexico trade in vehicles and auto parts expanded 
from $14.6 billion to $47.1 billion between 1993 and 2000. Almost 25 percent of 
U.S. auto parts imports come from Mexico.
20 Around 90 percent of Mexico’s 
vehicle exports are sold in the U.S. market, 6 percent in Canada, and 3 percent in 
Germany.  Mexico has become the second largest export market, after Canada, 
for both U.S. vehicles and auto parts. In 2000, U.S. car exports to Mexico totaled 
$4.3 billion. 
Mexico, largely as a result of the NAFTA, is now the eighth largest global 
producer of cars and fifth in trucks. The good performance of the industry makes 
it key for future integration with North America. Moreover, the government is 
keen to create conditions to attract more FDI and is in close consultation with the 
industry regarding taxes and other factors that affect costs and prices. In the next 
few years we will see greater commitments by the government to facilitate 
expansion and productivity growth in this industry. 
The Textile and Clothing Industry 
 
A major goal for Mexico in the NAFTA negotiation was to gain improved access 
to the U.S. market for its textile and clothing products through full elimination of 
tariffs and Multilateral Fiber Agreement (MFA) quotas.  Prior to NAFTA, the so-
called Special Regime enabled Mexican apparel assembled from U.S. fabric to 
benefit from flexible quotas and the application of U.S. tariffs only on the non-
U.S. value added (in other words, “round trip” U.S. fabric was free from duty).  
Intensive utilization of the Special Regime by Mexican exporters established the 
basis for a fast growing garment industry and jobs for low skilled workers.  
Under NAFTA, immediate elimination of MFA quotas, coupled with substantial 
cuts on exceptionally high tariffs as NAFTA entered into force, extended the 
gains achieved under the Special Regime.  Benefits were also extended to 
Mexican fabric producers, who became qualifying suppliers under the complex 
NAFTA rules of origin.
21    
                                                 
20  Among the main auto parts that the United States buys from Mexico are wire harnesses, 
auto stereos, auto body parts, speedometers, engines and air conditioning parts. For its part, Mexico 
buys from the United States engines, wheels, seat parts, and auto stereos. A similar type of 
integration has occurred between the Mexican and Canadian automotive sectors. 
 
21  NAFTA stipulates that no new quotas in the textile and clothing sector may be imposed 
except under specific safeguard provisions.  Moreover,  some products that do not meet the 
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After almost a decade under NAFTA, performance of the Mexican textile 
and clothing industry bears out the initial expectations. In 1995, the Mexican 
industry suffered from the collapse of the domestic economy. Like the auto 
industry, it was able to export its way to recovery thanks to preferential market 
access. After a sharp 6 percent decline in 1995, the industry grew 15 percent, 10 
percent, and 5 percent in 1996, 1997, and 1998, respectively.   
In 2000, Mexico’s textile and clothing industry exported $11 billion, contrib-
uting more than 6.5 percent of Mexico’s total exports.  Two-way Mexico-U.S. 
trade in textiles and clothing increased from $4.1 billion in 1993 to $15.3 billion 
in 2000.
22 In 1998, Mexico became the leading supplier of textile and clothing 
products to the United States, displacing China.
23 
 Significantly, Mexico has also 
become the largest market for U.S. textile products.
24 Today Mexico’s textile and 
clothing industry includes almost 1,200 maquiladora plants, employing close to 
286,000 workers. 
 
The Electronics Industry 
 
The electronics industry, in a fashion s imilar to the automotive and 
textile/clothing sectors, became a major export player for Mexico as a result of 
trade and investment opening promoted by the NAFTA. Mexico established itself 
as the main trading partner for the United States in electronics, surpassing such 
key players as Japan, Canada, Taiwan, Korea and Singapore.  In 2000, both 
Mexican exports of electronics to the United States and U.S. exports to Mexico 
amounted to about  $34 billion in each direction.  Electronics trade between 
Mexico and Canada rose from $210 million in 1993 to $773 million in 2000.  
Zero tariffs and a stable investment climate are behind these trade statistics. 
NAFTA has encouraged Mexican production of sophisticated electronic 
products that go beyond mere assembly, with significant research and develop-
ment now conducted in Mexico.
25 The 1970s stereotype of low cost, labor inten-
                                                                                                                         
or up to a specified import level, which is negotiated among the three countries (Hufbauer and 
Schott 1993). 
22 Sistema de Informacion Empresarial Mexicano,  NAFTA Works: For the Textiles and 
Apparel Industry. Sectoral Fact Sheet (2000) available at htpp//www.naftaworks.org/Publications/ 
Industrial/industrial.html. 
23 Mexico’s main textile and clothing exports to the United States are denim products, knit 
fabric, synthetic fabric, trousers, T-shirts, sweaters and underwear. 
24 Approximately 75 percent of Mexico’s clothing production incorporates U.S. fabric. Kurt 
Salmon Associates Capital Advisors, “Textile Transactions and Trends: Perspectives on Mergers 
and Acquisitions,” Textile Industry Newsletter (Summer, 1999). 
25 Jorge Carrillo  and  Alfredo Hualde, “Third Generation In-Bond Assembly Plants. The Case 
of Delphi-General Motors,” Comercio Exterior 47 no. 9 (1997): 747-58. 88  Vega 
 
sive assembly no longer characterizes the new generation of electronics produc-
tion.
26  
Some 570 maquiladora plants now operate in the electrical and electronics 
sectors, representing almost 12 percent of the total number of maquiladora plants 
in Mexico. In 2000, these firms employed approximately 350,000 workers, an 
increase of 80 percent over 1993 levels. 
The trade and investment story for electronics, as for autos and textiles and 
clothing, finds firms repositioning themselves through mergers, acquisitions and 
greenfield investments, and restructuring their chains of supply. The result is far 
deeper integration of the North American economies. The reward has been higher 
productivity in favored sectors, a strengthened position in the world economy, 
and booming intra-industry trade. 
The Agriculture Sector 
 
Unlike the manufacturing sector, however, NAFTA has had very different effects 
over a two-tier agriculture sector where a booming agribusiness sector coexists 
with a self subsistence, backward and traditional sector.  While the first has been 
able to increase its exports as a result of improved market access into the United 
States and Canada, the latter has been unable to take advantage of the benefits 
that NAFTA has provided in terms of investment and increased production. 
Agriculture accounts for less than 5 percent of Mexico-U.S. trade. While 
trade in this sector has grown, export dynamism is concentrated among fruit and 
vegetable producers in northern and western Mexico who have access to credit 
and have traditionally been quite competitive. These producers do not engage in 
traditional Mexican subsistence agriculture, which is heavily concentrated in the 
central and southern parts of Mexico. The dichotomy between subsistence ejido-
type production and export-led agriculture pushed the government to introduce a 
variety of domestic support policies that side-step NAFTA to sustain the 
livelihood of Mexican peasantry. 
27  
Regional Effects of NAFTA 
 
Exports and investment have been the leading forces of growth in Mexico for the 
past five years. Both of them are closely linked to the NAFTA, but for the same 
reason their effects have been uneven across regions. 
                                                 
26 Nichola Lowe and Martin Kenney, “Foreign Investment and Global Geography of 
Production: Why the Mexican Consumer Electronics Industry Failed,” World Development 27, no. 
8 (1999): 1427-43.  
27 This is the case of the Program for Direct Support for Mexican Producers which delivers 
cash payments  to guarantee a minimum income for 2.9 million farmers who sow 14 million 
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The main driver for exports and manufacturing activity has been the northern 
region and especially the border. South of the border, the industrial area north of 
Mexico City, Guadalajara, Monterrey, and Aguascalientes have all seen growth 
in industrial activity and in exports. These regions are all located in the northern 
corridor from the center of Mexico to the north east and in the western region of 
Guadalajara, where foreign firms in electronics have proliferated for the past 
years. 
But regional disparities have increased after the NAFTA, for the south of 
Mexico has not attracted as much activity as the north. This problem has been 
aggravated by budget constraints, preventing the Government from investing in 
infrastructure and social services. Lack of opportunities in the south while there 
are growing exports and activity in the north, results in large flows of migrants 
from southern states to the northern border and eventually illegally into the 
United States. 
The relatively high growth in the north has a dded pressure on public 
infrastructure and social services, leading in some instances, to extremely poor 
environmental conditions, lack of water, and other public services in northern 
cities. With this in mind, President Fox’s government announced an ambitious 
plan (Plan Puebla-Panama) to invest in infrastructure and connect Mexico with 
Central America through more roads, telecommunications and seaports. This 
plan, however, depends entirely on the successful integration of Mexico to North 
America. But can successful integration with North America be maintained and 
enhanced in light of recent events in the United States and particularly the attacks 
of September 11
th? 
The “Grand Bargain” 
 
As we mentioned before, NAFTA’s success in achieving the aims for which it 
was negotiated, led some academics and public officials including president Fox 
himself, to propose in early 2001 that North America should advance towards 
deeper levels of integration very much in the European style. The proposal was 
bold to the extent that it did not argue in favor of what in classic integration 
theory would be considered a natural second or third steps, namely,  a customs 
union or a common market but it went even further to propose a North American 
Community or  “Grand Bargain.” The main idea of the “Grand Bargain” was that 
NAFTA had achieved everything that could be accomplished through a process 
of free trade in goods and investment and what was required next was the 
liberalization of labor flows and a recognition that  the more developed 
economies, i.e., the United States and Canada,  have a responsibility to  provide 
financial support to the less developed economy, namely,  Mexico to tackle some 
of the problems that NAFTA had accelerated like the regional polarization of the 
economy or the lack of infrastructure in the southern states of Mexico and infra-
structural decay  in the northern border.   90  Vega 
 
This proposal, to say the least, was received with skepticism in Canada and 
the United States but in the latter country the government of President Bush 
decided to initiate talks to explore new ways to strengthen the U.S-Mexican 
economic and  migratory relationship.  According to some observers and 
participants in the negotiations, the talks basically were centering in a possible 
migratory agreement through which an important amount of Mexican workers 
would be allowed to come temporarily to work in the United States. Mexico in 
turn was insisting that the agreement should also include provisions to legalize 
the 3 to 4 million of Mexican undocumented workers that are residing in the U.S. 
This Mexican proposal was made famous by the Mexican Foreign Relations 
Minister, Jorge Castañeda as “the whole Enchilada approach.” Apparently, the 
Bush administration was not persuaded of the legalization proposal but had not 
rejected it either. But then came September 11
th.  What has been the impact of the 
September 11
th attacks on the Mexican-U.S. relations? In the next section, I 
discuss the significance of the September 11
th attacks for the future of Mexico-
U.S. economic relations. 
 
September 11
th and the Need for Secure but Open Borders  
 
History shows that stunning events can force a new perception of the world and a 
new set of policies. In 1941, Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor forced the American 
public to follow President Franklin Roosevelt’s lead, abandon the entrenched 
post First World War policy of isolationism, and adopt a new policy of active 
engagement in world turmoil. In 2003, the tragic events of September 11
th are 
still being debated in the United States.  President George W. Bush has called for 
a global war on terrorism based on a new doctrine of preemptive strikes and the 
creation of a new Department of Homeland Security with extensive powers.  
How these initiatives will play out remains to be seen.  But the same openness 
that fosters economic integration is evidently a great source of vulnerability. The 
United States has thus begun to adopt an array of new policies to make its 
domestic territory and its borders more secure. 
For Canada and Mexico the new security policies had immediate and shock-
ing implications.  On September 11, 2001, the U.S. authorities took a number of 
immediate measures at its borders north and south.  U.S. Customs went to a high 
level of alert which still exists (Level One: sustained and intense inspection). 
Automobile traffic was delayed for several hours and commercial traffic for up to 
12 to 15 hours for several days thereafter. Just-in-time manufacturers, particu-
larly auto companies and Mexican goods exporters, were in crisis.  By some es-
timates, unexpected shutdowns due to part shortages cost auto makers up to 
$25,000 a minute in lost production. Cross-border retail shopping and tourism 
plunged. The U.S. Customs Service beefed up its staffing along the border and 
introduced legislation to triple the number of agents. The Immigration and Natu-
ralization Service (INS) announced plans to introduce an entry/exit system by The Future of Mexican-U.S. Economic Relations  91 
 
2003 at airports and seaports and by 2004 at the 50 largest land entry points. This 
system would require visitors, including those from Mexico, to have their names 
recorded every time they enter and leave the country.   
As these measures were adopted, Mexico’s choices seemed to narrow: either 
take a leap towards deeper integration and be “inside the U.S. tent” or see the 
bilateral border re-erected and be left outside. Debates about deeper integration 
predated September 11
th as did work to negotiate a new initiative to allow more 
Mexican migrant workers into the United States and legalize the workers already 
living in the United States, but the range of possibilities changed that day. Deeper 
integration became a matter of national security: if Mexico wanted to preserve 
openness it had to pay more attention to security. 
Longer term, the impact of a permanent increase in border transaction costs 
acts like a tariff, particularly on Mexican and Canadian goods entering the United 
States.  The higher cost of exports causes U.S. customers to switch to cheaper 
domestic and alternative foreign suppliers.  Mexico’s exchange rate depreciates 
as the demand for Mexican pesos declines. More expensive imports undermine 
Mexican living standards. Higher costs of moving people, goods and services 
also erode Mexico’s productivity performance. The other longer term impact 
could be the reconsideration of the plans to invest in Mexico by countries like 
Japan and those in the EU. Increasingly, they can be expected to head for the 
United States with new investments. Why invest in Mexico or Canada if border 
delays are to be a permanent factor in the other North American markets? 
Diversion of such investment would also undermine Mexico’s productivity 
growth.   
Mexico is not alone in its dilemma.  Increased border security raises 
transaction costs around the world. Some estimates put the aggregate increase in 
transaction costs at one to two percentage points.  If these costs become 
permanent, some way will have to be found to offset the increase -- for example 
by negotiating in the WTO or the Free Trade Area of the of Americas an across-
the-board reduction in industrial tariffs of an equivalent or greater amount. 
Mexico’s response, after a period of uncertainty and delay, was to negotiate with 
the United States a Border Partnership Action Plan recently announced by the 
two countries.
28  This accord is similar to the one signed in December 2001 by 
the United States and Canada on Smart Borders.  
The Action Plan aimed to achieve three objectives: to secure infrastructure, 
to secure the flows of people and to secure the flows of goods.  The securing of 
infrastructure will aim to:  
…conduct a joint survey of [the]… border to identify bottlenecks that impedes the 
movement of goods and people…to develop integrated infrastructure investment 
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plans…and to conduct security assessments of critical infrastructure and take steps to 
protect them from terrorist attacks.
29   
 
The securing of the flows of people, in its turn, will aim to: 
 
 …develop and implement technology systems at ports of entry to speed the flow of 
bona-fide travelers; to cooperate to identify individuals who pose threats to....[both]  
societies before they arrive in North America and to coordinate efforts to deter 
smuggling of third-country nationals and establish a joint U.S. Mexico Advanced 
Passenger Information Exchange System.
30  
 
Finally, the securing of the flow of goods aims to:  
 
…implement technology-sharing programs to place non-intrusive inspection 
systems on cross-border rail lines and high-volume ports of entry; develop and 
implement technology systems to increase security at all points of the supply chain that 
links producers and consumers and to expand partnerships with the private sector to 
increase security of commercial shipments.
31  
 
In other words, all these measures aim to “move the border away from the 
border” through fast tracking pre-cleared travelers at border points; integrated 
border enforcement teams staffed by the two countries with common objectives 
and integrated actions; Internet-based measures to simplify border transactions 
for small and medium sized enterprises; and infrastructure investment to improve 
access to border crossings through, for example, new highway bypasses that 
avoid congested downtown streets, along with a smart handling of goods and 
people at crossings.  These are all sensible measures to secure an open border for 
goods and services.   
But there are a number of sensitive measures that relate to the movement of 
people that still are undefined.  Many measures will speed the cross-border 
movement of business travelers.  Even permanent resident cards are 
contemplated, including a biometric identifier. These measures, also, will 
undoubtedly increase confidence that people from third countries coming to 
North America do not have malign intentions. But what is not clear from the 
border plan is the treatment to be given to Mexican migrant workers. Within this 
category there are, as we know, two groups: those who already reside in the 
United States, a group whose number reached between 3 and 4.5 million in the 
last decade;
32 and those who will, in the future, come to the United States to 
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30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid. 
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work. All that was mentioned when the Action Plan was announced by presidents 
Fox and Bush in Monterrey, Mexico, was that the Cabinet level migration group 
should continue negotiating this issue the way it was charged with in previous 
meetings between both presidents in Guanajuato and Washington.
33 In these 
meetings both presidents committed to a “ Grand Bargain” in immigration flows 
from Mexico, that is a search for alternatives to legalize or regularize the 
migrants who already reside in the United States and adopt a more liberal 
approach for those who will, in the future, come to the United States to work.  
The question, however, is whether the “Grand Bargain” approach is still a vi-
able initiative after the September 11
th events. For Mexico, no doubt, immigra-
tion is an issue that has to form part of the Border Partnership Action Plan. The 
Mexican government considers the legalization of immigrant workers a matter of 
human rights and social justice -- and a necessary step in the economic integra-
tion of North America. In terms of economic benefits, legalization will help en-
sure that the Mexican economy receives a growing flow of worker remittances, 
which now run about $13 billion a year.
34 The legalization of millions of Mexi-
cans working in the United States will moreover improve their economic pros-
pects and enable many to return to Mexico as successful entrepreneurs.  
On the U.S. side, feelings are equally strong.  Some Americans flat out 
oppose any increase in immigration.  More immediately, the attack on September 
11
th and the subsequent deterioration of the U.S. economy damped discussions of 
a “Grand Bargain” that started in the Administration and Congress in the fall of 
2001. The fact that many of the terrorists overstayed their v isas cast a huge 
shadow over any legalization initiative.
35 The recession and rising unemployment 
gave fresh impetus to groups that oppose the opening of the border to migrant 
workers. According to polls, taken after September 11
th the American people 
grew more apprehensive about what they perceive as weak border control and 
voiced stronger support for enforcing immigration laws.
36 
  
What does this imply for a Grand Bargain on undocumented immigration and 
the concept of a Border Partnership Action Plan? In my opinion, the shifting 
                                                                                                                         
Impact on the United States  (Washington DC: Center for Immigration Studies, 2001). 
33  Presidents Bush and Fox Announcement of Border Partnership Program.  2002. 
(htpp://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/usmxborder). 
34 U.S-Mexico Migration Panel, 2001. 
 
35 According to some analysts, September 11 shifted the immigration discussion from 
legalizing illegal migrants towards cracking down on them.  Ronald Brownstein, The American 
Prospect (November, 21 2001): 31. 
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political landscape in the United States has superimposed security concerns on 
top of the already difficult economic issues wrapped up in immigration policy.  
Any deal on immigration will need to enhance the security climate by 
comparison with the current regime.  
What kind of assurances could an immigration agreement provide that both 
satisfies security concerns and facilitates the creation of a secure border?  The 
place to start is with the ongoing flow of migrant workers arriving in the United 
States.  When the current recession gives way to a stronger economy, the United 
States should take up Fox’s challenge, put forward shortly before the September 
11
th attacks, to substantially enlarge the annual quota of Mexicans legally 
authorized to enter the United States on temporary (but renewable) work permits.  
In recent years, legal immigration from Mexico to the United States has 
numbered about 130,000 to 170,000 persons annually.
  Illegal immigration 
numbers are of course speculative, but the INS places the annual average at about 
150,000 between 1988 and 1996.
37 
  
In my opinion, the way to tackle the flow problem is to start with an 
expanded number of legal visas, say 300,000 persons from Mexico annually. 
Additional visas should be issued on a work skill basis (including unskilled 
workers), not on a family reunification basis (the dominant test for current visas).  
However -- and this is where security is underlined -- to obtain a temporary work 
permit, the Mexican applicant will have to undergo a background check designed 
to avert security threats.  Once inside the United States, temporary permit holders 
would need periodically to inform the INS electronically of their address and 
place of employment.  Permit holders could renew their permits as long as they 
were employed a certain number of months (say eight months) in each rolling 
twelve-month period, had no felony convictions, and reported regularly to the 
INS.  They could apply for U.S. citizenship after a certain number of years (say a 
cumulative five years as temporary permit holders).  In the meantime, they 
should accumulate public Social Security and Medicare rights, as well as any 
private health or pension benefits.   
Coupled with this substantial, but closely regulated, increase in temporary 
work permits, the United States and Mexico should embark on a joint border pa-
trol program to reduce the flow of illegal crossings. The program should include 
features such as enhanced use of electronic surveillance, ineligibility for a tempo-
rary work permit for three years after an illegal crossing, and short-term misde-
meanor detention (say 30 days) in Mexico following an illegal crossing.  No bor-
der patrol program will eliminate illegal crossings, but a joint program, coupled 
with a substantial temporary work permit initiative, could reduce the flow.   
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That leaves the very difficult question of perhaps 4 million undocumented 
Mexicans living and working in the United States. There is no magic solution. 
The foundation for my tentative suggestions is the proposition that nearly all 
these people have made permanent homes in the United States and they are not 
going to pick up their lives and return to Mexico. Under a set of appropriate 
circumstances, therefore, they should be granted residence permits with 
eligibility for citizenship. The appropriate circumstances I envisage have two 
components  -- a threshold relating to illegal crossings and standards for 
individual applicants. 
 
•  The resident permit program would be launched when the Presidents of 
the United States and Mexico could jointly certify that the annual rate of 
illegal crossings does not exceed 50,000 persons.  This would entail a 
reduction of more than two-thirds in illegal crossings estimated in recent 
years.  The resident permit program would be suspended in years when 
the Presidents could not make this certification. 
 
•  Individual eligibility would require evidence that the person resided in 
the United States prior to the announcement of the program.  Otherwise, 
eligibility standards would parallel those for temporary work permits 
discussed earlier.  
 
•  An applicant for a residence permit who could provide satisfactory 
evidence of residence in the United States prior to the announcement of 
the program would not be subject to deportation (whether or not he met 
other eligibility requirements) so long as he periodically reported a place 
of residence to the INS and committed no felony after the issuance of the 
residence permit. 
 
•  Holders of residence permits would be immediately eligible for public 
Social Security and Medicare benefits, as well as private health and 
pension benefits.  They could apply for citizenship say after seven years. 
  
 
 
Comparing Canada, the European Union, and NAFTA: 
Comparative Capers and Constitutional Conundrums 
 
 
 
Steven B. Wolinetz 
 
Introduction 
 
This is an exercise in comparative analysis. The paper examines Canada, the 
European Union, and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Its 
underlying premise - that political systems are best seen in comparative context - 
is an article of faith for students of comparative politics.  Students of the 
European Union (EU) who began with the study of one or more of its member 
states will have little problem with this, while those who started from 
International Relations and European integration studies will have greater doubts. 
Pooling the sovereignties of fifteen or more member states, the EU is in some 
respects sui generis.  Although to be sure, it can be considered a multilevel 
system of governance, in some respects different from the federations with which 
it is often compared, the EU is different enough to make any serious student of 
comparative politics pause.  The EU, like many federal systems has complex 
decision-making procedures and impinges on the decision-making and 
sovereignty of its member states, and appears as a single actor in international 
trade negotiations, but in other respects, it is very different: unlike many settled 
federations, the EU unites no well-defined people, and its inability to act as a 
single actor in foreign affairs or defense was documented well before current 
splits on Iraq and the Middle East. 
Difference has never stopped thoughtful students of comparative politics. 
The old adage that you can’t compare apples and oranges is easily met by noting 
that both are fruits. The EU may lack many features of federations but it is a 
complex multilevel system that may bear closer resemblance to lesser studied 
entities such as leagues and confederations. Examining the EU in comparative 
context is worthwhile not only because it gives us a clearer sense of what the EU 
is and is not, and how it has changed over time, but also because such regional 
systems like the EU are likely to become more common in an interdependent 
world.
1 This paper is unorthodox: it compares the EU to another large trading 
bloc, the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) and to one of its 
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components, Canada.  Comparing the EU and NAFTA is straightforward and 
obvious enough.  The two regional systems take in almost all of the world’s 
largest economies but are sufficiently different in their governance and politics 
that comparison in most areas can do little more than highlight difference. 
Comparing Canada and the EU is another matter. To some, the comparison 
may sound absurd, and appear to compare fruit and vegetables rather than apples 
and oranges. Nevertheless, Canada is a federation and a state, with membership 
in international organizations.  However, it is not a pattern state from which 
models and theories have been extracted and does not figure prominently in the 
comparative literature. Like the EU, Canada can be considered unique and sui 
generis. It is difficult to find another country held together by two single-track 
railways, two broadcasting networks, (until recently) two airlines, and one very 
long border.  That said, Canada’s center-periphery tensions, constitutional 
disputes, and disintegrative tendencies make it a case about which students of 
comparative politics should know more.  The utility of this comparison will 
become more obvious if we consider not only current politics, but also the 
construction of the Canadian confederation (the official term), which was in 
some respects a battle, if not against nature, against geography and the pull of 
easier north-south relationships. 
We will begin by comparing the EU and NAFTA, highlighting differences 
and similarities, and then develop the more complex, but in many ways more 
tantalizing, Canada-EU comparison, and show why it is particularly relevant at a 
time, when the EU’s constitution, like Canada’s, is in discussion. 
 
The European Union and NAFTA: Vive le Difference? 
 
Comparing the EU and NAFTA is an obvious exercise in a world in which 
nation-states are supposed to be obsolete.  Both are large regional systems 
bringing together sovereign nation-states. As such, they might be considered the 
wave of the future. Whether that is true or not remains to be seen. What is more 
than apparent is how different the two are.  The EU was one of several 
transnational or international structures established during or after World War II. 
Despite the aspirations of Monnet or Schuman, the most important reason for the 
establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was to find a 
means of marrying France and Germany and removing barriers to economic 
reconstruction.  Creation of the European Economic Community (EEC) and 
EURATOM, following the European Defense Community debacle, reflected a 
saw-off between its two most important member states, France and Germany. 
Established at a time when recovery was complete and much of Europe was 
approaching full employment, the EEC rapidly succeeded in establishing both a 
free trade area and customs union in the 1960s. Although aspirations to move 
beyond intergovernmentalism and introduce qualified majority voting in the 
Council of Ministers were thwarted by French President Charles de Gaulle, the Comparing Canada, the European Union, and NAFTA  99 
 
EU launched the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), and began developing its 
competition policy in the 1960s.  
After General de Gaulle resigned in 1969, the way was open for British 
membership and the first enlargements, which included not only the UK but also 
Denmark and Ireland.  In the 1970s, the European Communities (later the 
European Community, EC) established the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP), 
used ECSC instruments to tackle over-capacity in the steel industry and built a 
fabric of competition law to supplement its agricultural support policies. Direct 
election to the European Parliament was also agreed upon and implemented. At 
the same time, the European Court of Justice built up a body of case law that 
constitutionalized the treaties and established the supremacy of European over 
national law. In the 1980s, the EU moved forward again, implementing qualified 
voting in the Council of Ministers, proceeding with the Single Market, and 
agreeing to contemplate both monetary and closer political union. Well before 
NAFTA was contemplated or established, the EU was becoming an increasingly 
complex multilevel system in which decision-making competence in several 
policy areas had been transferred from national capitals to Brussels. 
NAFTA’s story is different. Spared the misfortune of large scale wars, North 
Americans had no need to marry historic enemies to secure peace.  Instead, 
NAFTA’s origins reflect the separate needs of Canada and Mexico to deal with a 
larger, wealthier, and far more powerful neighbor, the United States, and in 
particular, to counter protectionist tendencies and ensure continued access to its 
markets.  For Canada, seeking a free trade agreement with the United S tates 
reflected the culmination of an historic debate between economic nationalists, 
who hoped to enhance and protect domestic industries, and continentalists, who 
believed that economic salvation required closer relationships with their neighbor 
to the south. Historically, Liberals had been more inclined toward continentalism 
and the Progressive Conservatives more inclined toward economic nationalism. 
By the 1980s, the positions had reversed: Progressive Conservatives (The 
Government from 1984) and the Macdonald Royal Commission (Royal 
Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada, 
1985) advocated free trade, while New Democrats and some Liberals opposed 
them.  The 1988 election was fought on the issue.  Progressive Conservatives 
under Brian Mulroney won a second majority and negotiated the Canada-US 
Free Trade Agreement, which was broadened in 1993 to include Mexico.  
NAFTA’s provisions are well known. The treaty opened up trade in goods 
not governed by other treaties, such as automobiles, which are regulated by the 
Auto Pact. In contrast to the EU’s founding treaty, neither the Canada-U.S. 
agreement nor NAFTA hinted at anything other than a free trade area. Although 
there are voices in Canada who believe that Canada should adopt the U.S. dollar 
and think that Canada will eventually join the United States, the North American 
Free Trade Agreement contains no aspirations for a customs or monetary union, 
let alone closer political union. Instead, NAFTA has been what it was advertised 100  Wolinetz 
 
to be: a free trade agreement with limited provision for the movement of people - 
albeit one with important consequences for the ability of federal and provincial 
governments to implement regulatory policies which might reflect a free flow of 
goods.
2 
 
Table 1.    Comparing the EU and NAFTA 
  European Union (EU)  North American Free Trade Area 
(NAFTA) 
Type of system  Free Trade Area 
Customs union 
Incomplete monetary union 
Partial governance structure: 
Pools sovereignty in certain areas 
Free trade area 
Membership  Most European states  Canada, Mexico, United States 
Governance 
structures 
Complex, combines transnational 
and intergovernmental structures 
Intergovernmental 
Internal power 
relationships 
Balance among larger and smaller 
member-states:   leading role for 
certain larger states but no clear 
hegemon 
United States  
Legal basis  Treaties, constitutionalized by 
European Court of Justice (EJC); 
new constitution being drafted 
Treaty 
Scope of policy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Initially economic (tariffs, trade, 
competition, agriculture, 
fisheries).  Broadened to include 
some  health and safety, social 
policy, monetary policy, foreign 
and security policy, justice and 
home affairs, citizenship 
Tariffs and trade with potential 
impact on competition, 
environment, and labor 
Principal type of 
policy 
Regulatory  Regulatory 
Instruments  Regulations, directives, some 
benchmarking 
Courts 
Adjudication by trade tribunals 
Aspirations  Ever closer union  Free trade 
 
We need not concern ourselves with a detailed history of either the Canada-
U.S. Free Trade Agreement or the North American Free Trade Agreement that 
superceded it. More important is to recognize what NAFTA is and is not and how 
it differs from the EU. Table 1 compares the EU and NAFTA. A quick glance at 
the chart should convince anyone that differences between these two regional 
systems more than outweigh superficial similarities. The EU is a complex and, at 
the moment, troubled multilevel system of governance. Member states pool their 
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sovereignties in an increasingly wide range of policy areas and participate in 
complex, and in some respects, cumbersome intergovernmental and transnational 
structures of governance. There are larger and smaller member states. However, 
even though some have played more pre-eminent roles than others, no one 
member state is in a position to dominate others. Decisions are made in different 
ways. The normal or official legislative process is from the Commission to 
Council of Ministers and European Parliament. However, the European Council 
has assumed an increasingly important role in cutting through the most important 
deadlocks. Less visible intergovernmental structures, such as COREPER and 
Permanent Representations, underpin the Council of Ministers and play an 
important role in building consensus among member states’ day-to-day decision-
making. Also important are the European Court of Justice and the fabric of 
European law which member state courts apply in their adjudication.
3 
The North American Free Trade Agreement is different.  NAFTA brings 
together Canada, the United States, and Mexico. All three are federations, but 
they are not equal in status or influence. The United States is superior to Canada 
and Mexico in population, the size and importance of its economy, and 
international status. NAFTA provides both Canada and Mexico with something 
that some policy-makers in each country thought vital: better, though hardly 
perfect, access to lucrative American markets.  Its governance structures are 
barely visible: Three councils, an intergovernmental Free Trade Commission 
(FTC), a Council for Environmental Cooperation (CEC), and a Commission for 
Labor Cooperation (CLC), bring together cabinet-level officials from time to 
time to deal with disputes and implement NAFTA provisions. These are staffed 
by small secretariats, and  can decide by two-thirds vote. It is also possible to 
convene trade tribunals in the event of disputes.
4  Even these appear to be 
sidelined when aggrieved interests in the United States - e.g. softwood lumber 
interests - can press the United States Trade Representative and the Commerce 
Department to impose countervailing duties outside of NAFTA and WTO trade 
relationships. That said, NAFTA limits the ability of local, provincial or state, 
and federal governments in each country to regulate economic activity.  This 
occurs not through direct prescriptions or prohibitions, but because plaintiffs - 
typically business firms - in each country can ask courts in other countries to 
strike down regulations which may be deemed to interfere with trade or limit 
commercial activity. The extent to which this will inhibit health or environmental 
regulation remains to be seen.
5 
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Comparisons between the EU and NAFTA are better undertaken within a 
larger universe of regional blocs or systems. The most obvious to be included is 
MERCOSUR. Doing so is beyond the scope of this paper. We turn now to our 
less likely, but in some ways more useful, comparison between Canada and the 
European Union. 
 
Canada and the European Union 
 
Comparing Canada and the EU makes sense because both are contested 
multilevel systems of governance, which have or are likely to experience strong 
center-periphery or autonomist tendencies.  Like most other nation states and 
political systems, both are constructs, and both are works in progress and subject 
to change. This is not difficult to understand with respect to the EU. Barely fifty 
years old, the EU has grown from a policy-specific system with six member 
states and competence in only one policy area, coal and steel, to a broader 
economic political union with fifteen (and before long twenty five and perhaps 
twenty seven member states). Despite neo-functionalist logic, the EU has moved, 
not in a smooth progression, with spillover from one policy area to another, but 
rather in a bumpier progression, in which we can distinguish periods of rapid 
progress toward ‘ever closer union’ from periods in which such progress appears 
at best tenuous. The European project moved into high gear in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s but has slowed down since then.  
The EU’s present situation is difficult to discern. European integration is at a 
threshold from which it could either advance or regress.  Earlier projects, 
including monetary union and ‘somewhat’ closer political union have been 
partially (though hardly fully) realized.  In 2004 the EU will take in ten new 
member states.  EU decision-making structures, strained with fifteen member 
states, will have to accommodate twenty five. Anticipating the problem, the fall 
2001 Laeken European Council established the European Constitutional 
Convention. Chaired by former French President Valery Giscard d’Estaing, the 
Convention is to propose a single constitution to replace the treaties. However, it 
is not certain whether, or how rapidly, it will or can succeed.  
Lurking behind all this is a profound sense of unease: Europe has been an elite 
project, built a few steps a time. Only a few of the member states have put the 
question of EU membership or ever closer union to their citizens for approval. 
Anti-European sentiments are stronger in some member states than in others, but 
in the late 1990s and the first years of this decade, those sentiments have been 
mobilized by new right parties (and occasionally smaller left parties) who 
themselves oppose established parties and governing elites.  Replacing the 
treaties, constitutionalized by the European Court of Justice, with a single, more 
transparent document is supposed to be a solution for this.  
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The Canadian Case 
 
What about Canada? To understand the Canadian story we need to go back and 
consider the ways in which Canada came together. Canada was assembled from 
British territories that did not join the thirteen American colonies in their 
rebellion against British rule. These initially included not only Nova Scotia and 
New Brunswick, in Atlantic Canada, but also Upper and Lower Canada - the 
present-day provinces of Ontario and Quebec.  Quebec had originally been 
French territory but was lost to Britain in 1763. Though defeated and conquered - 
a fact that Quebecois still regret -
6 the territory was allowed to retain its language 
and religion.  At the time there were few whites west of Quebec; fearing 
American expansion northward as well as westward, the British encouraged 
settlement in Upper Canada (Ontario).  
Colonial governments were dominated by wealthier upper classes. Rebellions 
in the 1830s induced the British to establish a more broadly based regime in Up-
per and Lower Canada. In 1840, both were brought together in the United Prov-
ince of Canada. This was a power-sharing regime in which new measures had to 
be approved by concurrent majorities from Canada East and Canada West. This 
proved to be short-lived. By the 1860s, there were pressures to unite all British 
North America. Requiring concurrent majorities produced frequent deadlocks. 
Political forces in Upper Canada were becoming restive. Incipient industrializa-
tion was underway and the population was growing, producing pressure for rep-
resentation according to numbers (impossible under the equal representation 
clauses of the 1841 Act of Union). The Colonial Office in London wanted to 
unite the maritime provinces. Fears that the post Civil War United States might 
want to expand northward provided further impetus for a different form of gov-
ernment. In 1864, the future fathers of Canadian confederation came together in 
Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island, to discuss the construction of a stronger 
federation to govern all of British North America. Confederation took place when 
the British House of Commons passed the British North America Act in 1867. 
Initially, only Ontario, Quebec, New Brunswick, and Nova Scotia joined, but the 
promise of a rail link persuaded British Columbia to enter in 1871. Prince Ed-
ward Island followed in 1873, but Newfoundland remained independent until 
1949. In between Ontario and British Columbia were territories, which became 
the provinces of Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Alberta.
7 
The Canadian Constitution (through 1982, the British North America Act, 
1867) adapted British institutions to a vast territory. Provinces were constitution-
ally entrenched and shared in sovereignty. However, the initial design was quite 
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centralized.  Residual powers belonged to the federal government, and federal 
governments could disallow acts of provincial legislatures.  Rarely used, this 
power has fallen into desuetude. Over time, court decisions and practices have 
de-concentrated powers and made confederation far more decentralized. This was 
no more apparent than in the 1960s and the 1970s, the period in which both fed-
eral and provincial governments were building the Canadian welfare state. Ac-
tivist federal governments became involved in education, health, and social wel-
fare - key areas of provincial jurisdiction. Some provinces, and particularly Que-
bec, objected. All responded by building up their own provincial state apparatus. 
Initially, differences could be paved over by expanding budgets. Once these be-
gan to contract, conflicts were inevitable.
8 
From the start, Canadian governments had to cope with strong disintegrative 
tendencies. Dissatisfied with its terms of union, Nova Scotia did not enter the 
confederation until 1869, and tried to secede in 1886. The western, and to a lesser 
degree the eastern, provinces invariably felt shortchanged by state-building 
policies which they felt favored central Canada (Ontario and Quebec). 
Conservatives in the 19
th century and Liberals in the 20
th century promoted a 
national policy.  These included protective tariffs for fledgling industries and 
freight rates which made it more advantageous to ship finished goods west from 
Ontario and wheat east to Ontario. These translated into a deep-seated sense of 
alienation and surge of support for parties of agrarian protest in the 1920s and 
1930s, and again later in the 20
th century.
9 At the centre were Quebec and 
Ontario.  However, Francophone Quebecois harbored deep grievances against 
English-speaking commercial elites in Montreal, then the financial centre of 
Canada. Within Quebec, the Roman Catholic Church maintained strong social 
control. Nevertheless,  issues such as opposition to conscription in both world 
wars divided Quebec from the rest of Canada. North-south relations were also a 
source of continual strain.  Because north-south shipping and travel was 
invariably easier than east-west movements, there were regular flows of people 
back and forth across the border. Actual boundaries were settled early on, but 
relations with the United States, particularly whether to resort to protective tariffs 
or seek free trade, could be divisive. 
Canadian politicians sought to balance these pressures by practicing a non-
ideological brokerage or aggregate style of politics. Initially, Canada had a two 
                                                 
8 R. Kenneth Carty and Steven B. Wolinetz, “Disconnected Competition in Canada,” Paper 
prepared for the Conference on  Multi-level Electoral Competition (University of Birmingham: 
Institute for German Studies, September 22-23, 2001).  R. Kenneth Carty and Steven B. Wolinetz, 
“Political Parties and the Canadian Federation,” Paper prepared for the Conference on The State of 
the Federation (Kingston, Ontario: Institute of Intergovernmental  Relations, November, 2001). 
9 R.K. Carty, W. Cross and L. Young, Rebuilding Canadian Party Politics (Vancouver: UBC 
Press, 2000).  Carty and Wolinetz, “Disconnected Competition in Canada.” Carty and Wolinetz, 
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party system. In the 19
th and early 20
th centuries, first the Conservatives, under 
Sir John A. MacDonald, and then the Liberals, under S ir Wilfred Laurier, 
pursued a National Policy, offering something for everyone, while building the 
industrial heartland  - Ontario and Quebec.  Initially, Canada’s cleavages were 
contained within a two party system, but this proved difficult after World War I. 
Agrarian discontent in the west fed protest movements and third parties, 
providing a basis for a multi-tiered multiparty system. Many but not all provinces 
continue to have two party systems, but from the 1920s and 1930s more than two 
parties were represented in the House of Commons. At present there are five 
parties but only the Federal Liberals can even pretend to be a nationally based 
party. More disconcerting, and different from most other federal and multilevel 
systems, parties competing at the provincial level are often not the same or even 
organizationally connected to parties operating in federal politics. In instances in 
which the parties happen to bear the same names, it is not unusual to find 
relatively harmonious relations between federal and provincial governments from 
different political families and acrimonious relations among parties of the same 
stripe or family.
10 
Party competition is only of one of several arenas in which Canadian 
politicians and governments wrestle with centrifugal tendencies.  Parties 
governing in Ottawa try to represent all provinces and major cities in the federal 
cabinet. Regional ministers typically serve as intermediaries between provincial 
governments, whatever their political color, and the federal government.
11 When 
available, patronage and federal largesse help to smooth over differences.
12 
The party system is not the only setting in which conflicts are dealt with. 
Intergovernmental relations are equally important.  The federal and provincial 
governments have their own line administrations and have concurrent jurisdiction 
in most policy area. Moreover, the provinces have to be involved in any process 
of constitutional change. Constitutional disputes have been a persistent but by no 
means exclusive source of conflict. Fiscal relationships and their ensuing policy 
conflicts are a close second. This reflects the build-up and later contraction of the 
Canadian welfare state. When the Canadian welfare state was being expanded in 
the 1960s and 1970s, the federal government became an important source of 
funding in health, education, and social welfare, all of which are areas of 
provincial jurisdiction.  Although federal funds were willingly accepted, some 
provincial governments (particularly but not exclusively Quebec) opposed 
                                                 
10 Ibid. 
11 Herman Bakvis,  Regional Ministers: Power and Influence in the Canadian Cabinet 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991). 
12 Carty and Wolinetz, “Political Parties and the Canadian Federation.” Herman Bakvis and 
Steven B. Wolinetz, “Canada: A Case of Hyper-Presidentialism?” Prepared for the ESF/SCSS 
Exploratory Workshop, The Presidentialisation of Politics in Democratic Societies (Kinston, near 
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Ottawa’s attempts to impose uniform standards; for the most part, Quebec was 
able to insist on its right to design its own programs in areas such as pensions. 
Later on, budgetary restraints fuelled further conflicts.  When the federal 
governments decided they had to bring their deficit under control, transfers to the 
provinces were cut, strapping provincial governments that found it difficult to 
sustain programs over which they felt they had little control. As a result, relations 
between federal and provincial governments are often overtly acrimonious.
13 
Though never formalized, there are regular contacts among federal and 
provincial ministers and their civil servants. Federal and provincial governments 
come together in federal-provincial conferences bringing together either ‘first’ 
ministers (Prime Ministers and provincial premiers) or the federal and provincial 
ministers active in policy areas such as finance, health, education, and social 
welfare. In addition, provincial premiers sometimes meet without their federal 
counterparts. Federal-provincial conferences can be important arenas in which 
positions are stated, thrashed out and sometimes reconciled.
14 The former was 
more typical when the Canadian economy and government budgets were 
expanding in the 1960s and 1970s, the later more typical, when both levels of 
governments were balancing budgets in the 1990s.  Aside from constitutional 
issues and center-periphery and linguistic strains, financing the Canadian welfare 
state is a continuous object of contention.  
As noted earlier, educational, health, and social programs were financed by 
federal governments operating in what were previously areas of provincial 
jurisdiction.  Typically federal moneys were available as long as provincial 
programs met national standards. Reducing deficits and bringing federal finances 
into balance has meant that the federal government finances a smaller proportion 
of each envelope. This has made it far more difficult for federal governments to 
insist that provinces, more and more inclined to go their own way, adhere to such 
standards. One consequence is that despite a regular underbelly of cooperation, 
federal and provincial relations have become more and more acrimonious. 
Provincial governments argue that the federal government is not paying its fair 
share. For its part, the government in Ottawa has been increasingly reluctant to 
provide transfers without strings or to fund programs for which the provinces 
take credit.
15 
Thus far, our discussion has emphasized center-periphery tensions and  the 
regularity of conflict between the federal government and its provincial (and 
territorial) counterparts.  Missing and deliberately omitted are conflicts around 
language, constitutional change, and the position of a modernized Quebec in 
                                                 
13 Carty and Wolinetz, “Disconnected Competition in Canada.” Carty and Wolinetz, “Political 
Parties and the Canadian Federation.” 
14 Ibid. 
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Canadian confederation. These are important, but also better known. Language 
has been a continuing problem. Reflecting the quiet revolution in Quebec, Liberal 
governments under Pierre Eliot Trudeau promoted bilingualism, much to the 
annoyance of anglophones in provinces without large concentrations of 
francophones.  Reflecting the same Quiet Revolution and the subsequent 
transformation of Quebec society, governments of the Province of Quebec have 
not only promoted French as the dominant language in Quebec, but also have 
insisted on both the distinctiveness of Quebec society and the right of a majority 
of the Quebec people to separate from the rest of Canada.  
Insistence that Quebec is distinct and that it should be able to assert that 
distinctiveness in either a special relationship in Canadian confederation or a 
separate country has dogged federal provincial relations and made it difficult to 
resolve either constitutional or day-to-day issues dividing the federal and 
provincial governments.  During the Trudeau era, federal and provincial 
governments tried unsuccessfully to agree on the status of Quebec and an 
amending formula which could be included in a ‘repatriated’ constitution. The 
1982 Canada Constitution Act revised the Canadian Constitution by adding a 
Charter of Rights  and an amending formula, requiring that amendments be 
accepted by seven of the ten provinces with 50 percent of the population and 
approved in a national referendum. However, this was done with the consent of 
only nine provinces and the unrelenting opposition of Quebec.  The Quebec 
government opposed the repatriated constitution because it neither recognized 
Quebec as a distinct society nor gave the province a veto over constitutional 
change. Progressive Conservative governments under Brian Mulroney tried to 
resolve the problem through a renewed constitutional settlement, the Meech Lake 
Accord.  This granted Quebec and the other nine provinces a veto over 
constitutional change and recognized Quebec as a distinct society.  Initially 
accepted by all ten provinces, the Meech Lake Accord failed when two 
provinces, Newfoundland and Manitoba failed to ratify it within the specified 
three year period.
16  
The 1991 failure of the Meech Lake package led to a flurry of constitutional 
activity. Meech failed, it was argued, because it had been negotiated by elites (in 
this case, the federal and provincial premiers closeted in a Gatineau villa) without 
broader involvement or success. A series of citizens forums were held, resulting 
in a new package, the 1992 Charlottetown Accord, negotiated by federal and 
provincial governments. However, this was rejected not only in Quebec but also 
in a national referendum.  The failure of both the Meech Lake and the 
Charlottetown Accords contributed in part to the subsequent defeat of the 
Progressive Conservatives in 1993. Since then, the Liberals under Jean Chretien 
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have preferred to keep constitutional change and the cans of worms which it 
entailed off the political agenda. Benign neglect gave way to a more aggressive 
posture after 1995, when separatists nearly won majority in a Quebec referendum 
on sovereignty came close to winning a popular majority.  Believing that no 
successful resolution was possible, the Chretien government refused to reopen 
the constitutional file. It did however adopt a harder line, the so-called ‘Plan B.’ 
This entailed recruiting a more aggressive Quebec Minster of Intergovernmental 
Affairs (a political scientist, Stephan Dion), seeking a reference from the 
Canadian Supreme Court on what would be required for Quebec to separate, and 
more generally putting separatists on notice that the Government of Canada 
would not necessarily lay down and acquiesce to Quebec’s separation.  The 
Supreme Court ruled that should a majority of Quebec voters vote for separation 
on a clear question that the Government of Canada would be obliged to negotiate 
with it. These actions put constitutional issues on the back burner. In power in 
Ottawa, the Chretien Liberals have seen no purpose to engaging the discussion. 
Parti Quebecois  governments would happily call for a referendum if they 
thought that they could win it, but no government has felt that ‘winning 
conditions’ existed. 
At this point, it is useful to conclude our discussion of Canada and return to 
Canada-EU comparisons. We have sketched a portrait of Canada, known to some 
extent to people outside the country. The Canada we have sketched is a country 
with strong centrifugal tendencies.  Differences among provinces and between 
west and east are considerable.  These include not only physical but also 
psychological distances.  Although it could be argued that the country (more 
specifically, its English speaking part - the ‘rest of Canada’) is held together to 
some extent by its public broadcaster, the CBC (English language listeners and 
viewers hear or see the same public affairs programs), there are also profound 
differences, exacerbated as immigration changes both Ontario and British 
Columbia. True to their Westminster origins, party systems are adversarial, but 
given the current fragmentation of the opposition parties at the federal level, 
opposition from provincial and territorial governments to the federal government 
is at least as important as the criticisms of New Democrats, Progressive 
Conservatives, the Bloc Quebecois, and the Canadian Alliance. 
Canada-EU Comparisons 
 
Our sketch of Canada is necessarily incomplete, but sufficient to raise questions 
about the utility of Canada-EU comparisons.  These can be treated in several 
ways. There were obvious parallels between “Meech Lake syndrome” and the 
“democratic deficit” from which the EU was said to suffer following the 
Maastricht Treaty. We could also extract cautionary tales about the futility of 
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itself, will tell us about the utility of systematic comparative analysis. That is the 
job of this section and the conclusion which follows. 
Can Canada and the EU be compared? Obviously, yes. In principle, anything 
can be compared, but some comparisons are more useful and more telling than 
others. As we suggested earlier, both Canada and the EU are multilevel systems 
of governance, and both, in comparison to federations such as the United States, 
are poorly and weakly integrated. Canadians do not readily disobey their national 
government - the laws of the government of Canada, including criminal and 
family law, are followed inside and outside the province of Quebec - but the 
national government and its institutions do not enjoy the same deep legitimacy or 
affection that most Americans accord their national government and constitution. 
Nor does the EU or its institutions in Brussels, Strasbourg or Luxembourg enjoy 
strong affection and legitimacy from European citizens.  The ways in which 
central or higher level governments deal with these problems - working with 
them or around them  - is an area which could be studied. The most obvious 
efforts  - putting big signs saying Canada on the sides of federal buildings, 
distributing plastic flags, financing Canada Day celebrations across the country 
on Canada Day (July 1), or their European equivalents - subsidized school trips 
to Brussels - may seem like better grist for satire - but it would be interesting to 
know what long term effects can be attributed to EU financed exchange 
programs, s uch as Erasmus and Socrates. Equally, it would be interesting to 
know what effects divisive issues  - e.g., relations with third countries, 
controversial military actions promoted by third countries, conflict in the former 
Yugoslavia - have on underlying identities. The same question, of course, can be 
asked about enlargement.  
The question of identity and the ability of citizens to hold multiple identities 
and affections, is only one of several areas that might be studied.  Equally 
important is the whole fabric of intergovernmental relations in federations and 
multilevel systems of governance. Whether we are looking at Canada and the 
EU, or perhaps including European federations such as Germany, Austria, or 
Switzerland, we need to know more about the underbelly of informal 
relationships which underpin formal relationships.  Canada is unusual among 
federal and multilevel systems in that there is no arena, aside from the Canadian 
Senate, in which provinces are formally represented at the federal or higher level. 
Ostensibly, the appointed Senate represents the provinces. However, Senators are 
appointed by the Governor General in Council (in effect, the Prime Minister) and 
serve until they reach the age of seventy-five, making this at best a passive 
channel. The informal channels described earlier - ongoing contacts among civil 
servants, federal-provincial conferences - are more important even when they are 
inactive. More to the point, though, few formal (or center-stage) processes of 
intergovernmental relations succeed without substantial underpinning. Something 
has to go before, smoothing and paving the way. In the EU, the most important 
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Representations in Brussels, and via COREPER and equivalent channels, the 
Council of Ministers. Even if the Canadian channels are not formalized, they 
exist, and could be compared fruitfully with EU processes and intergovernmental 
structures in other federal or multilevel systems. How such structures operate 
depends to some degree on the structures, and the extent to which they facilitate 
compromise and mutual understanding, but the impact of context could also be 
studied.  Federal-provincial relations were smoother in Canada (though by no 
means smooth) when federal and provincial budgets and activities were 
expanding. Coping with contraction is another matter. 
Other areas that might be studied include policy in any number of sectors, and 
the whole question of constitutional change. It is an open question whether the 
EU’s Constitutional Convention will produce a document on which existing and 
candidate member-states can agree.  John Fitzmaurice has argued that it will 
succeed because it has to B i.e., the costs of failure would be too great.
17 
Fitzmaurice may well be correct, but the obstacles at the moment are formidable: 
disagreement on war in Iraq, annoyance, depending on the corner it is coming 
from, at the French and Germans or the British because of positions which they 
have taken; very real disagreements on the shape which an enlarged EU will take. 
It is possible that Giscard will succeed, and produce a package that member-
states can not only accept, but which will give greater legitimacy and clarity to 
the European project. But it is also possible that the constitutional convention 
will fail, disagreeing not only on contentious issues of governance and 
competencies, but also on issues which would not have been raised  - e.g., 
whether God should be recognized in the new constitution – had there been no 
convention. Should this turn out to be the case, and Europe finds itself suffering 
from a ‘maladie canadienne,’ then European leaders may regret opening this file. 
Whatever the case, both the process of constitution-making and the process of 
seeking approval, if a constitution is indeed made, call for comparative analysis. 
And this is valid whether the result bears closer resemblance to a successful 
caper or a nagging conundrum. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Let us conclude our discussion.  The aim of this paper was to demonstrate  - 
perhaps to the convinced - the utility of Canada-EU comparisons. That case has 
been made and there is little utility to concluding it with an extended list of 
possible comparisons. The agenda I have suggested is sufficient to keep students 
of Canadian and EU politics, and more generally students of multilevel systems 
of governance, busy for some time to come. What is not needed is further lists, 
but rather critical imagination. 
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Introduction 
 
The summit of Central American presidents held in Antigua, Guatemala, in June 
1990 gave a strong impulse to the revitalisation of the Central American 
Common Market (CACM), regional integration scheme created in 1960 by Costa 
Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua. This renewed attempt at 
integration in the 1990s has not involved a return to the old scheme launched in 
the 1960s. While regional integration remains viewed as an instrument for 
accelerating the growth rates of the economies participating, its main goal has 
shifted. It is not sought to extend domestic import-substituting industrialisation 
(ISI) policies at the regional level, but to support an outward-oriented growth 
model based on the promotion of non-traditional exports. As part of this shift, the 
Central American governments have adopted commitments such as the 
liberalization of intraregional trade and the drastic reduction in the common 
external tariff (CET), commitments that have to materialize in the 
reestablishment of a customs union. 
This article aims at assessing the progress of the new Central American 
economic integration scheme, identifying its principal potentials and weaknesses. 
With this purpose, the paper is structured into four sections. The first analyses the 
measures taken to restore the Central American customs union. The second and 
third sections examine respectively, the achievements and limitations of the new 
CACM. The fourth and last section provides the conclusions drawn from that 
assessment. 
 
Reactivation of the Central American Common Market 
 
From the statements of the presidential summits in the early 1990s as well as 
from the Guatemala Protocol signed in October 1993 to modify the 1960 General 
Treaty of Central American Economic Integration, it is followed that the Central 
American governments have wished to reactive the CACM under the approach of 114  Rueda-Junquera 
 
the open regionalism or new regionalism.
1 The governments have manifested 
their intention of supporting a new market-driven integration, compatible with an 
outward-looking economic development.
2 
The main initiatives of the new CACM have been directed at restoring the 
two essential instruments of a customs union: the free intraregional trade and the 
CET. The last adopted initiative dates back to June 2002 when in the 21
st Summit 
of Central American Presidents celebrated in Granada, Nicaragua, the Action 
Plan for the Central American Economic Integration was approved. The general 
objective of this Action Plan is the consolidation of the economic integration 
process, emphasizing the establishment of a customs union for January 1, 2006.
3 
At present the benefit of free intraregional trade is granted to those goods 
originating in the CACM member countries, except to those included by pairs of 
countries in the Annex A of the General Treaty of Central American Economic 
Integration. The number of products originated from Central America that do not 
benefit from free intraregional trade, is small. Only sugar and unroasted coffee 
are excluded for all the countries. To this, there is to add the restrictions imposed 
on the imports of ethylic alcohol by Costa Rica and Honduras, on those ones of 
roasted coffee by Costa Rica, and on those ones of petroleum by-products and 
distilled alcoholic beverages by Honduras.
4 For the full achievement of a free 
intraregional trade area, it is still necessary to eliminate the Annexe A and grant 
                                                 
1 The theory and praxis of open regionalism in less developed countries are examined in: 
Jaime De  Melo and Arvind Panagariya (eds.),  New Dimensions in Regional Integration 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Vincent Cable and David Henderson (eds.), 
Trade Blocs?: The Future of Regional Integration (London: The Royal Institute of International 
Affairs, 1994);  CEPAL (Comisión Económica de las Naciones Unidas para América Latina y el 
Caribe),  El regionalismo abierto en América Latina y el Caribe: la integración económica al 
servicio de la transformación productiva con equidad  (Santiago: CEPAL, 1994); Sheila Page, 
Regionalism among Developing Countries (London: Macmillan, 2000); BID (Banco 
Interamericano de Desarrollo),  Más allá de las fronteras: el nuevo regionalismo en América 
Latina, Informe 2002 sobre Progreso Económico y Social en América Latina (Washington D.C.: 
BID, 2002); World Bank, Trade, Regionalism and Development, Global Economic Prospects 2005 
(Washington D.C.: The World Bank, 2005).  
2 On the new regionalism in Central America, see: Victor Bulmer-Thomas (ed.), Integración 
regional  en Centroamérica (San José: Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales / Social 
Science Research Council, 1998); Fernando Rueda-Junquera, La reactivación del Mercado Común 
Centroamericano (Burgos: Servicio de Publicaciones, Universidad de Burgos, 1999); Klaus 
Bodemer and Eduardo Gamarra (eds.),  Centroamérica 2020: un nuevo modelo de desarrollo 
regional (Caracas: Editorial Nueva Sociedad, 2002); SGSICA-CEPAL (Secretaría General del 
Sistema de la Integración Centroamericana – Comisión Económica de las Naciones Unidas para 
América Latina y el Caribe),  La integración centroamericana: beneficios y costos (San Salvador 
and México: SGSICA-CEPAL, 2004).  
3 The foreseen date for entering into force the Central American customs union was January 1, 
2004. As this deadline was not complied with, it was agreed to postpone it to January 1, 2006. 
4 SIECA (Secretaría de Integración Económica Centroamericana),  Unión aduanera 
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the same treatment to those goods not originated from the region, that is, that free 
trade extends to all the goods consumed –and not only produced– in the region, 
as well as to services (specially to those associated to the trade of goods). 
In order to facilitate free intraregional trade, there has been adopted a group 
of regulations applicable to intraregional trade. The main regulations approved 
by the CACM governments have been the Central American Regulations on 
Unfair Trade Practices (1995), Safeguard Measures (1996), Rules of Origin 
(1998), Measures of Standardization, Metrology and Authorization Procedures 
(1999) and Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (1999). In addition to these 
regulations, there has been created a trade dispute settlement mechanism in 2002. 
The aforementioned regulations provide a general framework to orientate the 
harmonization of norms, but it does not constitute a set of norms that serve to 
evaluate specific situations, what limits its effectiveness as a driving factor of 
intraregional trade. To amend this deficiency, proposals are been developed to 
advance in the harmonization of norms applying to specific situations.
5 In this 
context, it is debated on the degree in which it is necessary to harmonize the ex-
isting regulation at the Central American level or if alternatively, it turns out to 
be better to adopt international standards. Furthermore, this debate is conditioned 
by the possibility that the Central American countries apply among them the 
norms established as part of the United States – Central  America Free Trade 
Agreement (CAFTA) signed in 2003. This could have the advantage of consti-
tuting a set of norms in which the pressure to fulfil them would be greater. How-
ever, it would not suppose an endogenous element of strengthening and deepen-
ing of the Central American customs union. 
The implementation of harmonized norms will contribute to a greater 
transparency and fluidity in the intra-Central American trade. Likewise, the fact 
that there is a formal trade dispute settlement mechanism will facilitate the 
application of those harmonized norms. In practice, it is still necessary to verify 
if this mechanism is an effective means for reducing transactions costs within the 
region, being able to diminish uncertainty and lead to fewer costs than those ones 
stemmed from the international litigations initiated to settle intraregional trade 
disputes. 
With regard to the CET, the member countries of the CACM have made 
substantial progress in the harmonization of tariffs applied by every country 
against third countries, in such a way that there is a harmonized CET for most of 
the products. At the beginning of 2005 there were 332 tariff lines remaining to be 
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food and beverages, medicines and related products, agricultural inputs, and oil products), rules of 
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harmonized and 5,861 tariff lines already harmonized, which represent 94.6 
percent of the total of tariff lines.
6 
Also progress  has taken place in the areas of customs procedures and 
customs legislation.
7 In the last years there has been a process of modernization 
of the Central American customs, which has translated into better methods for 
goods controls, as well as into a speeding-up of the trading procedures between 
countries. Regarding regulations, important progress has been achieved such as 
the entry into force in the five CACM countries, of the Central American 
Uniform Customs Code and its corresponding regulation. Also there exists a 
Single Manual of Customs Procedures, which is applied by some customs in the 
region. Likewise, different projects of customs legislation are being  drawn up 
(legislation for fighting against contraband and customs fraud, reform of the 
Regulation on International Customs Transit Regime, code of conduct for 
customs officials, etc.). 
As for the establishment of a common customs, the CACM has four customs 
administration models.
8 These models have been designed to test out the different 
forms in which trade in the region might be managed in order to gradually 
advance towards a customs union. The customs models which have been put into 
practice, are the following: three of intraregional character  –integrated, 
juxtaposed and trinational–, and one of peripheral character. 
The integrated customs consists of sharing a single office for customs 
formalities by two countries, which are members of the same customs territory. 
The juxtaposed customs refers to the same previous case, but keeping different 
customs offices in every country, that coordinate their activities. In this case, the 
customs offices are committed to apply complementary customs formalities 
through the use of electronic communication mechanisms, which guarantee the 
effective control of intraregional transits  from origin to d estination.  In this 
respect, i t has begun to work on the implementation of an electronic 
interconnection system allowing the early electronic transmission of the Central 
American Uniform Customs Forms ( Formularios Aduaneros Uniformes 
Centroamericanos, FAUCAs) and the International Transit Declarations 
(Declaraciones de Tránsito Internacional, DTIs), forms required to those goods 
originated from the CACM. 
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it will be possible to initiate negotiations for harmonizing its tariffs at the regional level. 
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Since 2003 major customs between Guatemala and El Salvador rely on a 
customs administration model either integrated or juxtaposed. These two 
countries are those ones that have made more progress in promoting customs and 
migratory facilitation in their binational frontiers.
9 
The trinational customs correspond to customs administration services 
provided by three countries which carry out their functions in a common building 
where they implement coordinated and uniform procedures. The Amatillo 
(Honduras) is an example of trinational customs shared by El Salvador, 
Guatemala and Honduras. 
None of the three models of intraregional customs examined constitutes the 
type of customs that would benefit to a customs union in which free movement 
was allowed not only to those goods produced in the CACM, but also to those 
goods consumed in the region. The peripheral customs model can overcome this 
problem and is the one which is closest to the type characteristic of a customs 
union. This model consists of locating customs administration services in the 
exterior periphery of the common customs territory, applying the same 
procedures in the framework of an  uniform customs legislation. In this case, 
those goods dispatched by the peripheral customs, could move freely within the 
common customs territory.  Currently  El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and 
Nicaragua have established a pilot programme with six border posts operating as 
peripheral customs: Puerto Quetzal, Santo Tomás de Castilla, Puerto Barrios and 
Tecún Umán (Guatemala), Puerto Cortés (Honduras) and Peñas Blancas 
(Nicaragua).  
In sum, since the beginning of the 1990s the CACM reactivation has aimed 
at reestablishing a custom union. However, after almost three lustrums the new 
CACM remains an imperfect customs union. 
 
Achievements of the Central American Economic Integration Scheme 
 
New regionalism is expected to provide mechanisms promoting decisively the 
economic development of the Central American countries. The reactivation of 
the CACM has been able to stimulate substantially intraregional trade, improve 
its quality and attract intraregional investments, thus contributing to economic 
growth in the region. 
                                                 
9 In fact, since November 15, 2004 they have simplified substantially their procedures to 
facilitate goods and persons mobility. At present the customs procedure for loading traffic in the  
border posts between both countries has been reduced to only two stages: the haulage contractor 
presents the FAUCA in the integrated customs office and next, the customs official verifies the 
documentation and the corresponding payment. In migratory matters, when the overland route is 
used, travellers between Guatemala and El Salvador will only be required to enter to and leave for 
both countries, the submission of the migratory form in a mailbox installed in the border post. For 
the Salvadorans and Guatemalans using airway, their flight will be considered as domestic and so, 
they will only have to show the document identifying their nationality. 118  Rueda-Junquera 
 
Since the beginning of the 1990s, intraregional trade in the CACM has 
experienced a steady expansion. The total value of intraregional exports and 
imports quintupled in the 1990-2004 period, passing respectively, from $671 and 
$638 million in 1990 to  more than $3,300 million in 2004 (see Table 1 and 
Figure 1). 
 
Table 1 
Central American Common Market: Intraregional Trade, 1985-2004 (Selected Years) 
(in millions of US dollars and in percentages) 
Intraregional exports  Intraregional imports   
Year  Value 
(US$ million) 
Share in total 
exports 
(%) 
Value 
(US$ million) 
Share in total 
imports 
(%) 
1985     485.8  13.5     540.8  10.2 
1990     671.2  17.1     638.1   9.9 
1995  1,595.4  21.7  1,497.6  12.4 
2000  2,616.8  22.7  2,739.3  14.6 
 2001
a  2,829.4  27.8  2,933.6  14.3 
 2002
a  2,871.7  28.2  2,949.1  13.4 
 2003
a  3,076.6  27.3  3,042.1  12.8 
 2004
b  3,439.7  27.6  3,312.7  12.4 
2000-2004 average  2,966.9  26.7  2,995.4  13.5 
Sources: For 1985, 1990 and 1995, derived from: SIECA (Secretaría de Integración Económica 
Centroamericana), Series estadísticas seleccionadas de Centroamérica N.º 28  (Guatemala: SIECA, 1998); 
for 2000–2004 period, derived from: SIECA, Boletín estadístico 13.1 (Guatemala: SIECA, 2005). 
a Preliminary data. 
b Estimated data. 
 
 
 
Figure 1 
Central American Common Market: Intraregional Imports, 1950-2004  
(in millions of US dollars) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: SIECA (Secretaría de Integración Económica Centroamericana), Centroamérica en gráficas 
(Guatemala: SIECA, 2005), Figure 5.  
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Not only the value of intraregional trade has improved since 1990, but also 
its quality. As it has been revealed by several studies,
10 intraregional trade has 
been of a greater quality than extraregional trade, characterizing by its larger 
contents of manufactured products and intraindustry trade.
11 
The sustained growth of intraregional trade is essential to increase economic 
interdependence among the CACM members and to reduce their external 
vulnerability. If intraregional trade has a growing share in the total trade flows of 
the Central American countries, their dependence on extraregional trade will be 
diminished and the impact of adverse external shocks on their economies will be 
reduced. 
The greater quality of the intraregional trade in expansion is specially 
relevant for the economic development of Central America. The increasing 
presence of intraindustry trade in intraregional exchanges of manufactures helps 
to develop new comparative advantages alternative to the pattern of 
specialization in primary goods, since it improves industry productive efficiency 
and stimulates its diversification. 
The growth of intraregional trade in manufactures in the new CACM also 
can be an important factor for achieving a customs union with net trade creating. 
The old CACM was bound to be net trade diverting because it commenced its 
existence with the imposition of a CET which raised average tariff levels in a 
region lacking of a significant industrial base. By contrast, the new CACM has 
adopted a CET much lower than its predecessor and at the same time, a minimal 
domestic manufacturing sector is now in place in each member country. In this 
context there is considerable scope for the new integration scheme to be net trade 
creating. The lower CET induces increase in extraregional imports and the full 
restoration of free trade area within the CACM enables expansion in 
intraregional imports. 
                                                 
10 See: Pablo Rodas, “Comercio intra-industrial y ventajas comparativas reveladas en el 
comerco intra-centroamericano en manufacturas” in  Integración regional en Centroamérica, ed. 
Victor  Bulmer-Thomas, 79-98 (San José: Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales / Social 
Science Research Council, 1998); Rueda-Junquera,  La reactivación del Mercado Común 
Centroamericano, op. cit., Ch. III; BID, Integración y comercio en América, op. cit.; BID, Más allá 
de las fronteras: el nuevo regionalismo en América Latina, op. cit.; Roberto Monge, El comercio 
de bienes y servicios entre los países centroamericanos en el contexto de la apertura externa, 
Proyecto SGSICA-CEPAL “La integración centroamericana: beneficios y costos” (San Salvador 
and México: SGSICA-CEPAL, 2003). 
11 The main sectors involved in the expansion of intraindustry trade in manufactures in Central 
America produce final demand goods. These sectors at the four-digit level of International Standard 
Industry Classification (Revision No. 2) were identified by: Rueda-Junquera, La reactivación del 
Mercado Común Centroamericano, op. cit., Ch. III. Specifically, these sectors are: 3121 (food 
products n.e.c.), 3211 (spinning, weaving and finishing textiles), 3220 (clothing), 3419 (pulp, paper 
and paperboard articles n.e.c.), 3522 (drugs and medicines), 3523 (cleaning and toilet preparations), 
3551 (tyres and tubes), 3560 (plastic products, n.e.c.), 3620 (glass and glass products) and 3720 
(non-ferrous metals). 120  Rueda-Junquera 
 
If this potential trade creation comes accompanied by a high component of 
intraindustry trade, economic integration scheme will be facilitated. The 
productive structure adjustment linked to intraindustry trade is relatively costless 
and its effect on income distribution is less severe. In case of predominance of 
this trade, member countries have only to bear the cost of eliminating some firms 
from some industries, without having to abandon entirely those industries. By 
contrast, interindustry trade involves the whole elimination of some industries in 
some member countries due to their moving to other member countries where 
comparative costs for these industries are the lowest in the regional market. 
In addition to enhancing intraregional trade flows in value and quality, the 
new CACM has become an attraction factor of new foreign direct investment 
(FDI) flows, particularly of intraregional origin. Although the relationship 
between regional integration and investment is not clear, prospects offered by an 
integrated regional market appear to turn this integrated market into an important 
destination for FDI. In the case of the CACM, the FDI inflow of extraregional 
origin has been chiefly induced by the privatization processes undertaken by the 
regional governments in the framework of their structural adjustment policies, 
rather than by the reestablishment of the regional market, whose economic size 
remains small compared with those of the Common Market of the South 
(Mercado Común del Sur, MERCOSUR) and the Andean Community.  
The regional market seems to have contributed to a greater extent to 
encourage the FDI flows of Central American origin. There is not statistical 
information compiled systematically on regional capital movements, but 
available evidence suggests that intraregional investments have been growing 
since the reestablishment of the CACM.
12 Increasingly there is a greater presence 
of  domestic firms of CACM member countries which operate with a regional 
vision, taking the CACM as a starting point at the moment of designing their 
production and marketing strategies. In fact, this type of managerial activities is 
part of what is called  real integration, which takes place outside the formal 
integration promoted by the governments.
13 The process of real integration is 
constructed from the expansion and strengthening of the regional financial and 
trade activities developed by the major Central American economic groups and 
the transnational companies operating in this area. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12 See: Richard Aitkenhead, Tendencias y características de las estrategias empresariales en 
el contexto del proceso de integración económica centroamericana, Proyecto SGSICA-CEPAL 
“La integración centroamericana: beneficios y costos” (San Salvador and México: SGSICA-
CEPAL, 2003).  
13 Monge, op. cit., 71-80. Prospects for the Central American Customs Union  121 
 
 
 
Table 2 
Central American Common Market. Main Intraregional Investments By Country Of Origin, 2000 
Country of 
origin 
Sector  Activity  Group or Company  Recipient country 
Industrial  Construction 
materials 
Grupo Durman Esquivel Central America 
Trade  Wholesale trade  Supermercados Más x 
Menos 
Honduras, Nicaragua 
 
 
Costa Rica 
Services  Written press  Grupo La Nación  Guatemala 
Services  Airlines  Grupo Taca  Central America 
Services  Financial  Grupo Cuscatlán  Costa Rica, Guatemala 
Services  Financial  Agrícola Comercial  Guatemala 
Services  Hotels  Intercontinental Camino 
Real 
Costa Rica, Honduras 
Construction  Property  Grupo Poma  Central America 
 
 
 
El Salvador 
Trade  Department stores  Almacenes Simán  Guatemala 
Farming  Poultry  Grupo Gutiérrez  El Salvador, Honduras 
Farming  Sugar industry  Ingenios Guatemaltecos Costa Rica, Honduras, 
Nicaragua 
Trade  Supermarkets  Grupo Páiz  El Salvador, Honduras 
Industrial  Fizzy drinks  Grupo Mariposa  Honduras, Nicaragua 
Services  Hotels  Hoteles Princess  El Salvador, Honduras, 
Nicaragua 
Servicios  Fast food  Pollo Campero  Central America 
 
 
 
 
Guatemala 
Trade  Goods vehicles  Camiones Hino  Honduras 
Industrial  Brewing industry  Cervecería Hondureña  Nicaragua 
Trade  Supermarkets  Despensa Don Juan  El Salvador 
Housing  Property  Inversiones Sogeval  Guatemala 
 
 
Honduras 
Industrial  Non-alcoholic 
beverages 
Grupo Facusse  El Salvador, Guatemala 
Services  Financial  Grupo Pellas  Central America 
Services  Financial  Grupo Pacific  Central America 
 
Nicaragua 
Services  Financial  Grupo Fogel  Guatemala 
Source: INTAL (Instituto para la Integración de América Latina y el Caribe), Central American Report Nº 1
(Buenos Aires: BID-INTAL, 2001), 38. 
 
As Table 2 shows, the main intraregional investments tend to be concentrated 
in the services sector, specially in the financial, trade and tourist activities. This 
type of investments is consistent with the new growth pattern prevailing in the 
region, based on the dynamism of activities linked to the maquila industry and 
the services. 
 
Weaknesses and Challenges of the New Regionalism in Central America 
 
Despite the achievements examined, regional integration in Central America is 
still subject to numerous limitations, which have to be surmounted if expected 122  Rueda-Junquera 
 
positive effects on the economic development process are wished to become a 
reality. Among these limitations, the following can be highlighted: the great 
predominance of extraregional trade, the slow improvement in the quality of 
intraregional trade, the distributive problems of costs and benefits, the absence of 
a real common trade policy, the lack of a common customs administration, the 
limited coordination of macroeconomic policies and the weakness of  regional 
institutions. Next these limitations are analyzed  and some implications for 
institutional and economic policies are drawn for overcoming them. 
 
Predominance of extraregional trade 
 
Trade liberalization initiated in the 1990s has facilitated the rapid growth in 
intraregional trade, but part of this growth has only represented the recovery of 
trade lost as consequence of the economic crisis of the 1980s.
14 Intraregional 
trade remains limited within the total trade of the CACM. In the 2000-2004 
period intraregional exports were not able to represent on average more than 26.7 
percent of total exports, while intraregional imports did not exceeded 13.5 per 
cent of total imports (see Table1). These percentages are still far from those ones 
observed in the European Union (EU), where intraregional trade –measured by 
both the export and import side– accounts for more than 60 percent of total trade 
(see Table 3). 
 
Table 3 
European Union (15 Countries): Relative Importance 
Of Intraregional Trade, 1992-2003 (Selected Years) 
(in percentages) 
Year  Intraregional exports 
% of total exports value 
Intraregional imports 
% of total imports value 
1992  66.9  64.5 
1995  64.0  64.1 
1999  63.8  62.0 
2000  62.4  59.1 
2001
  61.9  59.5 
2002  61.8  60.4 
2003  61.9  60.2 
1999-2003 average  62.4  60.3 
Source: Derived from: Eurostat, http://epp.eurostat.cec.eu.int. 
 
 
The dominance of extraregional trade –between 73.3 percent and 86.5 per-
cent of total trade– explains why the economic policy of Central American 
governments has given priority to extraregional economic relations and in 
                                                 
14 Another important part of the growth in intraregional trade has been possible thanks to the 
net inflow of capitals, which has facilitated the funding of imports and current account deficits. Prospects for the Central American Customs Union  123 
 
moments of conflict, has not favoured the interests of the Central American 
integration scheme. If intraregional trade is wished to acquire more significance 
for the economic development of Central America, it is necessary to adopt 
measures favouring its expansion. Thus, measures such as the removal of the 
non-tariff barriers (NTBs) and the effective liberalization of intraregional trade in 
primary products and services can help to achieve this objective.  
The use of NTBs has been one of the principal obstacles to the sustained 
expansion in intraregional trade. Although in the last years considerable progress 
has been made to reduce them, it is still necessary to attain their total elimination. 
For example, the Central American governments need to adopt a competition 
policy designed to suppress oligopolistic practices among suppliers and 
restrictive practices between producers and distributors. 
The relevance of regional market can be enhanced not only by removing 
NTBs to intraregional trade in finished products, but also  liberalizing 
intraregional trade in inputs, particularly in raw materials and in some services. A 
regional market in such inputs could generate important cost savings for the 
Central American firms. Many of the sectors better placed to face successfully 
international trade insertion are industries processing raw materials. A genuine 
liberalization of intraregional trade in raw materials would provide an 
opportunity for these firms to lower their costs by purchasing these inputs from 
the cheapest regional source. Likewise, the costs of other inputs could be reduced 
if they were traded freely within the regional market. This could be the case of 
services such as electricity, water, gas, financial services and some business 
services. 
Although the proposed measures can help to increase the relevance of 
intraregional trade, it will be necessary –as it is shown next–  to make additional 
efforts to enhance its quality and achieve a more equitable distribution of its 
potential benefits. 
 
Slow improvement in the quality of intraregional trade 
 
Intraregional trade with its greater contents of manufactured products and 
intraindustry trade, has showed a better quality than extraregional exchange. 
Nevertheless, the available empirical evidence does not appear to corroborate the 
idea that intraregional trade, as it is expected in the new regionalism, has 
contributed substantially to change the structure of  extraregional exports and 
improve the trade insertion of Central America.
15 According to the theory of the 
new regionalism, the creation of a regional market has to enable member 
                                                 
15 See:  Rueda-Junquera, La reactivación del Mercado Común Centroamericano, op. cit.; 
Monge, op. cit.; Jorge Mario Martínez and Enrique Cortés, Competitividad centroamericana, Serie 
Estudios y Perspectivas de la CEPAL nº 21 (México: Sede subregional de la CEPAL, 2004). 124  Rueda-Junquera 
 
countries to attain learning economies, in such a way that later they gain access 
to extraregional market in competitive conditions. 
There has certainly been a rise in the participation of  manufactures in 
extraregional exports  –in particular, those ones going to the United States 
market–, as well as a change in the structure of these extraregional exports, 
which have incorporated new products, such as clothing maquila and in the case 
of Costa Rica, electronic products. The evidence indicates that this new pattern of 
extraregional trade insertion has not been boosted decisively by mechanisms 
generated by the new CACM, but by others linked to the national processes of 
trade opening-up and the preferential trade agreements, such as the Caribbean 
Basin Initiative and more recently, the signing of the CAFTA.
16 All this without 
forgetting the decisive role played in the 1990s by the intense and sustained 
economic recovery in the United States, major extraregional export market for 
the new Central American manufactures. 
As for the presence of intraindustry trade in intraregional exchanges, this has 
expanded since the reestablishment of the CACM. However, it reflects mostly a 
recovery of the levels existing before the crisis of the 1980s. Besides, the current 
dimension of intraindustry trade in Central America is still very far from that one 
reached by the industrialized nations. 
In short, the quality of intraregional trade in the CACM has improved since 
the early 1990s, but at a slow and insufficient pace and without substantial 
invigorating effects on the quality of the extraregional trade insertion. 
Intraregional trade liberalization by itself has not been enough to ensure a 
significant rise in its quality. Trade liberalization leads to a more efficient use of 
regional productive resources. Nevertheless, a better reallocation of these 
resources without the appropriate level of investment to upgrade the sources of 
industrial competitiveness, will not induce the expected revitalizing effect of 
intraregional trade. In the medium term, this revitalizing effect can become an 
essential factor for accomplishing a high-quality trade insertion, since the new 
exporting sectors of manufactures are demonstrating to have a limited capability 
for creating productive linkages and expanding productivity. 
 
Distributive problems of costs and benefits 
 
Most of the growth in intraregional trade and in its intraindustry component has 
been explained by the trade exchanges among the relatively more developed 
Central American countries, that is, Costa Rica, El Salvador and Guatemala. 
                                                 
16 On the special regime of trade preferences granted by European Union to Central America 
in the framework of the Generalized System of Preferences, see: Victor Bulmer-Thomas and 
Fernando Rueda-Junquera, “The Cooperation Agreement Between Central America and the European 
Union: A Case Study of the Special GSP Regime” Bulletin of Latin American Research 15, no. 3 
(1996): 323-340. Prospects for the Central American Customs Union  125 
 
Several studies have revealed that intraindustry trade is a phenomenon appearing 
exclusively in the trade flows among these three countries.
17 
 
Table 4 
Central American Common Market: Intraregional Exports  
of Agricultural Products, 1995 and 2002 
(in millions of US dollars and in percentages) 
1995  2002   
 
Country 
Agricultural 
intra-CACM 
exports 
(1) 
Total 
 intra-CACM 
exports 
(2) 
 
% 
 
(1):(2) 
Agricultural 
intra-CACM 
exports 
(3) 
Total 
intra-CACM 
exports 
(4) 
 
% 
 
(3):(4) 
Costa Rica  94.1  349.3  26.9  215.1  686.4  31.3 
Guatemala  85.5  427.3  20.0  174.9  739.1  23.7 
Honduras  134.9  565.3  23.9  242.5  873.7  27.8 
Nicaragua  19.7  117.9  16.7  103.4  240.5  43.0 
El Salvador  53.2  83.0  64.1  185.0  269.6  68.6 
CACM  387.4  1,542.8  25.1  920.9  2.809.3  32.8 
Source: INTAL (Instituto para la Integración de América Latina y el Caribe), Informe centroamericano Nº 2
(Buenos Aires: BID-INTAL, 2004), 12. 
CACM: Central American Common Market. 
 
Nicaragua is the country that less takes part of the relative greater quality of 
intraregional trade. It is the C ACM member which tends to have  a lower 
intradustry trade index and a higher weight of the agricultural products in the 
total value of its intraregional exports.
18 As it is observed in Table 4, in 1995 
agricultural exports accounted for 64.1 per cent of Nicaraguan intraregional 
exports, being this percentage the highest in the CACM. In 2002 this percentage 
has increased slightly to 68.6 percent and remains the highest one in the region. 
Nicaragua keeps a pattern of  intraregional trade specialization with weak quality 
and very little diversification, focused principally on the cattle exports. 
Besides the three relatively more developed Central American countries are 
responsible for most intraregional exports. Costa Rica, El Salvador and 
Guatemala have explained 84.3 percent of the average intraregional exports in 
the 2000–2004 period (see Table 5), being the bilateral exchange between El 
Salvador and Guatemala the most important.
19 
                                                 
17 See: Rodas, op. cit.; Rueda-Junquera, La reactivación del Mercado Común 
Centroamericano, op. cit., Ch. III; Monge, op. cit.. 
18 An empirical assessment of the effects of liberalizing intraregional trade in agricultural 
products, can be found in: Fernando Rueda-Junquera, “Regional Integration and Agricultural Trade in 
Central America” World Development 26, no. 2 (1998): 345-362. 
19 The bilateral exchange between Guatemala and El Salvador represents around 30 per cent of 
the average intraregional trade in the same period. For more detailed quantitative information, see: 
SIECA (Secretaría de Integración Económica Centroamericana),  Boletín estadístico 13.1 
(Guatemala: SIECA, 2005).  126  Rueda-Junquera 
 
Table 5 
Central American Common Market: Member Country’s Percentage Share 
in Total Intraregional Exports, 1990-2004 (Selected Years) 
(in percentages) 
Relatively more developed countries  Relatively less  developed countries   
Year  Costa Rica  El Salvador  Guatemala  Total  Honduras  Nicaragua  Total 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2001
a 
2002
a 
2003
a 
2004
b 
2000-2004 
average 
20.1 
21.9 
22.5 
23.4 
23.9 
24.9 
25.1 
 
23.9 
26.3 
26.8 
28.2 
25.5 
25.8 
24.3 
23.9 
 
25.5 
42.9 
34.8 
31.2 
37.4 
35.1 
35.3 
35.7 
 
34.9 
89.3 
83.5 
81.9 
86.3 
84.8 
84.5 
84.7 
 
84.3 
3.6 
11.3 
11.8 
7.5 
8.4 
8.2 
8.1 
 
8.8 
7.1 
5.2 
6.3 
6.2 
6.8 
7.3 
7.2 
 
6.9 
10.7 
16.5 
18.1 
13.7 
15.2 
15.5 
15.3 
 
15.7 
Sources: For 1990 and 1995, derived from: SIECA (Secretaría de Integración Económica Centroamericana), 
Series estadísticas seleccionadas de Centroamérica N.º 28  (Guatemala: SIECA, 1998); for 2000–2004 
period, derived from: SIECA, Boletín estadístico 13.1 (Guatemala: SIECA, 2005). 
a Preliminary data. 
b Estimated data. 
 
This empirical evidence points out that the members relatively more 
developed are in better conditions to enjoy the potential benefits from the 
consolidation of the new CACM. If this new regional integration scheme is to 
endure, it must not only result in a situation that improves allocative efficiency in 
the regional resources, but it must also be perceived to be equitable by all the 
member countries, especially by Honduras and Nicaragua. Without additional 
measures paying attention to specific needs of the relatively less developed 
countries, it  is almost inevitable that these countries begin to question their 
participation in the new CACM.
20  
It would be  appropriate to design mechanisms that enabled the potential 
winners of the customs union creation compensate the potential losers of the 
same. The European experience has shown that a way to carry out this 
compensation is through financial solidarity materialized in the Structural Funds 
and the Cohesion Fund. By these Funds, a part of the member states’ 
contributions to the community budget is transferred to the less favoured social 
groups and regions. In the current Financial Perspective 2000–2006, the 
aforementioned Funds account for the third part of the community budget. 
                                                 
20 The presence of intraregional asymmetries and the need to search for a mechanism facing 
them, have been a constant in the process of Central American integration from its inception in the 
1960s. The lack of a suitable mechanism to tackle the specific problems of the relatively less 
developed countries, was one of the main factors that contributed to the slowing-down of the 
integration scheme in the 1970s and to the withdrawal of Honduras in 1971, as well as to the crisis 
of the 1980s. On the problem of the intraregional asymmetries in Central America, see: Jorge 
Nowalski,  Asimetrías económicas, laborales y sociales en Centroamérica: desafíos y 
oportunidades (San José: Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales, 2002). Prospects for the Central American Customs Union  127 
 
This experience is beginning to be taken into account in the Latin American 
integration schemes, as it has been confirmed during the last MERCOSUR 
Presidential Summit held in Ouro Preto, Brazil, in December 2004. The creation 
of a Structural Convergence Fund was approved during this summit with the 
purpose of supporting the most depressed sectors and areas in the MERCOSUR. 
The debate that took place within MERCOSUR revealed two different 
approaches to confront the problem of the asymmetries in intraregional trade, a 
problem that also is present in the CACM. As opposed to the  Argentinean 
position that demanded the right to establish safeguard measures in intraregional 
trade to protect the national industries vulnerable to intraregional competition, 
the Brazilian position argued that the best way to correct trade imbalances was 
not b y restricting free intraregional trade, but by creating a mechanism of 
intraregional financial solidarity to facilitate the competitive incorporation of the 
most depressed sectors and areas into the regional trade.  
In the same way as it is happening in MERCOSUR, the European experience 
on intraregional solidarity could be adapted to the peculiarities of the Central 
American case, giving rise to some kind of structural and social cohesion 
instrument. In fact, the Central American presidents themselves have shown their 
formal interest in the creation of a Social Cohesion Fund. In the presidential 
summit held in Belize in December 2003, the Central American Bank for 
Economic Integration (CABEI) was instructed to submit “a financial mechanism 
to create a Social Cohesion Fund to mitigate possible impacts derived from the 
customs union and to promote its benefits ” (Point 6 of the Declaration of Belize, 
on December 19, 2003). Although the CABEI proposed a project of a financial 
mechanism of intraregional solidarity, this one was not approved. For the present 
time, the interest of the Central American presidents in this type of mechanisms 
is more formal than real. 
 
Absence of a real common trade policy 
 
The creation of a customs union involves unavoidably the adoption of a common 
trade policy, since all the customs union members are bound to apply the same 
CET against third countries. Besides the existence of the CET compels that trade 
negotiations are carried out jointly, providing a potential benefit to the customs 
union members stemmed from the greater regional bargaining power. 
In customs unions made up of developing countries, as it is the case of the 
CACM, the possibility of using the greater regional bargaining power is 
singularly important because it allows to take part in better conditions in 
international trade relations. However, the Central American countries have 
scarcely used this power. They have tended to negotiate bilaterally their free 
trade agreements, eroding the common dimension of the tariff protection 
guaranteed by the CET (see Table 6). Even when the Central American countries 
have negotiated free trade agreements en bloc  –as it was done with the 128  Rueda-Junquera 
 
Dominican Republic and the United States–, harmonized joint agreements were 
only reached regarding procedures, while the tariff concessions were negotiated 
bilaterally, taking into consideration the peculiarities and the sensitive products 
of every country. 
 
Table 6 
Central American Common Market: Free Trade Agreements Into Force 
Agreement  Entry into force 
Mexico – Costa Rica  1995 
Mexico – Nicaragua  1998 
Mexico – Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras  2001 
Panama – El Salvador   2002 
Panama – Honduras   2002 
Dominican Republic – CACM  2001-2002 
Chile – El Salvador  2002 
Chile – Costa Rica  2002 
Canada – Costa Rica  2002 
Source: INTAL (Instituto para la Integración de América Latina y el Caribe), 
Informe centroamericano Nº 2 (Buenos Aires: BID-INTAL, 2004), 16. 
CACM: Central American Common Market. 
 
The absence of a real common trade policy not only has prevented CACM 
members from taking advantage of the potential regional bargaining power, but 
also it can  endanger progress made in the CET harmonization. The problem 
arises when simultaneously establishing a CET with a series of bilateral free 
trade agreements including different tariff concessions. The entry into force of 
the CAFTA will give clear proof of this problem, since it will not take place in a 
homogeneous way in all the Central American countries. Tariff concessions were 
negotiated bilaterally, which means that the schedule of tariff exemption in the 
CAFTA will be different in every country and therefore, the CET will not be 
applied in its entirety by all the countries during the period of tariff exemption. 
The fact that the United States is the p rincipal trade partner of the CACM, 
providing around 40 per cent of its total imports,
21 converts to the CET 
exceptions originated by the CAFTA implementation, into a potential disturbing 
factor of the Central American customs union. The  potentiality  of this 
disturbance will become effective if governments do not come to an agreement to 
harmonize the differences in the CAFTA tariff concessions and to make them 
compatible with the establishment of the CET.  
Likewise, the weakness of the common trade policy in the CACM can hinder 
the conclusion of the current process of CET harmonization. If the 
aforementioned problem on CAFTA coming into force is left aside, the current 
percentage of the tariff universe remaining to be harmonized is small (5.4 
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percent). Nonetheless, its harmonization can be complex because tariffed 
agricultural products are included. For this type of products, a renegotiation both 
in the list of products and in the tariff levels, as well as in the quotas, could be 
required within the framework of the World Trade Organization (WTO). In other 
words, it would be necessary to renegotiate commitments assumed by every 
country as part of its admission into the WTO, for what it would be advisable to 
rely on a regional bargaining power. 
It is evident that the creation and consolidation of a customs union in Central 
America will need to adopt an authentic common external trade policy. This 
common policy will have to facilitate the harmonization of the different 
commitments undertaken by the CACM members as a result of their participation 
in the WTO and/or of the bilateral free trade agreement signed. Likewise, it will 
have to contribute to create joint trade negotiation mechanisms. 
 
Lack of a common customs administration 
 
Along with the common trade policy, the common customs administration is 
another element  inseparable f rom the formation and  operation of a customs 
union. Not only the CET has to be applied against third countries in equal terms 
by all the CACM members, but also it has to be collected and a dministered 
jointly. The CET collection is a source of community revenues, which can be 
allocated to the financing of common policies consolidating and deepening the 
economic integration process. 
At present there exist four models of customs administration  –three of 
intraregional character and one of peripheral character– that are being tested in 
the CACM. For now, the advances in the setting up of a customs administration 
strictly common are limited, what can be conditioning the effective establishment 
of the customs union. Progresses are only perceived in the binational customs 
between Guatemala and El Salvador. Nevertheless, it is still necessary to 
eliminate all the intraregional customs,  keeping only the peripheral customs 
model until becoming the type of customs which is typical  of a customs union. 
Given the budgetary restriction of the Central American governments, a 
significant issue is to delimit the use of the revenues collected in the peripheral 
customs, once intraregional customs are removed. These revenues include both 
the tariff incomes and the domestic taxes on imported goods collected at the 
customs. That is why it is important to find suitable mechanisms of tax 
harmonization as well as of collection and distribution of  the CET revenues 
received by the peripheral customs. A coherent proposal would be that such 
revenues financed a community budget from which common policies could be 
developed. Nonetheless, for the time being the Central American governments 
are reluctant to this idea. 
Moreover, a potential fiscal challenge arises in many countries due to the fact 
that the customs collect internal taxes that other tax agencies cannot due to their 130  Rueda-Junquera 
 
smaller overseeing ability (for example, the collection in the customs of taxes on 
the goods bound for the informal sector). In this context, the elimination of 
intraregional customs  –element  inseparable from the creation of a common 
customs administration– could lead to reduce this collection of internal taxes. To 
avoid this, it will be necessary to make previously progress towards the 
strengthening of other internal tax collecting agencies. 
 
Limited coordination of  macroeconomic policies 
 
Macroeconomic stability is another requirement for laying down a customs union 
on a sound basis. A way of contributing to this stability is the coordination of the 
major macroeconomic policies of the countries  participating  in the customs 
union. Besides, this coordination is fundamental to avoid that the measures 
adopted by every member country to adjust to the international economy 
changes, end up affecting unfavourably on the rest of the partners. 
Aware of the relevance of the macroeconomic coordination, the Central 
American Monetary Council (CAMC) has established a group of basic 
parameters of macroeconomic convergence as a  starting point for that 
coordination. These parameters have been used only for monitoring the economic 
evolution of the region, without a political commitment having existed to fulfil 
them. The prevailing parameters of macroeconomic convergence are  the 
following:
22 
 
a)  The growth rate of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) must achieve or 
surpass 5 per cent. Nevertheless, due to the economic slowdown in the 
last years,  growth rates exceeding 4 percent were regarded as 
satisfactory; 
b)  The rate of  inflation must not go above 6 percent; 
c)  The index of real effective exchange rate with the United States has to be 
placed between 95 and 105; 
d)  The rate of real passive interest must not pass 5 percent; 
e)  The ratio of Central Bank´s net international reserves to monetary base 
has to be greater than or equal to 100; 
f)  Balance of payments’ current account deficit does not have to surpass 3.5 
percent of GDP; 
g)  Public sector deficit must not be above 2.5 percent of  GDP; 
                                                 
22 The macroeconomic convergence parameters established by the CAMC have been changing 
throughout time, adapting to the conjunctural changes. The current version was established in 
November, 2002 in the 233
rd CAMC Meeting. In this Meeting it was agreed to modify some of the 
parameters to reflect appropriately the recent evolution of the Central American economies and to 
take into account the Dominican Republic incorporation into the CAMC in that year. For more 
information, see: SECMCA (Secretaría Ejecutiva del Consejo Monetario Centroamericano), 
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h)  Total public debt must not exceed 50 percent of GDP. 
 
As Table 7 shows, the fulfilment degree of these macroeconomic convergen-
ce criteria in Central America has been modest. In the 1997–2004 period the av-
erage fulfilment degree did not exceed 34 per cent in Honduras and Nicaragua, 
was around 50 per cent in Costa Rica and Guatemala, and reached almost 66 per 
cent in El Salvador. Although all the CACM members have been applying simi-
lar macroeconomic stabilization and structural adjustment policies, the degrees 
and speeds of implementation of these policies have been different in each coun-
try, what explains the disparity in the macroeconomic convergence. 
 
Table 7 
Central American Common Market: Fulfilment Degree 
of Macroeconomic Convergence Parameters, 1997-2004
a 
(in percentages) 
Year  Costa Rica  El Salvador  Guatemala  Honduras  Nicaragua 
1997  50.0  63.0  50.0  37.7  50.0 
1998  63.0  63.0  75.0  38.0  25.0 
1999  38.0  63.0  25.0  13.0  50.0 
2000  63.0  63.0  50.0  38.0  37.5 
2001  50.0  63.0  63.0  25.0  25.0 
2002  25.0  75.0  50.0  38.0  13.0 
2003  50.0  74.0  50.0  38.0  13.0 
2004
b  38.0  63.0  38.0  38.0  38.0 
1997-2004 
average 
 
47.1 
 
65.9 
 
50.1 
 
33.2 
 
31.4 
Sources: Derived from: SECMCA (Secretaría Ejecutiva del Consejo Monetario Centroamericano), Informe 
económico regional 2001 (San José: SECMCA, 2002), 20; SECMCA, Informe económico regional 2002 (San 
José: SECMCA, 2003), 22; SECMCA, Informe económico regional 2003 (San José: SECMCA, 2004), 21; 
SECMCA, Informe económico regional 2004 (San José: SECMCA, 2005), 27. 
a The macroeconomic convergence parameters are the eight ones established by the Executive Secretariat of the 
Central American Monetary Council; on this, see: SECMCA (Secretaría Ejecutiva del Consejo Monetario 
Centroamericano), Informe económico regional 2004 (San José: SECMCA, 2005), 25–26. The fulfilment 
degree of these parameters takes values varying between 0 per cent (null fulfilment) and 100 per cent (full 
fulfilment). 
b Preliminary percentages. 
 
In sum, the empirical evidence confirms that macroeconomic policies 
coordination in the CACM is very limited. The real possibilities that this 
coordination will be extended and  deepened, appear to be still very reduced, 
since regional commitments continue occupying a secondary position among 
governments’ national priorities. In the medium term it is not predictable that a 
political commitment  at the regional will be undertaken to coordinate 
macroeconomic policies and fulfil convergence criteria. 
 
Weakness of regional institutions 
 
The new institutional framework created by the 1991 Protocol of Tegucigalpa is 
characterized by its global and multidimensional aspects. It has established an 132  Rueda-Junquera 
 
institutional model –the Central American Integration System (CAIS) – based on 
four subsystems: political, economic, social and cultural. With this, it attempts to 
go beyond the strictly economic area and grant a  global dimension to the new 
Central American integration, a feature that was lacking in the 1960s old 
scheme.
23  
Likewise, the CAIS incorporates new institutions as the Central American 
Court of Justice and the Consultative Committee, which come to solve two 
fundamental insufficiencies of the previous phase. Firstly, the lack of institutional 
mechanisms guaranteeing the fulfilment of the agreements and the safeguard of 
the common interest (as the Central American Court of Justice). Secondly, the 
absence of an institutional mechanism allowing the active participation of the 
civil society (as the Consultative Committee). 
In contrast to these advances, the new regional institutional scheme presents 
three major limitations reducing its effectiveness. Firstly, the institutional scheme 
develops immersed in a remarkable juridical disorder. There are no homogeneous 
and compulsory deadlines for the national ratification of the agreements signed, 
what causes delays in their entry into force or the partial entry into force for only 
some member countries. For example, Costa Rica has not ratified the 1986 
Constitutive Treaty of the Central American Parliament. Likewise, Costa Rica, 
Guatemala and Panama have not ratified the 1992 Statute of the Central 
American Court of Justice. 
Secondly, the essentially intergovernmental conception of the new institu-
tional framework makes that the decision taking power is concentrated on the 
Summit of Central American Presidents, which is the CAIS highest ranking or-
ganization. The high political commitment level of the presidential summits is 
decisive in the first years of an integration process, but it can limit its deepening. 
The political consensus of the governments will be strongly conditioned by each 
member country’s specific political situations, which can slow down and hinder 
the regional integration process. 
If the consolidation and deepening of the new CACM is wished, facing an 
increasing number of conflicts in trade matters as well as in harmonization and 
production factors movement matters, will be inevitable. In this context, it will be 
necessary to provide the regional integration scheme with supranational 
institutional mechanisms having sufficient decision-making and financing 
capacity to remove rapidly obstacles arising on the path towards a greater 
integration. 
The third limitation of the new regional institutional scheme  lies in its 
excessive complexity and high number of institutions. This not only has 
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PNUD-Proyecto Estado de la Región, 2003), Ch. 4; SGSICA-CEPAL, op. cit.. Prospects for the Central American Customs Union  133 
 
conditioned its effectiveness, but also has ended up causing a serious funding 
problem.  
The aforementioned limitations have brought about an important institutional 
weakness, which hampers the advance in the regional integration scheme.  Aware 
of this, in the second half of the 1990s the Central American governments and 
the C AIS General Secretariat with the support of the Inter-American 
Development Bank (IADB) and the United Nations Economic Commission for 
Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLA), carried out a profound reflection on the 
rationalization and reinforcement of the Central American common institutions. 
The result was an institutional reform proposal contained in the report Diagnosis 
of the Central American Regional Institutions, published by IADB and ECLA in 
1997. However, governments did not put into practice report’s recommendations. 
Recently, the Central American Presidents Summit held in June 2004 has 
taken up again the formal commitment to conduct a deep institutional reform by 
constituting an  ad hoc Commission for the Comprehensive Reconsideration of 
the Regional Institutions. This Commission with the support of the the CAIS 
General Secretariat and the Central American Economic Integration Secretariat 
has  to submit a  consensual  agreement on the different institutional reform 
proposals.  If this formal commitment will actually materialize into a reality still 
remains to be verified. 
 
Conclusions 
 
After a profound deterioration in the 1980s, the interest in regional integration in 
Central America has been revived  on a new basis. Now regional integration is 
perceived not only as an instrument for creating a regional market that extends 
the national demand, but also as an instrument for gaining international 
competitiveness, compatible with the promotion of non-traditional extraregional 
exports.  
This new regional integration has achieved the revitalization intraregional 
trade, improving its quality and attracting intraregional investments, thus 
contributing to economic growth. Despite these achievements, the new CACM is 
subject to serious limitations such as the excessive dominance of extraregional 
trade, the slow improvement in the quality of intraregional trade, the unequitable 
distribution of  benefits, the absence of a real common trade policy, the lack of a 
common customs administration, the limited coordination of macroeconomic 
policies and the weakness of regional institutions. If these limitations are not 
overcome by implementing suitable economic and institutional policies such as 
those ones suggested in the article, the new regional integration will not be able 
to contribute effectively to the Central American economic development process. 
Faced with the current situation of the regional integration scheme, Central 
American governments can take up a passive or active stance. The adoption of a 
passive stance would imply that the regional integration scheme would limit 134  Rueda-Junquera 
 
itself to perfecting only the free trade area and at best, to completing the customs 
union. This passive stance would reduce drastically the bargaining power of the 
CACM, particularly if the Free Trade Area of the Americas was established.  
When tariffs were eliminated within the Americas, CACM’s political decision 
power  against the big multinational companies and world economic  centres 
would diminish substantially. 
Along with this passive stance, there is another alternative consisting of 
taking up an active stance in favour of regional integration. This alternative 
would aim at consolidating and deepening the economic integration scheme, by 
perfecting completely the customs union and going gradually  and realistically 
towards the creation of a common market and an economic and monetary union. 
Only through this active stance the regional integration scheme will be able to 
support effectively the economic development of Central America. For that, it 
would be necessary that member countries renewed their political commitment, 
taking on the need to deepen the integration scheme and especially, observe and 
comply with the commitments undertaken. 
 
 
  
 
The Politics of the Central American Free Trade Agreement 
(CAFTA) 
 
 
 
 
 
Eric Jacobstein 
 
Introduction 
 
In May 2004, U.S. Trade Representative Robert Zoellick joined trade ministers 
from Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua for the 
historic signing of the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA). The 
agreement  – which now also includes the Dominican Republic  – contains 
economic opportunities that come at a crucial time. While there are great 
differences of opinion over the potential benefits of the accord, these benefits 
may never be seen i f CAFTA is not voted on or if it is defeated in the U.S. 
Congress. 
Those in favor of the agreement contend that the Free Trade Area of the 
Americas (FTAA) is not progressing. For Central America, CAFTA appears to 
be the only viable option for expanding trade, attracting more investment and 
increasing productivity. The increased economic might of China poses an 
imminent threat to jobs in Central America. In particular, the expansion of 
Chinese textile production poses a significant challenge to Central America’s 
large textile and apparel sector. With the January 1, 2005 expiration of the Multi-
Fiber Agreement, China could now exploit an important comparative advantage 
in this sector. But CAFTA would give the U.S. private sector good reason to 
keep textile jobs in the hemisphere rather than sending them to China and other 
Asian nations.
1 
While the general idea of a CAFTA agreement is broadly supported among 
policymakers and legislators in the United States and Central America, the con-
tent of the agreement has been a great source of contention. Legislatures in El 
Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras have approved the agreement, but ratification 
is still pending in the other CAFTA countries.
2 The most difficult battleground 
for CAFTA will be the U.S. Congress. CAFTA will likely slide through the U.S. 
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Senate where legislators broadly focus their voting patterns on the concerns of 
constituents state-wide. In the U.S. House of Representatives, legislators have 
much more specific constituent concerns that come into play each time they cast 
a vote. Furthermore, members of the House of Representatives are likely to fol-
low party lines more closely. The vote on CAFTA in the House will be very 
close. If the agreement passes it will likely pass by no more than two or three 
votes.  
Virtually every Democrat that has spoken out on CAFTA has announced that 
they will vote against the agreement, on the grounds that it does not require 
member countries to enforce International Labor Organization (ILO) standards. 
In addition, members of Congress on both sides of the aisle have indicated they 
will vote against the agreement in order to protect constituents in the sugar and 
textile sectors. The House of Representatives approved trade promotion authority 
(TPA) for President George W. Bush in 2002 by just three votes. (TPA calls for 
international trade agreements to be subject to an up-or-down vote but not 
amendment in Congress). Furthermore, the window on free trade in the U.S. 
Congress continues to narrow.  
Failure to gain congressional approval of CAFTA would severely damage 
the prospects for approval of several upcoming bilateral trade agreements in the 
region and an eventual FTAA. It could also damage U.S. trade policy more 
broadly by setting a precedent for the rejection of future trade accords. The Bush 
administration is currently completing free trade negotiations with Panama and is 
in the late stages of negotiations with Colombia, Ecuador and Peru. These nego-
tiations use the CAFTA framework as a base, and the Bush administration will 
not be able to bring them to the floor of Congress if CAFTA fails. This paper will 
focus on the political dynamics of CAFTA in the 109
th U.S. Congress and the 
major implications that the political battle over CAFTA will have on the future of 
U.S. trade policy.  
 
The Case for CAFTA 
 
CAFTA proponents argue that the agreement has the power to expand economic 
opportunities in Central America and the Dominican Republic. CAFTA is not 
likely to make a major contribution to the massive U.S. economy but could spur 
investment in the poverty-stricken nations of Central America. Given increased 
competition from China and other Asian nations, such investment, though not an 
all-encompassing solution is seen by many as essential to increase the 
subregion’s competitiveness.  
Bush administration officials and members of Congress in favor of CAFTA 
also argue that the agreement is in a sense a reward to a group of countries that 
has made substantial democratic progress. Over the last decade, Central America 
has emerged from a s eries of military dictatorships to a community of 
democracies. Reflecting on a recent trip to El Salvador, former Representative The Politics of the CAFTA  137 
 
Cal Dooley (D-CA) and Representative Jerry Weller (R-IL) contend that the 
passage of CAFTA “can help cement the democracy and national reconciliation 
of the past decade – and a failure to approve its risks [would] push the region 
back toward the past.”
3 Arguments in favor of CAFTA go beyond pure 
economics and instead also focus on the agreement’s implications for democracy 
and security in the region. The Bush administration’s primary attention to Latin 
America has been shown in its intensive trade agenda. Without congressional 
approval of CAFTA, the administration will have little to show for its efforts in 
the hemisphere.  
 
Labor and CAFTA 
 
It is nothing new for trade agreements to be a source of major contention in the 
U.S. Congress. Free trade creates anxiety among a large sector of the American 
public who perceive U.S. job loss as directly linked to the signing of free trade 
agreements. This in turn often makes legislators equally wary. A recent survey 
found that 51% of Americans across all political parties oppose CAFTA. A press 
release describing the survey noted that “voters were primarily concerned with 
the negative impact CAFTA will have on the American economy along with 
possible significant job losses.”
4 
Even so, while some members of Congress cite job loss as a factor in their 
opposition to CAFTA, Democratic critics support the general idea of a CAFTA 
accord but point to the negotiated agreement’s weak labor standards in rejecting 
it. Democrats will vote overwhelmingly against the accord, far more so than they 
have in other trade votes. The day before CAFTA’s signing in Washington, three 
key Democrats – Representatives Charles Rangel (D-NY), Sander Levin (D-MI) 
and Xavier Becerra (D-CA) – issued a statement articulating their problems with 
CAFTA. (Rangel is the ranking Democrat on the House Ways and Means 
Committee – the committee that plays a leading role in U.S. trade policy – and 
Levin and Becerra also serve on the committee and on its trade subcommittee.) 
The legislators said they would reject CAFTA on the grounds that the agreement 
does not in any way bind member countries to the core labor standards of the 
International  Labor Organization (ILO) but instead simply asks countries to 
enforce their own labor laws. They found this to be particularly troubling given 
what they viewed as Central America’s dismal labor record. The statement 
explained: 
                                                 
3 Cal Dooley and Jerry Weller, “The CAFTA Choice,” ViewPoint Americas, Volume 2, Issue 
5, (October 1, 2004).  
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The CAFTA negotiated by the Bush Administration…adopts an ‘enforce your own 
labor laws’ standard. This standard is totally unacceptable when all of the analyses of the 
realities within the CAFTA countries – including those of the U.S. State Department, 
Human Rights Watch and the International Labor Organization  – confirm that the 
international standards are not incorporated into the countries’ labor laws and they do not 
enforce even their inadequate laws.
5 
 
The legislators further contended that the Bush administration’s failure to 
negotiate a bipartisan agreement put “this CAFTA on a midnight train to 
nowhere.”
6 Democratic presidential candidate John Kerry similarly rejected 
CAFTA noting his consistent support for free trade agreements but his concern 
that CAFTA was a “disappointing  and unnecessary step backwards in our 
nation’s efforts to ensure that opening markets results in higher living standards 
on all sides and not a race to the bottom on workers rights and environmental 
protection.”
7 
An October 2003 Human Rights Watch report called for trade negotiators to 
move beyond the labor rights provisions in the United States – Chile and United 
States – Singapore free trade agreements which call on governments to simply 
enforce existing labor laws. Human Rights Watch and many Democrats viewed 
the U.S. – Jordan free trade agreement, on the other hand, as the model for labor 
standards. This agreement entered into force in December 2001 and allows for 
the possibility of fines and sanctions in the case that domestic laws violate 
international standards.
8 Ultimately, CAFTA incorporated labor provisions 
similar to those in the Chile and Singapore free trade agreements. This has 
become a rallying cry against CAFTA for many Democrats. 
Democrats and organized labor groups argue that the implementation of 
CAFTA will lead to a setback for workers’ rights. They contend that specific, 
binding international laws and regulations in the CAFTA accord protect 
intellectual property rights and cover other issues of interest to the U.S. business 
community but no such laws exist for the protection of workers’ rights.
9 The 
AFL-CIO notes that CAFTA is a step backward from the current trade preference 
programs that exist between Central America and the United States  – the 
                                                 
5 Statement by Representative Charles B. Rangel, Sander M. Levin and Xavier Becerra, 
“Reps. Rangel, Levin and Becerra Statement on the Signing of the U.S. – Central America Free 
Trade Agreement,” May 27, 2004. 
6 Ibid. 
7 “Kerry Statement on CAFTA,” May 28, 2004. 
8 “Labor Rights Protections in CAFTA,” Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper, Pg. 2, October 
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Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) and  the Caribbean Basin Initiative 
(CBI). The GSP requires countries to take steps to afford internationally 
recognized worker’s rights and the CBI asks the U.S. president to consider the 
extent to which international workers’ rights are enforced in granting preferential 
access. The AFL-CIO contends that “the GSP and CBI directly condition market 
access on respect for international labor rights”
10 while CAFTA has no such 
binding mechanism. 
The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, however, points out that 
CAFTA is groundbreaking in its approach to labor. A three-tier approach is used 
in dealing with labor issues in the agreement. First, as previously noted, countries 
must enforce existing labor laws. Second, Central American countries have 
already begun to work with the ILO to improve existing labor laws and 
enforcement. Finally, there have been substantial trade capacity building efforts 
related to CAFTA. Trade capacity building efforts are funded not only by the 
U.S. government but also by international financial institutions and by the private 
sector.
11 
Members of Congress in favor of the current CAFTA accord have argued 
that the only way to ensure enhanced workers’ rights is through the 
implementation of the agreement. The CAFTA-DR countries have worked 
closely with the ILO over the past two years to improve their laws in an 
unprecedented fashion. Without the negotiation of CAFTA and the forging of 
closer economic and political links, supporters argue, such progress would have 
never been possible. Furthermore, CAFTA supporters contend that those who 
have cited faulty labor provisions as their primary objection to the agreement 
simply oppose the current CAFTA labor provisions as a pretense to reject free 
trade more generally. Former Representative Cal Dooley (D-CA) and 
Representative Jerry Weller (R-IL) make this argument in the context of the U.S. 
– Australia free trade agreement: 
 
We are doubtful that organized labor would ever support CAFTA, especially when 
one considers its opposition to the US-Australia trade agreement. If labor opposes an 
agreement with a country with a higher minimum wage, twice the percentage of union 
workers, and arguably higher labor standards, why should anyone believe that it would 
ever support a free trade agreement with Central America?
12   
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While labor provisions are clearly at the heart of the political battle over 
CAFTA’s approval, there is more to Democrats’ failure to support the agreement. 
The next section will describe further Democratic concerns and Republican 
responses. The specific constituent-based concerns from the textile and sugar 
lobbies will then be assessed.  
 
Further Democratic Concerns and Republican Responses 
 
In a recent opinion piece in the  Wall Street Journal,  former Clinton 
administration officials Stuart Eizenstat and David Marchick contend that “the 
Democratic opposition to CAFTA is very poor politics.”
13 Failure to support the 
agreement, they believe, would damage the Democratic Party’s image of being 
pro-growth and pro-trade. Eizenstat and Marchick elaborate off-the-record 
Democratic arguments against the accord. The first argument is that a unified 
Democratic opposition to CAFTA would force House Republicans with close 
races in 2006 to support CAFTA. This would allow Democrats to gain political 
leverage from the accord. The second argument is quite simply that CAFTA 
rhymes with NAFTA (the acronym used to describe the North American Free 
Trade Agreement) and brings back memories of the battle that President Clinton 
had to wage within the Democratic Party to get NAFTA approved in the U.S. 
Congress.
14 
In response to Democratic opposition to the agreement, Bush administration 
officials and lobbyists are said to be spinning rejection of CAFTA as anti-
Hispanic. This is particularly aimed at members of Congress in the Congressional 
Hispanic Caucus and non-Hispanics representing border states. 110 Democrats 
voted for a free trade agreement with Morocco with labor provisions similar to 
those in CAFTA.  A U.S. trade official recently quoted in the National Journal 
Congress Daily explains: “What message would it send to say ‘we’re not going 
to trade with poor Latinos?’…what message would it send when you get 110 
Democrats for Morocco and you can’t get them for CAFTA?”
15 Still, a number 
of members of the Congressional Hispanic Caucus have announced their 
intention to vote against CAFTA including Representatives Xavier Becerra (D-
CA), Raul Grijaiva (D-AZ) and Hilda Solis (D-CA).  
Bush administration officials are hoping to pick up votes for CAFTA from 
those Democrats who voted in favor of Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) for 
President Bush in 2002. But six of those Democrats who voted for TPA have 
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now retired. While Republicans did pick up seats in the House in the 2004 
elections, they are likely to lose a number of CAFTA votes as a  result of 
constituent-related concerns in sugar and textile districts. Representative Becerra 
recently challenged the assertion that Democratic opposition is solely responsible 
for holding up CAFTA. He contends that the real reason is “Because a 
Republican Congress will not give a Republican president the votes he needs to 
pass it.”
16 Republican Congressional opposition to CAFTA will make the Bush 
administration’s task of getting the agreement through Congress particularly 
difficuly. President Bush will have to find ways to get these votes back from 
select Democrats if the agreement is to gain approval. 
The recent appointment of Representative Rob Portman (R-OH) as U.S. 
Trade Representative demonstrates the Bush administration’s concern that the 
U.S. Congress should be a focal point for the top U.S. trade negotiator. The 
successful continuation of U.S. trade policy will depend on bipartisan inclusion 
of members of Congress in the trade policy-making process before trade 
agreements are voted on. By bringing members of Congress on board from the 
very start, Portman would be more likely to get future bilateral and multilateral 
trade agreements through the U.S. Congress and in particular through the U.S. 
House of Representatives. The Washington Post notes that Portman is in a strong 
position to do so because of his reputation as “a relatively bipartisan figure in 
Congress, having worked with such Democratic stalwarts as Sen. John F. Kerry 
(D-MA) and Rep. Ben Cardin (D-MD) on numerous tax-related legislative 
initiatives.”
17 Portman will need to work closely with members of the U.S. 
Congress if the U.S. trade agenda is to move ahead in any substantive way. 
 
Sugar and Textile Opposition to CAFTA 
 
If the passage of CAFTA simply depended on a Republican majority in the U.S. 
House of Representatives, there would be little serious concern about the 
agreement moving ahead. But while there is a Republican majority in the House 
of Representatives, a number of constituent concerns have led some Republicans 
to announce their intention to vote against CAFTA. While the ultimate decisions 
of legislators may depend more on pressure from the White House than on 
pressure from their constituents, sugar and textile opposition to CAFTA pose the 
risk of taking Republican votes away from the agreement. 
CAFTA would initially allow an extra 109,000 tons of sugar into the U.S. 
market. This number – which represents less than one percent of the 10 million 
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ton domestic market – would eventually grow to 150,000 tons.
18 While the 
numbers are relatively small, the sugar industry’s fear is that larger trade deals 
will be easier to pass if CAFTA goes through.
19 The proliferation of bilateral 
trade agreements will mean more competition for the U.S. sugar industry. The 
sugar industry was successful in managing to exempt sugar from the recent U.S. 
– Australia free trade agreement. It did not have similar success with the CAFTA 
accord, which was negotiated directly with countries that depend highly on sugar 
exports. 
The American Manufacturing Trade Action Coalition similarly rejects 
CAFTA, noting that “the deal is riddled with loopholes that will destroy tens of 
thousands of U.S. textile and apparel manufacturing jobs.”
20 The coalition 
believes rejecting CAFTA will protect textile jobs in the United States. The 
counterargument is that a free trade agreement between the United States and 
Central America will benefit both regions and thus keep textile manufacturing 
processes in the hemisphere rather than exporting jobs to China.  
Constituent concerns will be a major dealbreaker in the vote for CAFTA. 
However, while members of Congress are prone to make their constituents their 
first priority, political pressure from the White House could trump constituent 
politics if the Bush administration exercises a substantial amount of political will 
in pushing CAFTA forward. 
 
Conclusion 
 
CAFTA comes at a crucial time for Central America. China and other Asian 
countries pose a significant economic challenge to the small, poor nations that 
make up the Central American isthmus. These countries desperately need to 
increase their competitiveness and CAFTA presents them with such an 
opportunity. While there is no consensus in the U.S. Congress on the content of 
the agreement, the real question for those voting on CAFTA is whether Central 
America will be better off with or without the agreement. As a result of the recent 
expiration of the Multi-fiber agreement, the passage of CAFTA appears to be 
increasingly urgent and necessary for the subregion.  
CAFTA’s passage is by no means certain. If the Bush administration does 
not think it has the votes to get the agreement through, the agreement will likely 
not come to a vote at all in the 109th Congress. This would not only hold up 
CAFTA but would also delay free trade agreements being negotiated with 
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20 “CAFTA Bad for U.S. Textile Industry and Workers,” American Manufacturing Trade 
Action Coalition, May 28, 2004. The Politics of the CAFTA  143 
 
Panama, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru and a future Free Trade Area of the 
Americas (FTAA). It could also continue to hold up the Doha round. 
Nevertheless, the most likely outcome is the passage of CAFTA by a small 
margin. While constituent concerns are important, so is party politics. Still, a 
positive outcome on CAFTA will require the Bush administration to spend a 
great deal of political capital in getting the appropriate votes. This could mean 
making a number of side deals with members of Congress to get their votes. (For 
example, increasing agricultural subsidies in particular sectors.) In an 
increasingly polarized political environment, future cliffhangers such as the 
CAFTA vote will be hard to avoid. The vote on CAFTA will determine the 
future of the U.S. trade agenda and the speed at which it moves ahead. Approval 
of the agreement will mean the negotiation of agreements similar in content to  
CAFTA while rejection may lead to a reassessment of U.S. trade agreements and 
could foment the forging of compromises between Democrats and Republicans. 
More likely, rejection of CAFTA would lead to a general delay in the 
advancement of hemispheric trade and U.S. trade more broadly.  
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Introduction 
 
Against all odds, the European Union has long been trying to contribute to the 
transition of Cuba by offering a reasonable and natural anchoring in its proper 
context, the Caribbean. Rejected by Havana and suspected in Washington, 
Brussels seems to have sighed "don't blame me for trying".  Paradoxically, the 
EU plans and schemes are today seen in the light of the frenzy to predict and map 
the future of Cuba, an exercise in which everybody seems to have a perfect 
crystal ball. Utopian and catastrophic all plans contrast with the mire reasonable 
proposal that has been presented to the Castro regime for years and it is destined 
to be on the table when the transition is executed. There is no secrete weapon - 
the EU has only the soft power of the model of integration, in its natural setting.   
Although the partial dependency of subsidies and favors that the EU offers 
will not represent the long range solution that Cuba needs, the logic of the Cuban 
insertion in its special geographical setting of the overall African, Caribbean and 
Pacific (ACP) group is today perfectly valid for immediate implementation once 
the transition machinery is set in motion. This Caribbean anchoring will soften 
the exhaustive dependency that led to the confrontation of the 50s, and respecting 
cultural, racial, demographic and political peculiarities.  
It is extremely significant that the insertion of Cuba in a scheme to benefit 
from the Cotonou Agreement is stubbornly resisted by the Castro government, 
who is not willing to accept conditions. At the end of the day, they are "a 
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nuisance for little money". At the same time, the EU offer has been seen with 
skepticism from Washington, because it is still perceived as a violation of the 
remains of the Monroe Doctrine -Europeans are a bore in the back yard.     
Cuba may be 90 miles from Key West. It might be closer to Miami at the 
transition, but this dependency should better be confronted with an implacable 
reality of a Cuba exhausted, without viable infrastructure, but well anchored in its 
natural Caribbean setting. Then Cuba will have its most precious asset  -its 
people, comparatively well educated, used to survive, and willing to find 
solutions in its own environment. 
Europe may face this moment with its own resources under pressure, dealing 
with the cost of enlargement, prospects of Turkey membership and urgent needs 
in the immediate neighborhood. But so will be the United States facing the 
daunting challenges in the rest of the world. Cuba will then have to tackle its own 
problems and the most natural manner to do it will be in its Caribbean context. It 
is for this reason that the EU has insisted on its "constructive engagement" policy 
towards Cuba, encouraging it to start the needed training. Facing this 
unquestionable argument, Castro has been resisting the EU offer - he has simply 
resisted the implacable future of Cuba in the Caribbean. 
 
An Overall Assessment 
 
Fidel Castro dramatically selected the commemoration of the 50
th anniversary of 
his failed attack against the Moncada Barracks in Santiago de Cuba on July 26, 
1953, for his rejection of any kind of humanitarian assistance, economic 
cooperation, and political dialogue with the EU and its member states. This 
signaled one of the lowest points in European-Cuban relations.
1 Just days before 
the anniversary of the prelude of the Cuban revolution, the EU issued a harsh 
criticism of both the regime’s latest policies and a series of personal insults 
against some European leaders (notably, Spain’s José María Aznar), in essence 
freezing all prospects of closer relations. Having survived the end of the Cold 
War and the perennial U.S. harassment, the Castro regime seemed to have lost its 
most precious alternative source of international political cooperation, if not 
economic support.      
This serious setback was the result of the harshness of the reprisals against a 
number of dissidents and the death sentences imposed on three hijackers of a ferry 
in April 2003. These developments pushed back a series of rapprochement 
measures maintained by the EU and most of its member states with the expectation 
of contributing to facilitate the political transition. In spite of the fact that the Cuban 
government justified its actions in view of the perceived threat presented by the 
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increased activity of the internal opposition and the backing provided by the U.S. 
government to the dissidents, the bluntness of the response (disproportionate 
imprisonment and summary executions by firing squad) was too much to swallow 
for Brussels.  
The measures taken by Cuba generated an unprecedented worldwide protest not 
limited to the usual conservative sectors in the United States and the Cuban exile 
community. Traditionally acquiescent governments in Europe made explicit 
complaints. Important backers of the Cuban regime abandoned their endorsement, 
changing it for a straight denunciation. In the wider EU context, once again (as had 
happened in 1996), a possible cooperative arrangement became doubtful.
2 After 
careful consideration, the institutional framework of the EU acted accordingly. The 
European Parliament passed a Resolution and the Council adopted conclusions 
condemning Cuba. The Commission announced on May 1, 2003, the freezing of the 
procedure to consider the admission of Cuba into the Africa-Pacific-Caribbean 
(ACP) Cotonou Agreement.
3 In essence, this decision pushed back the EU-Cuba 
relationship to a low level similar to the one existing in 1996 when the EU voted on 
a Common Position (CP).
4 This conditioned a full European cooperation package 
upon reforms taken by the Cuban regime.
5 This time the breakdown in the process 
was not due to the Cuban government’s withdrawal from the application process (as 
had been the case in 2000), but rather to the decision of the EU not to continue with 
the negotiations. As expected, however, Cuba decided to withdraw again its 
application in order to avoid an embarrassing rejection. From what had previously 
been a dubious attitude and the absence of a clear single policy on Cuba, now the 
EU appeared to have confirmed an effective common policy.  
On June 5, the Presidency (held by Greece) of the EU issued an unprecedented 
blistering declaration on Cuba’s “deplorable actions” in “violating fundamental 
freedoms.” It demanded the immediate release of “all political prisoners,” and called 
on EU member states to limit high-level government visits to Cuba, to reduce the 
profile of participation in cultural events, and to invite dissidents at national day 
celebrations.
6 On July 21, the EU Council of Foreign Affairs issued a conclusion 
using some of the crudest terms in describing Cuba’s latest actions, and confirming 
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the previously announced sanctions of a mostly political nature.
7 The EU demanded 
the release of political prisoners, denounced the manipulation of an anti-drug 
trafficking campaign used, it claimed, to extend internal repression, condemned 
Cuba’s demonstrations against European embassies, and expected a new attitude of 
the Cuban government, conditioning all future assistance upon political and 
economic reforms.
8 In sum, from a policy of persuasion, the EU had first expressed 
frustration in not seeing the expected signs of reform from Cuba, and finally issued 
unequivocal signs of irritation.
9 Cuba’s policy towards the EU was seen as one 
bound to lead to rejection and confrontation, leaving European observers and 
leaders scratching their heads trying to find a logical explanation.   
In the setting of this chapter, it has to be understood that the linkage between 
Cuba and the EU is to be interpreted in its relationship with the collective 
institutions of the EU, and not with individual member states--with whom the 
Havana government seems to have been able to obtain ample ground for 
maneuvering, in terms of trade, investment and even political connections. It is in 
the common sovereignty o f the EU where, paradoxically, Cuba has been 
encountering a more cohesive front of the Union, both in imposing conditions and 
in requiring a breathing space for dissent. In the final analysis, Cuba seems to feel 
more at ease in bilateral relations, in a modest scale of a divide-and-conquer 
approach to European interests, than in the Byzantine terrain of the EU institutions 
where national interests are protected and covered under the rules of consensus (a 
must in matters of foreign policy) or in different scales of majorities, not privy to 
outsiders.    
After the end of the Cold War and the disappearance of the Soviet subsidies, 
a Cuban policy of encouraging foreign investment through joint ventures resulted 
in a notable increase in European, and especially S panish investment. Spain’s 
interest became very visible in tourism with the construction of hotels. The 
survival of the Cuban regime after the first half of the 1990s, based partially on 
this sector, led the United States to harden measures discouraging foreign 
investment on the island. The result has been major clashes between European 
interests and the United States over the extraterritorial aspects of U.S. legal 
initiatives, such as the Helms-Burton law.
10 
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The official European attitude towards Cuba and its problems with the United 
States can be illustrated by three fragments of three distinct declarations of the EU.  
First, with reference to the human rights situation: “The European Union condemns 
the repeated violations of human rights in Cuba, in particular in the political field.”
11 
The second has to do with U.S. extraterritorial legislation. On the one hand, “the EU 
believes that the U.S. trade embargo against Cuba is primarily a matter that has to 
be resolved bilaterally.” On the other, “ the U.S. has enacted laws that purport to 
regulate activities of persons under the jurisdiction of the member states of the 
European Union; this extra-territorial application violates international law and has 
adverse effects on the interest of the European Union.”
12 And finally: “If Cuba 
wishes to receive a favorable treatment through a cooperation agreement, it must 
show progress in the democratic process.”
13 These three references illustrate well 
the complex, and clear, approach of the EU. 
Simultaneously with the economic reforms that were taking place in Cuba after 
the end of the Cold War, the former Cuban dependency on the Soviet bloc began to 
shift to a sort of normalization of relations with members of the EU. The history of 
relations between revolutionary Cuba and what was called Western Europe during 
the Cold War provides some of the clues for the lack of agreement between the 
United States and Europe in the 1990s. Although in the 1960s and 1970s there was 
nothing to compare with today’s incipient EU's Common Foreign and Security 
Policy, a pattern of similarities was revealed in the manner that different European 
states were dealing with Cuba. To the delight of the Cuban government, each one 
maintained a link in clear violation of U.S. pressures and admonitions. In strategic 
terms,  some observers considered that “ without European links the Revolution 
might well have floundered.”
14   
At the end of the 1980s Cuba’s trade with today's EU member states was only 6 
percent of the total trade between Havana and the rest of the world. By the mid-
1990s, however, 38 percent of Cuban imports and 29 percent of its exports were 
with the European market.
15 More than half of all joint ventures in Cuba were 
established with European investments.
16   
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during the Revolution, (London: Macmillan, 1993), 11-63. 
15Data from IRELA and European Commission. 
16 For a listing of foreign investment in Cuba, see table of U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic 
Council:  http://www.cubatrade.org/foreign.html. For a sample of foreign companies in Cuba: 
http://www.cubatrade.org/nonus.html  150  Roy 
 
 
The Failure of the Cooperation Agreement 
   
The shooting-down of the “Brothers to the Rescue” planes on February 23, 1996, 
forced the discontinuation of a planned cooperation agreement between Brussels 
and Havana, one that was now doomed to failure. The European Council (under the 
Spanish presidency) held in Madrid on December 15, 1995, had given the 
Commission the duty of presenting a draft of a cooperation agreement to be ready 
during the following semester. With this purpose, Manuel Marín, the senior Spanish 
commissioner and the Vice President of the European Commission, visited Havana 
from February 8-10, 1996, when he met with Fidel Castro and other Cuban leaders. 
While he was leaving Havana, the Cuban government arrested leading dissidents, 
rejecting the call to reform human rights policies. Just a few days later, the actions 
of the Cuban Air Force MiGs shattered all plans. With the “Latin American option” 
of a cooperation agreement closed to Cuba, the alternative route of the ACP Lomé 
Convention was left open. This “back door” option apparently was to be energeti-
cally explored by the Cuban government. 
Once the rapprochement failed, the second hard-line response from Brussels 
would come as a supplement to the EU criticism against Helms-Burton. While the 
planned blocking statute was a first in EU activities, a critical Common Position on 
Cuba, taken for the first time in reference to a Latin American country, would also 
have a place in the annals of the EU's incipient foreign policy.
17 The spirit and the 
letter of the Common Position have been maintained to date, with the expected 
protests of the Cuban government. 
On the other hand, economic activity between Cuba and Europe increased in 
recent years. Trade doubled. EU exports to Cuba topped €1.43 billion in 2001 (44 
percent from Spain, followed by Italy and France). Cuban imports in Europe 
were in the amount of €581 million (54 percent in the Netherlands, followed by 
Spain). Two-thirds of Cuba’s imports from developed countries come from the 
EU. Bilateral development aid and tourism are two of the most important sources 
of European involvement in Cuba. Almost 70 percent of cooperation assistance 
has come from Europe, led by Spain (16.8 percent), followed by the 
Commission. Italian tourists are the leaders (13 percent) in a key sector for the 
Cuban economy. European direct investment in Cuba is over 50 percent of total 
foreign investment, with Spain alone providing 25 percent, followed by Italy 
with 13 percent.
18 Of the 400 investment consortia, 105 are with Spanish 
companies, followed by Canada (60) and Italy (57). Only Sweden does not have 
a bilateral cooperation agreement with Cuba, and ten European countries have 
investment protection agreements with Havana. Spain leads the European pack 
                                                 
17For a detailed review of these events, see: IRELA, Cuba y la Unión Europea: Las dificultades 
del diálogo,  June 17, 1996. 
18 IRELA, “Revision,” 27-34; Comisión Europea, Cuba y la Unión Europea, 2003. The European Union and the Caribbean: The Case of Cuba  151 
 
with the number of agreements, followed by Italy, the country that in 1993 
inaugurated the investment protection pacts.
19 Clearly in economic terms, the role 
of European countries in Cuba is great indeed. 
 
The ACP: A Back Door to the EU? 
 
Whatever form of evaluating the relationship between Cuba and individual 
European countries that one takes, the stark reality is that Cuba is the only Latin 
American country that still does not enjoy a bilateral cooperation agreement with 
the EU. This anomaly was further complicated when Cuba became a member of 
the ACP countries without being a signatory of the Cotonou agreements, the 
successor of the Lomé accord. Ironically, and in spite of all difficulties, the road 
to securing an agreement seemed to be on a sure path, initiated in Brussels in 
September 1998,
20 and culminating in the signing of the new agreement on June 
23, 2000, in Cotonou. Havana was not dealing now with one office in Brussels 
but rather with a multilateral outfit of 77 countries. In essence, the switch of 
Cuba’s position in the EU structure from the Latin American context to the post-
Lomé cooperation framework was dictated by a political decision to send a 
message to Cuba that the insertion in the Cotonou setting was the best option and 
that the political dimensions were downsized. However, the Castro government 
rejected the procedure, and withdrew the application intention,
21 claiming the 
Resolution issued by the United Nations Human Rights Commission was one-
sided. Ironically, the overall climate for Cuban membership in Lomé was 
positive, shifting towards a normalization of the EU-Cuba relationship, this time 
anchored in the ACP multilateral context.
22 However, Cuba then branded the EU 
conditions as “arrogant”, “unacceptable,” and dependent on the “U.S. policy.”
23  
For many, the Cuban reaction was unexpected and harsh. In fact, the decision 
was a slap in the face of those ACP members who had advocated Cuba’s 
membership. ACP diplomats in Brussels confessed on the record to being 
surprised, although in off-the-record comments seasoned ambassadors suspected 
the outcome and were not caught off guard.
24 In a gathering of high government 
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officials of the Caribbean  and Central America, in unofficial comments, Fidel 
Castro called the deal “demasiado fastidio para tan poca plata” [too big of a 
nuisance for so little money].
25 This remark became an omen of a more serious 
incident to come in April of 2003, confirming the worst suspicions about the 
priorities of the Cuban regime regarding the European linkages.   
However, some months later, in the sequel to this mini-drama, on December 
14, 2000, surprisingly Cuba became the 78
th member of the ACP group. The 
novelty of the e vent is that Cuba joined it without signing the Cotonou 
convention.
26 This anomaly led some to believe that Cuba had in fact obtained 
the same benefits. 
In reality, the charter of this organization had to be amended to provide for a 
new member that would not use the specific and unique service of the 
organization, namely the trade and cooperation benefits from EU member states. 
In comparative metaphorical terms, Cuba’s membership in the ACP is like 
belonging to an exclusive golf club without being able to play golf, only 
watching others play and walking around the facilities.
27 This is an example of a 
EU compromise to make an accommodation for particular, and rather difficult, 
circumstances and to give the impression to the three parties (the EU member 
states, the ACP countries and Cuba) that they have won something in the 
preparation of Cuba becoming a full member at some future point. 
 
EU-Cuba Showcases 
 
In the absence of the standard bilateral cooperation framework agreement, the 
standing EU policy towards Cuba can be subdivided into three main areas. The 
first one is a relationship based on humanitarian grounds; the second is an 
attitude towards the anchoring of Cuba in its natural Caribbean habitat; and the 
third, and most complex, is the setting of the wider ACP framework.  
Regarding humanitarian assistance, the EU record shows that the funds 
provided by the Commission have increased in the line of cooperation assistance 
delivered through NGOs. With respect to humanitarian aid and development 
assistance, this variance  on a programmable basis was phased out. A 
comprehensive evaluation conducted in April/May 2000 concluded that Cuba 
was no longer in a state of emergency. Before 2000 Cuba received sums 
sometimes reaching  €30 million per year, a level that was r educed after the 
failure of the cooperation agreement in 1996. Since 1993 the EU has financed 
close to € 125 million of assistance measures, of which nearly two- thirds have 
been in the field of humanitarian aid. It is estimated that some 16 percent of the 
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Cuban population has benefited from this aid. Following the Commission’s 
decision to phase out humanitarian aid, measures supporting economic reform 
and civil society development have been increasing.
28  
On a more politically oriented level, during the Spanish presidency of the EU 
in the first semester of 2002, relations with Cuba reflected a freezing of various 
initiatives made during the previous Belgian presidency. The end balance was 
mixed. What was perceived by Cuba as a “window of opportunity” did not in fact 
materialize, because the presidencies of Spain, Denmark and Greece would not 
make Cuba-EU relations a priority in the sense expected by Havana.
29 
Meanwhile, the weight of Cuba’s international activity and concerns seemed 
to have tilted towards the Western Hemisphere, away from Europe, perceived as 
concentrating on more pressing issues such as enlargement, the rise of the right, 
and immigration on top of the crucial disagreements over the consequences of the 
attacks of September 11, 2001. This thesis was confirmed by the absence of Fidel 
Castro in the second EU-Latin American-Caribbean Summit held in Madrid on 
May 17-18, 2002, repeating his decision to stay away from the Ibero-American 
Summits held in Lima in 2001 and in the Dominican Republic in 2002, a yearly 
event where the Cuban leader has been the frequent main protagonist of 
polemics.
30 Among the reasons behind his decision was his calculation of not 
reaping the expected benefits, and to risking a confrontation with some vocal 
counterparts, and most especially Spain’s Prime Minister José María Aznar. In 
contrast, Fidel Castro elected to travel to attend the inaugurations of the new 
presidents of Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay.  
 
The (Other) Empire Strikes Back 
 
The year 2002 ended with two important developments in EU-Cuba relations. On 
the one hand, on December 8 Fidel Castro surprisingly announced that Cuba 
would reapply for admittance to the Cotonou agreement.
31 On the other, the 
European Commission made official the opening of a full Delegation in Havana. 
Inaugurated in March 2003 by EU Commissioner Poul Nielson (then in charge of 
development and ACP affairs), it was entrusted to an experienced staff led by 
former Cuba desk chief in Brussels, Sven Von Burgsdorff, a person with direct 
knowledge of Cuba.
32  
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As outlined above, after a six-year period of frosty relations resulting from 
the Common Position of 1996, the Belgian presidency led the first modest troika 
approach in December 2001. However, the Spanish presidency during the first 
semester of 2002 did not take any initiative to further the dialogue with Havana 
(in spite of a wide consensus recommending consultations). The Danish 
presidency during the second part of 2002 decided to insert the dialogue with 
Cuba into a wider EU-Latin America setting. While several member states 
expressed renewed interest in  furthering bilateral commercial relations, a 
majority in both the Council and the European Parliament considered the 
Common Position as a limiting factor that conditions the potential use of 
available instruments in the fields of political, economic and development co-
operation on progress in respecting civil and political rights in Cuba. 
As a first move from the ACP Group, a request was made on September 26, 
2002, to grant observer status to Cuba for the Economic Partnership Agreement 
negotiation process. Although the member states were divided, a clear majority 
was in favor of the request advocating Cuba’s regional political and economic 
integration. On November 4, 2002, the EU met with Cuba. Both parties were 
frank, but not aggressive in their positions. Disagreement continued over the EU 
Common Position, the human rights situation in Cuba and co-operation on the 
area of human rights, while Cuba did commit to pursue reforms intended to 
establish a more market-oriented economy. Cuba then hinted on the probability 
of its applying for membership in the Cotonou Agreement, a thought that was 
strongly encouraged by the Commission. Cuba then agreed to the Commission 
proposal to set up an EU-Cuba task force to identify solutions in the field of 
investment and trade. As a result of behind-the-scenes negotiations, a potential 
compromise solution suggested by the Commission and supported by the 
Member States was contemplated in which Cuba would be given an “informal” 
observer status during the “all-ACP” phase of the Economic Partnership 
negotiations.
33 
Following the XII Evaluation of the EU Common Position, all member 
states, for the first time, were willing to reconsider the instruments available, 
with a view to making them more effective in the pursuit of the objectives of the 
Common Position. Following a Commission proposal the Council adopted on 
December 10, 2002, the Conclusions reconfirming the Common Position. 
However, they introduced two important modifications.  First, there were to be 
no limitations for development co-operation measures any more as long as the 
Cuban government attempts to meet the objectives of the Common Position 
(respect for human rights and democracy, improvement of living standards of the 
Cuban population and promotion of sustainable economic growth).  Secondly, 
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they extended the term for periodic reviews of the Common Position from six to 
twelve months, with the intention of giving both parties a longer term to pursue a 
political dialogue.
34  
Almost simultaneously, Fidel Castro announced in Havana before a meeting 
of all CARICOM Heads of Government (in Cuba to celebrate the 30
th 
Anniversary of the opening of diplomatic relations with the Caribbean states, and 
a rejection of the U.S.  embargo) that Cuba intended to join the Cotonou 
Agreement. However, two fundamental questions then were: How the EU would 
react to this? What were the Cuban expectations and real intentions? The record 
shows that the EU would maintain its conditions, and w ould not offer an 
evaluation of the application before it was submitted. 
Because of the endemic economic crisis in Cuba, the regime was in 2002 
interested in improving its relations with the EU. In spite of the Geneva 
confrontation and rejection of the conditions of the EU Common Position, a 
positive attitude towards Brussels developed. Allowing opposition activist 
Osvaldo Payá to travel to Europe to receive the Sakharov Prize was part of the 
strategy adopted. In the context of this  mild EU-Cuba “honeymoon,” the 
Commission was accurately perceived by Cuba as a major, cohesive force for a 
deeper rapprochement. However, Brussels was well aware that Havana’s moves 
were dictated by a long-term strategic interest. Fidel Castro did not expect any 
special softening of the official U.S. attitude after the Republican victory in the 
mid-term elections in the Fall of 2002. Hence, he needed the Europeans for 
breathing space, pressed by financial shortfalls in Cuba and the rest of Latin 
America. The difficulties in obtaining guaranteed (and badly needed) oil supplies 
from Venezuela has been only one of the country’s troubles. Moreover, the 
economic opening from the United States in allowing the exports of some items 
has not come without a price, since food and medicine sales have to be purchased 
on a cash basis. 
In consequence, the EU Commission opted once again for a policy of 
“constructive engagement.” The opening of the EU Delegation in Havana was 
supposed to serve as the proper setting for the inclusion of Cuba in the new Asia-
Latin American (ALA) Regulation (in which Cuba is already inserted in its 1992 
arrangement), including a technical framework agreement governing the 
implementation of EU aid. However, the serious events of April 2003 drastically 
changed the constructive EU approach. 
With this background, on the eve of the May 1 celebration, the European 
Commission considered the thorny topic of Cuba and decided to file the pending 
petition of Cuba to become a member of the Cotonou Agreement. The 
Commission issued a statement indicating that the situation in Cuba “has strongly 
deteriorated in such a very serious manner that the Commission did not want to 
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remain silent.”
35 Commissioner Poul Nielson pressed for an indefinite ban on 
membership, claiming that the cooperative agreement was not limited to 
commercial benefits, but also included the area of respect for human rights.
36 For 
its part, the EU Council acted with a speedy condemnation, warning Cuba not to 
expect European aid.
37 In an earlier stage, when the first arrests were announced, 
the Greek Presidency of the EU issued a critical declaration.
38 On April 10, the 
European Parliament approved a Resolution expressing concern, criticizing the 
lack of due process, demanding the release of the detainees, calling on Cuba to 
stop “hampering human rights,” and asking the Council to “display firm resolve 
in tackling the issue of human rights in Cuba, and to monitor the situation very 
closely.” 
39  
Right after the announcement of the imprisonment of 76 dissidents, their 
organizations, led by leaders such as Elizardo Sánchez, Gustavo Arcos and 
Osvaldo Payá, opted to request the help of the EU institutions in their release.
40 
European newspapers stepped up critical commentaries against the Cuban 
government, while intellectuals signed declarations of condemnation on both 
sides of the Atlantic.
41  
 
David Responds to the New Goliath 
 
Cuban authorities replied to this criticism by using such blunt expressions as 
“blackmail” and being “soft” [on the United States] when describing the actions 
and attitudes of Europeans.
42 The Cuban ambassador in Madrid branded Spanish 
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politicians as “opportunists” seeking electoral gains.
43 Meanwhile, protests in 
Europe and Latin America degenerated into serious confrontations and 
aggression inflicted on press members by Cuban diplomatic staff.
44 The EU 
Commission warned that the repressive measures could have a “devastating 
effect” on the relations with the EU.
45 Several European countries cancelled or 
considerably downsized the level of scheduled participation i n programs and 
activities to be held in Cuba.
46 The French government, in spite of its spat with 
the United States over the war in Iraq, issued extremely critical statements 
against Castro, vouching for support of EU-wide measures,
47 while intellectuals 
signed letters of protest.
48 The Italian parliament and government, dominated by 
premier Berlusconi’s party, announced their intention of proposing a European-
wide embargo on Cuba, in anticipation of tougher measures to be implemented 
when holding the EU presidency in the second semester of 2003, while at the 
same time reducing diplomatic relations with the island.
49  
The Cuban Ministry of Foreign Affairs lamented that the EU was not making 
similar  statements on the situation on the imprisonment and trial of five Cuban 
security agents arrested in Miami.  They also indicated a double standard in the 
EU position on capital punishment, claiming that the European leaders had never 
condemned the United States for a much higher annual number of executions. 
Official statements and reports in the Cuban media also claimed that the 
sentencing of dissidents as well as executions were performed strictly according 
to Cuban law and were “a sad but absolute necessity for defending the vital right 
to national independence and sovereignty,” as the United States “is looking for a 
pretext for an armed intervention” in the island, by “creating the conditions for a 
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new massive exodus from Cuba.” Most of these arguments were reiterated by the 
address made by Fidel Castro on May 1.
50   
On May 16, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Cuba announced the withdrawal 
of Cuba’s application procedure for membership in the Cotonou Agreement of the 
ACP countries, thereby renouncing any opportunity to benefit from European 
development aid.
51 In a blistering note published in Granma, the official newspaper 
of the Cuban Communist Party, the government blamed the EU Commission for 
exerting undue pressure, alleged its alignment with the policies of the United States, 
and rejected EU’s censure for the measures taken by Cuba during the previous 
weeks.
52 In reality, Cuba avoided an embarrassing flat rejection of its application. 
This was the anti-climatic ending for a long process that can be traced back to the 
end of the Cold War, in a context where Cuba has been testing alternative grounds 
as a substitute for the overwhelming protection of the Soviet Union.  
On June 5, the EU Greek Presidency issued a harsh Declaration, labeling as 
“deplorable” the recent Cuban actions, “aiming not only at violating fundamental 
freedom, but also at depriving civilians of the ultimate human right, that of life.” 
The EU therefore called upon Cuban authorities “to release immediately all 
political prisoners.” In addition it decided to limit the bilateral high-level 
government visits, to reduce the profile of member states’ participation in 
cultural events, to proceed with the reevaluation of the EU Common Position,
53 
and to invite Cuban dissidents to national celebrations. In fact, this policy was 
dramatically inaugurated when on July 14 the French embassy invited Cuban 
dissidents to the reception for the anniversary of the French Revolution. The 
Cuban government responded by boycotting the reception, establishing a parallel 
function to celebrate its admiration for the 1789 historical event. 
Cuba’s Foreign Minister Pérez Roque qualified these EU measures as a result 
of a “superficial analysis” of Cuba, a “victim of an agreement between the United 
States and the EU,” showing “European incapacity for maintaining an 
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autonomous policy.”
54 He also refused to receive the members of the EU Troika 
(Italy, Greece and Spain), while Cuban officials refrained from attending 
receptions at EU member states’ diplomatic functions. In an adaptation of a 
common epithet bestowed on Cuban exiles in Miami, Fidel Castro referred to the 
EU as a “little gang” and “a mafia allied with fascist imperialists.”
55  U.S. 
Secretary of State, Colin Powell, received the latest EU measures with 
satisfaction, indicating that the United States might join the European Union in a 
common strategy towards Cuba.
56   
This apparent U.S. invitation to form a coalition added fuel to the ongoing 
fire. The Cuban government increased the level of the confrontation with the EU 
to an unprecedented level.
57 Fidel Castro and Foreign Minister Pérez Roque 
targeted Italy and, most especially, Spain as the leaders of the EU measures 
imposed on Cuba.
58 The Italian government announced the termination of 
development programs estimated at about $40 million, and rejected Cuban 
personal insults against Premier Silvio Berlusconi (called “Nero” and “Benito 
Berlusconi”). Subsequently congressional sources demanded the withdrawal of 
the ambassador.
59 France announced the termination of some cooperation 
programs. The Spanish government initially exercised extreme restraint
60 when 
                                                 
54 EFE, “Acusan a la Unión Europea de plegarse a Estados Unidos,” El Nuevo Herald, 7 junio 
2003. 
55 EFE, “Castro arremete contra ‘mafia’ aliada de EE.UU.,” Diario las Américas, 8 junio 
2003; AFP, Pablo Alfonso, “Castro amenaza tras sanción de Europa,” El Nuevo Herald, 8 junio 
2003; Marie Sanz, “En un punto muerto las relaciones con Europa,” El Nuevo Herald, 8 junio 
2003; J.  Luis Sariol, “ Dispuestos, invencibles,”  Juventud Rebelde, 8 junio 2003; Sara Mas, 
“Nuevas y grandes batallas nos esperan,”  Granma, 8 junio 2003; Mauricio Vicent, “Castro 
arremete contra la UE por las sanciones a Cuba,” El País, 8 junio 2003.   
56 George Gedda, “Se acercan EE.UU. y Europa ante Cuba,” El Nuevo Herald, 9 junio 2003. 
57 For the official text of the statement, see “The European Union Capitulates to the USA,” 
Granma International, June 11, 2003; “Declaración de Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores,” Granma, 
12 junio.  
58 Anita Snow, AP, ”Cuba angrily accuses EU of catering to U.S.” The Miami Herald, June 
12, 2003; Pablo Alfonso, “Cuba acusa a España e Italia de conspiración,” El Nuevo Herald, 12 
junio 2003; EFE, “Cuba acusa a Aznar,” El Mundo, 11 junio 2003; EFE, “Fidel Castro encabeza 
una marcha,” El País, 12 junio 2003; EFE, “Castro se refiere a Aznar como ‘caballerito de ideas 
fascistas,’ “ El Mundo, 12 junio 2003; The Miami Herald, “Castro protests his allies ‘fascism,’” 
The Miami Herald, June 13, 2003; Pablo Alfonso, “Castro agrava la crisis,” El Nuevo Herald, 13 
junio 2003; Granma, “Encabeza Fidel y Raúl patrióticas marchas,” 12 junio; Reynold Rassi, “No 
cederemos un átomo,”  Granma, 12 junio;  Granma Internacional, “Insta Fidel Castro a UE a 
abstenerse de sancionar a Cuba,” 13 junio; Marelys Valencia, “Una fuerza popular sacudió a La 
Habana Vieja,” Granma Internacional, 12 junio.      
59 AP, “Reacciona Europa,” El Nuevo Herald, 14 junio 2003; La Repubblica, Centinaia di 
migliaia di cubani in piazza contro Italia e Spagna,” June 14, 2003; Corriere della Sera, “Cuba: 
manifestazione contro l’Unione europea,” June 14, 2003. 
60 Luis Ayllón, “El gobierno español no entrará en una ‘escalada de provocaciones’,”ABC, 13 160  Roy 
 
challenged by a government-led demonstration in front of the Spanish embassy, 
presided over by Fidel Castro himself. Spain’s Premier José María Aznar, 
accused as the main author of the “treacherous escalation against Cuba,” was 
labeled by the Cuban president on live television as a “caballerito”, “coward”, 
“fascist”, and a “little Fuhrer.” He was depicted in posters as wearing a Hitler-
looking moustache and a swastika. While the Spanish press reiterated critical 
commentaries on the Cuban reactions, former Spanish Prime Minister Felipe 
González branded Castro’s actions as “pathetic,” expressing doubts about the 
internal security of Cuba in view of the rash of aircraft and boat hijackings.
61  
Then, accusing Spain of improperly using its facilities, the Cuban 
government announced the cancellation of the bi-national agreement for the 
Spanish Cultural Center, a unique institution funded by Madrid since 1997 at an 
initial cost of over $3 million for the remodeling of a beautiful and centrally 
located building in front of the Malecón waterfront.
62 In an effort to divide the 
EU and Spanish leadership, the Cuban government accused Spain and Italy of 
undue influence upon European decisions.  With kind references to King Juan 
Carlos (in contrast to the ferocious criticism of President Aznar and former 
Spanish anticommunist dictator Francisco Franco, who despite his right-wing 
politics never broke diplomatic relations with Cuba), Castro reiterated his 
personal inclinations. Ironically, commentators insisted on the similarities 
between the current Cuban situation and the last stages of the Franco regime.
63 
Behind the scenes, Cuban officials confidentially expressed concern about the 
international isolation of the regime and the erratic and counterproductive result 
of the actions and declarations implemented and issued by the top leadership, 
hoping that calm would finally prevail and that basic relations with the EU could 
be rebuilt--a thought that is shared by the EU leadership.
64               
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The EU Foreign Affairs Council rejected as “unacceptable” the insults from 
Havana, confirming the sanctions. Italy pressed for the termination of 
cooperation funding still enjoyed by Cuba,
65 but Javier Solana, High 
Representative for Foreign Policy of the EU did not endorse the ending of 
humanitarian aid.
66 While the Spanish government reaction was prudent, vowing 
not to engage in a “verbal spiral of mutual disqualifications,” the Spanish 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs summoned Cuba’s ambassador to Madrid, Isabel 
Allende, to express to her its displeasure at the general situation, the threats 
against the Cultural Center, and the presence of Fidel Castro at the head of the 
demonstrations, an activity considered “outside the margins of normal diplomatic 
usage.”
67 Allende, in turn, blamed Spain for the diplomatic conflict.
68 
In an exchange of declarations and opinions issued by Cuban and Spanish 
officials, the already cloudier context of relations between the two countries got 
even more confusing, if not contradictory. On the one hand, Spain’s Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, Ana Palacio stated that the Cuban regime was “exhausted” and 
would “not survive its founder.” Moreover, she noted that “the Cuban transition 
has already started”, and that “the Cuban Suárez [as a parallel to the Spanish 
political process) is already present in the island”.
69 Coincidentally, the Spanish 
press frequently mentions Oswaldo Payá as the “Cuban Suárez”.
70 In addition, 
while business delegations decided to postpone scheduled visits to Cuba waiting 
for a better climate, reports emanating from the governing Partido Popular 
signaled the intention of the Prime Minister of convening the Spanish companies 
dealing with tourism in Cuba in order to recommend them “not to benefit the 
Castro regime”.
71 On the other hand, in contrast with the acrimony of official 
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relations between Havana and Madrid, Cuban Minister of Foreign Affairs Pérez 
Roque assured more than a hundred Spanish and Italian companies that they 
would not be affected, comparing the current conflict to a personal feud.
72      
In an apparent policy of avoiding further controversies, the Spanish 
government elected a wait-and-see attitude expecting the Cuban government to 
make the next move regarding its announced plans for the intervention of the 
Cultural Center. While legally speaking the Castro government could use the 
contractual clauses to denounce the agreement with a ninety-day notice, the 
Spanish government could also litigate on the grounds of expenses incurred in 
the delivery of furniture and the over $3 million contributed for the remodeling 
of the building. Meanwhile, the official posture of Madrid was revealed in the 
collective demands and expectations inserted in the EU General Affairs Council 
conclusions of July 21. In Cuba, the government was about to commemorate the 
50
th anniversary of the attack on the Moncada barracks. 
As an answer to the offer of assistance (but with conditions attached) and to 
the political demands of the EU, Fidel Castro dramatically ended half a century 
of Cuban history of confronting the United States by electing a new target --the 
European Union. Calculating the effective EU assistance to have been about an 
average of $4.2 million in recent years, reduced to less than $1 million in 2002 
(of which no funds had yet arrived), Castro pointed out that Cuba had imported 
European goods valued at $1.5 million, while EU’s imports of Cuban products 
only amounted to $571 million. He not only blamed Spain’s Prime Minister 
Aznar for being the main instigator of the EU measures, but labeled Spanish 
education as a “banana republic disaster, a shame for Europe.” In an apparent 
deviation from his previous selective critiques and kind references to different 
EU commissioners, Castro also accused the professional staff of the EU 
institutions (“a small group of bureaucrats”) of drafting a resolution (a “cowardly 
and repugnant act”), allegedly without consulting their ministers. Claiming the 
EU is endorsing “the hostility, threats, and dangers for Cuba” of the “aggressive 
policy of the hegemonic superpower”, he stated that Cuba “does not need the 
European Union to survive,” and vowed that “neither Europe nor the United 
States will say the last word about the destiny of humanity.”
73 Subsequently, the 
Cuban government sent a three-paragraph letter to the European Commission 
confirming the terms of Castro’s speech. The EU Commission answered this 
address by confirming the spirit and the conditions of earlier declarations, 
lamenting the “extreme attitude of the Cuban government,” accepting its 
                                                 
72 Mauricio Vicent, “Cuba tranquiliza a los empresarios españoles,” El País, 29 junio.  
73 See text in Granma, 27 julio 2003. For initial wire reports, see Mar Marín, EFE, “Castro 
responde a UE con renuncia a diálogo político y a ayudas,” 27 julio 2003. For selected reports in 
the Spanish press: “Mauricio Vicent, ”Castro renuncia a la ayuda humanitaria”, El País, 28 julio; 
Angel Tomás González, “Cuba renuncia al diálogo y la ayuda”, El Mundo, 28 julio.  The European Union and the Caribbean: The Case of Cuba  163 
 
decision, and pledging to maintain its willingness for a political dialogue with 
Cuba.
74  
 
Conclusion 
 
The balance sheet of the experience of the Cuba-European Union relations 
reveals a mixed picture. It is composed of a coherent series of EU measures 
intended in the first  place to maintain the lines of communication open, and 
secondly to contribute to facilitating the conditions for a sort of “soft landing” in 
the terrain of democracy and market economy in the event of a peaceful 
transition. This strategy has not come free of charge, as demonstrated by the 
persistent negative vote on Cuba at the UN Commission for Human Rights, and 
the maintenance of the Common Position imposed in 1996, conditioning any 
special cooperation and aid package upon the implementation of political 
reforms.  
This institutional framework contrasts, on the one hand, with the apparently 
uncoordinated policies of the member states that trade and invest in Cuba 
according to their individual interests. This has made the Common Position 
“neither common, nor a policy,” in the words of sarcastic EU insiders.
75 On the 
other hand, the EU collective strategy contrasts with the decades-old U.S. policy 
of confrontation and harassment. While the United States has been pursuing a 
path consisting of the embargo and extraterritorial laws such as Helms-Burton, 
the EU has opted for a policy of  “constructive engagement.” While the European 
pattern has been geared toward preparing for the transition, the United States 
policy has concentrated on regime change.
76 Both, however, share one dimension 
in common–Cuba’s policy has not changed or reformed according to the 
expected results. The European strategy can be labeled at its initial stages after 
the end of the Cold War as one based on good intentions and reasonable (if not 
excessively high) expectations. But at the end of any serious attempt to condition 
an offer of a special status in the EU structure (bilateral agreement, Lomé, 
Cotonou), the result has been a high degree of frustration.  
From the European perspective, Castro’s priorities place a conditioned 
relationship with the EU at a lower level than the urgency to maintain a line of 
internal discipline. It is a useful arrangement for Cuba—but only up to a certain 
point.  Moreover, the confrontation with the United States i s considered by the 
Cuban regime as the ultimate  raison d’être to justify the continuation of the 
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system and the refusal to modify it, or even less to change it. This ever-present 
theme is obsessive in all communications and declarations of the Cuban 
government when dealing in public and in private with EU officials. Cuba claims 
an alleged “aggressive,” “subversive,” “irresponsible,” and “provocative,” 
behavior of U.S. officials in Havana supporting “mercenaries, created, organized, 
trained and financed”
77 by Washington. Questioning the policy of opposing this 
pattern, from Cuba’s perspective, equals a form of collaboration with their self-
declared enemy. Consequently, by rejecting pressure and conditions of the EU, as 
Fidel Castro’s speech of July 26, 2003, explicitly decreed, Cuba’s position has 
resulted in making any formal cooperation agreement and ACP benefits virtually 
impossible to obtain.  The prognosis for Cuba-European relations, at least for the 
foreseeable future, was not good. In retaliation for the additional measures taken 
by the EU in 2003, the Cuban government had frozen communications at the 
highest level, while no changes were made regarding the human rights conditions 
and the emprisonment of representatives of the dissident movement.
78 
These shaky conditions did not discourage the EU and its member states 
from maintaining a wait-and-see attitude, while strengthening a permanent policy 
of “constructive engagement.” Consequently, in a more sign of positive moves, 
in view of the freezing of communications at the highest levels of the Cuban 
government, Spain (after the change of government as a result of the March 14, 
2004, elections) led a motion in the summer of 2003 to correct the sanctions-like 
measures, considered as “counterproductive.”
79 As an apparent gesture to answer 
this EU initiative, the Cuban government announced the release (“excarce-
lación”) of a group of dissidents. After much consultation, internal negotiations 
and compromise, the EU Council decided on January 31, 2005, to suspend the 
measures (while the Common Position of 1996 is still valid), while committing to 
schedule periodic meetings with thr dissidents. In return, the EU expected the 
Cuban government to release all the imprisoned members of the dissident move-
ment, while scheduling an evaluation of the results six months.
80 
After an initial critical reaction of the Cuban government, especially through 
personal declarations of Fidel Castro, rejecting the EU conditions, diplomatic 
moves led to a visit of Cuban Foreign Minister Pérez Roque to Madrid (where he 
was received by Spain’s King Juan Carlos and Prime Minister Rodríguez 
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Zapatero) and Brussels (where he met with Commission members and Parliament 
leaders. In Cuba, EU ambassadors met with dissidents in compliance of an 
agreement made when the EU measures were lifted. Subsequenly, EU 
Commissioner for Development Louis Michel visited Havana in a very 
publisized tour that included meetings with representatives of the dissident 
movement, and it ended with an extended four-hour interview with Castro. The 
EU officials insisted on the demand for the release of prisoners and the Cuban 
government confirmed its stance that it would not accept conditions branded as 
colaboration with pressures from the United States.
81 Simultanteously, high 
Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials visited Miami in an unprecedented 
mission to brief all sectors of the Cuban community on the recent EU and 
Spanish initiatives towards Cuba.
82 This argument was highlighted at the annual 
UN Human Rights Commission session held in Geneva, where the EU members 
voted endorsed a U.S. motion against Cuba.
83  In spite of the fact that the Cuban 
government banned the presence of several European parlamentarians who 
wanted to attend the unprecedented assembly scheduled by the dissident 
movement on May, the event was held without incidents.
84 While Raúl Castro 
visited his paternal town escorted by Galician president Manuel Fraga,
85 the 
Spanish government insisted on the need to continue with the dialogue with 
Cuba.
86 Meanwhile, the dissident poet and journalist Raúl  Rivero took residence 
in Spain.
87 While several exile representatives lobbied the EU institutions and 
European NGOs endorsed the new policy, on June 13 the EU Council confirmed 
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the suspension of the measures against Cuba, reaffirming its policy of 
“constructive engagement.”
88     
All this was happening in a tense contextual climate that included some key 
events and recurrent trends. In Cuba, the accidental fall of Fidel Castro in Santa 
Clara produced much speculation regarding the future of the leadership.
89 In the 
U.S.-Cuba scenario, Castro banned the U.S. dollar (later officially “devalued”) as 
a currency in Cuba, while President Bush ordered a reduction of remittances and 
travel to Cuba, in a climate of mutual recrimination over diverse subjects such as 
decorations in the compound of the Interest Section in Havana. After the 2004 re-
election, sectors of the exile community lobbied President Bush and his newly 
appointed Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice to increase the level and quality of 
pressure on Castro during his second term. In contrast, as seen above, Europe, 
once more, elected a prudent degree of restrain and communication. Only the 
record in the future will show which policy will obtain the best results to 
contribute to the peaceful political transition of Cuba. In this setting, speculation 
and predictions on the future of Cuba have increased in volume and scope, with 
all sorts of possibilities and outcomes. In contrast with most schemes, the EU has 
insisted o n the anchoring of Cuba in the Caribbean ACP network.
90 Only time 
will say. 
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within the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) 
 
 
 
 
 
Wendy Grenade 
 
Introduction 
 
The concept of governance has gained currency in recent years with the advent of 
the new wave of globalization and the ensuing debate on the role of the nation-
state in the international system.
1  This article focuses on regional governance 
which, in a broad sense, involves the formal political, legal and institutional 
arrangements which underpin regional integration schemes. This article 
concentrates on regional governance within the Caribbean Community 
(CARICOM).
2 It first provides an overview of Caribbean integration. It then 
examines the emerging CARICOM framework.  Finally, the chapter draws some 
broad conclusions in relation to regional governance within CARICOM, making 
reference to some aspects of the EU model.   
 
Overview of Caribbean Integration  
 
The Historical Dimension  
 
The process of Caribbean integration has its genesis in the West Indian 
Federation which lasted from 1958 to 1962. This early experiment was part of a 
wider British project which was aimed to curtail the costs of empire for a 
weakened post-war Britain while seeking to minimize the i mpact of 
decolonialization on the small island economies unable to survive as viable 
territories on their own.  Writers have cited many political, economic, socio-
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cultural and geographic factors for the short-lived federal venture.
3 The end of 
the federation was followed by the creation of the Caribbean Free Trade Area 
(CARIFTA) (1968). This free trade arrangement experienced economic success, 
as evidenced by export expansion from US$85 million in 1970 to US$233 
million in 1974.  Imports expanded comparably during the same period.
4  
However, this trade expansion was concentrated mainly among the More 
Developed Countries (MDCs) which had stronger manufacturing and industrial 
bases, which served to reinforce the disparities between the MDCs and the Least 
Developed Countries (LDCs). The shortcomings of CARIFTA demonstrated that 
the creation of a free trade area is often inadequate to deal with the complex 
problems of development.
5 Thus a more comprehensive approach to integration 
was needed. 
 
The Establishment of CARICOM – The Old Paradigm 
 
The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) was established in 1973 by the Treaty 
of Chaguaramas. The three main objectives of CARICOM were economic 
integration, through a common market, functional cooperation and foreign policy 
coordination. Since its establishment CARICOM has made notable achievements 
in the area of functional cooperation. However, it had mixed results in terms of 
coordinating foreign policy while economic integration was even more 
probelmatic. 
In terms of foreign policy coordination, CARICOM member states were able 
to cooperate on a number of foreign policy issues, particularly in the area of 
international negotiations. CARICOM played a leading role in initiating the 
negotiations for the Lomé Conventions. It also benefited from collective 
diplomacy in the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade 
Organization (GATT/WTO), the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD), the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS) negotiations as well as in various commissions and joint councils 
with Canada, Cuba, Japan, Mexico, the United States, the Organization of 
American States (OAS), the G3 (Columbia, Venezuela and Mexico), among 
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Press, 1968);  and  Eric E. Williams, From Columbus to Castro:  the history of the Caribbean, 
1492-1969 (London:  André  Deutsch Ltd., 1970). 
4 Harold Codrington and  DeLisle Worrell, “Trade and Economic Growth in Small 
Development Economies:  Research on the Caribbean,” in Economic Adjustment Policies for Small 
Nations:  Theory and Experience in the English-Speaking Caribbean, DeLisle Worrell and 
Compton  Bourne (eds.)  (New York:  Praeger, 1989).  
5 In a path breaking work Brewster and Thomas developed this thesis. See Havelock Brewster 
and Clive, Y. Thomas, The Dynamics of West Indian Economic Integration (Kingston: Institute of 
Social and Economic Research, 1967). An Overview of CARICOM  169 
 
others.  In addition, by trading each others’ support, the CARICOM countries 
succeeded in getting their nations elected to key international positions, such as 
Commonwealth Secretary-General and African Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) 
states Secretary-General. CARICOM has also been successful in assisting with 
territorial disputes in the region.  The Community has been instrumental in 
assisting Guyana and Belize in protecting their sovereignty and territorial 
integrity and enabling both member states to exercise their right to sit in the 
councils of the OAS from which they had been debarred for many years.
6  
However, CARICOM was established at the height of the Cold War. Given 
the close proximity of CARICOM member states to the United States and the 
realities of the Monroe Doctrine, this region was a central theatre for Cold War 
politics. Thus, given the Cold War environment, there was “a marked unwilling-
ness” to harmonize their positions in their relations with superpowers.
7 There-
fore, there was an ideological divide within CARICOM. Consequently, CARI-
COM adopted a policy of ‘ideological pluralism’ after Guyana, Jamaica and Gre-
nada opted for socialism as distinct from the Western liberal democracy followed 
by the other states within the region. The Grenada revolution (1979-1983) was 
particularly problematic. Several Heads of the Community were openly hostile to 
the idea of ‘ideological pluralism.’  For the late Tom Adams, the then Prime 
Minister of Barbados, ideological pluralism meant “we can no longer hope to 
achieve one of the goals of the founders of CARICOM which is to maintain a 
coordinated foreign policy.”
8  
Nevertheless, other CARICOM leaders held an opposing view. The late 
President of Guyana, Forbes Burnham pointed out that “there is one thing we 
must get straight if we are to survive.  We cannot prattle about democracy 
internally and not accept the facts of political and ideological pluralism within 
our region.” Burnham cautioned that it was time for CARICOM Heads to mature 
and “not be the football of outside circles.”
9  The implosion of the Grenada 
revolution in 1983 coincided with the end of socialist experiments in Jamaica and 
Guyana and the subsequent end of the Cold War in 1989, which defused the 
ideological conflict.   
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In addition to the ideological conflict, external economic forces also 
impacted negatively on CARICOM.  The establishment of CARICOM in 1973 
coincided with the world economic crisis which had a devastating impact on the 
small open economies of the CARICOM region. The 1981 World Bank (WB) 
Annual Report confirmed that: 
 
The past decade has been a difficult one for the nations of the Caribbean.  Many are 
newly independent and most are small islands, with fragile economies.  The problems of 
adjustment to being independent states in a world economy would have been immense 
even if the world economy of the 1970s had been as stable as that of the 1960s.  
[However] events since 1973  - uncertain prices for the few primary products that they 
export, declines in earnings from tourism, dwindling foreign investment, higher energy 
costs, global  recession and hurricane-caused destruction – have served to exacerbate the 
situation.
10  
 
Therefore, by the mid-1980s most CARICOM countries had undergone 
Structural Adjustment Programs imposed by the International M onetary Fund 
(IMF) and the WB. Those austerity measures had a crippling effect on the alrea-
dy fragile economies of the region. This meant in effect that political leaders 
were preoccupied with national concerns which diverted attention from the re-
gional project. Therefore, economic integration was problematic for CARICOM.  
In addition to geopolitical and global economic factors, the historical legacy 
of the Caribbean and its small size also affected its quest for economic 
integration.  For example, in terms of trade, intra-regional trade has been 
relatively minimal.  For the years 1981 to 2001 the main market for CARICOM’s 
exports as well as its imports was the United States, which accounted for 40.5 
percent of exports and 41.4 percent of imports.  The European Community/EU 
was the other major market, accounting  for 18.8 percent and 15.3 percent of 
CARICOM exports and imports respectively.  For that period intra regional 
exports and imports amounted to 14.8 percent and 9.5 percent.  In fact, 
CARICOM’s intra-regional exports, as a percentage of total exports – which is 
an index of integration – for the years 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990 and 2000 was 8.54 
percent, 8.92 percent, 12.99 percent, 12.37 percent and 15.7 percent 
respectively.
11   
This relatively minimal intra-regional trade can be attributed to CARICOM’s 
small size and to the historical legacy of the Caribbean. In fact at independence 
Anglophone Caribbean economies were immersed into the world economy at a 
disadvantage.  Traditionally, they were monoculture economies, producing 
mainly agricultural products to satisfy the comparative advantage of Britain. This 
led to economic dependency. Further, for the most part, Caribbean countries pro-
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duced similar products which undermined intra-regional trade. What emerged 
instead were competitor economies vying for foreign investment, foreign aid etc. 
This impacted negatively on economic integration. 
Institutionally, the original Treaty of Chaguaramas provided for a Heads of 
Government Conference - as the highest decision-making organ - a Common 
Market Council, a number of institutions and associate institutions and a 
Secretariat.  Decision-making within all the organs of CARICOM was taken 
unanimously. For most of its existence CARICOM functioned within this inter-
governmental framework, which revolved around the Heads of Government 
Conference and the CARICOM Secretariat. This structure characterized the old 
paradigm. 
 
The Transition Phase – Preparing for the Twenty-first Century 
 
CARICOM gained momentum in the late 1980s.  This was triggered by the harsh 
realities in the global political economy. The end of the Cold War, the new wave 
of globalization and the intensification of trade liberalization transformed the 
global landscape and had the potential to further marginalize the vulnerable states 
in the CARICOM region.  In addition, the emergence of non-traditional security 
threats, such as the illicit drug trade, and the attendant crime and violence as well 
as the spread of the HIV/AIDS pandemic also posed grave threats to member 
states individually and to the CARICOM region as a whole. Given limited human 
and financial resources, these threats presented an incentive to enhance regional 
cooperation within a more dynamic framework. 
Therefore, on the eve of the twenty-first century, there was a gap between the 
regional arrangements and the demands of the new era. In fact, CARICOM found 
itself on the threshold of a new century relatively unprepared for the new 
dispensation. Therefore, this situation warranted a fresh look at Caribbean 
integration and the institutional arrangements which supported it. To this end, a 
number of declarations were made in the late 1980s through the mid 1990s. For 
example, in 1984 Heads of Government convened in Nassau, The Bahamas to 
further examine the economic condition of the region.  The ‘Nassau 
Understanding’, which followed the Conference, represented a listing of the ills 
of CARICOM and a prescription for its revitalization and regeneration.  Often 
referred to as “a survival document” the Nassau Understanding indicated that 
“The governments are determined to steer the economies away from a situation 
of economic and social breakdown.” Consequently, by the early 1990s CARICOM 
had opted for a strategy of ‘open regionalism’, where the development of the 
Community was seen as requiring a more liberalized trade regime where 
protectionist measures were abolished and where the thrust of the activities of the 172  Grenade 
 
Community was driven by the need for a secure place in the changed global 
economy.
12   
In addition, the 1989 Grand Anse Declaration was a landmark event for 
CARICOM.  Several key initiatives were agreed upon to chart a new path for 
Caribbean integration: 
 
1.  The CARICOM Single Market and Economy (CSME)  to be established 
in ‘the shortest possible time’; 
2.  Free movement of CARICOM nationals; 
3.  Free movement of skilled a nd professional personnel beginning with 
university graduates, visual and performing arts, sports and media 
personnel; 
4.  Establishment of the Assembly of Caribbean Community 
Parliamentarians (ACCP); 
5.  Establishment of an independent West Indian Commission for advancing 
the goals of the Treaty of Chaguaramas. 
 
This period also brought to the fore concerns about democracy within the 
CARICOM region.  Therefore, through the Kingston Declaration in 1990 
CARICOM Heads of Government agreed to strengthen the democratic process 
by “providing every opportunity for the full involvement of all … citizens in the 
governance of their affairs, in particular the deepening of [the] integration effort 
toward the achievement of a truly authentic Caribbean personality.” They also 
reiterated their commitment to establishing an ACCP with representatives from 
both government and opposition members of parliament to “be a powerful 
influence on the integration movement and on furthering democratic processes in 
the region.”
13  
Another milestone event was the 1992 Report of the West Indian 
Commission (WIC) which assessed CARICOM and made recommendations for 
the way forward.  The report covered a wide range of concerns and found that 
although CARICOM had made notable progress in the area of functional 
cooperation, particularly in the areas of health and education, lack of common 
institutions was a critical weakness of CARICOM. The WIC Report stressed that 
CARICOM suffered from “an implementation paralysis” which was viewed as “a 
chronic CARICOM  deficiency.”
14 The WIC drew on the EU model and 
recommended, among other things:  a mechanism for CARICOM to speak with 
one voice in trade negotiations; speeding up the proposed Single Market and 
Economy; a Caribbean Court, a Council of Ministers, an Executive Commission, 
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a Charter of Civil society, widening of CARICOM to include Suriname and Haiti 
and enhanced cooperation with the Greater Caribbean. Those declarations and 
recommendations marked the beginning of a shift from the old paradigm to the 
emerging one. 
 
The Emerging CARICOM Framework 
 
Currently, there is consensus that more than ever before regional integration is 
critical for the small states in the CARICOM region. Sanders captures the general 
theme in the literature when he emphasizes that “smallness is powerlessness” and 
that Caribbean states have achieved gains in the international community only 
when they have acted in unison. He maintains that one way to address the crisis 
of being “crumbled small” is for these states to make their countries bigger 
through arrangements of joint governance that “are so patently necessary to make 
them more viable.”
15 According to Sanders: 
 
The alternative is to let the culture of smallness perpetuate itself, and for hardship to 
eventually force them either into a new form of colonialism with larger countries, or to 
pawn their people’s future with the IMF and the World Bank. 
16  
 
Within this context, Caribbean integration is a necessary imperative in the 
contemporary era. As such, a regional decision-making space is emerging where 
the sovereign nation-states in the region are seeking to collectively devise 
regional strategies to better cope with common threats from the global 
environment. In 1992 Heads of Government agreed that the overall structure of 
CARICOM would continue to be a community of sovereign (independent) states. 
However, it was agreed that the following changes would be implemented: 
 
•  The chairperson of the Conference would be changed every six months 
on the basis of an agreed schedule; 
 
•  A Bureau of the Conference would be established comprising the 
current, the outgoing and the incoming chairpersons of the Conference as 
well as the Secretary-General acting in the capacity of chief executive 
officer; 
 
•  Each member state would designate a minister with specific 
responsibility for CARICOM Affairs.  Together they would constitute 
the Caribbean Community Council of Ministers, replacing the Common 
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Market Council of Ministers as the second highest organ of the 
Community; 
 
•  The Secretary-General would be given executive authority and the 
Secretariat would be reorganized in order to strengthen its ability to 
respond more effectively to the  numerous demands being placed upon it; 
and 
 
•  The Treaty of Chaguaramas would be revised, to reflect the 1989 
decision of Heads of Government to move from a Common Market to a 
Single Market and Economy. 
 
In addition, in order to complete the process of independence from Britain, 
they also agreed to establish a Caribbean Court of Appeal, as the final appellate 
court replacing the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council based in the United 
Kingdom.  The New Institutional Structures of the Community came into being in 
1997 with the signing of Protocol I which was later incorporated into the Revised 
Treaty of Chaguaramas.
17  
 However, prior to the Revised Treaty in 2001, four important initiatives 
were introduced into the CARICOM structure: the ACCP; the Charter of Civil 
Society, a CARICOM Quasi Cabinet and the Caribbean Regional Negotiating 
Machinery (CRNM).  Each will be examined in turn. 
First, the establishment of the ACCP was intended to be a major step towards 
more inclusive governance within the Caribbean Community.  The objective of 
the ACCP was to give regional representatives of both the government and the 
opposition a greater say in the affairs of the integration movement.  It was 
established as a consultative and deliberative body for the deepening of the 
integration movement and its objectives are clearly set out in Article IV of the 
Agreement:
18 
 
1.  To involve the people of the Community, through their representatives, 
in the process of consolidating and strengthening the Community; 
2.  to provide opportunities for involvement in the issues of the integration 
process by members of parliament in each member state and associate 
members, in addition to those who now participate; 
3.  to provide a forum for people of the Community to make their views 
known through their representatives; 
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4.  to provide more frequent contact in the monitoring of the policies of the 
Community; 
5.  to provide enhanced opportunities for the co-ordination of the foreign 
policies of member states;  
6.  to promote greater understanding among member states and associate 
members for the purpose of realizing and safeguarding the ideas and 
principles of democratic governments in the Community and facilitating 
the economic and social advancements of their peoples; 
7.  to encourage the adoption by the Government of member states of the 
Community of a common policy on economic, social, cultural, scientific 
and legal matters deliberated upon by the Assembly.  
 
Since its inaugural meeting in Barbados in 1996, the ACCP has met twice in 
nine years:  in Grenada in 1999 and Belize in 2000. The shortcomings of the 
ACCP reflect the wider political culture within the CARICOM region. It is 
pertinent to note h ere that there is an ongoing scholarly debate on the 
Westminster model as it has evolved in the Anglophone Caribbean.  While some 
scholars argue that the Anglophone Caribbean has adapted the Westminster 
model and has for the most part sustained a liberal democratic tradition
19 others 
argue that what emerged in the post emancipation Caribbean were “authoritarian 
states” camouflaged in the trappings of formal democracy.
20 This debate has 
drawn attention to the quality of democracy within the CARICOM region.  
Within this context, therefore, there is an emerging tendency among opposition 
parliamentarians to seek greater space in decision-making and there have been 
calls from various circles to include opposition parliamentarians in the affairs of 
CARICOM.
21  
Consequently, the CARICOM leadership is being forced to address the 
pressing issue of democracy within the CARICOM region. As such, plans to in-
stitutionalize the ACCP to include representatives of government and opposition 
parliamentarians as full members and representatives of civil society as observers 
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are high on CARICOM’s current agenda. At the Sixteenth Inter-sessional Meet-
ing of the Conference held in Suriname on February 16 to 17, 2005, the Confer-
ence of Heads of Government considered the report from the Prime Ministerial 
Expert Group on Governance which included recommendations to institutional-
ize the ACCP. It was agreed that the recommendations would be examined by the 
Bureau, which would make concrete proposals for implementation to be consid-
ered at the Twenty-Sixth Meeting of the Conference in July 2005.
22  It is still too 
early to access what impact of the ACCP will have.  It is hoped that the recom-
mendations will translate into concrete action to address the democratic deficits 
in the regional project. 
Second, the Charter of Civil Society was adopted in 1997. This instrument 
became necessary as the question of legitimacy and governance within member 
states became problematic in the late 1990s. Civil unrest in Guyana and other 
constitutional crises within some other member states warranted CARICOM’s 
intervention. The Charter aims to: enhance public confidence in governance; 
ensure the continuing respect for internationally recognized civil, political, 
economic, social and cultural rights; uphold the right of the people to make 
political choices to create a truly participatory political environment within the 
Community; promote, foster and maintain racial harmony in order to enter the 
twenty-first century on the basis of the best possible governance.
23 However, the 
effectiveness of the Charter of Civil Society has come into question, particularly 
in view of t he most recent Haitian crisis. In reviewing the lessons from the 
Haitian crisis, the Secretary-General of CARICOM acknowledges the 
weaknesses of CARICOM since in his view the Charter of Civil Society, which 
deals with human rights and democratic governance within member states, does 
not impose “binding obligations” on member states.
24  
Third, as issue areas increased and became more complex there was a need to 
spearhead action in sectors critical to the region’s integration and development.  
Therefore, at the Seventh Special Meeting of the Conference of Heads of 
Government held in Chaguaramas, Trinidad and Tobago from October 26 to 27, 
1999, Heads of Government agreed to constitute themselves into a quasi-cabinet 
with individual Heads having responsibility for critical portfolios. Within the last 
five years there have been visible signs of individual CARICOM Heads of 
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Government taking the lead role in a number of specific areas.  For example, St. 
Kitts and Nevis has been spearheading strategies to combat the spread of 
HIV/AIDS; Barbados has visibly displayed leadership in the area of the CSME; 
Grenada in the realm of Science and Technology, St. Lucia, in the area of Justice 
and governance, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, on the issue of bananas, 
Jamaica has been at the forefront of international negotiations, among others.  
This new component within the structure creates the possibility for greater 
accountability by the CARICOM leadership to Caribbean peoples. 
Fourth, in relation to external negotiations, a notable development was the 
establishment of the Caribbean Regional Negotiating Machinery (CRNM) in 
1997.  The CRNM was established to coordinate external negotiations to enable 
the region to speak with one voice in international trade negotiations. Initially, 
the CRNM functioned within the framework of the CARICOM Secretariat.  
However, it was an “awkward relationship” and ultimately the responsibility for 
the management of the financial resources of the CRNM was transferred from the 
CARICOM Secretariat to the Government of Barbados.
25  Despite the conflicts, 
the CRNM has been instrumental in the preparations for the Doha Round of the 
World Trade Organization (WTO); the Economic Partnership Agreements with 
the EU and the proposed Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA).  Such 
initiatives marked a distinct break with the past, albeit within limitations. 
 
The Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas, 2001 
 
The 2001 Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas marked a new impetus in Caribbean 
integration.  The original Treaty has been supplemented by nine protocols which 
aim to facilitate the implementation of the CSME.
26  These amendments are 
intended to facilitate a single economic space within which the factors of 
production, including labor, would be able to locate to countries, regions and 
sectors where they can be optimally employed, and in the process improve 
productivity and the efficient allocation of resources while enhancing the quality 
of life and the standard of living of citizens of the Community. Protocol one of 
the Revised Treaty outlines the organizational and institutional arrangements of 
the Community.  
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The Conference of Heads of Government continues to be the supreme 
decision-making organ of CARICOM.  Decisions of the Conference continue to 
be taken unanimously. It is argued that the retention of the unanimity rule in 
voting procedures of the Conference, is intended to emphasize the principle of 
sovereign equality of states and to “scotch in the bud” any lingering disposition 
at political integration.”
27  
The Revised Treaty also made provision for the Bureau of the Conference, as 
mentioned above.  In addition, the Community Council of Ministers replaces the 
Common Market C ouncil of Ministers.  The Council consists of ministers 
responsible for Caribbean Community Affairs and any other minister designated 
by member states.  It is responsible for the development of Community strategic 
planning and co-ordination in the areas of economic integration, functional co-
operation and external relations.   There is a notable change in the decision-
making at the level of Council of Ministers. For example, Article 29 (1) states 
that “…the Ministerial Councils shall take decisions by a qualified majority vote 
and such decisions shall be binding.”  Thus, while the unanimity principle 
remains entrenched in the voting procedures of the Conference, it has been 
dispensed with for decision-making of other organs save in the exceptional 
circumstances identified in Article 19 (3) which relates to issues “determined to 
be of critical importance to the well-being of a  member state.”  This is a 
significant development, although it is too soon to determine what impact such a 
change will have.  
Within the new structure the principal organs of CARICOM are assisted by 
four Ministerial Councils: 
 
(a)  The Council for Finance and Planning (COFAP), which coordinates 
economic policy and financial and monetary integration of member 
states; 
(b)  The Council for Trade and Economic Development (COTED), which 
promotes trade and economic development of the Community and 
oversees the operations of the CARICOM Single Market and Economy 
(CSME);   
(c)  The Council for Foreign and Community Relations (COFCOR), which 
determines relations between the Community and  international 
organizations and third states; and 
(d)  The Council for Human and Social Development (COHSOD), which 
promotes human and social development within the CARICOM region.  
 
As the number and scope of issue areas increased, these Ministerial Councils 
became necessary to provide a key link between the national, regional and 
                                                 
27 Duke Pollard (ed.), The CARICOM System:  Basic Instruments (Kingston:  The Caribbean 
Law Publishing Co. 2003), 460. An Overview of CARICOM  179 
 
international levels. These Ministerial Councils are entrenched in the CARICOM 
structure and represent a more integrated approach to regional policy making 
than what obtained with the standing committees provided for in the original 
Treaty. 
The Revised Treaty also made provision for three Bodies of the Community: 
 
(a)  The Legal Affairs Committee, which is responsible for providing the 
Organs and Bodies, either on request or on its own initiative, with advice 
on treaties, international legal issues, the harmonization of laws of the 
Community and other legal matters; 
(b)  The Budget Committee, which examines the draft budget and work 
program of the Community prepared by the Secretariat and submits 
recommendations to the Community Council; and 
(c)  The Committee of Central Bank Governors, which makes 
recommendations to the Ministerial Council for Finance and Planning 
(COFAP) on matters relating to monetary co-operation, payments 
arrangements, free movement of capital, integration of capital markets, 
monetary union and any other related matters referred to it by the organs 
of the Community. 
 
Besides the organs and bodies of the Community, the Revised Treaty also 
provided for a number of institutions and associate institutions of CARICOM.  
The institutions are established by or under the auspices of the Community as 
outlined in Article 21. Article 22 provides for associate institutions which are 
entities with which the Community enjoys important functional relationships 
which contribute to achieving the Community’s objectives. These institutions and 
associate institutions create a regional network which helps to underpin 
Caribbean integration.  They play an important role in regional governance and 
have greatly contributed to CARICOM’s achievements in the area of functional 
cooperation.
28  This suggests that non-state actors have a role to play in regional 
integration. 
Within the new structure, the CARICOM Secretariat continues to be the 
principal administrative organ of the Community. To reflect the changes in the 
Community, the Secretariat has been restructured to include three directorates on 
foreign and community relations; human and social development; and regional 
trade and economic integration.  The Secretariat has evolved as the main conduit 
for Caribbean integration.  It is the focal point for matters relating to Caribbean 
integration and acts as the catalyst among the various organs, bodies, institutions 
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and associate institutions of CARICOM. However, the Secretariat’s role is 
primarily administrative. Since CARICOM is a community of sovereign, 
independent states, the Secretariat is not empowered to implement CARICOM 
decisions nor is it equipped to effectively respond to the diverse challenges posed 
by the changing global environment. Cognizant of this reality, further options for 
governance are high on CARICOM’s agenda.  
 
Current Options for Governance  
 
Currently “Options for Governance” is one of the pressing issues facing 
CARICOM.  As pointed out in the 1992 Report of the WIC, the CARICOM 
Treaty, unlike the Treaty establishing the EEC/EU, did not include similar 
institutions to monitor and implement the treaty. Consequently, the WIC 
recommended the creation of a  CARICOM Commission, empowered with 
authority to  implement CARICOM’s decisions.  In this regard, after much 
preliminary work, in 2003 the Conference of Heads of Government agreed, 
through the Rose Hall Declaration, to establish a CARICOM Commission or 
other executive mechanism, whose purpose will be to facilitate the deepening of 
regional integration in the area of the CSME and such other areas of the 
integration process as the Conference of Heads may from time to time 
determine.  The Commission’s function will be to exercise full-time executive 
responsibility to further the implementation of Community decisions. In the 
exercise of its responsibilities the Commission will be accountable to the 
Conference of Heads of Government and will be responsive to the authority of 
other organs of the Community within their areas of competence.
29  Currently a 
recommendation for a four-man executive commission is on CARICOM’s 
agenda. It is not yet known what form the Commission will take or what impact 
it will have.  However, this is a positive development which, can help to address 
the “implementation paralysis” within CARICOM. 
This urgency to settle the question of governance within CARICOM is 
driven by the CSME.
 After many hurdles, it is expected that the single market 
will be a launched in a staggered way first between Barbados, Jamaica and 
Trinidad and Tobago in 2005 with other member states, (except the Bahamas, 
Haiti and Montserrat) joining the single market by 2006.  The single economy is 
expected to come on stream by 2 007.  However, as integration deepens, 
particularly in light of the CSME, CARICOM’s approach to integration as a 
community of sovereign independent states may become problematic. Some 
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scholars question whether the single market is realistic without some 
commitment to political unity.
30  Some politicians also question the wisdom of 
CARICOM’s approach to integration.  According to Gonsalves:  
 
The course we have taken to view CARICOM as a community of independent 
sovereign states, that is, if we proceed without a supranational authority to which some 
measure of sovereignty is transferred to direct the operation we can still succeed but it 
will take much longer and there will be greater pain and frustration.  We have chosen to 
proceed in the most difficult way to a single market and economy.  We ought to do it the 
way the Europeans have done it, to transfer some measure of sovereignty to a 
supranational entity through a single law in the independent states and have that 
particular supranational entity provide directives to drive the CSME. Instead, what we are 
seeking to do is to see if whilst we are being a community of independent states that we 
can have a measure of supranationality without in fact creating a central supranational 
authority…We need deeper political union for us to be able to provide the requisite 
institutional expression for our civilization.
 31 
 
However, others caution against adopting the EU model. Sandiford warns 
that: 
 
The European countries are the former colonial masters of the Caribbean.  In a sense 
they still carry that kind of tutelage and would want the Caribbean to do things ‘à la 
Europe’. But we have to create our own model based on our concrete circumstances.  We 
can work toward having the Integrated States of the Caribbean.  But it is more than just 
putting a structure together.  It is the embodiment of nationhood among those English 
speaking Caribbean countries that can work together and want to work together.  We 
need a Caribbean personality.  We need that because in the building of our nation we 
have failed to do it and we need to find that framework which would embrace both the 
commitment to national aspirations as well as a larger commitment to a Caribbean nation. 
We need internal synergies and energies to bring about integration. We have to create our 
own institutions that come out of the needs of the ordinary man and woman.  What is 
happening now is that it is a bureaucratic emphasis placed on forming institutions without 
looking closely at what they are supposed to do for the needs of ordinary people.
32 
   
The debate on the future political and institutional expression of CARICOM 
is ongoing. It is often argued that the establishment of the CCJ will create the 
balance between CARICOM’s decision to be a community of sovereign 
independent states and the demands of the CSME. However, the CCJ itself is 
fraught with difficulties. It should have been inaugurated in 2003, but due to 
constitutional and political wrangling, particularly in Jamaica and Trinidad and 
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Tobago, its inauguration was  postponed several times. A  Privy Council 
judgment delivered on February 3, 2005 ruled that the procedure followed by 
Jamaica to enact three pieces of legislation to bring the CCJ into force by a 
simple parliamentary majority, was constitutional.
33  This ruling has created a 
lively debate throughout the CARICOM region which throws light on the 
adversarial nature of Caribbean politics and the implications for the emerging 
governance arrangements within CARICOM. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The regional space is being shaped b y several factors.  On the one hand, the 
demands in the global political economy are creating an incentive for deeper 
integration.  However, the lingering concerns of the early federal experiment and 
the political culture within member states are mitigating against deeper union. 
The central problem is that CARICOM is in a bind. The CARICOM political 
leadership has agreed that even as the Caribbean deepens integration, CARICOM 
will continue to be a community of sovereign independent states, without a 
central authority to make rules which are binding on all member states. Within 
this framework, as integration deepens, individual member states are required to 
pass national laws in order to give force to regional decisions.  This process often 
requires super majorities in national parliaments or in some cases referenda.  
However, given the adversarial nature of Caribbean politics, regional decisions 
usually become hostage to domestic power politics.  
What seems to be emerging is what Sanders refers to as “a half-way 
house.”
34 That is, there is a shift from the solely inter-governmental framework to 
an emerging model which is necessary to facilitate the CSME.  The emerging 
framework includes the Bureau, the CARICOM Quasi-Cabinet, the Council of 
Ministers, Ministerial  Councils and Bodies, the CCJ, the CRNM, the ACCP and 
the proposed Executive Commission. These initiatives are definitely a break from 
the past and represent a shift toward a more integrated regional project. In 
essence this model, while reflecting the concrete circumstances of CARICOM, is 
building on the recommendations of the WIC which proposed an EU-like 
structure for CARICOM.  If one were to compare the emerging CARICOM 
structure with the EU, the CCJ, while designed differently and while fraught with 
its own difficulties, is intended to carry out functions similar to that of the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ). In addition, the CRNM, while not as 
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sophisticated as the European Commission, has been speaking with one voice for 
CARICOM in international negotiations. These are two of the central “pillars” of 
the emerging structure. It is too early to tell what form the proposed Executive 
Commission will take and what impact it will have. Suffice it to say, this is a 
positive step that can help to address the i mplementation deficiencies within 
CARICOM.  
In summary, one possible future scenario is that in the medium to long term, 
external pressures will force CARICOM to deepen integration within a more 
cohesive political and institutional framework. That is, an e ffective and 
sustainable regional governance arrangement will become a necessary 
prerequisite for CARICOM’s survival as a viable region.  This does not mean full 
political union, but greater pooling of sovereignty in critical areas.  However, 
CARICOM’s decision to continue to be a community of independent sovereign 
states will continue to creation tensions between the desire for deeper integration 
and the political, legal and institutional mechanisms needed to underpin 
integration. Finally, it is expected that CARICOM will continue to search for an 
indigenous path to development through regional integration. This is a 
continuous process which requires creativity and sacrifice. In my view, there is 
no easy or no one ‘right’ way to integrate sovereign nation-states within a 
regional framework. However, it is useful to compare various regional schemes 
to draw useful lessons, while tailoring the regional project to the concrete 
circumstances of the respective project. In this respect, what CARICOM can 
draw from the EU is that common institutions and the pooling of sovereignty are 
critical to sustain the integration process.   
The fundamental issue is that regional integration is b oth necessary and 
problematic. However, appropriate and effective governance mechanisms can 
help to enhance the viability of regional integration movements. 
 
  
 
Internal Political Tribalism and Regional Integration  
in the Caribbean 
 
 
 
 
David Hinds 
 
Introduction 
 
As the Anglophone Caribbean navigates its fifth decade since the beginning of 
constitutional independence, international and domestic forces are threatening its 
survival, both as individual nation-states and as a community of states. The 
challenges of the current wave of globalization with its bias against small states 
have had serious implications for the Caribbean Political Economy. The 
dominant response has been a push towards deeper regional integration whereby 
the states could collectively coordinate and maximize their ability to compete in 
the global economy and protect themselves from the negative effects of 
globalization. Three crucial developments in this direction have been the setting 
up of a Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ) and movement towards a Single Market 
and Economy (CSME) and an Executive Commission with powers to h elp 
implement decisions taken by the Heads of Government, the highest decision 
making body of CARICOM. 
However, this push towards deeper integration, which is spurred in large part 
by the forces of international capital in consort with U.S. political and cultural 
hegemony, has been accompanied by a pull factor occasioned by the domestic 
political dynamics of the Caribbean states. This push-pull factor or the 
convergence of global and domestic factors is largely responsible for the nature 
and pace of regional integration in the Caribbean. This paper argues that while 
developments at the international level are critical to regional integration, of 
equal importance are developments at the domestic level.  
During the last few years the historical polarization of Caribbean societies 
both at the level of government and society has played a critical role in slowing 
down the pace of Caribbean integration over the last few years. The chief culprit 
in this regard has been the persistent conflict between government and 
opposition, which is not helped by the Westminster winner-take-all system and 
the authoritarian political culture, both of which are legacies of the region’s 
colonial past.  
The CCJ, in particular, has been a victim of this problem, particularly in 
Trinidad and Tobago and Jamaica, where opposition parties have linked support 
for the court to their partisan domestic agendas. The opposition Jamaican Labor 
Party (JLP), which objects to the CCJ as a court of last resort for Jamaica on the 186  Hinds 
 
grounds that it will b e subject to partisan political influence, has called for a 
referendum to decide on the issue. Ironically, it was the JLP while in government 
in 1970 that first proposed the idea of a regional court to replace the Privy 
Council as the court of last resort for the region. Trinidad’s opposition United 
National Congress (UNC), which strongly supported regional integration when in 
office, though not objecting to the CCJ has nevertheless tied its support for it to 
constitutional reform in the country. In both instances the ruling parties have 
rejected these proposals, leading to a political stalemate.  
While this scenario may be characterized as politicking, it points to a larger 
issue: the extent to which domestic politics can affect regional integration. This 
paper contends that where there is more political and social integration at the 
domestic level a more stable and viable regional integration is likely to emerge.  
Conversely the more the countries are politically and socially polarized 
domestically a stable and viable regional integration is less likely to emerge. 
Since a regional integration movement is a community of states, what happens 
within one state is bound to affect what happens at the regional level. If states 
seeking integration are structurally and politically geared towards one-party rule 
then what results is a community of ruling parties rather than a community of 
states.  Internal integration, therefore, is a perquisite for regional integration, 
while internal polarization and tribalism are recipes for regional disaster. Political 
cooperation between government and opposition is, therefore, critical to the 
viability of regional integration. 
In this regard three key questions must be interrogated. First, can states that 
are incapable of constructing a national ethos based on shared values and 
governance in their respective societies create a viable regional unity? How can 
governing parties and leaders that eschew unity with their own opposition, 
construct regional unity? Second is the majoritarian winner-take-all system an 
adequate tool for the construction of the culture of cooperation in postcolonial 
societies? Third, is the issue in the Caribbean really about the refusal of leaders 
and states to pool sovereignty or is it a refusal to surrender power? 
This link between domestic politics and regional integration is pivotal to an 
understanding of regionalism. Mandsfield and Milner agree with this thesis. 
According to them: 
 
Various recent studies indicate that whether states enter regional trade arrangements 
and the economic effects of these arrangements depend on the preferences of national 
policymakers and interests groups, as well as the nature and strength of domestic 
institutions.
1 
 
Mandsfield further contends that “any comprehensive analysis of the 
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international political economy would consider the effects of both international 
and domestic politics.”
2 This view is shared by Hoffman who observes that 
“every international system owes its inner logic and its unfolding to the diversity 
of domestic determinants, geo-historical situations and outside aims among its 
units.”
3 Expanding on this relationship he opines, “[d]omestic politics are 
dominated not so much by the region’s problems as by the purely local and 
purely global ones, which conspire to d ivert the region’s members from the 
internal affairs of their area…each nation new or old, finds itself placed in an 
orbit of its own, from which it is quite difficult to move away:  for the attraction 
of the regional forces is offset by the pull of all the other forces.”
4 
Hoffman hits the nail on the head when he observes that because the nation-
state is made up of its “internal features,” when policy makers move beyond the 
nation-state they do so “by taking along the nation with its baggage of memories 
and problems  – with its situation.”
5 The contention here is that economic, 
political and social instability within member states have implications for the 
success of regional integration. Jacome
6 supports this approach to regional 
integration. She argues that integration has to be dealt with within a broader 
political and social framework that includes democracy and governance at the 
domestic level.  
 
Domestic Politics and Governance- An Overview 
 
Unlike Europe, the Caribbean is building a regional movement among countries 
that have not yet settled the national or democratic question--the question of 
nationhood and an acceptable body of principles, values and rules that underpin 
the state and society. The political history of the region did not prepare it for the 
cooperation and sense of oneness that are needed for building viable nation-
states. The convergence of authoritarianism, class domination, an externally 
driven and determined political economy, racial insecurity and gender inequity 
lend to some degree of political dysfunctionality that retard political consensus 
and socio-economic development.  
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Despite some democratic modifications, the Caribbean state is as 
authoritarian as it was at the time of independence.
7  The coercive arm has 
maintained its historic role as a medium of terror against the masses while 
serving as protector of the interests of the ruling class. This situation in 
conjunction with chronic poverty, narco-traffic, social alienation and corruption 
within the state has engendered a complex criminal enterprise that threatens to 
overrun the state. Some scholars have, however, attributed to the countries of the 
region an overly democratic profile that has not been consistent with the lived 
realities.
8 Because the region has had a very good record of maintaining 
parliamentary democracy and the rule of law, these scholars have mistaken these 
democratic forms and procedures for democratic substance. In the process they 
have ignored the anti-democratic form of governance in the region; they have 
focused on structures while ignoring outcomes. As Ryan observes, “[t]he triumph 
of electoral democracy notwithstanding, the Caribbean has had its share of 
political charlatan and adventurers, politically inspired riots, successful and 
unsuccessful coups, draconian repression, politically driven victimization and 
assignation, election related violence, electoral thuggery, fraud and corruption, 
social and ethnic cleanings, and some of the other ugly, nasty and exploitative 
deformations that have characterized democracy elsewhere.”
9 
This phenomenon is aided and exacerbated by the Westminster model, which 
encourages fierce competition for power. Because Westminster model in the 
Caribbean confers on the wining party absolute power and the losing party no 
power, and because the winning party is unlikely to incorporate the interests of 
the losing party, the stage is set for permanent conflict.  Ruling parties contain or 
marginalize opposition parties while opposition parties try to sabotage the work 
of the ruling parties. This antagonism is total because what is at stake is the 
power of governments to control almost every aspect of the society. This has led 
to a crisis of governance that is reflected in the inability of the governmental 
system to transform formal democracy into substantive democratic outcomes and 
advance the cause of nationhood.  Peters describes such rule as “quasi-
authoritarian.” According to him: 
 
What is peculiar about the Eastern Caribbean political system is the absolute 
authority that government somehow inherits. Government officials are able to circumvent 
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the laws that they have enacted.  They are able to use public resources for their personal 
gain.  While partisan politics is a normal phenomenon in modern democracies, Caribbean 
governments have taken the concept to its zenith.  As a result, when a party is elected to 
power it virtually eliminates the opposition through patronage, control of the media and 
legislative action where necessary. These actions are in part responsible for the 
domination of one party for decades in most of these islands.
10   
 
The Westminster Model, therefore, has been utilized to enforce elite 
domination of politics and governance and has served to institutionalize sharp 
polarization of the society along racial and tribal lines.  Both elite dominance and 
polarization among the masses have served as impediments to democratization of 
society and politics. Barbados Prime Minister, Owen Arthur argues, “the 
unfortunate aspect of the Westminster model of governance is that it has 
encouraged “to the victors the spoils” mentality.  It has ensured that at any time 
almost half of the population of any given Caribbean society is marginalized and 
alienated from participation in the development of their society.
11  
The two-party system in the Caribbean mirrors the division of the societies 
into relatively fixed antagonistic factions. In each country there has developed an 
intra-class rivalry and competition among the working peoples that divides them 
into two antagonistic camps or political tribes. In Guyana and Trinidad these 
tribes have the added identification of race. The political parties have evolved 
into bastions of tribal and racial representation.  This attachment to one political 
party or the other arises out of the practice of clientilism whereby political 
support is based on the party’s ability to grant favors to its constituencies.  In the 
case of Guyana and Trinidad, party membership and support are based on racial 
considerations. In effect, therefore, the Caribbean political landscape is 
characterized by fixed factions or “tribes” that battle each other for control of the 
government and state, thus making elections a high intensity exercise and the 
capture of government the ultimate prize. Owen Arthur captures this reality when 
he opines: 
 
There is something fundamentally flawed about a system of governance, based upon 
the first-past-the-post principle, in which the victor gets all the spoils, but in which all 
other than hard score party supporters and in fact, almost half of the population at any 
time feel alienated from participating in what is taking place around them.
12 
 
Ruling parties, despite some degree of constitutional checks, function as 
paramount entities leading to little distinction between ruling party, government 
and state. As Peters contends, “The system of government that emerges out of 
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that process is one characterized by some aspects of democracy but tightly 
controlled with the tradition of a quasi-authoritarian system.  The countries, 
therefore, are recognized as democracies, but the government apparatus and the 
decision-making process at the national level are not democratic and cannot be 
capsulized within any of the broad political models that dominate the Third 
World.”
13   
 
Arthur Lewis puts it this way: 
 
In a small island of 50,000 to 100,000 people dominated by a single political party, 
it is very difficult to prevent political abuse.  Everybody depends on the government for 
something, however small, so most are reluctant to offend it.  The civil servants live in 
fear, the police avoid unpleasantness, the trade unions are tied to the party, newspapers 
depend on government advertisements and so on.
14 
 
Because political power is monopolized by the leadership of the political 
parties in consort with the economic elites, there has developed a top-down 
approach to governance and politics that excludes the masses from any 
meaningful say in the decision making process.  But even at the top, the elites 
compete for power and administer it not as a means to an end but as an end itself.  
Control of political power means absolute control of state resources and 
paramountcy of the party over the state.  In many respects the ruling party in the 
Anglophone Caribbean is indistinguishable from the state.  The fierce 
competition for  power, therefore, engenders a very high intensity electoral 
exercise that excites the citizenry into a carnival of acrimony and violence that 
have been increasingly carried over into the post-election period. In between 
elections political parties, both governing and opposition, are motivated less by 
national concerns and more by the need to maintain or secure party hegemony.  
The exercise of politics is, therefore, an exercise in anti-development and anti-
nationhood. Again Prime Minister Arthur hits the nail on the head, when he 
asserts that, “[i]t can also reasonably be argued that there has, in our region, been 
too destructive a competition for political office; too heavy a concentration of 
power in the hands of the ruling elites, an unhealthy preservation of anti-
development party and tribal division, a focus on short term partisan political 
concerns rather than long-terms strategic objectives, and efficient patronage and 
spoils systems which work against sound and progressive government. 
Alienation, cynicism and marginalization have been the result, all leading to a 
perpetuation of underdevelopment.”
15  
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Opposition parities are, therefore, treated as outcasts and not as part of the 
governance structure while ruling parties assume power to govern and determine 
who gets what, when and where. In effect the winner determines unilaterally the 
fate of the rest of the society. Parties generally use their majority status to make 
national decisions and in the process more often than not ignore the views of 
opposition parties, which often represent significant minorities. According to 
Jamaica’s opposition leader Bruce Golding, “There is no joy in being in 
opposition, you know.  When you are in opposition, you control nothing.  If one 
is outside the “power loop”, one is ineffective, and impotent despite the fact that 
one may be a duly elected representative of the people.
16  
Opposition parties in turn have generally tried to undermine the government 
outside of the formal constitutional framework and take advantage of loopholes 
in the formal system to stall or torpedo government initiatives. Beginning in the 
1990s the region has seen a new tendency whereby losing parties have either 
refused to accept the results of elections or cooperate with the government after 
the elections.  This is a departure from the norm in post-colonial Caribbean 
politics. Neville Duncan
17 sees this as a problem for regional integration. While 
he observes that this development is not new to the region, given their prevalence 
they assume greater significance at this time.  This zero-sum political praxis has 
led to persistent political instability within the countries that invariably spills 
over into regional politics. It has consumed all facets of the society.  The working 
people become pawns in a ruthless political game that subsequently compels 
them to see their salvation in partisan terms. The middle strata and the 
professional class become cheerleaders of the status quo, thus making a mockery 
of the concept of Civil Society. Political space is surrendered to the political 
parties as a matter of course. Trevor Munroe is on the ball when he says: 
 
There are a number of serious obstacles in the way of radical reform and democratic 
renewal.  One such is a constitutional system that, throughout the region, places excessive 
power in the hands of the executive, in particular in that of the office of the prime 
minister.  The converse of this over-concentration of power are legislatures that are 
ineffective, electorates that have little institutional means of influencing policy between 
elections. In its most extreme form, this system allows constitutional dictatorship as 
manifested itself in the Gairy regime of the 1970s and that can lead to extra constitutional 
revolutionary action such as undertaken by the New Jewel Movement in the 1970s.
18 
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Domestic Politics and Integration—The CCJ 
 
As the Caribbean pushes for deeper regional integration, the adversarial nature of 
the region’s politics pulls it back. This scenario is most glaring in the case of the 
CCJ, which should have been inaugurated in 2003. It was, however, postponed 
on at least three occasions until April 2005 when largely on account of 
disagreements at the domestic level it was launched as a trade court rather than as 
a replacement for the Privy Council. In particular, opposition parties in Trinidad 
and Tobago and Jamaica have tied their country’s participation in the CCJ to 
domestic constitutional reform and the holding of referendum respectively; 
proposals that have been rejected by the ruling parties. 
Since leaders and parties are unaccustomed to operating within a culture of 
political cooperation, which is so pivotal to a viable regional integration, they 
have little appetite for it. Regionalism, therefore, is not a major consideration at 
the domestic level; it is a sideshow but more importantly it is transformed into a 
noose around the neck of the incumbent party-tribe. It becomes a political 
football, a casualty of tribal politics as governments and opposition parties 
behave more like enemies rather than partners in the developmental process. 
While leaders insist on cooperation and consensus at the regional level they 
entrench the government-opposition divide at the domestic level. 
Editorializing on this issue, a Caribbean newspaper,  Stabroek News, 
comments:  
 
In these instances it may well be the case that CARICOM projects are being held 
hostage to domestic conflicts. Indeed it may well be the case that the slow pace in the 
implementation of decisions made by the Summit and other CARICOM bodies is due 
precisely to the fact that governments must steadily look over their shoulders at what 
political capital the opposition might make of CARICOM issues.
19 
 
What matters at the domestic level is not the collective will, but the will of 
the ruling party, which in turn is projected as the national will. This narrow 
national will, in the final analysis, is premised on a narrow legitimacy and it 
invariably collides with regional imperatives, which then leads to a slowing down 
of the pace of regionalization.  
Neville Duncan picks up the relationship between national legitimacy and 
regional integration. According to him the sustainability of democratic 
procedures cannot be left solely to member states but it should also become a 
regional concern. He suggests that Caribbean Heads of Government should set up 
a regional office to deal with the question of legitimacy at the state level.
20 
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The Jamaica Controversy  
When the Jamaica Labor Party (JLP) held office in the 1980s its then leader, 
Edward Seaga, had committed Jamaica to joining both the CSME and the CCJ. 
However when the JLP became the opposition, the party became a vocal critic 
and withdrew support for these institutions. In response to Prime Minister P. J. 
Patterson reminder of the JLP’s earlier support for the CCJ, Seaga replied that 
conditions had changed. In an interview with a US based Caribbean television 
program Seaga expressed his party’s position: 
We are not convinced that we can divorce the intrusiveness that seems to pervade all 
aspects of our life - the political intrusiveness - in a Court that is to have final appellate 
jurisdiction. The way in which the Court is structured is that the Chief Justice is to be 
appointed politically and then he appoints all the other Judges. So you have a Chief 
Justice who  is beholden to the political leaders who appoint him. And as such, the 
Justices that are appointed to empanel the Court are also beholden to the Chief Justice 
who is beholden.  Now, the one thing that we must not have is any watering down of the 
purity of justice.  What this country needs, and I can’t speak for the rest of the Caribbean, 
I think some countries in the Caribbean will fall in this category, is more justice not less 
justice and to the extent that we need more justice, we do not want to water down the 
pure form of justice that we are able to enjoy by appeals to the Privy Council.  That has 
served us well, we have full confidence in it largely because not only the quality of 
justice that is there but because the members of the Privy Council are far removed from 
local circumstances.  We do not want a Court that is going to take into account 
circumstances and conditions of the society in which they operate.  We want a Court that 
takes into account two things:  the law and the evidence before it.
21 
 
In relation to the larger issue of regional integration, Seaga takes an equally 
uncompromising nationalistic position. According to him institutions like the 
CCJ would weaken Jamaican sovereignty. He contends that, “We in the JLP do 
not wish to pursue this course and it is for this reason that we differ…by this 
position we mean no disrespect to our Caribbean sister states with whom we have 
had a strong record of cooperation at many levels for 30 years.  It is not that by 
our stand we love them less, but we love Jamaica more.”
22  
Delroy Chuck, another JLP spokesperson supports Seaga’s position by 
situating what he sees as Jamaica’s domestic commitments in direct conflict with 
regional integration and hinted that the JLP was serious about the matter. 
According to him, “If we mean Jamaica well, then the priority would be to look 
after the Jamaican citizen, especially the unemployed, yet, is that being done?
23 
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Any attempt to remove the Privy Council, without putting in place a Caribbean 
Court of Justice in accordance with proper procedure will be resisted and it will 
be “bangarang inside and outside of this Parliament.”
24 
When the JLP’s call for a referendum to decide the matter was rejected by 
the ruling PNP which then used its legislative majority to pass the CCJ 
legislation, the JLP in alliance with the Jamaica Human Rights organization took 
legal action. The argument before the courts was that issues such as the changing 
of the final court of appeals should be decided by either a two-thirds majority in 
parliament or a referendum and not a simple majority vote by the government 
side. While the Jamaican courts ruled in favor of the government, the Privy 
Council found that the manner in which the laws were passed did not comply 
with constitutional requirements and was thus unconstitutional. This ruling has 
had implications for other CARICOM countries which belong to the Privy 
Council and one can argue with much justification that it was the chief reason 
that the CCJ was launched in its abbreviated form.  
As a result of the Privy Council’s ruling the JLP and PNP eventually agreed 
to enact legislation to facilitate the CCJ as a court of first resort or trade court 
only.  However, this agreement was hammered out in bilateral negotiations 
between the two parties outside of the formal constitutional structures.  This 
development only occurred after there was a change of leadership in the 
opposition party.  When the parliamentary debate over the bill eventually started 
the government allegedly used its majority status to circumvent parliamentary 
procedure leading to opposition protests and a walkout from parliament.
25 
Although the Prime Minister eventually gave in to the opposition demands for 
parliamentary transparency, the bitter struggle between the two parties over this 
issue would have done irreparable damage to the cause of integration in the eyes 
of Jamaicans. 
 
The Trinidad Scenario 
 
In Trinidad where the CCJ is headquartered, the opposition party, the opposition 
United National Congress (UNC) which championed regional integration while 
in office initially, tied its support for the CCJ to the government’s agreement to 
constitutional reform. After an electoral tie that saw the President favoring the 
rival People’s National Movement (PNM) to run the government, the UNC had 
been clamoring for constitutional reform.  Since the ruling PNM has ignored this 
when the issue of the CCJ arose and the government needed opposition support 
to pass legislation in this regard, the UNC seized the opportunity to hold the 
government at ransom and in the process held regional integration hostage. Here 
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once again what is paramount for both parties is not the realization of a regional 
institution but their partisan political survival. 
Speaking as Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago at the Twelfth Inter-
Sessional Meeting of CARICOM Heads in February 2001 UNC leader, Basdeo 
Panday, was emphatic about his party’s support for the CCJ:   
 
Let me assure the Conference of the Government of Trinidad and Tobago's 
continuing commitment to and support for the establishment of the Caribbean Court of 
Justice. Indeed, the temporary Headquarters of Port-of-Spain for the Court will be ready 
for occupancy by the end of April 2001.
26  
 
But following the UNC’s electoral defeat, it adapted a similar position to that 
of the JLP. In an about turn Panday asserted, “Our position remains unchanged.  
We believe that there is need for fundamental constitutional reform in Trinidad 
and Tobago before we could move on to anything else and unless we have that 
we do not intend to support the move for the setting up of the Caribbean Court. 
Without constitutional reform the court could be very dangerous [and] with a 
Government like the PNM in office and in power one has to be extremely careful 
in setting up that court.
27  
Since unlike Jamaica, Trinidad required a two-thirds majority to pass the 
CCJ legislation, the government had to withdraw the bill. Although Prime 
Minister Patrick Manning pleaded that the matter “should be above the cut and 
thrust of politics” and had “nothing to do with the PNM or UNC” and although 
CARICOM tried to mediate, the UNC was unmoved. Like the PNP which did not 
budge on the JLP’s referendum call, the PNM remained equally unmoved on the 
UNC’s call for constitutional reform in Trinidad.  
When the vote was taken on the bill to enact the CCJ as a court of first resort, 
which required a simple parliamentary majority, the UNC MPs abstained. One 
opposition MP called the CCJ a “Trojan Horse” that will be a “Caribbean Court 
of Injustice.”
28  She predicted that it will lead to a destruction of democracy and 
an erosion of Trinidad and Tobago’s independence and sovereignty.
29 The UNC 
has contended that there should have been a two-thirds vote even to enact the 
CCJ in its original jurisdiction and has threatened to take legal action.
30 
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Conclusions 
 
The refusal of ruling parties to hold referenda to decide on regional institutions 
such as the CCJ and the CSME is a direct result of the nature of domestic 
politics.  Since a referendum would be treated as a national election ruling parties 
are less likely to want to go in that direction.  In any case, these ruling parties 
interpret their election victories as a source of empowerment to act on behalf of 
the nation even when such issues entail extraordinary implications, such as 
sovereignty.  On the other hand, opposition parties are more eager for a 
referendum since it allows them a medium through which they can hold the 
government accountable and possibly erode their influence and confidence. 
Sanders makes this observation in relation to the failed attempt at political unity 
among the OECS countries: 
 
It can be seen, therefore, that by not actively seeking to involve the opposition 
parties fully in the process toward a political union, the governments had wrong-rooted 
themselves.  For the parties, which never wanted union, could oppose the process on the 
basis that the governments were acting undemocratically.
31   
 
The ruling parties’ refusal then to go to the people on regional issues opens 
them to opposition charges of authoritarianism.  In the process, regional issues 
become attached to the notion of authoritarian rule.  A referendum on the CCJ in 
Jamaica, for example, will more likely than not become a referendum not on 
regional integration but on the government’s stewardship.  Hence t he CCJ 
becomes a victim of the extreme tribal competition between the two major 
Jamaican parties.   
The key issue for Caribbean governments seems not to be a loss of 
sovereignty, but a loss of power.  In fact regional integration will enhance 
sovereignty for Caribbean countries, as it would provide more leverage for the 
individual and collective defense of Caribbean sovereignty which given the neo-
colonial grip of the developed countries on the region has never been fully 
established. What leaders fear is the curtailment of their power since in a regional 
political economy their ability to dictate and influence their domestic economies 
and dispense favors would likely be reduced.  Similarly the power to influence 
the composition of the courts and the outcomes of their deliberations would not 
be easily transferred in their dealings with a regional court as it will take 
unanimous approval of the Heads of Government to amend the treaty. 
The Westminster majoritarian model, which assumes a spirit of consensus 
within the letter of majority rule, has proven disastrous for Caribbean societies. 
Although there were moments of unity during the decolonization process, they 
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have never developed any sustained consensus ethos. In the final analysis, apart 
from the external problem, the most worrying problem of Caribbean 
regionalization lies in the non-resolution of the problem of governance and 
decision making within member states. That is what is being played out in 
Jamaica and Trinidad; the CSME and CCJ are not the cause of the problem, but 
merely the occasion for a dramatization of it. As Hinds argues: 
 
While regional unity is welcomed, it will falter if it is not premised on democratic 
practices both at the center and inside of its sub-units or individual countries. In this 
regard Trinidad and Tobago’s opposition UNC position of tying agreement to the CCJ to 
constitutional reform in that country should not be taken lightly. Similarly Jamaica's 
opposition JLP’s call for a referendum on the CCJ should not be ignored. These two 
developments point to the necessary relationship between governance in the individual 
countries and governance at the regional level. There is no doubt that regional 
governance has to be premised on shared democratic governance or consensus among the 
member countries. Already governance at the level of the Heads of Governments is based 
on consensus democracy. This consensus model is, however, at variance with the 
majoritarian model used in the member countries. Hence part of the reason for the tension 
in Trinidad and Jamaica. The views and role of the opposition in the member countries 
cannot and must not be ignored. If governments continue to endorse CARICOM 
agreements by using the "part-democratic" majoritarian principle, then CARICOM itself 
will be plagued by the instability that arises from majoritarianism.
32  
 
This disjoint between the decision making process within member countries 
and the necessities of the regional movement is, therefore, a matter of urgent 
concern. The implication of domestic conflicts for the regional movement is not 
confined to the pace of implementation of decisions; there is also the strong 
possibility that change of governments could lead to countries reversing 
decisions of their predecessors. The Jamaica case reeks of this. Imagine the 
negative impact on CARICOM if the JLP, which has vehemently opposed both 
the CSME and the CCJ, comes to power and pulls Jamaica out of these 
institutions. Unlike Europe, CARICOM cannot afford the absence of some of its 
members from the CSME. Dr Eric Williams' mathematical logic of “one from ten 
leaves nothing” still holds true to a large extent. Edward Seaga’s warning that if 
the JLP came to power it would repeal any law establishing the CCJ in Jamaica is 
instructive.
33 Although new leader, Bruce Golding, has had a less confrontational 
tone, he has not wavered from the party line.
34 
While one may, with some justification, dismiss the JLP and the UNC as 
obstructionists and anti-CARICOM, the matter is much more profound. The 
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Caribbean is trying to build a regional movement based on consensus but the 
individual countries are wedded to a majoritarianism that has served to 
perpetuate differences and disharmony rather than similarities and harmony. 
These differences are direct and indirect legacies of colonization but they have 
been taken to higher heights since independence. For CARICOM to advance with 
any purpose this problem has to be solved both from within the states themselves 
and from without. Of course the leaders can proceed with integration by 
circumventing this issue--some would argue that they have no choice given the 
global imperatives--, but the process will be persistently handcuffed by the 
democratic contradictions within member states.  
While the CCJ has highlighted the problem of regionalism in the Caribbean 
more than others, there are other concerns. For example, in the case of Guyana, 
where race is the central factor in domestic politics, the situation is even more 
complex.  The then Indian PPP government in 1958 refused to take Guyana into 
the Federation.  The PPP leader, Cheddi Jagan, cited as the main reason the East 
Indian fear of losing the majority status it enjoyed in Guyana.
35 The present PPP 
government, although an active participant in CARICOM, is known to favor a 
Guyana-Trinidad-Suriname union that would preserve the Indian majority.  That 
the CARICOM Secretariat is located in Guyana means that these developments 
have serious repercussions for regional integration.  Further, Guyana’s persistent 
political instability resulting from its racial problems, which has attracted 
regional intervention in the past, must by necessity be of concern for the regional 
movement. In fact, CARICOM’s intervention in Guyana, Trinidad and St. 
Vincent to mediate domestic problems is a clear signal of the relationship 
between internal instability and regional viability. 
Another contentious issue has been the institution of free movement of some 
categories of labor within the region.  In St. Kitts a Guyanese national had his 
work permit withheld on the grounds that his job was not properly advertised. 
This government action occurred shortly after a general election in which the 
opposition raised the issue of St. Kitts commitment to regional integration at the 
expense of the country’s interest.  A few years earlier two journalists were 
similarly denied work permits in Antigua and Trinidad because they were critical 
of the then government.  
A consensus form of democratic governance will go a long way towards 
reducing adversarial politics, which in turn will reduce the possibility of 
regionalization being held at ransom. Regional consensus will always be 
vulnerable in the face of a lack of domestic consensus. Surely decisions on 
important matters such as committing sovereign countries to shared institutions 
should n ot be left to the discretion of a bare majority of the people's 
representatives. Both the Jamaican and Trinidadian governments should find a 
framework for consensus within their countries on the CCJ and CSME before 
                                                 
35 Cheddi Jagan, The West on Trial (Seven Seas Press: Frankfurt: East Germany, 1972). Internal Political Tribalism  199 
 
proceeding with it. If prime ministers Patterson and Manning cannot find unity at 
home, how can they be serious about unity with others? Sanders is clear that the 
role of the opposition in regional unity is most important. To quote him: 
 
If the people of these territories were to be persuaded to subsume their nationalist 
feeling for greater benefit under a political union, it would require all their political 
leaders to convince them; no one faction could do it alone…But the alienation of the 
opposition parties could not practically serve the purposes of any government which was 
serious about political union.  For the constitutions of all the OECS territories demand an 
affirmative vote of two-third of the members of some parliaments and three-quarters in 
others before a referendum can be held on any alternation to an entrenched clause of the 
constitution. Therefore, before the people of each state could be asked to vote in a 
referendum to alter the constitution allowing for political union, members of the 
opposition parties would have had to support such a motion in parliament…. It is highly 
unlikely that any government would have been able to secure two-thirds of the votes 
without the support of opposition parties.
36   
   
Newly elected Prime Minister of Antigua, Baldwin Spencer, has called for 
involvement of the opposition in CARICOM. According to Spencer:  
 
Very regrettably a “No Admittance to Opposition Politicians” sign continues to hang 
over the door of the councils of CARICOM… it is a pity that CARICOM has not yet 
sought to make itself a pasture in which the Region’s lambs and lions could lie down 
together. Think of how wonderful that would be!
37 
 
Although there is an Assembly of Caribbean Community Parliamentarians 
(AACP) that includes opposition parliamentarians, this does not address the 
problem of the opposition’s role in the regional project. Ultimately decisions both 
at the national and regional levels are made in the executive. So if the opposition 
is to play any meaningful role, it has to be within this branch of the regional 
body. I would propose that rather than having an opposition delegation at CARI-
COM meetings, each country should have a joint delegation that include gov-
ernment representatives and representatives from the parliamentary opposition 
and where necessary members of Civil Society. It would make no sense for gov-
ernments and their opposition to be sparring at a CARICOM meeting; that spar-
ring within a consensus framework and a spirit of shared interests should take 
place before they go to the meeting.  
Finally regional unity will falter if it is not premised on democratic practices 
both at the center and inside of its sub-units or individual countries. Regional 
governance has to be premised on shared democratic governance or consensus 
                                                 
36 Sanders, 2005, 116-117. 
37 CARICOM Secretariat, “Opening Address  by the Honorable Balwin Spenser, Prime 
Minister of Antigua and Barbuda and Outgoing Chairman of the Caribbean Community at the 
Twenty-fifth Meeting of the Conference of Heads of Government, St. George’s, Grenada, July 4, 
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among the member countries. Already governance at the level of the Heads of 
Governments is based on consensus democracy. This consensus model is, 
however, at variance with the majoritarian model used in the member countries. 
Hence part of the reason for the tension in Trinidad and Jamaica. The views and 
role of the opposition in the member countries cannot and must not be ignored. If 
governments continue to endorse CARICOM agreements by using the "part-
democratic" majoritarian principle, then CARICOM itself will be plagued by the 
instability that arises from majoritarianism. In this regard, Sanders is not 
incorrect when based on the OECS’ experience he warns: 
 
It also meant that political parties in those states would have to overcome their 
intense aversion to talking with each other.  They would have had to learn that integral to 
operating the Westminster [style] of government, is that, on important issues of national 
concerns, political leaders of all sides of the house must hold dialogue as representatives 
of the people to whom they are accountable.  If they failed to do so as they did, national 
consensus, which is an absolute prerequisite for altering their constitution and proceeding 
to a political union would never be achieved.
38   
 
It follows, therefore, that forms of shared democratic governance have to be 
worked out within the member countries if regional unity is to be effective. For 
example, there is a contradiction between Prime Minister Manning's fierce 
advocacy of closer regional political unity and his dismal failure to advocate and 
work f or a similar unity with the opposition in Trinidad. There is also the 
democratic contradiction of the regional heads making decisions on super 
government when they represent just over half of their populations. One way to 
begin to address this problem is f or the member countries to move in the 
direction of power sharing based on shared democratic governance to 
compliment the evolving power sharing at the regional level.  
                                                 
38 Sanders, 2005, 118.  
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A Governance Approach 
 
 
 
Aimee Kanner 
 
Introduction 
 
Since the Spanish colonization of most of Latin America in the sixteenth century, 
including the European mining center in the Andean highlands and Spain’s 
second viceroyalty in the Americas established in  Peru in 1544, historical, 
economic, and cultural ties have been developing between Europe and the Andes. 
Relations between the two regions have been reinforced through processes of 
immigration, from Europe to the Andes and currently a reverse trend is being 
experienced from most Andean countries to Europe; increased European 
investments in the Andes, especially after the end of the Cold War; and the 
institutionalization of relations between the European Union (EU) and the 
Andean Community. 
The Andean region was the first in Latin America with which the European 
Community signed a cooperation agreement in 1983.  This was followed by a 
regional framework agreement for cooperation in 1993, the 1996 Declaration of 
Rome which established a formal political dialogue between the European Union 
and the Andean Community, the institutionalization of a high-level dialogue on 
drugs between the EU and the Andean Community, and the first civil society 
forum on EU-Andean Community relations in March 2005. Really deepening 
relations between the two regions and beginning negotiations for the association 
agreement agreed to as a “strategic common objective of the parties” at the third 
EU-Latin America-Caribbean Summit of Heads of State and Government
1 in 
Guadalajara in May 2004, is still in its infancy stage. Given the delays and 
difficulties experienced in negotiating an association agreement between the EU 
and MERCOSUR,
2 and the apparent commitment between the EU and the 
                                                 
1 Since 1999, Summits of the Heads of State and Government of the EU, Latin American and 
Caribbean countries have been convened every few years to strengthen and provide direction to the 
bi-regional relations. The first summit was in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil on 28-29 June 1999, the second 
in Madrid, Spain on 17-18 May 2002, and the third in Guadalajara, Mexico on 28 May 2004. 
2 The Southern Cone Common Market, commonly referred to as MERCOSUR, is a regional 
organization created through the 1991 Treaty of Asunción.  Its members are Argentina, Brazil, 
Paraguay, and Uruguay, and its two associate members are Bolivia and Chile.  The objective of 
signing an interregional association agreement between the EU and MERCOSUR was included in 204  Kanner 
 
Andean Community to successfully and efficiently complete their negotiations 
for an association agreement as reiterated in the 8
th meeting of the EU-Andean 
Community Joint Committee on 21 January 2005, investigation into potential 
problems and prospects will place the regions in a much better position to design 
a solid framework for increased cooperation and deeper interregional relations. 
This paper argues that the potential problems associated with deepening EU-
Andean Community relations are fundamentally related to issues of governance.  
It further posits that there are three interrelated levels of governance: domestic, 
regional and global, and relations between regions are constrained when there is 
difficulty in achieving good governance at any one of the interrelated levels.  
Constraints may be compounded when there is difficulty at more than one of the 
levels and may be alleviated when efforts towards good governance at one of the 
levels is designed to positively affect governance at another level.  The three 
levels to be addressed in this paper are domestic governance in each one of the 
Andean Community countries, European (or regional) governance, and the EU’s 
role in global governance.   
This paper is elaborated in the next section with a review of the literature on 
governance.  In the subsequent two sections, I consider the crisis in the Andes 
and the Andean Community and then the EU’s external relations, both in the 
context of governance.  Following is a consideration of EU-Andean Community 
relations from the perspective of interrelated levels of governance.  Finally, I 
discuss the outlook and prospects for the future of the EU-Andean Community 
relations.   
 
Governance 
 
Governance is often referred to in the global context and as a response to the 
need to govern globalization in the absence of a world government, however, 
domestic and regional governance are important in and of themselves, as well as 
in conjunction with global governance.  In terms of regional governance, a 
multilevel governance approach has emerged as an alternative to state-centric 
theories in analyzing the decision-making processes in the EU.  In this view, 
“European integration is a policy-creating process in which authority and policy 
making influence are shared across multiple levels of government – subnational, 
national, and supranational.”
3  This approach, however, does not specifically 
consider the affects of domestic governance on European governance, 
                                                                                                                         
the EU-MERCOSUR Interregional Framework Cooperation Agreement of 1995, and negotiations 
are currently stalled. 
3 Hooghe and Marks, 2001, quoted in Nelsen and Stubb, 2003: 283. Nelsen, Brent F. and 
Alexander Stubb eds. The European Union: Readings on the Theory and Practice of European 
Integration  (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2003); Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks,  Multi-Level 
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governance with regard to the EU’s external relations, or the EU’s role in global 
governance.   
Governance does not negate the primary role of state governments in 
policymaking and decision-making at any level of governance, however, it does 
recognize the influential role of additional agents in these processes such as 
corporations (domestic and transnational), non-governmental organizations, and 
civil society groups, to name but a few.  Governance also considers formal and 
informal networks of state and non-state agents that affect the policymaking and 
decision-making processes.  At the most basic level, governance is “the processes 
and institutions, both formal and informal, that guide and restrain the collective 
activities of a group.”
4 
Given the complexities of the EU and the need to improve its standing with 
the European citizens, one of the four strategic objectives of the European 
Commission in 2000 was to reform European governance.  In the Commission’s 
2001 White Paper on European Governance, European governance is defined as 
“the rules, processes and behavior that affect the way in which powers are 
exercised at the European level.”
5 The White Paper also identifies five principles 
of good governance that the EU works toward achieving, promotes in countries 
with which it has institutionalized relations and agreements, and attempts to 
embrace in its relations with third countries and the leadership role it is trying to 
develop in global governance.
6  These five principles of good governance are 
openness, participation, accountability, effectiveness, and coherence. Openness 
involves active communication in understandable language between the EU and 
its citizens.  Participation refers to the involvement of all those with an interest in 
the deliberations of a policy from its conception to its implementation, including 
but not limited to local and regional governments, grassroots organizations, and 
civil society organizations.  Accountability is the distinction in roles and 
responsibilities of the EU and member state institutions.  Timeliness, clear 
objectives, and evaluations are all elements of the principle of effectiveness.  And 
cohesion is avoiding contradiction in objectives and elements of policy despite 
the challenges the EU faces in dealing with an increased number of policies, 
interests, and agents.
7 Although the EU has recognized the benefit of good 
governance in obtaining many of i ts objectives, this goal remains a work in 
progress.   
                                                 
4 Robert Keohane  and Joseph S. Nye, “Introduction,” in Governance in a Globalizing World, 
eds. Joseph S. Nye and John D. Donahue  (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), 
12. 
5 Commission of the European Communities, European Governance: A White Paper.  (2001): 
8  http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/com/cnc/2001/com2001_0428en01.pdf   
6 Ibid, 27. 
7 Idem.    206  Kanner 
 
As technology develops and brings peoples from all parts of the world closer 
together  – since an outbreak of the bird flu in one remote town in Asia or 
political instability in a newly independent country has known repercussions in 
the largest urban agglomerations in the world  – there has been increased 
academic attention to how these interconnected societies are, can, and should be 
governed.  Held and McGrew suggest in conjunction with Rosenau: 
 
Given  the absence of a world government, the concept of global governance 
provides a language for describing the nexus of systems of rule-making, political 
coordination and problem-solving which transcend states and societies (Rosenau, 2000a, 
2000b).  It is particularly relevant to describing the structures and processes of governing 
beyond the state where there exists no supreme or singular political authority. . . As an 
analytical approach, global governance rejects the conventional state-centric conception 
of world politics and world order.  The principal unit of analysis is taken to be global, 
regional or transnational systems of authoritative rule-making and implementation.
8  
 
From a more normative perspective, Keohane asserts that “governance 
should enhance  the capability sets of the people being governed, leading to 
enhancements in their personal security, freedom to make choices, and welfare as 
measured by such indices as the UN Human Development Index.”
9 He further 
argues that “global inequality leads to differences in capabilities that are so great 
as to be morally indefensible and to which concerted international action is an 
appropriate response.”
10 The EU is determined to play a legitimate leadership 
role in this global governance. 
 
Crisis in the Andes and the Andean Community 
 
The complex and continuing problems afflicting the Andean countries are, to put 
it mildly, discouraging. Political instability has been the norm for at least the past 
five years, plagued by corrupt leadership,
11 questionable elections,
12 insurmount-
                                                 
8 David Held and Anthony McGrew,  “Introduction,” in Governing Globalization: Power, 
Authority and Global Governance,   eds. David Held and Anthony McGrew (United Kingdom, 
Polity Press, 2002), 8-9; James Rosenau, “Change, Complexity, and Governance in Globalizing 
Space,” in  Debating Governance: Authority, Steering, and Democracy,   ed. J. Pierre (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2000a); James Rosenau, “Governance in a Globalizing World,” in The 
Global Transformations Reader, eds. David Held and Anthony McGrew (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
2000b). 
9 Robert Keohane, “Governance in a Partially Globalized World,” in  Governing 
Globalization: Power, Authority and Global Governance, eds. David Held and Anthony McGrew 
(United Kingdom, Polity Press. 2002), 327.    
10 Ibid, 328.   
11 Former President Alberto Fujimori of Peru, his former intelligence chief, Vladimiro 
Montesinos, and numerous high-level government officials were all involved in a web of corruption 
that remains under investigation. European Union and the Andean Community  207 
 
able ideological and practical divisions,
13 and above all, the persistence of weak 
institutions. While overall economic growth and development has improved in 
some countries, economic and social inequalities have worsened, forcing more 
and more into the throes of absolute poverty
14 and social exclusion. Furthermore, 
insecurity in the Andes is not contained within national borders and is jeopardiz-
ing regional stability. Despite years of intentions, at times supported economi-
cally, politically, and/or militarily from external sources, drug trafficking, money 
laundering, violent guerrilla movements, and the resulting property destruction, 
kidnappings and the deaths of innocent people remain commonplace in the An-
des. 
The diagnoses have been many, including but not limited to cultural, struc-
tural, systemic
15 and the prescription has remained very much based on the struc-
tural reforms
16 required by the international financial institutions in Washington, 
D.C., and at least a theoretical commitment to democracy and human rights.
17 
The fundamental problem, however, is one of governance and remedies must be 
designed based on the illness itself, not its symptoms. If there were better gov-
ernance in the individual countries of the Andean Community, based on open-
ness, participation, accountability, effectiveness, and cohesion; if the people were 
well-informed about specific policies; if all interested groups could take part in 
the deliberative policymaking processes; if institutions and their representatives 
were held accountable for their actions; if policies were clear, timely, and based 
on evaluations; if there were cohesion among the policies, would the prognosis 
                                                                                                                         
12 The opposition’s accusations of fraud undermined the victorious results of Venezuela’s 
President Hugo Chavez in the 15 August 2004 presidential recall referendum. 
13 Colombia has experienced more than forty years of internal conflict, during which 
ideologically-driven irregular armed groups in the form of guerrilla movements and paramilitaries 
(not to mention the drug traffickers) have regularly resorted to violence as a means of action in 
support of their ideological beliefs.  Since the late 1990s, the divisions between the supporters of 
Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez and the opposition have become so deep they have resulted in 
economically paralyzing strikes in the petroleum industry, attempted coups, and deadly protests. 
14 In 2003, the percentage of the population living below the nationally-defined poverty level 
was higher than 40 per cent in Ecuador and Venezuela, higher than 50 per cent in Peru, and higher 
than 60 per cent in Bolivia and Colombia. Council on Foreign Relations.  Andes 2020: A New 
Strategy for the Challenges of Colombia and the Region  (2004): 122  http://www.cfr.org/pdf/ 
Andes2020.pdf 
15 John Peeler, Building Democracy in Latin America (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2004), 25-26. 
16 Ibid, 145-150. 
17 On 11 September 2001, the member states of the Organization of American States (OAS) 
adopted the Inter-American Democratic Charter which establishes a definition of the minimum 
required elements for democracy, and guidelines to follow in cases when democracy comes under 
threat.  The OAS also provides options to citizens of the member states who believe their human 
rights have been violated through the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights. 208  Kanner 
 
for resolving the region’s problems not improve? With established good govern-
ance on the domestic level, shifts in government leadership would not threaten 
entire political systems nor create such violent opposition, because the ability to 
destroy formal and informal state and non-state institutionalized networks is con-
siderably difficult and not very prudent, as the end result is more likely to be a 
change in the leader rather than a change in the system.  
The idea of some form of integration in Latin America has existed since 
Simón Bolívar began his liberation campaign in the early 1800s.  The  first 
experiment of such a nature in the Westphalian era,  Gran Colombia, was 
implemented by Bolívar himself, and although short-lived, represented the first 
system of integration in the Americas.  In the 1960s new processes of integration 
were initiated both on a continental and sub-regional scale.  During this decade, 
the Latin American Free Trade Association (later to become the Latin American 
Integration Association), the Central American Common Market, and the Andean 
Pact (later to become the Andean Community) came into being.  During the 
1990s, with the impetus of the creation of the Single European Act in Europe 
followed by the fall of the Berlin Wall, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the 
end of the Cold War, and the creation of the North American  Free Trade 
Agreement, an increased focus on and interest in regional integration in the 
Americas became a reality.   
The Andean Community, successor to the Andean Pact created through the 
Cartagena Agreement of 1969, is a free trade area and customs union. The 
current member states of the Andean Community are Bolivia, Colombia, 
Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela.  The Andean Integration System is a network of 
institutions, including a Commission, Parliament, Council of Foreign Ministers, 
and Court of Justice (among others) (General Secretariat Andean Community) 
that provides the administrative and organizational basis for all aspects of the 
objectives and work of the Andean Community. 
One of the main objectives of the Andean Community is to reduce barriers to 
trade amongst the member states as a means of promoting economic liberaliza-
tion and growth in the region. This process has been relatively successful as be-
tween 1990 and 1997, intra-Andean Community trade more than quadrupled.
18 
As with many other regional integration schemes around the world, including the 
one that is consistently referred to as the most developed, the European Union, 
economic integration and the institutionalization of economic exchanges between 
the member states has been accomplished more efficiently than integration in 
other sectors. 
Over time, the integration process has provided for other areas in which the 
members of the Andean Community have decided to cooperate: border 
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development, social issues, sustainable development, foreign policy, and 
security.  On June 17, 2002, representatives of the governments of the members 
of the Andean Community signed the Andean Charter for Peace and Security.  In 
March 2003, an Observer Group on Combating Drugs and Terrorism was 
created, consisting of the Foreign and Defense Ministers of Bolivia, Brazil, 
Colombia, Ecuador, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela.
19  The members of this Group 
will basically receive periodic reports on the illicit trafficking of arms, control of 
illicit finances, border controls, intelligence cooperation, combating drugs, and 
legislative developments.
20 
Despite what appear to be good-faith intentions with regard to deepening 
integration in additional issue areas in the Andean Community, and even in the 
economic sector, tangible results have not been as evident.  Declarations and 
theoretical commitments have surpassed actions, in large part because the 
integration process has not become institutionalized.  There is a tendency for 
national governments of the Andean Community member states, when under 
pressure or in the name of protecting their own national security interests to 
adopt and implement policies with little regard for their Andean partners even on 
issues encompassed by the framework of Andean integration.
21  
In order for a system of cooperation to obtain optimal results, institutions 
need to be created to monitor and share data, build trust, solve problems and 
negotiate in an otherwise unorganized region.  These institutions should provide 
information, increase interactions, monitor conformity, define cheating, facilitate 
linkages between various topics, and offer solutions.
22 In a region burdened by 
political crises such as the current situations in Bolivia and Venezuela, where 
national elections take place in different member states at different times with the 
possibilities of leaders that have different perspectives on integration coming to 
power, where external events such as the terrorist attacks on the United States 
and subsequent policies can have a long lasting impact on seemingly uninvolved 
actors, the institutionalization of integration has an essential role to play: it 
provides a constant that creates more certainties.  The process of integration 
                                                 
19 Due to geographic and spillover concerns, Brazil and Panama are often included in such 
activities, and the European Union also recognizes the need to include these countries when 
discussing such regional issues. 
20 Carlos Malamud, “El conflicto colombiano y las amenazas a la seguridad regional,” Analisis 
del Real Instituto Elcano.  (Madrid: Real Instituto Elcano, 2003): 5.  http://www.real 
institutoelcano.org/analisis/imprimir/304imp.asp 
21 International Crisis Group, “Increasing Europe’s Stake in the Andes,” Latin America 
Briefing, (Quito/Brussels, 2004): 10. 
22 Robert O.  Keohane, “The Demand for International Regimes,” International Organization 
(1982): 36. See also Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World 
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depends on the institutionalization of relations in all sectors of the integration in 
order for projects to continue despite eventualities.
23 
In terms of governance, institutions are important in that they provide a 
formal base upon which good governance can be developed.  As mentioned, 
although the state and its institutions are not the only actors involved in decision-
making and policymaking when assuming a governance perspective, they are still 
considered to be the main actors.  The same holds true for regional governance 
except that the regional level (and others according to the multilevel approach) 
may also play a dominant role.  In order for the regional level to be effective in 
terms of governance strong institutions provide the backbone for this 
development. 
   
The European Union’s External Relations 
 
The European Union maintains an intricate network of foreign affairs with third 
countries, groups of countries, and other international organizations. The EU’s 
external relations take on many different forms including development, enlarge-
ment, the European Neighborhood Policy, external assistance, external trade, for-
eign policy, and humanitarian aid. The EU and its member states together con-
tribute more to development assistance than any other individual country or or-
ganization in the world, representing approximately half of the total yearly inter-
national disbursements in this area.   
The European Commission’s External Service has 120 offices and 
delegations throughout the world that control and monitor the EU’s external 
policies and programs and serve as a liaison between the EU a nd foreign 
governments.  Additionally, the EU holds institutionalized high-level meetings 
with several individual countries such as the United States and Russia.  It also 
operates on a multilateral basis with groups of countries – Latin America and 
Caribbean countries, for example in the form of summits of heads of state and 
government.  
Since the EU is more integrated in economic competences, its external 
relations have traditionally focused on trade, aid, and other international financial 
transactions with third countries.  With the advent of the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy, the EU has now expanded its third country relations into the 
political arena, especially in terms of promoting peace and stability and 
cooperatively addressing cross-border concerns.  As the EU’s foreign-related 
political decision and policymaking is essentially intergovernmental, this aspect 
                                                 
23 Institutionalization in terms of regional integration adapted from a previous chapter and 
paper. Aimee Kanner, “European Union-Mercosur Relations: The Institutionalization of 
Cooperation” (Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series 1, no. 8, 2002); Aimee Kanner, “La 
institucionalidad del MERCOSUR” in Retos e interrelaciones de la integración regional: Europa y 
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of its foreign affairs remains in a developmental, yet progressing, stage.  The EU 
has been successful in requiring all of its trade and cooperation agreements to 
include a human rights clause, effectively combining elements of both political 
and economic policies in its conduct of foreign affairs. 
The nature and possible units of analysis of global governance have resulted 
in several studies regarding the role of the EU in global governance, many of 
which recommend a continuation of this research agenda from an 
interdisciplinary perspective.  Rumford and Murray claim that “the integrative 
dynamics of globalization are also deemed to have another dimension: presenting 
a range of new opportunities for the EU to assume a leading role in global 
governance.”
24 The questions remain as to the means and legitimacy of the EU in 
developing this leadership role, as well as whether it can ensure this global 
governance is indeed good global governance, an objective that has been 
established by the EU itself. 
There appears to be a general consensus forming around the idea that in order 
for the European Union to develop a role as a leader in global governance, and in 
order for the EU to achieve good global governance, it must be considered as a 
legitimate actor in assuming this responsibility.  Keohane argues from a liberal-
democratic perspective that: “Voluntary cooperation based on honest 
communication and rational persuasion provides the strongest guarantee of a 
legitimate process… For global governance to be legitimate, global institutions 
must facilitate persuasion rather than coercion or reliance on sanctions as a 
means of influence.”
25 The EU recognizes that much work is yet to be done in 
order to achieve a substantial degree of legitimacy in this respect, and therefore, 
committees, papers, etc. have been created in order to determine where the 
weaknesses are and what the EU can do to strengthen those areas.  The Working 
Group on “Strengthening Europe’s Contribution to World Governance” 
submitted a contributing report to the EU’s White Paper on Governance in which 
they “favor the inclusion in our deliberative processes (though not decision-
making) of third country players, governmental or not, with an interest in EU 
decisions.  Such consultative inputs are crucial to the quality and legitimacy of 
EU policy.”
26 As the EU continues to build its global network of politically 
institutionalized relations, providing an arena in which there can be a peaceful 
                                                 
24 Chris Rumford and Philomena Murray, “Globalization in a Globalizing World,” in The 
Global Transformations Reader, eds. David Held and Anthony McGrew, Cambridge: Polity Press, 
2003), 88.  
25 Robert Keohane, “Governance in a Partially Globalized World (Presidential Address, 
American Political Science Association, 2000) The American Political Science Review 95, no. 1 
(2001): 9. 
26 Working Group N° 5, “Strengthening Europe’s Contribution to World Governance,” White 
Paper on Governance: An EU Contribution to Better Governance Beyond Our Borders. (Working 
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exchange of ideas and concerns as well as a possible convergence of interests, the 
prospects for the EU’s role in global governance improves.   
 
Interrelated Levels of Governance: 
European Union-Andean Community Relations 
 
While European-Andean relations have been developing for centuries, European 
Community-Andean Pact relations began in the 1970s.  The first few decades of 
these relations, until the middle of the 1990s, were predominantly economic in 
nature.  After the members of the Andean Pact made a conscious and political 
effort to deepen integration, and the Andean Pact was reorganized into the 
Andean Community, relations between the EU and the Andean Community also 
assumed new meaning and dimension.  
After nearly a decade of institutionalized relations in this context, consisting 
of a high-level political dialogue established through the 30 June 1996 
Declaration of Rome; a high-level specialized dialogue on drugs which began in 
1995 and since included the principle of “shared responsibility” agreed to in the 
1995 Cochabamba Declaration; financial, technical and economic cooperation; 
most favored nation status and inclusion in the EU’s Generalized System of 
Preferences for the Andean countries; and  development aid, the EU and Andean 
Community decided to work towards negotiating a 4
th generation association 
agreement, such as the EU already has with Mexico and Chile, respectively, and 
is in the process of negotiating with MERCOSUR. On 21 January 2005, the 
European Commission and the Andean Community launched a joint assessment 
of regional economic integration in the Andean Community, an intermediate 
stage prior to the beginning of negotiations for the association agreement, agreed 
to during the May 2004 Guadalajara Summit. 
Deepening relations between the EU and the Andean Community depends on 
good governance.  There is an obvious and urgent need to strengthen governance 
on the domestic level in each one of the Andean countries.  It is even more 
evident that in order to start to move in this more positive direction, international 
support and encouragement is necessary.  Merilee S. Grindle contends that “the 
burden of finding ways to increase the capacity of developing countries to benefit 
from globalization does not fall only on the shoulders of developing countries 
and their public leadership.  Certainly the academic community must be part of 
such efforts.”
27 I certainly agree with this statement and recognize its value but 
would further argue that the developed countries must also be part of such efforts, 
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not only because they have the moral imperative to do as argued by Keohane,
28 
but because positive results would be mutually beneficial. 
The EU has begun to include the topic of good governance in its high-level 
political dialogue and cooperation with the Andean Community; however, it has 
received rather low levels of attention given the apparent importance of this issue 
to the EU.  For example, good governance is mentioned only once in both the 
EU’s Regional Strategy Paper for the Andean Community
29 and the EU’s 
Regional Indicative Programme, 2004-2006, for the Andean Community.
30 In the 
EU-Andean Community Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement, good 
governance is mentioned a total of seven times: 
 
•  Recalling their commitment to the principles of the rule of law and good governance 
(5) 
•  Highlighting their commitment to work together in pursuit of the objectives 
of…democratic institutions and good governance (5) 
•  The Parties reaffirm their attachment to the principles of good governance and the 
fight against corruption (8) 
•  The Parties agree that political dialogue shall cover all aspects of mutual interest and 
any other international issue.  It shall prepare the way for new initiatives for 
pursuing common goals and establishing common ground in areas such as…ways of 
strengthening democratic governance (10) 
•  The Parties agree that the cooperation shall focus on the objective of promotion of 
political and social stability through the strengthening of democratic governance and 
respect for human rights (12) 
•  The Parties agree that cooperation shall actively support governments and 
representatives of organized civil society through actions, in the promotion of 
human rights, the democratic process and good governance, including  the 
management of electoral processes (14) 
 
Issues and initiatives related to good governance in this agreement lack 
substance and clarity.  Where the EU has made significant progress is in the area 
of civil society participation, and the first Civil Society Forum on EU-Andean 
Community Relations held in March 2005 is indicative of positive movement in 
this direction.  In order for the EU to reinforce the achievements it has made and 
improve in other areas in terms of encouraging good domestic governance in the 
individual countries of the Andean Community, two of the EU’s principles of 
good governance are highlighted: participation and effectiveness.  Additional and 
continuous participation of state and non-state actors in the deliberation of 
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policies in which they have specific interest in the final decision is key, 
particularly in light of the typically weak governmental institutions in the Andean 
countries.  Furthermore, in terms of effectiveness, the development of clear 
objectives will establish a basis f or evaluation to determine what works and 
where improvements are required. 
The importance of evaluation in policymaking and decision-making currently 
seems to be underestimated in the EU, yet its value to good governance is 
unmistakable and must become a priority. The EU donates approximately €130 
million a year in development aid to the Andean region, provides €420 million in 
financial, technical, and economic cooperation for the period 2002-2006, and 
commits what will amount to €140 million in drug-related cooperation projects. 
The objectives associated with this cooperation assistance include the reduction 
of poverty and inequalities, strengthening regional stability, and improving 
democracy and the respect for human rights.  Positive results, however, are not 
evident.  The EU has focused part of its strategy for regional stability in 
Colombia where arguably the threat to this stability is greatest.  The EU 
developed a regional program for innovative peace-building, a peace laboratory, 
in the Magdalena Medio.  Before a comprehensive evaluation of this project was 
initiated, former EU Commissioner for External Relations, Chris Patten, 
announced in January 2004, plans for additional peace laboratories. “With no 
independent evaluation yet of the first peace laboratory, some argue that the 
search for autonomy and visibility still comes at the expense of utility and 
efficiency in promoting integrated community development.”
31 An evaluation of 
this and similar projects and of the areas to which the EU development aid is 
directed is essential to determine if the aid should continue as originally planned 
or be shifted in order to meet what need to be clearly stated objectives. 
In terms of the EU’s leadership role in global governance, speaking with one 
voice, saying what it means and doing what it says will establish a stronger 
foundation for the EU to legitimately assume this responsibility.  This is 
particularly critical in the case of the EU’s relations with the Andes as there is 
evidence of inconsistencies.  “EU policy towards the Andean region not only 
lacks political uniformity but is also not always coherent.”
32 As the EU continues 
to develop partnerships rather than imposing unilateral requirements, and as the 
EU continues to depend on power rather than force to achieve its international 
objectives, the basis for its legitimacy as a leader in global governance already 
exists, and will be reinforced through the development and implementation of 
clear and common policies towards the Andean Community, as well as other 
countries and regions throughout the world. 
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Conclusion 
 
The prospects for the individual countries of the Andean Community developing 
good governance on their own are, at best, weak.  On the other hand, the EU ap-
pears to be making a conscious effort to improve good governance internally as 
well as in its external relations and in the countries and regions with which it 
maintains these institutionalized relations.  Currently, deepening Andean integra-
tion and EU-Andean relations is the most promising option for the Andean coun-
tries and the Andean Community in moving towards what will be an undoubtedly 
difficult process of developing good governance.  Demonstrating the benefits 
associated with adopting these principles is the best way to reinforce their merit 
and consolidate them. Therefore, the EU should move quickly and efficiently 
towards beginning the negotiations for a 4
th generation association agreement 
with the Andean Community. 
 
 
  
 
The Role of Networks in the European Union’s 
Foreign Policy toward Colombia 
 
 
 
Roberto Domínguez
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Introduction 
 
Based on the premises of network approaches, this paper considers that European 
Union (EU) foreign policymaking includes a variety of actors and competing 
perceptions with regard to particular themes, countries and/or regions. Taking 
Colombia as a case study, this analysis focuses on three stages of foreign 
policymaking.  The first is the nature of the external issue (i.e. country, region, 
issue) the EU has to deal with. The second is the inter-institutional perception 
and debate between the Council, Commission and Parliament. The third is the 
creation of external networks with non-governmental organizations (NGOs), 
which becomes decisive in executing cooperation policies, particularly with 
regard to humanitarian aid. 
 
Theoretical Note: Networks in the EU 
 
One of the analytical problems in the study of the EU in general and its foreign 
policy in particular is that the integration process presents different degrees of 
integration depending on the specific sector under examination.  While areas 
such as trade or monetary policy are closer to the higher stages of Balassa’s 
framework, foreign policy and justice and home affairs have remained rooted in 
the traditional logic of the Westphalian state.  Under different labels, tones and 
nuances, the essence of the dichotomy supranational versus intergovernmental 
remains at the grand theory level, whereas several middle range theories have 
emerged in order to explain more specific areas of the European Zoon Politikon, 
namely, the EU. 
In 2001, the European Commission published a White Paper on European 
Governance, in which it made the case, inter alia, for a more structured relation-
ship with civil society, namely, the creation of policy networks.  Networks are 
important for policy makers in general because they “create convergence of in-
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formation; improve compliance with international rules (enforcement); and in-
crease the scope, nature, and quality of international cooperation (harmoniza-
tion).”
1 Above all, the Commission proposed to “ open up the policy-making 
process to get more people and organizations involved in the shaping and deliv-
ering of EU policy.”
2 Thus, creating and including networks is not a matter of 
good will, but a pragmatic approach for legitimizing and delivering policies, as 
well as a means to link “Commission officials with representatives of interest 
groups and NGOs
  aiding the Commission in gauging the likely reception of fu-
ture EU policies on the ground.”
3 
There are several definitions of networks.  From a governmental perspective, 
network “is a regular pattern of regular and purposive relations among like 
government units working across the border that divide countries from one 
another and that demarcate the domestic from the international sphere.”
4 In the 
context of European integration, a definition that fits best with this particular 
process comes from the informal governance perspective, which states: “We 
consider informal governance as the operation of  networks of individual and 
collective, public and private actors pursuing common goals --which lead to 
cooperation, patterned relations and public decisions—through regular non-
codified and not publicly sanctioned exchanges in the context of the European 
Union.”
5 In a similar vein, the “term policy network connotes a ‘cluster of actors, 
each of which has an interest, or stake in a given… policy sector and the capacity 
to help determine policy success or failures.”
6 When specific issues are addressed 
by participant actors, “policy networks are arenas in which decision-makers and 
interests come together to mediate differences and search for solutions.”
7  
 
There are several types of policy networks.
8  On the one end, there are tightly 
integrated policy communities in which membership is fluid and often 
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hierarchical, external pressures have minimal impact, and actors are highly 
dependent on each other for resources.  These are often found in areas where a 
specific EU policy is well established, organized groups exist, and decision-
makers benefit from the cooperation of interests.  Examples of such policy areas 
include agriculture and research and development. At the other, there are loosely 
integrated issue networks, in which membership is fluid and non-hierarchical, the 
network is easily permeated by external influences, and actors are highly self-
reliant.  Issue networks are found where EU policy is not well developed, the 
policy debate is fluid and shifting, and organized interests have few resources to 
influence decision-makers.  This is the case of policies within the second and the 
third pillar of the European architecture.  
The literature on networks has developed the concepts of vertical and 
horizontal dimensions of networks. The first, or vertical dimension, “refers to the 
shifting levels of policy authority and influence between international, national, 
regional and even local levels of government administration. The second, or 
horizontal dimension, refers to the shifting competencies of policy actors and 
agencies arising as a consequence of new interpretations of government’s role in 
the organization and administration of public policy.”
9 This conceptualization 
privileges the regional or domestic formation of networks. How are external (to 
the European region) agents, however, included in the creation of networks in 
foreign policy making?  
From the perspective of the present paper, EU foreign policy is still to a great 
extent determined by the willingness of the member states to act as well as by the 
perceptions of the transformations in international scenarios.   In the case of 
Colombia, there are several actors that have created networks contributing to the 
peace talks and reconstruction from different angles.  In order to deliver concrete 
policies, the Council, the Commission and the Parliament portray competing 
and/or complementary visions about the situation in Colombia. By themselves, 
considering the external “issue” (Colombia) and the expectations that they will 
deliver policies, these EU institutions create an inter-institutional network. Once 
concrete policies have been decided within the EU, the participation of external 
actors such as NGOs in conflicting areas is increasingly more relevant in the 
network  policy. NGOs provide not only information about the events in the 
conflicting areas, but also complement the Commission’s policies towards 
Colombia. Based upon the practices of the Commission on Humanitarian Aid, for 
example, the creation of external networks with local actors becomes crucial for 
carrying out successful cooperation. 
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The Issue of the Network: Colombia in the European Context 
 
Latin America underwent several transformations during the 1990s.  From 
inward-looking economic models and authoritarian regimes, Latin America 
gradually moved towards free market economies and democratic systems.  
However, there is a pervasive sense of disillusionment with regard to the 
performance of governments, both in the economic or political arenas.  In this 
context, the central topic of the 2004 EU-Latin America Summit was social 
inclusion.  By choosing this aspect of the bi-regional relationship, the EU 
recognized a worrisome and growing problem in the Western hemisphere: social 
exclusion.  Former External Relations Commissioner Chris Pattern described the 
current trends in Latin America as follows:  
 
…. In almost all Latin American countries, only 9-15 percent of total income goes to 
the poorest 40% of households. Despite a decade of reforms, the gap between rich and 
poor is widening…. social inequalities act as a brake on economic growth as large 
sections of society are unable to contribute. And politically there is a danger that people’s 
faith in democracy will be eroded if they consider that institutional and market reforms 
have failed to deliver a better quality of life.
10  
 
In addition to the uncertainties brought about by the insufficient efforts of the 
national governments in the region, the role of Latin America in the global sphere 
has also been affected by the slowdown of economic growth in Europe and 
United States and the volatility in international financial markets.  According to 
the Inter-American Development Bank, the strong growth of EU-LAC trade 
evident for most of the 1990s ended in 1999, when flows contracted by over 5 
percent in value terms.  Despite some recovery in the following years, inter-
regional trade in 2003 was still below the levels recorded in 1998.
11  
The EU-Andean Community of Nations (ACN) trade relationship has 
followed a similar pattern.  “There has been virtually no growth in EU trade with 
the Andean Community in the past decade. Andean imports from the EU grew 
vigorously between 1994 and 1998, but contracted equally strongly in the 
following five years. The trends for exports were the opposite.”
12  Thus, whereas 
the EU, considered as a region, is in second place on the list of ACN trade 
partners, the ACN ranks 29th among the EU’s trading partners.
13 From the EU’s 
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standpoint, based only on economic trends, the Andean Community does not 
represent a priority in its agenda. Former Commissioner  Chris Patten has 
straightforwardly described the economic place of the Andean countries for the 
EU: “The EU trades more with Vietnam than with Venezuela, more with 
Kazakhstan than with Colombia, more with Bangladesh than with Peru, and more 
with Aruba than with Bolivia.”
14   
Following the economic logic, Colombia represented 0.2 percent of total EU 
imports in 2002, whereas in 1980 it was 0.5 percent. Likewise, with regard to EU 
exports, Colombia received only 0.2 percent in 2002 in comparison with 0.4 per-
cent in 1980.
15 These numbers suggest that the European interest in Colombia is 
driven by other factors, chiefly security. Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner 
recently stated that, “The EU has a range of interests in Colombia, from trade and 
investment to the problems of drug production and drug trade, criminal net-
works, terrorism, migration and regional dimension to conflict in Colombia (em-
phasis added).”
16 In this regard, the problems derived from the internal conflict in 
Colombia contribute to the deterioration of the regional and international secu-
rity.  
The complexities of the Colombian conflict as well as the “strategic and 
historical distance” hamper a more active European involvement in it. To provide 
a glimpse of the nature of the conflict, the  Norwegian Refugee Council  has 
summarized the deep  causes of the Colombian situation  as follows: a) the 
extremely unfair division of land and other resources, b) the lack of democratic 
channels of influence available to the people, c) the state’s inadequate presence 
in certain parts of the country, d) the enormous resources from the drugs trade 
that have contributed to the escalation of the conflict, and e) the extremist right-
wing paramilitary groups and the left-oriented guerrilla groups.
17 In Adam Jones’ 
perspective, “In few countries of the world in recent decades has para-
institutional violence been so pervasive as in Colombia, and in few other 
instances have paramilitary formations amassed so substantial share of political 
control and political power.”
18 
Due to the worsening of the conflict, the 2004-2009 European Commission 
has based its general strategy towards the Colombian conflict on three 
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fundamental principles: a) the promotion of respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, coupled with a thorough follow-up of the humanitarian 
situation; b) good governance, in particular support for the Colombian 
Government’s efforts to strengthen the rule of law throughout the whole country; 
and c) sustainable development and social cohesion.
19 In the past decade, the 
EU’s approach has developed some concrete policies towards Colombia. At the 
donors’ conference in April 2001, the Commission promised  €140 million to 
Colombia between 2001 and 2006, the largest sum for a single country in Latin 
America. By the end of 2003, the Commission had already released €136 million 
and it is expected that between 2005 and 2006 extra resources will be 
committed.
20  
The EU participation in the reconstruction and pacification of Colombia is 
significant. However, in comparison to the active role of the United States in the 
area, even without considering Plan Colombia, the European contribution is 
overshadowed and less substantial.  Table 1 presents the perceptions of 
Colombian public opinion in that regard. 
 
Table 1 
Contributions of United States and European Union to Issues on the International Agenda 
in the Colombian Public Opinion (2004) 
  Democracy  Peace  Aid/Development  Free Trade 
United States  48  49  48  49 
European Union  23  22  15  10 
Source: Elaboration based on Marta Lagos, América Latina & Unión Europea. Percepción Ciudadana. 
Latinobarómetro 2004. Focus Latinoamericano (Chile: Corporación Justicia y Democracia, 2004) 
 
According to  Latinobarómetro,
21 Colombian public opinion reflects the 
overwhelming role of the United States as a result of its involvement in the 
Colombian conflict through Plan Colombia, bilateral trade relations, prospects of 
free trade as well as active cooperation on drug trafficking issues and migration, 
among others. Likewise, public opinion reflects the discrete role of the EU in the 
pacification talks and direct intervention through humanitarian aid.  It may be 
hypothesized that the low perception of the role of the EU in aid and 
development can be explained by the fact that considerable resources of the EU 
are allocated through the local partners of the European Office for Emergency 
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Humanitarian Aid (ECHO), and their performance is not always visible to public 
opinion.  Likewise, other factors may be the lack of any clear attempt to negotiate 
a free trade area between the Andean Community and the EU as well as the 
technical nature of the Generalized System of Preferences.  On the other hand, a 
similar perception is shared in Europe; according to Eurobarometer, 51 percent 
of European public opinion feels that Europe is the actor best placed to help 
Africa whereas the percentage of people who think that the European 
Commission helps the poor in Africa, Asia and Latin America has fallen from 67 
percent in 1996 to 59 in December 2004.
22 
 
EU Inter-institutional Network 
 
At the Community level, the architecture  of the EU encompasses three main 
institutions in foreign policymaking.  In light of the concentration of power in the 
decision making process, the most important institution is the Council of the EU 
(composed of member states), which is a collective body o f decision-making.  
The second institution is the European Commission, defined by its tasks of 
monitoring compliance, providing expert regulation, facilitating policymaking, 
and exerting influence on the principal agents of the EU, namely, the member 
states and the Council of the EU.  The third is the European Parliament, which 
shares legislative powers with the Council, basically through the assent 
procedure in the ratification of international agreements.  These three institutions 
forge a horizontal inter-institutional network in the policymaking process, with 
standpoints that may be divergent or convergent with regard to specific issues, 
countries and/or regions. 
The Council of the EU has been aware of the challenge the Colombian con-
flict represents to the international community. Two features can be identified in 
the policymaking in the Council with regard to Colombia. The first is the diver-
sity of viewpoints. For instance, in the context of the debate on Plan Colombia, 
Belgium and Germany insisted that the EU should distance itself from such a 
Plan and that European assistance should be limited by a set of conditions. On 
the other hand, Italy, Sweden, Germany, Austria and Denmark were prone to 
support program funding for the protection of human rights and the involvement 
of civil society.
23 The second is that with the exception of two or three countries, 
most of the EU members consider the Colombian conflict as a low priority on 
their agendas. In the case of Germany, Detlef Nolte has insisted that the German 
policy towards Latin America fits into the EU general approach since “Many in 
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the foreign policy community argue that German interests are better represented 
as part of a common European Latin America policy than individually. Others 
argue that this could be a way to get rid of a minor topic in foreign relations in 
order to save time for more serious foreign policy matters.”
24 In this regard, 
Spain, the United Kingdom, Netherlands and France are the EU members with a 
relatively higher interest in the Colombian conflict. 
As a result of the consensus of its members, the general approach delineated 
by the Council is based on both support for the Colombian government and a 
firm condemnation of the deterioration of the humanitarian situation resulting 
from the long-standing conflict.  In the middle of both positions, the Council has 
recently conditioned a further involvement depending on concrete results of the 
peace talks.  A review of the conclusions of the General Affairs Council on 
Colombia suggests that there are some elements which can be considered 
guidelines of the EU’s strategy towards Colombia.
25  
The most important feature is the “ European Union's full support for the 
Colombian Government, notably in its efforts to establish the rule of law 
throughout  the country and in its fight against terrorism and illicit drug 
production and trafficking.”
26 Along those lines, the Council welcomed the 
decision of the Colombian Government to pardon 23 members of the FARC in 
2004 and has persistently reiterated its demand that illegal armed groups that still 
detain hostages must release them immediately and unconditionally.  Likewise, 
the Council welcomed the December 15, 2004 meeting between President Uribe 
and representatives of civil society, which represents the implementation of some 
of the recommendations made by the Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights.  
In the same supportive line, the Council, based upon a briefing by former 
Commissioner Patten in February 2004, welcomed the reduction i n the overall 
numbers of murders and kidnappings in Colombia as indicated by the released 
statistics, and hoped that this downward trend would continue.  In this respect, 
the Council expressed its satisfaction regarding the extension of the EU 
Generalized System of Preferences as well as the launch of the second EU Peace 
Laboratory.  
On the other hand, the deteriorating situation of civil society, NGOs and hu-
man rights has been stressed several times by the Council. In the Council conclu-
sions of December 10, 2002, the Council expressed deep concern with respect to 
the worsening of the situation of human rights and urged the Colombian Gov-
                                                 
24 Detlef Nolte,  Problems of Latin America Security and its Implications for Europe: A 
German Perspective (Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman), 3. 
25 EU General Affairs Council Conclusions,  10 December 2002; 26 January 2004; 13 
December 2004. 
26 General Affairs Council Conclusions, 13 December 2004.  The Role of Networks in the EU’s Foreign Policy  225 
 
ernment to increase its efforts against impunity.  Likewise, in the context of 
President Uribe’s visit to Brussels in February 2004, the Council pointed out the 
perilous security conditions under which local and international NGOs and civil 
society organizations, including trade unions and human rights defenders, carry 
out their work in Colombia, and called on the Government to cooperate closely 
with all such groups to ensure their protection. In December 2004, taking as a 
base the Declaration of Guadalajara, the Council once again noted the importance 
of ensuring the safety of those individuals, organizations or institutions working 
for the promotion and protection of human rights. The Council has also called on 
the Colombian authorities for an early adoption of a comprehensive legal frame-
work for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of the illegal armed 
groups. Such a framework should be in conformity with international commit-
ments and take into account the right of the victims to truth, justice and repara-
tion.  
The Council has acknowledged that the Colombian conflict needs the active 
participation of several other international organizations and countries and has 
stressed its strong support for the good offices of the United Nations Secretary-
General, and welcomed the engagement of the Organization of the American 
States, the Government of Mexico and the Group of Friends countries, as well as 
the efforts of the Catholic Church in the processes towards peace in Colombia.  
In fact, on December 13, 2004, the EU conditioned its participation depending 
upon the progress made by the parties:  
 
  More specifically, the Council expressed the European Union's readiness to pursue 
an effective and result-oriented engagement.  A more formal EU involvement could take 
place through timely political endorsement for the ongoing peace process once the 
Colombian Government has set out a comprehensive legal framework.  In this respect the 
Council underlined that the European Union would have great difficulty in endorsing the 
peace talks as long as the illegal armed groups have not ceased hostilities.  Following a 
gradual approach linked to developments on the ground, the Council also expressed its 
readiness to provide concrete and adequate financial support for the outcome of such 
talks once a comprehensive strategy concerning concentration, disarmament, 
demobilization and reintegration of the members of the illegal armed groups in the 
society has been defined.
27  
 
The European Commission not only executes the policies decided by the 
Council, but also actively works in the development of external networks in the 
areas of conflict in Colombia.  With regard to the execution of policies, the 
Commission has insisted that the cooperation with Colombia has been too 
dispersed both in sectors covered and in the number of actions.  Likewise, several 
projects in Colombia have faced delays and problems in implementation for 
several reasons, including problems in the identification phase caused by the 
complexity of the situation on the ground and in particular, the degree of 
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violence.  The rapid changes in the situation on the ground also make it difficult 
to identify the programs correctly since the situation at the beginning of the 
project may largely differ from the one when the project was identified.
28 Thus, 
in the execution of policies, the Commission acknowledges that the evolution of 
the conflict has to do with the extreme weakness of the state.
29 
In addition to the technical problems in cooperating with Colombia, the 
Commission also made public some of its disagreements with regard to the 
approaches in the complex pacification process.  During his visit to Colombia in 
January 2004, Commissioner Chris Patten expressed the European criticism on 
the drug eradication program, which is supported by the United States, and 
informed that the EU has refused to fund fumigations of the Andes citing their 
impact on the life and well-being of Colombians, as well as on the environment.  
Likewise, in a press conference in Bogota, he stated that,  
 
Many people will want to discuss with him (Uribe) the recommendations of the 
United Nations… The improvement in civil liberties and human rights can and must go 
hand-in-hand with the overcoming of violence. Colombia's commitment to basic 
freedoms is important to all of us in Europe who want to play as generous a part as 
possible to help Colombia overcome its problems.
30  
 
In response to Patten’s statements, Colombian Vice President, Francisco 
Santos, in an interview with the newspaper El Tiempo, denounced Europe for 
having “a neocolonial concept of justice in Colombia" and for treating the 
country as a "banana republic.”  
There is a pervasive criticism in the European Parliament of the Colombian 
government.  In the 2002 electoral process, a delegation of the European 
Parliament warned of the risks of spreading some of the effects of the Colombian 
conflict in the region and advocated a regional approach as a solution of the 
problem.
31  
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The EU Parliament has also reacted against the U.S. approach to the conflict. 
Under a conservative-Christian Democratic majority, it passed a resolution 
opposing the Plan Colombia (with 474 votes in favor, only one against, and 33 
abstentions), “perceived in Europe as inspired by the United States with 
‘militaristic’ and counter-insurgency purposes, with the potential of danger for 
spillover to other Andean neighbors.”
32 In direct reference to the conflict itself, 
conservatives stress the abuses committed by the guerrillas (collectively or on an 
individual basis) whereas the European left emphasizes the deep roots of the 
conflict in the social inequality and the collapse of Colombia’s state system.
33 
The European Parliament has been a critic of President Uribe’s policies.  In 
February 2004, 20 parliamentarians (some people say 100) walked out of a 
speech by President Uribe to protest the 2004 Colombian anti-terrorism law, 
which grants sweeping powers to the armed forces to detain suspects without 
warrants, tap phones and search homes.  They were headed by Monica Frassoni, 
leader of the Green group.  This protest is explained by the fact that in 2002  the 
Green Federations of the Americas, Europe, Africa, and Asia Pacific, “in an 
unprecedented show of global Green solidarity, published a letter to FARC 
calling on the guerrilla movement to release kidnapped Colombian presidential 
candidate Ingrid Betancourt, presidential candidate by the coalition Green 
Oxygen Party-For a New Colombia.”
34 Likewise, this case has been particularly 
relevant for European lawmakers because Betancourt is also a French citizen.
35 
In this context, the then-President of the European Parliament, Pat Cox, received 
President Uribe and stated face to face that “we consider essential to develop a 
fully functioning democratic state. Exceptions with respect to human rights are 
not acceptable.”
36 
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External Networks with NGOs 
 
EU networks with external partners are crucial in the implementation of policies.  
In fact, in cases of internal conflicts, such as in Colombia, the know-how of 
NGOs is decisive in reaching the EU’s goals.  To some extent, the relationship 
between NGOs and the Commission is a two-way street because they both try to 
get something from the other.  Commissioner Siim Kallas has acknowledged the 
role of NGOs in the policymaking and has stated that “There is nothing wrong 
with lobbies because each decision-making process needs proper information 
from different angles.”
37 Similar to the U.S. political system, lobbying the EU 
policymakers is a way for exerting influence on the final outcomes.  At the 
moment, there are about 15,000 lobbyists established in Brussels, while around 
2,600 interest groups have permanent offices in Brussels.  Lobbying activities are 
estimated to produce 60 to 90 million in annual revenues.  In this context, the 
Commission channels over €2 billion to developing countries through NGOs, a 
situation that has led Commissioner Kallas to assert that, “The word ‘non’ is 
quite fictitious.  Some of the NGOs receiving funds from the Commission 
describe from (on) their website one of their main tasks as lobbying the 
Commission.”
38 In this regard, the 2004-2009 Commission is implementing a 
European Transparency Initiative, which seeks to increase transparency in these 
networks because people have the right to know how their money is being spent, 
including NGOs.  
Having in mind the nature of the NGOs-Commission relationship described 
above, the European Office for Emergency Humanitarian Aid (ECHO), which 
was set up in April 1992, has fostered the creation of networks with NGOs.  As 
part of the strategy to get external partners involved, ECHO works with 210 
partners worldwide, which are organizations that have signed a contract with the 
European Commission.  Between 1992 and 1999, ECHO spent approximately €4 
billion on relief operations via 170 agencies which had signed framework 
partnership contracts. Among these partners, NGOs accounted for 56 percent of 
spending, UN agencies 25 percent, other international organizations (e.g. 
International Red Cross) 11 percent, and the remaining percentage by ECHO or 
specialist member state agencies.
39   
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Based upon the annual ECHO aid strategy, in 2003 ECHO accounted for a 
budget of €442.5 million, aimed to enhance and refine the reforms initiated in 
2001, among others, the transparent dialogue with ECHO’s partners and other 
humanitarian agencies.  Current Commissioner Michel has reiterated the need for 
reform of the policies of humanitarian aid, based upon three priorities.  The first 
issue is to place development as an integral part of the external action of the EU.  
The second is to strengthen the practice of partnership, attempting to overcome 
some of the past mistakes of vertical aid cooperation.  Commissioner Michel is 
straightforward in this regard: “Too often in the past we in the ‘north’ have set 
the priorities for developing countries.  And partnership starts at home.”
40 The 
third priority is the effectiveness of humanitarian aid. 
NGOs worldwide have contributed to strengthening the role of the EU in the 
Third World by the multiple feedbacks (information on the ground) they provide 
to EU institutions and their surveillance practices over donor and receiver gov-
ernments. In this regard, three main types of European NGOs can be differenti-
ated. The first encompasses those based in the Netherlands, Scandinavian coun-
tries and UK, which have a long tradition of active civil society participation. 
Based upon such long-standing practices, some British NGOs have transformed 
themselves into multinational organizations; this is the case of OXFAM, Save the 
Children and Amnesty International. The second cluster is made of other coun-
tries that have recently developed policies towards NGOs because their democra-
cies are younger; this is the case of Greece, Spain and Portugal. The third group 
of countries shares a strong role for the state in the activities of NGOs, such as 
the case of France, where NGOs coexist with a strongly centralized state, or 
Germany with the reemergence of NGOs supported by the state.
41  
With regard to the performance of the NGOs beyond the European borders, 
Latin America is a region in the lower layers of their priorities. Influenced by 
colonial links, some countries give priority to specific countries. British NGOs 
are particularly active in Central Asia and French ones in some African countries. 
Quite relevant in the memory of European NGOs and EU institutions is the joint 
work in Central Europe. In spite of the fact that the transitions in most of post-
communist countries were state-led, namely, “centrally organized democratiza-
tion,” NGOs had a real impact on the political and economic areas in the region, 
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particularly in the spread of democracy as a culture. Also in geographical terms, 
from the perspective of ECHO and once the 2004 enlargement process took 
place, the most general tendency in humanitarian aid policy is to withdraw from 
Eastern Europe and focus more on Africa and Asia. According to the 2003 
ECHO’s report, the most important operations were conducted in Africa (Great 
Lakes, West Africa, and Southern Africa), Afghanistan, the northern Caucasus 
(Chechnya), the Middle East (Palestinian Territories), and Western Sahara. The 
last place on the list of ECHO’s priorities was to Colombia
42 
In this context, during the military and authoritarian regimes in Latin 
America in the 1970s and 1980s, political parties, foundations and universities 
were important non-governmental interlocutors in Europe.  In the last ten years, 
due to flaws in the implementation of cooperation policies, the EU and many 
European governments have also included some degree of decentralization in the 
aid to Latin America for three reasons:
43  a) if people participate, aid policy is 
more legitimate in the eyes of public opinion; b) plurality strengthens democracy; 
and c) there is a steady surveillance among the participants in an aid project. 
In the specific case of Colombia, the Commission has allocated resources of 
€330 million to civil society initiatives in the past five years.  In February 2004, 
during President Uribe’s visit to Europe, a new program was launched to support 
the integration process and improve the living conditions of internally displaced 
people, with a total budget of  €9.2 million for 2004-2005.  This project is 
currently being implemented by the EU and local NGOs with the support of the 
Colombian government represented by the National Solidarity Network (Red de 
Solidaridad National).  
 
The flagship EU project is the Peace Laboratory Magdalena Medio with the 
participation of local networks. Following the strategy of getting NGOs involved, 
the Commission has delegated the implementation of the first phase to the De-
velopment and Peace Cooperation of the Magdalena Medio, awarded Colombia’s 
National Prize, with a long record of intervention in the Magdalena Medio, and 
credibility among the Colombian population.
44 The first Laboratory in Magda-
lena Medio started in March 2002 and includes four elements: 1) peace culture 
and integral rights, 2) productive activities, 3) productive and social infrastruc-
tures and 4) institutional re-enforcement. It foresees a Community financing of 
€34.8 million and will last eight years.  
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Table 2 
ECHO’s Partners in Colombia 
Partner  Aid provided  Department 
Action Against Hunger, Spain  Clean water, sanitation, food, 
school rehabilitation 
Magdalena  
Cordoba 
Caritas Spain  Psychological support, shelter, 
good sanitation 
Huila, Meta 
Red Cross International 
Committee 
Access to conflicting areas to 
help victims; food, essential 
non-food items 
Areas in conflict 
International Committee for 
the Development of People. 
Italy 
Socioeconomic reinsertion, 
psychological support 
Antioquía, Quindio, Caldas, 
Risalralda 
Spanish Red Cross  Psychological support, basic 
health care 
Magdalena Medio, Bolivar, 
Antioquía 
French Red Cross  Basic health care  Narino 
Dutch Red Cross  Psychological support, basic 
health care 
Caqueta, Risaralda, Caqueta 
Movimondo Italy  Community centers, food aid, 
psychological support, 
economic activities 
Valle del Cauca, Cauca, 
Nariño 
Movement for Peace, 
Disarmament and Freedom, 
Spain 
Economic activities, sanitation, 
clean water 
Cesar, Sucre, Bolivar 
UN Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs (OCHA) 
Coordination of different 
humanitarian agencies, 
evaluation of the needs, 
elaboration of studies 
n/a 
Oxfam, United Kingdom  Economic activities, clean 
water, public health, housing 
reconstruction.  
Choco, Antioquía, 
Santander North 
International Solidarity, Spain  Psychological support, 
economic activities, clean 
water, public health, housing 
reconstruction 
Valle del Cauca, Cauca and 
Narino. 
Source: Own elaboration based on ECHO, Construyendo un Nuevo Futuro (Brussels, 2003) 
 
The role of the European Commission working with its partners through 
ECHO, however, goes beyond the confines of the Magdalena Medio region.  
Table 2 summarizes the participation of the NGOs on the ground.  
In addition to ECHOs partners, there are some other NGOs that are receiving 
funding from the EU and are playing a very constructive part in the pacification 
of Colombia.  The European Commission has awarded the  Colombian 
Commission of Jurists (CCJ) €650,000 for projects that aim to strengthen social 
and institutional capacity for the promotion and defense of civil and political 
rights in Colombia.  On the other hand, the Office of the Human Rights 
Commissioner of UN ( OHCHR) has received  €600,000 for improving prison 
conditions in Colombia.  Likewise, Terre de Hommes (Italian NGO) has been 232  Domínguez 
 
financed  by the Human Rights and Democracy Programme of the European 
Commission. 
Other NGOs have also contributed to the debate on the pacification of 
Colombia. Amnesty International, through its annual reports, has pressured some 
EU members to explain suspicious double standards of their national policies 
with regard to Colombia.  This is the case of the February 2004 Amnesty 
International report, in which this NGO demanded that the Spanish government 
(under J.M. Aznar) transferred arms to Colombia in violation of the 1998 Code 
of Conduct, signed by the EU members.  
With regard to other EU members, the British government has declared their 
admiration for the progress made by Uribe’s administration, but they have 
refused to take any notice of the damaging reports released by Colombian and 
international NGOs (see Colombian Commission of Jurists Report) that proved 
that the human rights situation in Colombia had actually deteriorated, and that the 
government had manipulated and falsified the figures.  Germany and other 
European governments have had a sense of disillusionment after the failure of the 
peace talks between the Pastrana government and the guerrilla movements in 
2002.  Since then, the Colombian government under Uribe has had limited 
success in explaining its position to European governments.  Many Europeans – 
in the governments and in the NGOs – are arguing that the security measures 
adopted by the Uribe Administration are violating human rights.  A focus of this 
criticism is the 2004 antiterrorism legislation, which grants powers of arrest and 
interrogation to the Colombian armed forces with limited judicial control.
45   
From the Commission’s standpoint, NGOs contribute to the implementation 
of EU policies.  Former Commissioner Patten has said that  
 
…we are working not only with the government support.  But also directly 
with civil society and NGOs, whose role we recognize and support.  Be it for the 
defense of human rights, humanitarian assistance, support for internally 
displaced people or the fight against poverty, we believe they are essential 
partners.
46 
 
In the Colombian perspective, however, the disagreement arises not over the 
role of NGOs, but in the legitimacy of some of them, which has created a 
controversy in the bilateral relationship.  In the view of a specialist on Colombian 
politics, President Uribe has been partial in his assessments: “Uribe not only 
parroted paramilitary claims that Colombian non-governmental organizations 
were playing into the hands of leftist terrorists, but announced that paramilitary 
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leaders might receive a pardon in return for paying compensation for their 
atrocities.”
47 In this regard, President Uribe has also states that “Here there are 
traffickers in human rights who spend all their time asking for support from the 
European Union and other institutions simply to maintain themselves, because 
they have made a living out of this and because they need resources to stop the 
state from acting.”
48 Such statements only contribute to undermine the EU’s trust.  
 
Final Thoughts 
 
The complexity of the Colombian case has demanded from the international 
community the participation of a plurality of actors in order to restore the 
confidence for a peaceful future. Although its contribution has been modest, the 
EU has displayed resources in a creative fashion, particularly by giving back to 
the affected people the opportunity to reconstruct their lives. NGOs, local and 
international, have been a key player to implement on the ground some of the 
decisions made in Brussels.  
This paper has remarked that the EU is a polity in which the policymaking 
process involves a variety of actors with competing visions of the world. In this 
vein, the inter-institutional network consisting of the Council, the Commission 
and the Parliament must be in the objectives of policymakers and lobbies from 
other continents. Likewise, Latin American NGOs must be clear that regardless 
of the “strategic distance” from Europe, the kind of support the EU offers can 
make the difference in local communities, especially those in which there are 
increasing human rights violations.  
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Understanding Mercosur and its Future 
 
 
Félix Peña 
 
Introduction 
 
Four Main Approaches to Understand Mercosur 
 
After almost fifteen years of its formal creation by the Asunción Treaty, it is 
possible to draw some lessons of the Mercosur experience and to introduce some 
reflections concerning its future. Mercosur is a term that is used in relation with a 
regional reality, a strategic idea, a formal economic integration process, and an 
image. 
As a regional reality, Mercosur is multidimensional. It constitutes an 
international subsystem that results in interactions at the political, economic and 
cultural levels. It expresses itself through perceptions and behaviors of 
governments, firms and civil society organizations, and through trade and 
investment flows; as well as a network of interactions involving several aspects 
of social life. It covers a great part of South America. In its hard core, the 
Southern Cone of this region, there is a shared history that includes conflicts, 
rooted deep in history back to the Iberian Peninsula.
1   
As a strategic idea, Mercosur implies an option for the logic of integration in 
the relationship among its member countries. It implies the building of a common 
ground of political stability and democracy within the region, mainly through 
economic preferences and common policies, with the idea of competing and 
negotiating together at the global level. It is not an abstract idea. It reflects 
concrete and dynamic national interests that are not always exactly the same for 
each of the member countries, due among other factors, to the significant 
differences of economic dimensions among them.  
At the founding moment of the bilateral economic integration and 
cooperation program among Argentina and Brazil, in 1986, the strategic idea was 
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closely related to the need to consolidate the “new born” democratic processes. 
Later on, other goals appeared, linked to the member countries’ needs in the field 
of economic modernization and international trade negotiations, especially at the 
hemispheric level  – after the launching in 1991 by President Bush of the 
American Enterprise Initiative. The main idea was to enlarge, through economic 
preferences the national markets, so firms could invest and transform them to 
become more  competitive both at the regional and global level, and to build a 
more attractive environment for both domestic and foreign investments.  The 
assumption was that these would generate a win-win situation for the four 
member countries, including those with small economies, as were the cases of 
Paraguay and Uruguay. 
The idea of integration was then the result of concrete national interests. Not 
the result of any hypothetical supranational rationality. As well as in Europe, the 
idea of a regional approach to economic development started at the national level 
and not the other way round.
2  
If we go down to its deepest cultural roots, we can find the need to reaffirm 
the national identity in face of the challenges of globalization. This was the main 
idea behind the option for a strategy of working together among sovereign 
nations on a systematic and permanent basis. This strategic idea does not 
necessarily produce an irreversible phenomenon. Should this occur, we will only 
know it with the passing of time. But its distinctive characteristic, what turns it 
into a phenomenon different from a traditional friendly relationship among 
neighboring nations, is that it has an implied ambition to be irreversible. This is 
the reason why the pact that formalizes the strategy – in this case the Treaty of 
Asunción - is of a permanent nature. It does not generate a lineal process. On the 
contrary, as the European experience shows us, it implies a very winding road, 
which will even suffer crises and eventual setbacks.  
As a formal economic integration process, Mercosur means a consensual 
alliance among sovereign nations, through the development of common 
mechanisms and rules that allow them to share markets and resources, beginning 
with a customs union that should become then a common market.  
Common principles, criteria and rules of the game  – both formal and 
informal - are conceived as a set of signals sent to citizens, investors and third 
countries, regarding the desired long term goals of the partners and the road map 
to achieve them.  
These are not, nor could they be, instruments or rules of the game that apply 
only to short-term trade. For that restricted purpose, it was not necessary to 
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design such a complex and ambitious project as Mercosur. On the contrary, its 
legitimacy lies in the long term objective, which was explicitly defined for the 
association: the development of a common market, as it is defined in the Treaty, 
and built upon the reciprocity of rights and duties among the partners. This is 
why its results cannot be measured only in terms of global and sector short term 
trade balances. These instruments and rules of the game have  - at least they 
should have – a real influence upon the investment and strategic decisions of 
both domestic and foreign firms. The quality and efficiency of these instruments 
and rules will largely depend on the degree of predictability they offer to 
investors. Therefore, their deepest results should be measured in terms of its 
impact on investments generated in each member country as a result of the 
preferential access to the markets of their partners. The rule oriented nature of the 
integration process –if it is really achieved – is, therefore, crucial for its success 
and social legitimacy.  
In terms of image, Mercosur is the result of the perception held by citizens, 
investors, and third countries, in the sense that its formal goals, mechanisms and 
rules of the game, are really credible because they will be enforced. It implies 
that they could have a real influence in expectations and behaviors of the main 
protagonists of the economic life at each of the member countries. The weaker, 
more inaccurate and volatile the signals – or the lower their quality – the poorer 
will be their impact. In that case, the level of efficiency  - for example, the 
expected outcome in terms of investment decisions oriented toward the enlarged 
market - will be negatively affected.   
Thus, t he image cannot be the result only of rhetoric and idealistic ap-
proaches. As long as the image is sustained in the real life, it will certainly be an 
important element in the concrete behavior of economic and social actors. But 
the expert eye, that of the investor and third countries with whom Mercosur in-
tends to negotiate, will assess the quality of the commitments undertaken by gov-
ernments, their strength, enforceability, and potential to penetrate reality; as well 
as their projection and permanence over time. If there is no correlation among the 
instruments (for example, the unrestricted opening of markets and macroeco-
nomic coordination) and if there is no satisfactory answer to basic questions re-
garding the conditions to operate within the enlarged markets, the possibilities of 
attaining a customs union and then a common market will remain uncertain and 
the investors will become more doubtful about the decisions they have to make. 
In that case, the credibility gap will also affect the idea of strengthening the ca-
pacity of the group to negotiate with third countries. 
 
After Almost Fifteen Years of Mercosur Experience: 
A Balance of Achievements and Failures 
 
What is the balance we can draw from the Mercosur experience? We could 
consider it in relation with each of the above mentioned dimensions. 238  Peña 
 
As a regional reality, Mercosur presents a significant progress in the quality 
of the relations among a group of neighbor’s countries. This is evidenced by the 
growth in trade and investments within the integrated area, especially in the 
1991-1998 period. It is difficult to assess how much of this progress is due to 
Mercosur’s formal integration process and instruments, and how much to the 
geographical contiguity of countries that have significantly opened up to 
international trade. It is also difficult to know what may have happened with 
trade and investments among its members if Mercosur as a process had not been 
a reality.   
However, it is certain that we have passed from a low level of relative 
interdependence – measured by different trade and direct investment indicators, 
as well as those that show the willingness of a joint defense of democracy (as 
was the case during a political crisis in Paraguay) – to a higher interdependence 
level. On account of this situation it is difficult that what happens in one country 
does not have a strong effect on the political and economic life of the others.  
Mercosur have not yet attained the level of economic interdependence, much less 
political, that the European countries h ad in 1950, when they created the 
European Community of Coal and Steel through the Treaty of Paris, or when in 
1958, they started the process of what is today the European Union. It has not 
even attained the level of economic interdependence existing in North America, 
when in 1994, the NAFTA was formalized.  
At present, in Mercosur, both the politicians and the citizens have the feeling 
of “being on the same boat.”  This feeling is shared by those who have invested 
or placed their savings in the region. It is reflected in the contagion effect which 
means that what happens to the economy of one partner will be felt in the 
economies of the others. This is especially true if the country that suffers a 
problem is one of the major partners. In terms of country risk, the markets are 
already integrated, in spite of the attempts to focus on differences during critical 
situations.  
It is not easy to imagine a setback in this dimension, for example a return to a 
low level of interdependence. What may occur, however, are variations in the 
levels of regional interdependence. The experience of the Mercosur and South 
American region and specially the experience of other international subsystems 
such as those in Europe and the Middle East, indicates that a growing 
interdependence among a group of countries that share a geographical area may 
have a predominantly conflicting character or a predominantly cooperative one. 
The economic and political value of moving from a predominantly conflicting 
interdependence to a predominantly cooperative one is very high, as evidenced 
by the European experience of the last fifty years compared to the last few 
centuries. This is not something that may be measured, for example, in terms of 
trade flows or of development of common infrastructure projects.  
As a strategic idea, we can see greater continuity and consistency in the 
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this is the main contribution from the so called presidential diplomacy, leading to 
the creation of Mercosur as an area of integration and solidarity among its 
members. This was evidenced at the founding moment in 1986, and then again in 
1990. But this has particularly been observed during periods of crisis, for 
example, the car industry crisis  in 1995, the 1998-1999 economic recession 
period, and even more recently when Argentina adopted exceptional economic 
measures after its crisis of 2002.   
A detailed examination of those events clearly shows that in all cases the 
political leadership has favored the preservation of the strategic direction of the 
integration process. Two presidential leadership abilities appear to be 
outstanding: the assessment of each situation within a long term vision and in the 
larger framework of converging national interests, and the recognition that the 
most valuable element for the common project is the economic and political 
health of each partner (democracy, and economic growth and stability). This has 
led the political leaders to act in accordance with a strict sense of prudence when 
one of the partners is experiencing serious difficulties, accepting sometimes de-
facto flexibility with respect to the implementation of the formal commitments 
and the time-table of the economic integration process.  
But it is also in this dimension of the strategic idea, where one may observe 
different perceptions from the member countries with respect to the real situation 
and the behavior of other partners. On occasion, the perception of eventual 
disloyal conduct by the government of o ne member country or controversial 
assessments of the real distribution of costs and benefits of the integration 
process, have contributed to weakening the feeling that the strategic idea is 
shared with the same intensity by the different partners. Reflected by the media 
to each country’s public opinion, often in the middle of a crisis, this stimulates 
the culture of conflict rather than the culture of cooperation. Here lies one of the 
issues that will require a great deal of attention in the future, if the member 
countries desire to deepen integration in Mercosur and to increase its social 
legitimacy in each of them.  
However, the fact that the political leaders have been normally strongly 
determined to support the strategic idea does not necessarily imply  that each 
country economic policy is always consistent with Mercosur commitments. On 
the contrary, the growing loss of relevance of the previously frequent meetings of 
Economy Ministers and Central Bank Presidents, might be evidence of a 
significant gap between the specific economic policies of each partner and the 
strategy to build Mercosur. Except for the initial period during which the 
biannual meetings of Economy Ministers and Central Bank Presidents became a 
real driving force of the integration process, the Ministers appeared aloof, and 
eventually, not very interested in being directly involved in the Mercosur 
development. Sometimes they have only done this during crises. This may even 
account for the lack of progress in coordinating macroeconomic policies, 
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for the growing deterioration of Mercosur as a formal economic integration 
process. 
As a formal economic integration process, perhaps is where it is possible to 
observe that progress in building Mercosur has been even more limited. In the 
beginning, it seemed feasible to advance rapidly, but after the initial transition 
period -1991-1994- a relative ineffectiveness and inefficiency has characterized 
the evolution of the economic integration process. This was also the case during 
the bilateral integration program among Argentina and Brazil, in which it was 
possible to observe that after a significant progress in the first two years -1986-
1988, it then stagnated largely due to the political and economic performance of 
the two countries.  
The period initiated in 1991 with the Treaty of Asunción received a strong 
boost, partly because of an international and local environment favorable to these 
types of initiatives, and partly as a result of the automatic nature of the trade 
liberalization process, taking place not only between Argentina and Brazil but 
also extended to Paraguay and Uruguay.  
Thus, we arrive at the most recent period –the roots of which may be found 
in Mercosur decisions adopted an even those not adopted at Ouro Preto in 
December 1994 (for example, regarding non-tariff barriers and safeguards), and 
the lack of progress in macroeconomic coordination. During this stage we 
observe significant institutional deficiencies, low quality rules of the game, and a 
growing weakness of the economic preference and of collective disciplines, for 
example in the field of export and investment incentives.  
As an image, Mercosur has experienced in recent years, both at the national 
level  of each member country and abroad, a deterioration of its credibility. It 
reflects the perception by public opinion, investors and third countries, of a 
weakening of the quality of the economic integration process. In 1995, the good 
image reached a peak when the nations overcame the effects of the Tequila crisis. 
In the period from 1998-1999 (particularly during the first semester of 1999), 
Mercosur’s image began to deteriorate after the Brazilian devaluation of the Real. 
The situation deteriorated more when Argentina had its own 2002-2003 deep 
economic and even political crises.   
In each of the member countries, Mercosur began to be perceived  –with 
some exaggeration- as part of the problems and not necessarily of the solutions. 
The conflicts and crises multiplied. Gradually, the image of a stagnated process 
settled in. A vicious circle emerged, consisting of low effectiveness of the rules 
of the game (they do not correspond to reality), reduced efficiency (the expected 
results are not achieved), loss of credibility (citizens, investors and third 
countries have started to doubt if the process is feasible), and the loss of 
attractiveness.  
In the Mercosur of this last period, we may also observe the introduction of 
the social illegitimacy virus. The public opinion of member countries start to 
doubt if the association is based on a win-win relationship and hence, if it is Understanding Mercosur and its Future  241 
 
convenient to continue with its development as it is today. The original strategic 
idea does not seem to be questioned. Yet, people do debate the methodologies of 
the economic integration process. Expressions, such as “Mercosur has died” or 
“Mercosur is useless if it remains as it is,” may seem exaggerated but have 
become more frequent.   
We can conclude that almost fifteen years after its founding moment, 
Mercosur as a  regional reality and as a strategic idea, maintains its relative 
strength. However, there is a growing concern with respect to its real capacity as 
an instrument to negotiate together with third countries and its efficiency to 
stimulate development and investments in all the member countries. This is 
because, as an economic integration process and as an image, Mercosur exhibits 
remarkable deficiencies. However, there has been a learning effect in the sense of 
knowing how to advance –or not to advance- in an integration process of these 
characteristics.  
A strong political decision will be needed to overcome the relative deteriora-
tion of the economic integration process and of the Mercosur image. This would 
be especially necessary, if member countries want to adapt it to the challenges of 
the new international economic and even domestic realities. It is in this sense that 
the accumulated experience should be capitalized, in order to prevent the deterio-
ration of the process and its instruments from contaminating the quality of the 
achieved regional interdependence, which will continue to grow at any rate.  
 
Three Central Questions with Respect to the Accumulated Experience 
 
Three central questions arise when reviewing the first fifteen year experience of 
Mercosur:  
 
•  What lessons can be drawn in terms of the methodology of consensual 
integration among sovereign neighbor nations? 
•  What scenarios can be drawn with respect to the future of Mercosur 
considering, in particular, the FTAA negotiations and those with the 
European Union? and 
•  What issues would be crucial for Mercosur’s future as a regional process that 
could be functional to each member country’s national objectives, 
particularly those related with the consolidation of democracy a nd the 
modernization of their economic and social life? 
 
Lessons Concerning Integration Methodologies 
 
With respect to the first question, we should pay particular attention to three 
essential aspects of integration methodologies.
3 It is on these issues that the 
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protagonists –both at governmental and business level - and analysts should focus 
their reflections.  
The first one is related with efficiency, in terms of how to achieve the original 
goals of the economic integration process, particularly in terms o f building a 
common platform from where to compete and negotiate at the global level. This 
issue is related to the redefinition of some of Mercosur instruments and rules of 
the game in order to enhance its potential effectiveness. It is directly linked to the 
question of how to develop a dynamic reciprocity of national interests at stake, so 
that the instruments and rules of the game could produce a win-win relationship 
and are not perceived by any member country as originating a zero-sum game.  
The second  question is that of  credibility, in terms of the perception of 
investors about how seriously they can consider Mercosur commitments when 
adopting investment and strategic business decisions, and of third countries –for 
example the United States and the European Union- when considering it as a 
valid interlocutor in international relations and negotiations. The collective 
memory as regards the Latin-American tradition of the “fiction-integration” 
influences the way citizens, investors and third countries perceive Mercosur 
when they have to assess its commitments, making them highly sensitive to any 
indicator that the member countries are not really willing to attain their agreed 
goals. Therefore, credibility will strongly depend on the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the instruments and rules of the game.   
The third question is that of social legitimacy. It focuses on the public 
opinion’s perception of Mercosur’s contribution in terms of taking care of public 
needs, expectations and interests, related with resolving critical problems of the 
political, economic, and social agendas. Social legitimacy also is related to the 
perception of how effective the distribution of costs and benefits of the 
integration process is among the partners, taking into account the existing sharp 
economic differences. This leads to questions about Mercosur´s opportunity costs 
compared to other economic integration alternatives. In practice, this issue 
underlies the debate that from time to time is possible to observe in some 
member countries, between Mercosur as an integration process and the FTAA or 
other imaginable options for a special and preferential relationship with the 
United States. The permanence, efficiency and effectiveness of the economic 
integration process and the rules of the game will ultimately depend on their 
social legitimacy. 
The accumulated experience is pointing out the political need to carefully 
approach the issues of efficiency, credibility and legitimacy, in any process of 
consensual integration among sovereign nations. This may not be achieved 
without introducing mechanisms that will allow for an effective preservation of 
national interests in the implementation of the integration process.   
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About Some Possible Future Scenarios for Mercosur 
 
With respect to t he  second question we can see at least three trends for 
Mercosur´s future scenarios. It is even possible to imagine combinations of the 
different scenarios. 
 
a)  Irrelevance 
 
The first one  – possible and somewhat likely- is the trend toward a 
continuous deterioration of the integration process and of its image, gradually 
slipping into a growing irrelevance as regards the agenda of critical issues for all 
or some of the member countries. This would be the scenario which we would 
call the “aladification” of Mercosur: it continues to exist as a process but its 
commitments are diluted and lose effectiveness in the perspective of citizens, 
investors and third countries. It does not influence significantly any longer on its 
expectations and behaviors. In this scenario, Mercosur would continue to exist as 
a formal process, but it would lag behind – with so many other experiences of 
Latin American integration-, in a kind of museum of “the irrelevant”
4. Nobody 
else would care about it. This scenario may be dysfunctional as regards the goals 
of a cooperative interdependence, not only in the current Mercosur area but also 
at the South American region. This would end up eroding the original strategic 
idea. 
 
b)   Dilution 
 
The second one – possible and also relatively likely- i s the trend toward the 
dilution of Mercosur into an eventual integration at the hemispheric level with 
the FTAA. This scenario may co-exist with the former one. It may lead to a 
changed Mercosur – as a matter of fact or of law – in a kind of free trade area. 
The external common tariff would be diluted, mainly in its principal element (for 
example the collective disciplines in the field of trade policy). Each country 
would then enter individually into a large hemisphere-wide free trade area.  
Mercosur as an economic region would survive but the integration process and its 
instruments would be overcome by those adopted at the hemisphere level. This 
scenario, in turn, may result from the current negotiations of the FTAA or its 
transformation into a network of free trade agreements, in which the United 
States would be the trade hub. Mercosur’s current partner countries may 
eventually negotiate free trade agreements with the European Union, as did 
Mexico and Chile. Its effects on the future of South American interdependence 
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are difficult to forecast. Eventually, they may be similar to the irrelevance 
scenario. This might also erode the original strategic idea. 
 
c)  Consolidation 
 
The third one – possible and still likely- is the trend toward the renewal and 
consolidation of the Mercosur integration process and its instruments, as a 
regional and institutionalized subsystem, with a growing South American 
dimension. This is the preferred scenario of actual governments. This would be 
the scenario of a “serious” Mercosur, with economic preferences, collective 
disciplines and rules of the game that are actually enforced and that contemplate 
the interests of all the member countries. In this case, Mercosur as an integration 
process, would imply higher commitments than those undertaken in the FTAA. It 
would also maintain the possibility for free trade agreement negotiations with the 
European Union. It would strongly contribute to the social legitimacy of the 
hemisphere and transatlantic trade negotiations.  
This is the scenario that was originally imagined for Mercosur and, in my 
opinion, continues to be the favored scenario, consistent with each partner’s 
national interest. It is also the scenario that would contribute most greatly to the 
development of political stability and democracy in South America.  
 
The Future Development of Mercosur 
 
As regards the  third question, there are priority issues that should be 
addressed on the agenda for the renewal and consolidation of Mercosur as an 
integration process.  Four are more relevant. The first one is related with its 
institutional quality, particularly its normative production process and the 
enforcement of its rules. The second one refers to strengthening the main 
collective trade disciplines and the development of a gradual coordination of 
macro-economic policies. The third one is related to the extension of the 
economic preference among member countries, covering not only trade on goods 
but also services and government procurement. And finally the last one is related 
to the need of developing concrete measures of cooperation with the smaller 
countries, to allow them to take advantage of the enlargement of their markets 
through an effective access to those of Argentina and Brazil.  
 
Some conclusions  
 
We may conclude by affirming that, under the original strategic idea, none of the 
problems existing in the Mercosur -as a formal integration process- are without 
reasonable solutions. This remains true as long as there is a willingness to 
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national interests that is the only way that the association can maintain its social 
legitimacy.  
To achieve the original strategic idea, however, it would require a strong 
collective political leadership, technical imagination, and the creative participa-
tion of the civil society.  
A consolidated Mercosur is not contradictory to the idea of the FTAA. On 
the contrary, it may be a necessary condition for successful negotiations on the 
hemisphere level and, above all, for its social legitimacy in the member coun-
tries. Without Mercosur, the idea of free trade in the hemisphere would be more 
easily exposed to strong social criticisms. A consolidated Mercosur is also the 
best way –perhaps the only one- to achieve the goal of a bi-regional strategic as-
sociation with the European Union. 
 
  
 
Mercosur: Political Development and Comparative Issues  
with the European Union 
 
 
 
 
Marcos Aurelio Guedes de Oliveira 
 
Introduction 
 
In the last ten years Mercosur has become a viable instrument for the creation of 
a South American pole of economic development and integration as well as to 
enhance regional power in face of inter-regional and global negotiations. For 
many Europeans, Mercosur
1 is a child of the EU process and structures and 
should closely follow its model of integration; for many North-Americans it is 
being portrayed as nothing more than a regional political arrangement in order to 
better negotiate with the United States. They argue that Latin Americans do not 
have conditions to create a stable integration process. Surprisingly for everyone 
Mercosur is there and is growing despite all adversities. This essay discusses key 
aspects that Mercosur shares with the EU and stresses the particularities that once 
produced and maintain Mercosur as an original regional integration model. 
 
Origins  
 
It is undeniable that the project of the European common market, developed just 
after WWII, affected tremendously Latin American views on the need to link 
economic development to a free trade arrangement. Of course the European case 
was related to security implications not found in Latin America. 
We have to look at the historic context of European states in order to 
understand the previous assumption. Its birth was during the 14
th and 15
th 
centuries where the Holy Roman domination started to fade away and Europe 
lived a succession of empires under the leadership of different European states.  
From the 17
th Century onward Europe entered a period of continuous and 
growing warfare among its main states. This situation produced a concern with 
the future of the continent that indicated unification as a way out of the anarchic 
system based on war. The Congress of Vienna (1814-15) was a breakthrough by 
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forwarding the first relevant international system, the Concert of Europe, and its 
methodology, the balance of power. 
A counter-force to emerging integration ideas was a new wave of 
nationalism, particularly in Germany and Italy, states of late consolidation. Their 
leaders’ actions together with the fear and aspirations of small national groups 
spread suspicion and produced an arms race in Europe, pre-conditions for break 
out of the First and the Second World Wars.  By the end of the Second War there 
were two dominant ideas: one on the declining of European states and a second 
that a federal Europe was a next and needed step for the survival of the continent. 
The terrible consequences of the two world wars have ended the European 
condition as center of power, science, culture and civilization. It had become a 
frontier area of disputes between two superpowers, had lost its scientific and 
cultural hegemony and was put under the constant menace of nuclear destruction. 
What could have been worse? In this unforeseen context, Europeans with the 
support of the United States begun to take seriously the road towards integration. 
South and Central Americas were not involved in a global war and they were 
not bound to be in the center of a bipolar Cold War. Latin America was never so 
well protected under U.S. umbrella than in the aftermath of WWII.  Regional 
integration has become for European nations a matter of life or death; for Latin 
America it was seen as a facilitator to overcome backwardness. 
The Latin America project looks back to colonial exploitation, to the back-
ward heritage of European domination and indicates a way to overcome this past 
and to foster economic and social development. Differently, the European project 
is associated to the historic crisis of their powerful states, to the undeniable need 
to stop waves of European destructive wars that created global crisis and fostered 
U.S. projection towards world hegemony, to the desire to rebuild Europe as the 
center of civilization, power and hope. 
The European states can look at themselves as decaying political structures in 
need of a common economic framework while the Latin Americans look at them-
selves as building up economic structures based on industry, urban life and thus 
creating and enhancing newly-independent states. Europe was at the center of 
U.S. attention and worry about its future position as hegemonic power, not Latin 
America. 
This perception is the key to understand the slow development of integration 
in the south. The decades following the end of the war were marked by a wish for 
a father-like U.S. support followed by frustration with U.S. denial to recognize 
the region as strategic in face of its growing involvement on conflicts in Asia and 
Europe. Gradually as a result of this dilemma Brazil, as well as Argentina, started 
moving in the direction of creating national development strategies that would 
depend less on the U.S. will and more on state-oriented guidelines. 
The United Nations became in the 1950s instrumental for Latin America 
cries for economic support. The creation of United Nation’ s CECLAC 
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most important step. By the end of the 1950s development was at last gaining 
momentum in regional politics. Industrialization had firmly started in Brazil and 
President Kennedy  – after t he Cuban revolution  – admitted the need for a 
response to regional cries. Thus, the Alliance for Progress was created. 
The assassination of Kennedy and the reemergence of military dictatorships 
in Latin America stopped this development for two decades. The military were 
good in cooperating in intelligence and torture, but kept the feeling of secrecy, 
suspicion and national competition that transformed economic development in a 
national security and nationalistic matter. 
As a common market arrangement the European Economic Community was 
doing well. The power of its democratic institutions and its economic superiority 
to Eastern Europe were visible. Differently to this, ALALC ( Latin American 
Free Trade Association) was powerless and its methods unrealistic. This 
situation changed only in the 1980s and 1990s with the decline and fall of the 
Cold War. A new global reality demanded new strategies. Europe felt secure to 
move towards a more daring structured union. In Latin America the creation of 
ALADI ( Latin American Integration Association), in 1980, permitted more 
flexibility in regional negotiations. The general perception that the new global 
economic reality would reduce even more South America importance gave a new 
flow of energy to the existed free trade initiatives.  
The decline of state-orientated development, the emergence of the debt crisis 
and the fear of negative consequences of globalization forced Brazil and 
Argentina into cooperation. One can establish a comparison on two common 
sources of origins between the European (the sources behind the creation of the 
Coal and Steel Community are quite different from these behind the EU) and 
Mercosur projects: security and infrastructure (energy and communication). 
(a) If one sees the conflict over the construction of Parana hydroelectric as a 
problem of regional security, one can affirm that in the case of Mercosur, the first 
drive was a matter of security. Very much as it was in the European case; (b) but 
if the fear of loosing economic importance in the emerging globalized world is to 
be seen as a main force then Mercosur is a product of a post-Cold War and 
globalization era. Thus it corresponds to the concerns that fostered lately the 
European Union;  (c) last but not least, if  the need by Brazil and its partners to 
use common natural resources in order to enhance regional infrastructure is seen 
as a first drive then the forces behind Mercosur are similar to the force behind the 
Coal and Steel community and not the forces of globalization that lately drove 
the EU. 
One can clearly argue that the origins of Mercosur reflect a combination of 
challenges and problems that were dominant in different moments of the 
European integration history. Democratic stability, security and infrastructure 
development are faced at  the same time as the search for adaptation to global 
economy and to deal with new problems brought by the Twentieth c entury 
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force in it connecting and giving directions to all initiatives to deal with these 
challenges. 
The concerns with regional security and infrastructure development date 
back to the 1940s and 1950s and were never sufficient relevant to provoke a 
common initiative towards integration. Until this date the United States was con-
ceived as an unchallenged and solid leader for the whole region in terms of eco-
nomic development and an ally in security issues. This changed after the Malvi-
nas war when, at last, regional elite realized that they could not count on the 
United States for both development and security. Although there were surely se-
curity aspects behind the emergence of Mercosur, its main drive was and still is 
the fear to be left behind in economic development and to become unimportant to 
international economy due to the negative consequences of the debt crisis and 
globalization.  
The view of South America as a system or as a sub-system within the 
international system –and not as an extension of U.S. power- was enhanced and 
the elements that characterize it have since the end of the Cold War become more 
significant. They are shared believes about: belonging to a region with a common 
identity; a need to increase interaction and integration among states in order to 
achieve common strategic goals. Regionalization was perceived as a processes 
that could remake relations within the region and give it broader room for 
common economic and political action; in other words to follow the regional 
strategic move towards economic and political independence from the powerful 
developed countries; to enhance the South American economic and political pole 
or sub-system.   
 
The Nature of Political Institutions 
 
Quite often one criticizes Mercosur for not having political structures that 
resemble those of the EU. It is depicted as not being supranational, being weak 
and bearing powerless institutions common to intergovernmental political 
arrangements. These views are the product of readings of Mercosur from the 
dominant theories made to understand  European integration. As it i s being 
argued so far, historic background and context are key factors for understanding 
any integration process. Views that undermine regional context do not 
acknowledge the important progress of Mercosur through its intergovernmental 
structures and mechanisms as well as the constraints of the slow but steady 
transition that regional countries undertake towards democracy, economic 
stability and global insertion. 
In the early 1990s a debate was in progress about the shape of Mercosur 
political mechanisms. O n one hand the defenders of a supranational power 
supported their view very much from a functionalist perspective. For them, the 
need of such  institutional form would give a independent dynamic to Mercosur 
as well as provoking a spill over process. On the other hand a less ambitious view Mercosur: Political Development and Comparative Issues  251 
 
supported that corresponding to the level of development and to the regional 
external and internal economic and political limitations, a prudent and pragmatic 
set of intergovernmental structures should be sufficient and certainly functional 
to the challenges Mercosur had ahead. 
From the Iguaçu Declaration in 1985 to the Assunçion Treaty in 1991 the 
cooperation between Argentina and Brazil moved rapidly from security to 
economic concerns. In seven years both countries together with Paraguay and 
Uruguay were convening for the creation of a common market. The immediate 
effect was a renewed international interest on the region and an enhancement of 
the democratic transition.  
The 1994 Ouro Preto protocol represented the consolidation of former 
agreements and it gave Mercosur international legal status. It created an 
intergovernmental Council composed by ministers and high-level officials of all 
sides empowered with a decision-making process that would accommodate 
national interests and a set of technical committees specialized on economic 
areas aiming at finding solutions to forward integration in the direction of a 
common market. Two other important intergovernmental bodies created were: 
Mercosur’s Joint Parliamentary Commission  and the Social and Economic 
Forum, a space for the participation of non-governmental actors.  
Though it could be argued that Mercosur institutions resemble that of the 
1949 statute of the Council of Europe, it is undeniable that since its heyday the 
nature of institutions in the EU has been a combination of intergovernmental and 
supranational while in Mercosur it is only intergovernmental.  
The declining European states demanded such structures due to their need to 
move towards a more interconnected unity and enhance their particular cultural 
interests as well as economic and social standards already achieved through 
social democractic means. The guarantee of regional and global security; the 
need to attract by economic and political advantages a growing number of 
European countries to a unifying project were grounded on issues and interests 
different from that Mercosur institutions emerged. 
Differently from the European case, Latin American countries still see their 
states as “under construction” or as young states which need to achieve their 
economic and political aims. The economic situation facing these states is a 
problematic one. They face debts; social exclusion; corruption; lack of social 
security network; poverty; uneven internal economic development and need to 
enhance a democratic and entrepreneurial culture.  The reemergence of 
democratic governments have brought these issues to the center of political 
concerns. 
A succession of neoliberal economic policies during the 1990s proved to be 
insufficient to deal with most of the problems above and to foster the progress of 
Mercosur. One could say that the challenges that South American countries face 
demand a long and persistent set of policies. They are basically related to three 
points.   First, the stabilization of economic structures by reducing  the burden  of  252  Guedes 
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the  debt and orienting externally the economy. Secondly, by creating a 
sustainable growth that would spread benefits all over South America. Lastly, the 
demise of an aristocratic and unfair state, and the shaping of a democratic and 
less partial one. 
The privatization of state companies and the initiatives on developing a so-
cial network for the very poor were positive steps taken in this decade. Never-
theless these policies were still national-centered, transitional and the region was 
hit by a series of international economic crises that undermined major changes. 
Only in 2003-04, Brazil and Argentina have begun to see first results on their 
move on the direction of an export-oriented model. Due to the importance of in-
ternal reforms, for a decade not much was done in order to forward common 
macroeconomic policies in Brazil and Argentina. In spite of a set of concrete ini-
tiatives, during nearly a decade, Mercosur was taken by a neopopulist discourse 
in favor of unrealistic proposals such as immediate monetary unification. Merco-
sur agenda was also during this period limited to a debate on the growth of inter-
bloc trade and the increase of trade among South American countries. 
At that time commentators were quite skeptical on the continuity of regional 
integration and for many Mercosur was a dying and mistaken initiative. Mercosur 
supporters were not silent. They reminded these critics that the EU resulted from 
a process of ups and downs and in Europe an even deeper skepticism was present 
in many moments.  On the side of Mercosur, this was a period of maturation in 
which common business interests were consolidated, such as in the agriculture 
sector. 
The new century brought renewed combination of soft brands of 
neopopulism to the region with new leftist governments. Brazil, Argentina and 
Uruguay are upgrading their commitment to regional integration. As a leading 
country, Brazil took the step to enhance Mercosur links to the Andean Pact 
countries and proposed negotiations for the integration of the two blocs. It also 
invited Peru and Venezuela to join Bolivia and Chile as associated members. One 
even daring step, what appeared for some as an unrealistic initiative, was the 
launch of the South American Community, a renewed version of the South 
American free trade initiative taken by former President Sarney and that 
represents an additional move to k eep the debate on the need for regional 
integration at the center of South American countries concerns.   
Mercosur negotiations with the EU and with the United States or the 
establishment of a free trade area gained a new impetus. It also took important 
steps towards Africa, Asia and North-America. There are ongoing negotiations 
with Australia, Canada, Mexico and with Arab countries. There are recent 
successful trade agreements with India and South African countries, the result of 
which will prove how a priority Mercosur has become for the present 
governments of Brazil and Argentina.  
Perhaps the most important initiative has been directed to the region’s infra-
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able to reduce its debt and enter into a period of sustainable development, Brazil 
directed the brazilian development bank, Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento 
Economico e Social, (BNDES), to finance projects that would create and develop 
the integration of communications (roads, railroads, waterways and ports) the 
common production of energy (dams, the use of natural gas and other common 
natural resources such as water). This initiative is of uttermost importance for the 
region because it deals with the issue of intra-regional asymmetries. 
In August 2003, 23 projects for the integration of South American infra-
structure were presented by 12 South American countries worth US$ 5,5 billion. 
Most of these projects are near the frontier of Mercosur countries and they aim at 
transforming what used to be a security issue into an area of economic prosperity. 
The growing investments from big regional enterprises as well as multinationals 
are about to consolidate a new pole of economic growth at the heart of South 
America. Only in 2004 foreign investment from brazilian business was US$ 9.5 
billion and most of it went to Mercosur area.
2  There has been a continuous 
growth on small and middle-sized regional enterprises as well as on investment 
from Europe, North-America and Asia. A proposal for the creation of structural 
funds and rules for regional governmental purchase have been approved. 
On the political side COREPER was created which is a committee directed 
by former Argentine President Eduardo Duhalde to support  members’ initiatives 
towards third parties. The formation of a dispute-resolution tribunal, the 
establishment in 2006 of a parliament for Mercosur and the newly-created 
Mercosur Forum of Federative States and Cities, point out that for the time being 
new intergovernmental mechanisms are the region’s reply to growing integration 
demands. 
Obviously an expected consequence of this is an increase of common 
regional pressure groups in favor of more Mercosur political institutions. This 
would represent a spillover that still depends on intergovernmental action but that 
has already involved non-governmental actors. Thus, frontiers in South America 
will be less and less a matter of security and more and more a matter of 
development, integration and growth. 
If the stability and the positive economic framework of recent years is kept, 
then the discussion on more effective political institutions and mechanisms will 
naturally emerge and the intergovernmental institutions created 15 years ago in a 
very hostile and uncertain environment will be replaced by more functional ones.  
 
Two Meanings of Deepening and Widening 
 
The EU has set the processes of deepening and widening as the two main 
challenges to consolidate itself. This fits well to the economic level and the 
strategic ambition Europe searched for itself. The context of Mercosur indicates 
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two other meaning for deepening and widening. The first can be translated into 
creating an infra-structure of communication, transport and energy to enhance 
economic links among South American countries,  attracting the non-Mercosur 
members to join-in a common integration and regional development process. The 
second is establishing as much as possible free trade agreements and common 
strategies with countries and blocs of countries all over the globe. 
The aims of Mercosur are to deal with regional economic development in a 
way that in the end the region will become more relevant and integrated into the 
global economy than it is now, to avoid being swallowed by the two huge blocs 
and to keep relative interdependence in order to be capable of having options for 
increasing its international economic and political power. Mercosur has lived 
through different governments  –five only in Brazil- and is undoubtedly a 
strategic project for its member countries.  
Critics argue that in order to achieve its aims, Mercosur must enhance its in-
stitutional structures. So far all important decisions taken are by the presidents 
and ministers of the countries involved. This breaks and limits the institutional 
dynamics of  integration. Firstly, because presidents and ministers cannot meet 
frequently. And when they do, instead of discussing a positive agenda, they are 
forced to deal with problems that where once small ones and that could have 
been solved at the level of Mercosur’s lower bodies. Secondly, all intergovern-
mental arrangement needs a dispute-solution mechanism empowered and capable 
to deal with conflicts in a way that creates a pattern that is acceptable by all sides 
and that is able to remove the obstructions to the flow of conflict and conciliation 
proper of growing integration. There are hopes that the newly-created tribunal 
will accomplish its mission. 
Thirdly, there is a concern that Brazil as the most powerful partner might be 
tempted to adopt an hegemonic stand and instead of enhancing regional regimes 
and institutions as a mean to face regional problems, act unilaterally focusing on 
its own economic and political interest and at the expenses of its neighbors. This 
would increase asymmetry and in a long run would jeopardize the very precious 
gains associated with the transition to democracy and the emergence of regional 
integration, gains that are so fundamentally dear to all South American countries 
today, Brazil included. 
Finally a number of critics and supporters o f supranationalism poses the 
following question: can Mercosur continue to exist within its limited 
intergovernmental institutions and mechanisms and be functional? My reply is 
yes. Intergovernmentalism has been for centuries a viable mechanism for dealing 
with international issues. It can present itself in different forms from a modest set 
of periodical meetings of national leaders or policy-makers to discuss common 
problems to a well-defined and bureaucratically dominated institutional body. 
The option taken in favor of minimum institutions for Mercosur avoided the 
creation of a large and expensive set of organizations that would not have 
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already have special bodies dedicated to international issues. It was a concern not 
to create organizations that would not be functional. The transformation of 
national states, the search for economic stability and adaptation to a export-
oriented model are preconditions still to be met and necessary for more 
substantial and concrete integration initiatives such as common macroeconomic 
policies. 
The above must not be interpreted as Mercosur does not need to change. The 
functions of its intergovernmental institutions are not fully explored and m any 
ongoing conflicts would not exist if these institutions were active. 
Mercosur has a long way ahead in order to accomplish its ambitions. So far it 
has been very successful in offering a framework for responding to the region’s 
challenges without conceding to the temptations of adopting automatically other 
models. Taking into consideration the historic and political contexts of the region 
and taking a pragmatic approach instead of an ideological one, Mercosur project 
maintains alive the dream of an independent, democratic, politically and 
economically strong Latin America in a world increasingly asymmetrical.  
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Introduction: Origin and Evolution of the FTAA
* 
 
The benefits associated with Miami becoming the permanent headquarters of the 
Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) were energetically emphasized during 
the preparations of the trade ministerial meeting that took place in November of 
2003.  The overarching idea was that this Secretariat would transform Miami into 
“the Brussels of the Americas.”   
In newspaper columns from around the world, most especially in the Ameri-
cas, the goals and characteristics of the FTAA are frequently, and incorrectly, 
compared to those of the European Union. The repeated comparisons between 
these two processes of regional integration warrant a brief analysis of the current 
state of the FTAA and what it would need in order to be more like the European 
Union.  
According to the organizers of the FTAA meeting in Miami, the expected 
reward for treating the trade representatives of the continent well was to clinch 
the permanent headquarters of the Secretariat.  The FTAA will integrate 800 
million people and a combined GDP of $14  trillion.  With the Secretariat in 
Miami, it is estimated that 90,000 new jobs will be created, payrolls in the state 
will increase by $3.2 billion, and Florida’s gross state product will increase by 
approximately $13.6 billion. 
Miami has been competing with other cities that are likely to reap similar 
benefits including Panama City (Panama), Puebla (Mexico), Port of Spain (Trini-
dad and Tobago) and Atlanta (United States). Denver, Chicago, and San Juan de 
Puerto Rico have recently announced new candidacies.  The administrative 
structure (400 jobs, $27 million in combined incomes, and $12.3 million in fiscal 
benefits) would transform the selected city into a financial, services and political 
center comparable to Geneva, New York, Washington and Brussels. 
                                                 
* This portion was originally presented as a paper at a conference on  “The relations of the 
European Union with Latin America”, organized  by Bocconi University of Milan, on January 15 
and 16 of 2003. In an expanded version, it was published entitled  “El Area de Libre Comercio de 
las Américas (ALCA): Origen, evolución, consecuencias y perspectivas.” Política Internationale, 
Rome, Italy, año XXX, n. 1-2 (enero-abril) 2003, pp. 157-168. For the initial development of the 
paper I wish to thank the bibliographical contributions of Aimee Kanner and Roberto Domínguez, 
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The reference to Brussels stems from the city being considered the “capital” 
of the European Union, which some have mistakenly claimed to be a model for 
the FTAA.  In order to better understand why this in fact is not the case, a 
comparison of the FTAA structure, objectives, and origins with those of the EU 
is in order. 
Since its conception, and in spite of many declarations of political and social 
solidarity, and the subsequent evolution of peripheral activities, the central aim of 
the FTAA has been purely economic. Moreover, the remote origin can be 
identified not with the foundational meeting held in Miami in December of 1994, 
but with the declaration issued by President George H. Bush on the launching of 
an Initiative of the Americas in June of 1990, an idea that simply echoed as an 
enlargement of the more modest initiative of the Caribbean Basin. This wider 
project coincided with the beginning of the negotiations for the implementation 
of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Those were already the 
times when  Washington have shifted gears, from the traditional policy that 
combined the use of the carrot and the stick, abandoning mechanisms of 
assistance and donations, and electing the path of commerce (“trade, not aid”).  
 
From the “Fortress Europe” to American Reaction  
 
In reality, the precise context of the birth of the FTAA was much wider and it 
was not limited to the Western Hemisphere. The epicenter of the current 
ambitious project was not located in any of the capitals seeking to become 
permanent sites. Its origin was, paradoxically, in Brussels, in a Europe that was 
still much depending of the uncertainties of the Cold War. Western Europe had 
been protected by the double umbrella of the nuclear power of NATO and the 
socioeconomic cover of the EC. Some leaders skillfully predicted the epoch-
making changes to be generated by the first moves to reform the Soviet system 
through perestroika and glasnost, resulting in the disintegration of the Soviet 
Union. 
At the helm of the European Commission, Jacques Delors (its most 
influential president since Jean Monnet led the predecessor, the High Authority) 
decided to change the erratic EC course, marooned at the mercy of the 
functionalist method. Since the 60s Europe was affected by “euro sclerosis”, 
under  the ballast of “euro-skepticism” on the integration progress. Political 
uncertainty demanded a drastic change. Another bold step in the best tradition of 
the Schuman Declaration, that set in motion the original European Community of 
Coal and Steel 1950, was in order.  
The magic formula this time was the Single European Act (1987) which, 
with its precedent of the White Paper (1985) and backed by the Delors Plan 
(1989) set the course directly to the Maastricht Treaty of 1992. This was later 
reinforced by the treaties of Amsterdam and Nice in the political terrain and by 
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euro as a common currency in 2002. While the Berlin Wall was collapsing, 
Washington began to perceive the still unborn EU with curiosity, later with some 
uncomfortable feeling and finally as a competitor. The construction of a 
“European Fortress” was the alarm that had to be met at least in the territories 
that were considered as the natural domain of the United States. Latin America 
and the Caribbean were the logical theatre of operations. 
On its own, the European Union, and most significantly some of its member 
states with special interests in the area, proceeded at the beginning of the 90s to 
accelerate its relations with the Latin American subcontinent, through a pincer 
movement of diverse reach and objectives. Within its more active external 
policy, the EU increased its offers of agreements with the varied integration and 
economic cooperation sub-blocs around the world
1. Closely related to this 
interest was the consolidation of the role of Spain in the community institutions, 
especially through Commission portfolios of relations with Latin America and 
development aid held by Spanish commissioners Abel Matutes and Manuel 
Marín. In the same time setting, the Ibero-American Community Project was 
launched using the impulse of the 1992 commemoration, although its energies 
lost a certain steam afterwards
2. Politely, Washington showed uneasiness towards 
both moves. In the uncertain progress made by the Uruguay Round of the GATT, 
Washington perceived the possibility of a division of the world in blocs, instead 
of the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO), a risk that could leave 
the United States without any bloc to belong. 
Taking advantage of the necessary evolution of the Mexican regime, under 
an exhausted PRI after the end of the Cold War, Washington elected to extend 
the trade alliance it had with Canada since 1989 to cover Mexico. Well in the 
90s, the United States then decided to expand the scope to Tierra del Fuego. With 
the Clinton administration at the helm, hemispheric leaders met in Miami in 1994 
with no clear agenda, later filled by an ambitious plan never implemented in 
fashion
3. 
Still, a strategic change was set in motion, leaving aside the priorities of the 
past based on the fight against Marxist threats and electing instead the primacy of 
the market according to a code presented by the United States. This was 
                                                 
1 For a panorama of the external action of the EU, see Joaquín Roy and Roberto Domínguez 
Rivera eds.  Las relaciones exteriores de la Unión Europea (México: Universidad Nacional 
Autónona de México -UNAM-, 2001).  
 
2 See compilation by Roy, The Ibero-American Space and El espacio iberoamericano. 
 
3 See my comments on the first stages of the FTAA: "El Espíritu de Miami: Orden del día, 
resultados y expectativas de la Cumbre de Miami", Anuario Iberoamericano 1995. (Madrid: EFE, 
1995), 473-484; “El proceso de Miami, un año después,” Anuario Iberoamericano 1996  (Madrid: 
Agencia EFE, 1996), 441-449; “Origen y consecuencias de la Cumbre de Miami,” in Integración 
Eurolatinoamericana. Carlos Molina del Pozo (coord.) (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Ciudad 
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composed of fair access for U.S. goods and capitals, the implementation of stable 
macroeconomic policies, institutional capacity to implement them, environmental 
and labor criteria similar to NAFTA, and the non obligatory nature of preferential 
treatment for the less developed countries.
4 
This is the context upon which the hemispheric countries met in Miami in 
1994, setting in motion an institutional process that can be described as 
“summitry” and meetings at different levels, implemented by an itinerant 
schedule though different capitals. From the start, institutional and geographical 
anchorages were discarded. The lack of an institutional base was seen as a mark 
of identity. There was a notable obsession in avoiding a physical link and 
location identification similar to Manhattan with the UN, Brussels with the EU, 
Rome with FAO, Washington with the OAS, the World Bank or the IMF, or 
Geneva with dozens of international organizations.  
The FTAA must be a unique international network, one of a species, an 
emblem of the cyber era and virtual reality. As NAFTA, it does not exist 
anywhere, but it tries to be everywhere thanks to its virtual nature. On the other 
hand, it seems that the functionalist method, by which the progressive pooling of 
portions of sovereignty would generate a deeper integration, has been replaced by 
a more personal and dynamic diplomacy through periodic meetings at the highest 
level of the hemisphere. This procedure has then been delegated to ministers and 
vice-ministers who take global decisions, reinforcing the summitry method.  
This aversion contrasts with the European method based on a systematic 
institutionalization and the precise anchoring of each one of the entities with a 
city, resulting in a competition to obtain the site. In the inter-American context, 
this voluntary escape from institutionalization has as an explanation to correct the 
errors of the first stage of integration, based on grandiose schemes, with a high 
cost of staffing, and poor results. Through the 90s a gap between the European 
integration model and the Western Hemisphere economic “cooperation” fashion 
was confirmed. This trend partially explains why the EU had to reform its 
projects of association with Latin American sub-blocs. Although the initial 
conditioning discourse has been maintained, the pressure for a deeper integration 
has been reduced.
5   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 See chapter by Jaime Estay Reino, “El Area de Libre Comercio”, in Retos e interrelaciones 
de la integración regional: Europa y América Latina, eds. Joaquín Roy, Roberto Domínguez y 
Rafael Velásquez (México: Universidad de Quintana Roo/ Plaza y Valdés, 2002) 
 
5 For an early comparative review of the European and inter-American processes, see the 
content of the compilation by Peter Smith, The Challenge of Integration: Europe and the Americas. 
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The rules of the game  
 
Through the process, a sort of code of principles has been composed to carry out 
the negotiations. In the first place, it is explicitly stated that decisions will be 
taken by consensus. This requirement applies equally to the elaboration of a new 
“legislation”, as well as the reshaping of sectors already committed. In other 
words, from the start there is no possibility that a future structure of the FTAA 
includes a mechanism similar to the “weighed” vote of the EU, a qualified 
majority, in which each one of the members has a number of votes proportionally 
to the population (although small countries are favored), “blocking minorities”, 
or “demographic clauses”. The FTAA will be subject to the threat of a veto by 
one single country, or it will be under the effects of the pressure of the most 
powerful or influential. 
All negotiations will be ruled by the principle of  transparency.  This 
commitment responds to the popular pressure that has considered t he 
experiments of free trade as a monopoly of business interests covered by the 
opacity of governmental negotiations. On the other hand, the process will be 
consistent with rules and disciplines of the WTO and it will be implemented on 
the basis of these disciplines when possible and appropriate. The intention is to 
“enrich” the WTO system, not to substitute it or contradict it. 
The agreement should be  a single commitment. This will avoid the 
construction of diverse Americas at different speeds, or with gradual accessions 
of some countries and others waiting. However, the FTAA may coexist  with 
other bilateral and sub-regional agreements.  Countries may negotiate or accept 
obligations derived from the FTAA process on an individual basis or as members 
of sub-regional integration groups. This issue is subject to certain evaluation and 
interpretation, because there is the possibility that some individual arrangement 
of one of the FTAA members with another world region might be in 
contradiction with some of the stipulations of the FTAA.  The agreement also 
includes a commitment to pay special attention to the  needs of the smaller 
economies. This is a dimension that has been of the utmost preoccupation of the 
small countries (above all, in the Caribbean and Central-America areas) that are 
at the mercy of the effects of globalization and are pressured to opt (without 
controlling the process) for one of the geographical alternatives of regional 
integration.   
Regarding shortcomings and absences, the FTAA does not contemplate the 
extension of the non-existing acquis (to use the EU term for shared competences 
and legislation) to other sectors of the economy. Although some observers have 
pointed out that the FTAA profile is closer to the EU as envisioned in the Single 
European Act than the preceding European Community, the reality is that in the 
present project there is no space for either a Customs Union or a Monetary 
Union. There is no mention of free movement of people. As in NAFTA, this 
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some social, political and even cultural aspects were added to the proposed 
scheme. 
 
Structure and Organization 
 
FTAA negotiations are carried out according to a structure previously arranged 
by its members, in s uch a manner that guarantees an ample geographical 
representation. This structure sets the rotation of the Presidency of the process, 
the sites of the negotiations and the national identification of the Presidents and 
Vice-presidents of the Negotiating Groups and other committees and groups
6. 
The Presidency will rotate each 18 months, or at the moment of the 
conclusion of the ministerial meeting. When the process began, these 
presidencies were successfully appointed: Canada, Argentina, Ecuador, and 
finally Brazil and the United States that share the presidency in what supposedly 
was to be the last stage of the negotiations. 
The  Ministers of  Trade have the responsibility of supervising the 
negotiations. They usually meet at intervals of 18 months at the site of the 
country holding the presidency. 
The Vice Ministers of Trade, organized as a Trade Negotiations Committee 
(TNC)
7, have a central role in the administration of the process. In this function, 
the TNC shapes the work of the negotiation groups and the other committees and 
groups and has the decision-making power over the general structure of the 
agreement and other institutional issues. The TNC is also responsible of assuring 
the full participation of all countries in the process, monitors the transparency of 
the negotiations, supervises the work of the  Secretariat and controls the 
identification and implementation of the measures to facilitate business 
transactions. The Committee meets as often as it is necessary, at least twice a 
year in rotating fashion in different countries. 
There are nine Negotiating Groups
8 with specific mandates given by the 
ministers and the TNC to negotiate in different areas: Market Access; Services; 
Investment; Government Procurement; Dispute Settlement; Agriculture; 
Intellectual Property Rights; Subsidies, Antidumping and Countervailing Duties; 
and Competition Policy. The Negotiating Groups meet regularly through the 
year.  In addition, there are other committees and groups dealing with relevant 
topics for the better process of the negotiations. 
                                                 
6 For a revision of this aspect, see chapter by Eduardo Roldán Acosta, “El Área de Libre 
Comercio de las Américas: Estructura y propósitos,” in Retos e interrelaciones de la integración 
regional: Europa y América Latina, op. cit.  
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The Consultative Group on Smaller Economies follows the evolution of the 
negotiations, and evaluates the interests of the small economies, issuing 
recommendations to the TNC. This group has identified the needs of these 
countries to provide them with technical assistance in trade when they have to 
participate in the negotiations
9. In addition, the Tripartite Committee maintains a 
Trade Education Database in trade matters. 
The FTAA process also created a Committee of Government Representatives 
on the Participation of Civil Society with the objective of increasing the 
transparency of the negotiations and deepening the comprehension and public 
backing of the process. This Committee was also organized with the intention of 
facilitating the participation of the business, labor, environment and academic 
communities, and other sectors that may need to present their particular points of 
view. In the first stage of the negotiations, the Committee issued its first public 
invitation to the civil society of the countries to present their view in a 
constructive way.  
 
Institutional Comparative Perspective 
 
In isolation and in comparison, the institutional structure of the EU is very 
complex. Admittedly, the FTAA is much simpler, and it does not seem that a 
future and final structure will be more complicated than the temporary profiles. 
From a European perspective, the equivalent to the European Council are the 
summits (three until the scheduled for Mar del Plata in Argentina in November of 
2005) that are periodically held. In turn, the trade ministerial meetings are the 
equivalent of the Council of Ministers of the EU. But the absence of other 
institutional base is filled by the FTAA with a virtual and innovative entity, a 
“troika” composed no by governments, but by inter-American organizations (or 
as part of these) in a very sui generis format. This Tripartite Committee, with 
“analytical and technical support“, composed of the Inter-American 
Development Bank (IBD)
10, the Organization of American States (OAS)
11 and 
the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(ECLAC)
12. In other words, these existing entities are placed at the disposal of 
the new network. Their main role is to supply financial, technical and analytical 
support for t he FTAA process. Among its functions, they include the 
maintenance of the official website of the FTAA, as a technical delegation of the 
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11 Organization of American States (OAS): http://www.oas.org/ 
 
12 United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC): 
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Secretariat. These institutions and organizations individually provide other 
technical help in matters related to the FTAA, especially to the countries with 
weaker economies. 
Nonetheless, as in any other international organization with an inter-
governmental profile, the FTAA needs to have an “administrative support”. Its 
location has been for a long time the object of lobbying by countries and cities, 
wishing to host what has been sold as a sort of “Brussels of the Americas”, a 
comparison much beyond the original aims of the FTAA. This Administrative 
Secretariat has been located in the same country site of the negotiations. This 
Secretariat provides logistical and administrative support and services of 
translation and interpretation. For its functioning, the temporary Secretariat, 
instead of receiving a budget from an international organization that does not 
exist, is financed directly by the Tripartite Committee. 
The broad similarities between the two organizations’ institutional structures 
stop with the light comparisons between the summits and the European Councils, 
and equating the ministerial meetings with the EU Council of Ministers. 
In an effort to demonstrate to what lengths the FTAA would have to be taken 
to even remotely resemble the EU, the following unrealistic scenarios should be 
provided, based on the current institutional state of the European Union.  The 
following should be read as a vision as it is not what is likely to occur but what 
would be necessary in order for the FTAA to obtain a system of multilevel 
governance comparable to the EU. 
 
Dreaming an Enhanced FTAA   
 
First, we may imagine that the ministerial meetings are institutionalized, with a 
permanent headquarters similar to that of the Council of the European Union. 
The Summits are institutionalized to take place twice a year, presided over by the 
host country, whose rotation will be decided by an agreement based on equality 
between the sub-regions and the large and small states.  The President of the 
country assuming the FTAA presidency for this period will be considered the 
President of the Americas, similar to the President of a Republic or the Prime 
Minister of a parliamentary democracy. 
In this scenario, Presidential summits are restricted by the traditional 
intergovernmental method (necessary consensus, subject to individual veto). 
However, the Council of Ministers may enjoy supranational authority over trade 
matters through a system of qualified majority voting (much in the EU tradition), 
in which each country is allocated a certain number of votes based on its 
population while overcompensating the small states to ensure relative equality. 
Thirty-four commissioners, nominated by each one of the members of the 
FTAA with impeccable credentials will be needed to form a sort of Inter-
American Commission. Taking into account the compromise made by the EU 
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member Commission to 2/3 of the number of countries), this number is excessive 
and may be reduced in fashion. In any event, these commissioners, including one 
President of the Commission should be nominated by the Inter-American Council 
and approved by and responsible to the Inter-American Parliament.  This Inter-
American Commission would have its permanent headquarters in the same 
location as the permanent Secretariat and each commissioner will be responsible 
for one Directorate General representing the different competences of the trade 
area. 
As in the EU, the Commissioners would not respond to the requests of 
individual national governments but would have the sole authority to propose 
legislation on trade matters.  The Commission has its own financial resources 
provided through a continental tax derived from imports and exports with 
countries outside of the western hemisphere. 
Each one of the American parliaments would select a certain number of 
delegates, proportional to their populations, to form the FTAA (Inter-American) 
Parliament (with a five-year mandate). Within a limited span of time it will be 
elected by universal suffrage as in the case of the European Parliament.  Soon 
thereafter the Inter-American Parliament will gain co-decision powers, sharing 
the legislative decision-making process with the Council on all trade issues. 
A permanent dispute tribunal would replace the ad-hoc governmental panels 
that currently attempt to resolve disputes in NAFTA, and supposedly will do the 
same in the FTAA.  This American Court of Justice would uniformly interpret 
and apply FTAA law across all of the member states.  Its decisions will be 
binding in all member states, and FTAA law has supremacy over national 
legislation.  There will be one judge from each member state but the decisions 
will normally be made by smaller panels of judges, none of which will be from a 
state that is party to the dispute, in order to ensure the independence of this 
institution.  Every five years, the justices will elect a President of the Court of 
Justice from amongst its member judges. 
The competences of each of these institutions would be clear and respected.  
All of the member states will voluntarily pool their sovereignty on trade issues 
(and perhaps others in the future) with these supranational institutions of a higher 
authority. 
To show that these initial measures would be only part of the first stage of a 
more ambitious process, the leaders of thirty-four participating states in this EU-
like FTAA would make a joint declaration regarding an integration process that 
would lead the Americas on a path that would in fact be comparable to the 
European Union.  A free trade area, as the FTAA today is envisioned, would 
have to be followed by a customs union with a common external tariff.  The third 
stage will be the common market. These stages, implemented efficiently, 
guarantee a cohesive development, which is the ultimate goal of the process. 
Naturally, to minimally accomplish the fourth stage of integration (the 
economic union), the FTAA would have to adopt a common currency similar to 270  Roy 
 
the euro (€).  Just as the hegemonic power of the Deutschemark was used as the 
base of the euro, the U.S. dollar will serve the same purpose until a common 
currency with a new name can be consolidated.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Now, let us come back to reality.  Clearly utopian, a political union will not be 
consolidated in this system of regional integration in the Americas. Neither will 
be a truly institutionalized entity with autonomous bodies fully empowered with 
competences and resources.   
The Single European Act of 1986 included the goal of completing the single 
market by 1992; a single market that provides for the free movement of goods, 
services, capital and people; a single market that distinguishes the European 
Union as the most advanced and successful system of regional integration in the 
world today.  It is currently unimaginable that the EU would allow the free flow 
of goods and capital while maintaining strict regulations on the passage of people 
through the internal borders of the EU. While the free movement of goods 
becomes more probable through the FTAA, there remains a pact of silence 
regarding the free movement of people. 
The European Union would still be in its infancy without the transfer of 
funds from the more developed regions to the less developed regions, not through 
a charitable process of conditioned financial assistance, but as a portion of the 
budget controlled and administered by the common institutions, as a stronger 
guarantee of neutrality. This is what many are asking from NAFTA. For the 
FTAA to be truly successful, free trade cannot be its end goal, but there must be 
an attempt to achieve an equal and just integration within individual participating 
countries and throughout the hemisphere. One way to address this is through the 
transfer of development funds from the richest countries and regions to the less 
developed areas in an effort to eradicate poverty and inequality.  
This is in essence the message given by José Miguel Insulza, new Secretary 
General of the Organization of American States at the opening press conference 
and successive declarations of the General Assembly held in Fort Lauderdale, 
Florida, in June of 2005. Unfortunately, besides the many items of disagreement 
between the United States and Latin America, the U.S. representatives insisted on 
an agenda based on “prosperity” and “security”.  
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of the FTAA: Does It Relate to the European Experience? 
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Introduction 
 
What is the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) really about? What kind of 
integration does it consist of? What motivates Western Hemisphere countries to 
move in such a direction? We need to reflect on the meaning and significance of 
the FTAA. At this writing, as we know, it is not entirely clear when there will be 
one. 
It is perhaps easier to say what the FTAA is not about. Most obviously, its 
wellspring is not analogous to the Schuman Declaration, the political origin of 
the European Union announced on May 9, 1950.  That document said quite 
plainly that the pooling of coal and steel between the two main European powers 
would be done to prevent any future war between them:   
 
The solidarity in production thus established will make it plain that any war between 
France and Germany becomes not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible.  
 
There have been wars between states in the Western Hemisphere during the 
past two centuries.  However, they have been limited or minor when compared to 
the European conflicts of the Twentieth Century. World Wars have not rampaged 
through the region, and no one has suggested integration as a necessary way to 
insure international peace.  
Yet, the idea of integration has been around in the Western Hemisphere since 
the independence of these republics. Their initiatives have been motivated by 
other sets of mutual interests. The FTAA is only a recent event in that chain. Let 
me mention just a brief selection of the integration efforts that have transpired. 
Essentially, using very disparate threads, a web of relationships has been woven 
over a long period, converging into the FTAA concept. 
In 1826, Simon Bolívar inspired the Congress of Panama,
1 an effort to weld 
together the newly free states of northern Latin America. He invited the U.S. 
president, John Quincy Adams, who, though not especially an admirer of Latin 
Americans, was eager that his government attend the sessions. A reluctant 
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Congress, however, held up the approval of the two U.S. representatives and then 
delayed the funding of their trip until it was too late for them to get there before it 
had ended.  Does that sound familiar? 
The Congress of Panama was attended by four American states--Mexico, 
Central America, Gran Colombia, and Peru. The "Treaty  of Perpetual Union, 
League, and Confederation" drawn up at that congress would have bound all 
parties to mutual defense and to the peaceful settlement of disputes. Only 
Colombia ratified it, however, and  Bolivar’s dream failed so completely that he 
lamented before his death that to support revolutions was “to plough in the sea.” 
A subsequent step toward integration was taken in 1889, when the First In-
ternational Conference of American States, commonly known as the Pan Ameri-
can Conference, convened in Washington, DC. Its driving force was James G. 
Blaine, the American secretary of state. Its result, an initiative “ for the prompt 
collection and distribution of commercial information” established the Commer-
cial Bureau of the American Republics in Washington, with a secretariat. Some 
18 Western Hemisphere nations, including the United States, joined it. In 1910, 
the Commercial Bureau became the Pan American Union, and philanthropist 
Andrew Carnegie donated $5 million to construct a permanent headquarters, the 
beautiful building in Washington, which today is the headquarters of the Organi-
zation of American States. 
Other periods of United States-Latin American relations, while signifying 
interaction between these parts of the Hemisphere, can hardly be associated with 
integration. I refer to War of 1898 and Cuba, the Panama Canal, the period 
known as “dollar diplomacy,” and the various interventions by the United States 
in Central America, the Caribbean and several times in Mexico.
2 
Franklin Roosevelt created a positive relationship with Latin America though 
his embracing the “non-intervention” principle, abolition of the Platt 
Amendment, and an ambitious program of educational and cultural interchange. 
It accounted for strong support from most of Latin America during World War II 
and set the stage for the Rio Treaty (1947) and the Organization of American 
States (1948) after the war. They were, for the United States, essentially security 
arrangements based on the Cold War. Those Latin Americans who hoped that 
they might be the precursor of a Marshall Plan were bitterly disappointed. 
President Juscelino Kubitschek of Brazil proposed an ambitious integration 
scheme called “Operation Pan America” in the late 1950’s which linked 
economic and development components to s ecurity considerations.  It stated 
“The more rapid development of Latin America's economic strength will result in 
a growing sense of vitality and will enable it to increase its contribution to the 
defense of the West.” 
3  The establishment of the Inter-American Development 
Bank in December 1959 is a result of his efforts. The Hemisphere-wide 
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development theme was advocated powerfully to President Dwight D. 
Eisenhower by his brother, Milton Eisenhower, who prepared a report on the 
region. 
During the Eisenhower years, in fact, plans were being drawn up to 
implement some of Kubitschek’s and Milton Eisenhower’s ideas. Nonetheless, it 
fell to the new John F.  Kennedy Administration in 1961 to propose the Alliance 
for Progress. The Cuban revolution obviously gave it a Cold War rationale, as 
well, similar to that of the Marshall Plan; there must be no more Cubas. At the 
same time, it was clearly an integrative advance, and President Kennedy cited 
Operation Pan America in launching it. The Alliance’s vision was bold: 
 
And if we are successful, if our effort is bold enough and determined enough, then 
the close of this decade will mark the beginning of a new era in the American experience. 
The living standards of every American family will be on the rise, basic education will be 
available to all, hunger will be a forgotten experience, the need for massive outside help 
will have passed, most nations will have entered a period of self-sustaining growth, and, 
although there will be still much to do, every American Republic will be the master of its 
own revolution and its own hope and progress.
4 
 
By the late 1960’s, the Alliance had nearly run out of steam, so to speak, but 
one last effort aimed at a true integration project. The Organization of American 
States held a Meeting of American Chiefs of State in Punta del Este, Uruguay 
from April 12-14, 1967, which President Lyndon B. Johnson attended. Its 
centerpiece was none other than a genuine common market: 
 
Beginning in 1970, to establish progressively the Latin American Common Market, 
which should be substantially in operation within a period of no more than fifteen years. 
 
The Latin American Common Market will be based on the improvement of the two 
existing systems: the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) and the Central 
American Common Market (CACM). The two systems will initiate simultaneously a 
process of convergence by stages of cooperation, closer ties, and integration, taking into 
account the interest of the Latin American countries not yet associated with these 
systems, in order to provide their access to one of them. 
5 
 
The United States promised to assist this process with substantial aid. But 
President Johnson was increasingly bogged down in Vietnam, and the largely 
authoritarian countries of Latin America were not at any stage of readiness for a 
common market. Their economic policies became increasingly centered on 
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protectionism, import-substitution industrialization, state-owned enterprise, and 
borrowing as preferable to foreign direct investment. 
In 1969, President Richard Nixon asked Nelson Rockefeller to prepare a 
complete report on the state of U.S.-Latin American Relations and the region’s 
political, economic, financial and social conditions.
6 Arguing for more U.S. 
attention to the region, it foresaw many of the issues which would later come to 
the forefront, including the debt crisis of the 1980’s. But the Vietnam War had 
not ended, and the report, along with attention to Latin America, was laid aside. 
The preferred economic policies ran their course with the debt crisis of the 
1980’s, properly termed a “lost decade,” until they were replaced by neo-liberal 
reforms, beginning in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s. Economic failure also 
helped effect the restoration of democratic governments.
7 Moreover, the end of 
the Cold War enabled the United States to take a different view of the Hemi-
sphere, among other things taking away the attractiveness of supporting anti-
communist dictatorships.  
Large steps forward occurred during the administration of President George 
H.W. Bush during 1990.  The significant economic policy transformations in 
Mexico under the de la Madrid and Salinas de Gortari governments made the 
start of the NAFTA negotiations possible (building on the already existing FTA 
with Canada.) The debt workout using Brady bonds would put the debt crisis into 
the background. On June 27, 1990, President Bush announced the Enterprise for 
the Americas Initiative, resting on the tripod of debt workout (linked to 
environment initiatives), stimulation of new  investment, and trade initiatives 
reaching beyond NAFTA. Bush’s vision was one of a democratic free trade 
region reaching from Alaska to Tierra del Fuego. 
Part of the Bush motivation may have been the U.S. economic interest in a 
world that might be dividing up into trading blocs, if the Uruguay Round of the 
GATT were unsuccessful. Under such circumstances, the United States might not 
have a trading bloc to call its own in which it enjoyed such high market share. 
But NAFTA negotiations were not the only game going on in the 
Hemisphere. Bilateral and regional integration efforts were breaking out all over. 
On March 26, 1991 the Southern Cone countries of  Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay 
and Paraguay signed the Treaty of Asunción, establishing the MERCOSUR 
common market. Not just a free trade agreement, it was to be a European-style 
common market. The agreement provided: 
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The States Parties hereby decide to establish a common market, which shall be in 
place by 31 December 1994 and shall be called the "common market of the southern 
cone" (MERCOSUR).  
This common market shall involve:  
The free movement of goods, services and factors of production between countries 
through, inter alia, the elimination of customs duties and non-tariff restrictions on the 
movement of goods, and any other equivalent measures;  
The establishment of a common external tariff and the adoption of a common trade 
policy in relation to third States or groups of States, and the co-ordination of positions in 
regional and international economic and commercial forums;  
The co-ordination of macroeconomic and sectoral policies between the States Parties 
in the areas of foreign trade, agriculture, industry, fiscal and monetary matters, foreign 
exchange and capital, services, customs, transport and communications and any other 
areas that may be agreed upon, in order to ensure proper competition between the States 
Parties.
8 
 
Despite a deep division among Democrats, President Bill Clinton completed 
and signed the NAFTA and then waged the political fight in the Congress for its 
approval, which finally came in late 1993. It was a true Armageddon between 
those two great macro-tendencies in U.S. politics, the globalist-free traders and 
the protectionists.  (The following year U.S. adhesion to the WTO was fought the 
same way, though less acrimoniously.) An interesting speculation is whether the 
NAFTA legislation could have passed if it were not for an expensive public 
relations campaign put on by the Mexican Embassy in Washington, aimed at the 
U.S. public. 
In December 1993 Vice-President Al Gore was in Mexico City, mending 
fences after the rough atmospherics of the U.S. Congressional debate. There he 
made the surprise announcement that President Clinton would invite all of the 
Hemisphere’s heads of state and government to a meeting in the United States in 
1994. This, of course, ultimately turned out to be the Summit of the America, in 
Miami, in December 1994. All countries in the Western Hemisphere were there 
except Cuba, and they were represented by freely-elected leaders. 
The FTAA turned out to be the centerpiece of the Summit, though, strangely, 
that was only decided upon in October. Well, not so strangely, there were 
members of the Clinton Administration still licking their political wounds over 
NAFTA and determined that there would be “no more NAFTAS.” But, 
consensus prevailed at the Summit, and the long process was begun toward a 
FTAA. To keep momentum going, the first Trade Ministerial meeting was set for 
the following spring in Denver, to begin the FTAA’s implementation. 
There were several obvious holes in the FTAA web from the outset which 
would have to be filled in.  
First, it was plain that there was no commonly-held design or blueprint. In 
general, NAFTA countries assumed that the FTAA would be a sort of NAFTA 
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rolling southward until it reached Tierra del Fuego.
9 Meanwhile, in Brasilia, 
other thoughts ran strong: perhaps the deeping of MERCOSUR to become a kind 
of SAFTA to negotiate more evenly with the North. 
Second, there was no entity around which to build the FTAA; nothing which 
would correspond to the European institutions created from the beginning of the 
1950’s. This was deliberate; countries of the Americas are highly nationalistic 
and would not countenance the erosion of sovereignty which has taken place in 
Europe. The idea of some creeping supranational authority, accepted early on in 
Europe, was and still is anathema on this side of the Atlantic. 
Third, despite the bold declarations to the contrary, there was no successful 
way to bring the private sector and civil society directly into the process.  When 
the Trade Ministerial meetings began, to be sure there were Business Forums 
seeking private sector input, and finally a civil society forum was held along with 
the Miami meeting in December 2003. Their input has not been direct, however. 
Fourth, from the beginning there has been some doubt about the U.S. com-
mitment, without which there can be no FTAA. In 1995 the “fast-track” authority 
ran out which allowed up-or-down voting in the Congress for trade agreements. 
It was only restored (under the new name Trade Promotion Authority) in the 
George W. Bush Administration in 2002 (but runs out again in June 2005). Al-
though the U.S.-Chile FTA passed the Congress and has had one good year of 
positive accomplishment, it is not clear at this writing whether the DR-CAFTA 
regional FTA will be approved. 
Another problem for the FTAA, of course, is the issue of the smaller 
economies (over half of the FTAA countries) and whether they can survive 
without more special arrangements than now seem to be offered. After all, the 
special aid offered to new European Common Market countries in the past 
(Ireland, Greece, Spain, Portugal) has been essential to their integration. 
But after two more full Summits (Santiago, 1998 and Québec, 2001, two 
special summits (Santa Cruz on sustainable development in 1996 and Monterrey 
on security and democracy in 2004), and a projected one (Mar del Plata, 
November 2005, which President Bush will attend) the process continues. Never 
mind that it did not make its completion date of January 2005. That was an 
arbitrary and speculative goal when chosen at the Miami Summit. 
The emphasis today in South America seems to be movement toward 
regional integration, as does the movement by the United States and its closer-in 
neighbors. Meanwhile, the idea of a North American Community, elucidated at 
this conference by Dr. Robert A. Pastor,
10 may be the closest thing at this end of 
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the Hemisphere to the beginnings of European-style integration, based, as it is, 
on the reality of economic relationships. 
11 The recent meeting in Crawford, 
Texas between the three NAFTA country leaders underscored that vision, even 
though it produced little results. 
How far and how fast will the Hemispheric relationships progress, of which 
the FTAA is a paradigm rather than a tangible reality? There are, of course, 
external relationships to be taken into account: The European Union has FTA’s 
with Mexico and Chile; Chile and Mexico are members of APEC. MERCOSUR 
and the EU have held talks, though the most recent meeting of negotiators this 
month ended on a dismal note.
12 
As for the United States, as Latin Americans are well aware, its policy 
toward Latin America and the Caribbean has long been characterized by sporadic 
periods of attention punctuated by longer periods of inattention.  In the view of 
many, the United States can and should do better in the region in pursuit of its 
own national interests.
13 This country’s leadership now focuses on homeland 
security, the war on terrorism, and the problem of failing states around the world. 
The outcome (and exit plan) in Iraq is far from clear. 
 Moises Naim, editor of Foreign Policy magazine, said that despite President 
Bush’s presence at the Monterrey summit last year, which pleased Latin 
American leaders, “…the reality is that Latin America, usually seen as the US 
backyard, has become Atlantis, the lost continent.”  
As in many situations, it is useful to look at U.S. relationships before and 
after the date of September 11, 2001, which changed the U nited States’ 
relationship with the world to such an extent. President George W. Bush began 
his administration in 2001 with a great deal of obvious interest in Latin America. 
His first foreign visit was with President Vicente Fox of Mexico, and the two 
discussed a special migration accord (strongly desired by Mexico but which 
became a non-starter). President Bush committed to achieving the FTAA on 
schedule in 2005 and an “early harvest” of business facilitation measures. At the 
Quebec Summit of the Americas, shortly after his inauguration, he endorsed a 
“democracy clause” for the FTAA, which, was  encompassed in the “Democratic 
Charter” signed at Lima  on September 11, 2001 by Secretary Powell. It makes 
democracy the only accepted norm in the Western Hemisphere, a policy which 
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President Bush had given strong endorsement. In this important respect, the 
FTAA process coincides with the norms and standards of the EU. 
After September 11, 2001 Latin America showed its solidarity with the 
United States by adopting an Organization of American States (OAS) resolution 
proposed by Brazil on September 21 to invoke the Rio Treaty, as an attack on a 
member state which called for action by all members. Nevertheless, it was clear 
that other priorities, obviously the war against al- Qaeda and the Taliban regime 
in Afghanistan, dominated the scene. The special relationship with Mexico faded 
in importance, and there was some doubt as to whether the Congress would give 
Trade Promotion Authority to the President in order to stay on course with the 
FTAA. The general world economic downturn and especially that of the United 
States affected Latin America profoundly, cutting its already low growth rate to 
almost zero and negative in some countries. 
Beginning early in 2002¸ however, the  picture improved. On January 16, 
2002, President Bush addressed the OAS, again committing this country to the 
FTAA and announcing his intent to pursue a free trade agreement with Central 
America. U.S. Trade Representative Zoellick presented a strong pro-trade testi-
mony to the Senate on February 7. In March 2002 President Bush visited 
Mexico, El Salvador and Peru, and he began the final push for Trade Promotion 
Authority and other measures of a trade bill approved by the Congress in August. 
In Monterrey, Mexico, on March 14, 2003, President Bush announced the crea-
tion of the Millennium Challenge Account, which, by 2006, adds 50 percent to 
the core development assistance funding of 2002. From 2006 onwards, $5 billion 
per year would be put into that account. In the meanwhile, however, the Admini-
stration also showed a protectionist face by adopting special tariffs on steel and 
by supporting a $180 billion farm subsidy bill. These measures again raised 
doubts about U.S. credibility in free trade.  
From the beginning of this administration, it has seemed that President Bush 
is the one person in his administration who has had the highest interest in Latin 
America, and that this interest is personal. His closest advisors, such as Vice 
President Cheney, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, National Security Advisor 
Rice and even Secretary of State Powell, were not previously known to have any 
special interest in the Western Hemisphere.   
On a concluding note, it is evident that the United States still enjoys a great 
deal of goodwill in Latin America and the Caribbean. The Iraq crisis, and then 
the subsequent war and present occupation under violent circumstances have 
provoked very strong anti-U.S. attitudes in many parts of the world.  Latin 
America and the Caribbean have c onstituted a region perhaps somewhat less 
affected by that phenomenon than in other places. Their countries have their own 
pressing matters to attend to, and they need help. It is also a part of the world 
with which the United States shares a great many goals and aspirations. It should 
simply find ways to expand its attention span to give the Western Hemisphere the 
consistent focus in its policy mix that is compatible with broader, long-term Reflections on the Development and Prospects of the FTAA  279 
 
national interests. Public opinion polls (Zogby, Latinobarómetro) reflect highly 
unfavorable attitudes in Latin America toward Bush Administration policies, as 
much as 87 percent among opinion leaders. These probably signify, as much as 
anything else, a sense of frustration from the relative low priority given to the 
region by Washington under present circumstances. 
Shared values and common interests still come to the fore, however.  Latin 
American response to this year’s Haiti crisis has been impressive. Chile sent 
troops within 36 hours of President Aristide’s departure, to join the U.S., 
Canadian and French forces in Haiti. It since sent a second increment on March 
9. Brazil is now in charge of the international peacekeeping contingent. It is an 
impressive demonstration of shared responsibilities in the Hemisphere. 
How will the relationship play out in the future?  Latin America continues to 
hope for a greater role of partnership with the United States. At the same time, it 
is in a mode of deepening its economic ties with the rest of the world, especially 
Europe and Asia. 
On another positive note, Chile, Brazil and Argentina have benefited from 
the rise of the Chinese economy. Although the region cannot compete with China 
in manufactured goods, China has become an excellent customer for agricultural 
products, especially soy, livestock, and mineral products such as iron ore. China 
is now Chile’s third-largest trading partner. President Hu spent 12 days on a tour 
of Latin American and Caribbean countries last year. Among other things, he 
promised increased investment. Chinese purchases of agricultural and mineral 
products are partially responsible for the upturn in the growth rates in several 
Latin American countries.  
China is on the move in other areas as well. Because of dogged U.S. 
opposition to the International Criminal Court, eleven Latin American countries 
which once sent military officers for training and education to the United States 
(about 700-800 officers) are now unable to do so under a U.S. law because of 
their countries’ refusal to sign “Article 98” agreements (i.e., agreeing never to 
turn over a U.S. person to the ICC). According to U.S. military sources, many of 
them are now going to China at the invitation of the Peoples’ Liberation Army. 
As the EU enters its bold new step of enlargement, it is all too clear that 
nothing similar will happen any time soon in the Western Hemisphere. The 
European willingness to experiment with political institutions and to trade 
elements of national sovereignty for closer integration, remain a distant model for 
this part of the world.  
 
The FTAA: Current Status and Prospects 
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Introduction 
 
Trade negotiations progress at a deliberate pace. When the task is to negotiate a 
free trade agreement (FTA), the process can become even more tentative.  Offi-
cials must balance the interests of participating countries in terms of coverage, 
depth of reform, and time period to implement or phase-in the terms of the 
agreement. Because the objective of FTA negotiations is to eliminate trade barri-
ers between the signatory countries, the politics of FTA negotiations can be more 
difficult to manage than global trade deals (where most-favored nation (MFN) 
liberalization can be limited or avoided entirely for import-sensitive products).
1 
Often, the negotiating timetable must be extended to resolve unexpected prob-
lems or to accommodate the domestic political calendars. 
Thus, it is not surprisingly that the negotiation of a Free Trade Area of the 
Americas (FTAA), comprising 34 democratic countries in the Western 
Hemisphere, has struggled to advance over the past decade.  The Summit of the 
Americas in Miami in December 1994 provided the original mandate for an 
FTAA that would progressively eliminate barriers to trade and investment in the 
hemisphere and targeted the completion of the negotiations no later than January 
2005.  After several years of consultations and preparations, the trade talks were 
finally launched after the Santiago Summit in April 1998. Seven years later, the 
original deadline for concluding the trade deal has passed and negotiations 
remain at an impasse.  With each passing month of inactivity, doubts grow about 
the viability of the exercise. 
By any standard, the FTAA is the most ambitious free trade initiative of the 
postwar trading system. The 34 FTAA participants span the world’s richest and 
poorest, and largest and smallest, countries. Never before have countries of such 
widely diverse size and level of development joined together to negotiate a recip-
rocal trade pact. Crafting a free trade pact among this diverse group of countries 
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was never going to be easy. The task has been further complicated by the finan-
cial crises and political turmoil that beset many Latin American participants since 
the FTAA talks began, the US economic downturn in 2001–02, and the new se-
curity imperatives of the post-9/11 world. 
This short paper examines the current status of the FTAA negotiations and 
posits what needs to be done to get the talks back on track.  To better understand 
the current negotiating stakes, I first briefly discuss the historical factors that 
precipitated the hemisphere-wide trade initiative. 
 
Why Did Countries Want an FTAA? 
 
Why did the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) reverse 
decades of antipathy to formal trade ties with the United States and support—and 
in some cases actively lobby for--a free trade deal with the world’s industrial 
superpower?  The answer is complex and requires more analysis than can be 
devoted in this short paper.  But in most cases, the policy reversal reflected a sea 
change in national economic policies and development strategies caused by the 
failure of the import-substitution model of development of the 1960s and 1970s, 
the collapse of debt finance in the wake of the Latin American debt crisis of the 
1980s, and the inexorable competitive pressures emanating from the advance of 
globalization. 
Why did the United States promote the idea of an FTAA with the LAC 
region?   Visions of a hemisphere-wide free trade zone were expounded by 
Ronald Reagan a generation ago, but were shunted aside during the lost decade 
of the 1980s as debt problems, high levels of trade protection, civil strife, 
corruption, and autocratic rule in the LAC region burdened US-Latin American 
relations. 
While Ronald Reagan may have put the vision of hemispheric free trade into 
words, the leaders of Mexico deserve credit for taking decisions that provoked 
other LAC countries to embrace trade talks with the United States.  Mexican 
President Miguel de la Madrid turned to economic reform in 1985 essentially 
because there were no other viable alternatives. Carlos Salinas followed and ac-
celerated the reform program during his term in office. His pivotal decision to 
request an FTA with the United States in early 1990 can be seen as the first con-
crete step toward a hemispheric trade pact. Instead of slowing down the reform 
process to “digest” the substantial economic adjustments incurred in the 1980s, 
Salinas used the prospect of the FTA to accelerate the pace of economic change 
within Mexico and to encourage inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI). In 
fact, the mere announcement effect of FTA talks elicited significant new com-
mitments of FDI in Mexico in anticipation of the new trade regime with the 
United States. 
When Mexico and the United States announced the launch  of FTA 
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the talks several months later, other countries in the LAC region faced a new 
competitive challenge for market share in and FDI from the United States.  The 
purpose of NAFTA for Mexico was to complement ongoing domestic reforms 
and create new trade and investment opportunities within the Mexican 
economy—some at the expense of neighboring countries.  The prospective 
NAFTA preferences posed a real competitive threat to countries participating in 
the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) and in the Andean Trade Preferences Act 
(ATPA).  Those countries either had to emulate the Mexican (and Chilean) 
reforms—following a strategy of competitive liberalization—or risk losing trade 
and investment to countries offering a more hospitable business climate. 
The United States could not say “no” to the audacious Mexican proposal, but 
US officials were cognizant of the potential adverse effects the NAFTA could 
have on nascent economic and political reform in the LAC region.  Accordingly, 
President George H. W. Bush announced the “Enterprise for the Americas 
Initiative” (EAI) just a few weeks after the US-Mexico decision to develop an 
FTA.  The EAI had three main pillars: trade, finance, and debt.  It was designed 
to support the new commitment to democracy and market-oriented reforms 
throughout the LAC region by expanding regional trade and investment and 
helping to reduce national debt burdens (by augmenting the Brady Plan).  Trade 
was the focal point of the EAI, with the ultimate goal of creating a Western 
Hemisphere FTA.
2 
The EAI soon was overshadowed by ongoing negotiations of the NAFTA 
and the Uruguay Round, and subordinated to new initiatives involving the rapidly 
growing nations of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum.  The 
onset of annual Summit meetings of APEC leaders, starting in Seattle in 
November 1993, posed a sharp contrast to US relations with the LAC region.  To 
its credit, the Clinton administration subsequently proposed a new Summit of the 
Americas to parallel the APEC process.  The resulting meeting in Miami in 
December 1994 echoed the APEC commitment to free trade and investment in 
the region by 2010/2020 issued three weeks earlier with the mandate to negotiate 
a FTAA within a decade.
3 
What is the FTAA Really About? 
 
The FTAA was never meant to unite the economies of the Western Hemisphere; 
it merely sought to eliminate barriers to trade and investment among participating 
countries.  To be sure, some officials projected a broader vision of the FTAA, 
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and sought to borrow elements of the European integration model for the FTAA 
process, particularly the use of regional aids to promote growth in less-developed 
countries.  Small developing economies have called for special FTAA funds to 
transfer resources from North America to poorer parts of the LAC region akin to 
the regional development grants funded by the richer, northern European 
countries as inducements to get new members to join the European Community.  
Similarly, Mexican leaders also have sought increased NADBank financing for 
public infrastructure projects.  None of these countries, however, buys into the 
political side of the European bargain—the ceding of sovereignty to supra-
regional bodies—since in the Western Hemisphere context that would translate 
into US hegemony over the LAC region.
4 
For that reason, the FTAA always had a more traditional and discrete trade 
objective: to remove barriers to trade in goods and services between the countries 
of North and South America.  It is not a surrogate or a channel for development 
aid; however, the trade and regulatory reforms implemented in response to FTAA 
provisions can and should be important components of national development 
strategies.  Indeed, what distinguishes the US-LAC trade initiatives from many 
ventures between other developed and developing countries around the globe is 
the recognition of the developing countries that they need to adjust their domestic 
policies both to attract foreign investment and to promote competition in the 
home market.  Without sustained economic reform—abetted by FTAs but 
primarily driven by domestic development imperatives—trade pacts will not 
generate the expected gains to trade and economic growth. 
As mandated by Summit leaders, the FTAA is a self-contained negotiation 
among the 34 democratic countries in the hemisphere.  As a practical matter, 
however, these countries already are moving toward free trade at different speeds 
with different countries in the region.  There already are numerous FTAs linking 
countries in North and South America, FTAs or customs unions among LAC 
neighbors, and a variety of “partial scope” trade accords that grant sector specific 
benefits to bilateral trading partners.  Except for the NAFTA, most of these 
accords involve small volumes of trade:  for example, intra-Mercosur exports in 
2003 totaled only $12.7 billion or 12 percent of global exports of the four 
countries (down from 25 percent in 1999).  By contrast, intra-NAFTA exports 
were valued at about $609 billion in 2003, and accounted for 57 percent of total 
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exports of the three countries that year—and almost 80 percent of total trade 
between the Western Hemisphere countries.
5 
The United States accounts for much of hemispheric trade and large shares of 
the total trade of the Central American and Andean countries.  Moreover, much 
of that trade is or will be liberalized under existing and prospective FTAs.  The 
United States already has implemented FTAs with Canada, Chile, and Mexico, 
has signed but not ratified pacts with the five Central American countries and the 
Dominican Republic; and is currently negotiating FTAs with Colombia, Ecuador, 
Panama, and Peru.  What’s left is mainly US-Caricom and US-Mercosur trade. 
Why then bother with a FTAA?  The short answer is that an FTAA would 
yield both economic and foreign policy benefits.  First, the FTAA would have 
beneficial effects on the conduct of overall economic policy in and economic 
relations among the participating countries.  Second, the FTAA would link the 
major economies of North and South America, whose bilateral trade—as 
projected by gravity models—could expand two or three-fold in response to 
FTA-type reforms.
6 
Many LAC countries already have open access to the US market for most 
merchandise products because of CBI and ATPA preferences, or because US 
MFN tariffs are zero or very low.  Of course, there are a few notable exceptions, 
mostly involving agricultural goods; these products have been immune to deep 
MFN reforms and often are excluded from FTA or unilateral trade preferences.  
For many countries, the value of their bilateral FTAs and the FTAA is more 
secure access to the US market since these trade pacts turn their unilateral 
preferences into contractual obligations.  By “locking in” open access to markets, 
free trade pacts help reduce uncertainty about the future course of trade and 
regulatory policies and thus facilitate business planning and investment.  For 
many developing countries, this benefit is key to the success of their investment-
led development strategies. 
The FTAA initiative does cover one big gap in the free trade matrix of the 
Western Hemisphere. The largest countries of North and South America—which 
also are those with the lowest trade openness ratios—engage in free trade talks 
with each other only in the hemispheric context.  Bilateral trade between the 
United States and Brazil is relatively small; two-way trade was $35 billion in 
2004—by contrast, US-Mexico trade was valued at $266 billion. 
Compared to their peak in 1997, US merchandise exports to Brazil in 2003 
were 33 percent lower due to the economic crises in Brazil (and subsequently 
Argentina).  By contrast, US imports from Brazil have continued to grow 
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markedly and were 86 percent higher in 2003 than in 1997.
7  Bilateral trade in 
services also has grown rapidly; US services exports have more than doubled 
since 1992 and imports have almost tripled. 
Gravity models indicate a large US-Brazil bilateral trade deficiency; in other 
words, the United States and Brazil trade less with each other than is expected 
given the magnitude of the two economies and the distance between them.  If the 
United States and Brazil had access to each other’s market comparable to that 
existing in the NAFTA region (adjusted for market size, per capita income, and 
geography), US-Brazil trade could quickly double (or more).  Of course, to 
achieve such results, the main barriers to bilateral trade would need to be 
liberalized. 
In addition to trade gains, the United States has a sizeable investment stake in 
the Brazilian economy—and Brazil has an important interest in encouraging 
additional FDI from the United States and elsewhere.  At yearend 2002, US 
holdings in Brazil were valued at $32 billion on a historical cost basis—though 
down from its peak of $39 billion in 2000.  Part of this growth can be attributed 
to the participation of US firms in the privatization of Brazilian energy and 
telecommunications companies, but a significant share has been placed in 
manufacturing plants that serve both the large Brazilian market and other export 
markets.  More than one third of US FDI in manufacturing in the LAC region is 
in Brazil. 
The United States and Brazil will continue to co-chair the FTAA talks for 
their duration.  An FTAA deal will not get done unless the two countries bridge 
their differences and offer concrete new opportunities for their exporters and 
investors in each other’s markets. 
 
FTAA:  Current Status 
 
Bluntly put, the FTAA negotiations have been stuck in the mud since the Miami 
ministerial meeting of November 2003.  At that time, soon after the failed WTO 
meeting in Cancun in September 2003 that had led to a breakdown in the Doha 
Round of multilateral trade negotiations, trade officials were under intense 
pressure “not to fail.”  While the substantive differences  between the major 
protagonists were perhaps greater on the FTAA negotiating table than in the 
WTO talks, the co-chairs of the FTAA process—the United States and Brazil—
produced a procedural compromise that allowed them to shake hands and 
promise to resume negotiating in early 2004.  Looked at another way, trade 
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ministers put a governor on the carburetor of the FTAA engine so that talks could 
sputter but not totally stall out. 
  Declaration adopted a new two-track approach to the FTAA.  Ministers 
agreed to continue talks in all the existing negotiating groups, but offered coun-
tries greater flexibility to opt out of making commitments in sensitive areas.  In 
essence, ministers “affirmed their commitment to a comprehensive and balanced 
FTAA” (paragraph 5), which includes “provisions in each of the [FTAA] negoti-
ating areas” (paragraph 10).  However, they also agreed that countries could take 
specific issues or products off the table, and some “countries may assume differ-
ent levels of commitments” (paragraph 7). 
This diplomatic double-speak basically accommodated two levels of 
negotiation:  a core FTAA in which countries could exclude sensitive issues, and 
supplementary accords by a subset of FTAA participants that covered “FTAA-
plus” commitments—otherwise referred to as “plurilateral” agreements that only 
obligate those countries that sign the specific pact.  Thus, if Brazil and others did 
not want to negotiate on investment and intellectual property issues, they could 
opt out of a hemispheric accord in those areas while the United States and others 
could adopt a more comprehensive accord among a subset of FTAA participants 
(probably the same countries that already have signed FTAs with the United 
States). 
The value of the plurilateral approach is unclear, since  there is little 
“additionality” if the pacts exclude important LAC countries like Brazil and 
basically replicate existing obligations in bilateral FTAs involving the United 
States.  At best, plurilateral pacts would harmonize the terms of existing FTAs 
inter alia by augmenting Canadian obligations in NAFTA and unraveling 
politically sensitive compromises on FTA origin rules for textiles, clothing, and 
agricultural products. Such a result is highly unlikely. A more limited outcome 
would not seem sufficient t o justify the political cost/risk of going back to 
Congress for another vote on these pacts. 
The plurilateral option was introduced to accommodate the incremental 
development of an FTAA through a series of iterative negotiations.  In so doing, 
however, it has made it more difficult to take the first step. 
To many observers, mandate seemed to walk away from the comprehensive 
trade accord that hemispheric leaders promised at the Summit of the Americas in 
1994, and had reiterated at their subsequent reunions i n Santiago (1998) and 
Quebec City (2001). Some countries took mandate as license to try to remove 
entire areas from the talks—leading some observers to derisively label the poten-
tial outcome “FTAA-lite.” The Brazilians certainly thought that they had pared 
down the negotiating agenda to core issues that need not include subjects sensi-
tive to them—particularly, investment and intellectual property rights (IPRs)—
but such a result is not viable since the United States could not agree to liberalize 
its own border barriers to trade in the absence of reciprocal benefits for US trad-
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US or Brazilian officials be able to garner political support to reform longstand-
ing barriers protecting farmers, manufacturers, and service providers? 
Simply put, the Miami Declaration complicates the task of crafting a 
balanced package of concessions that negotiators can sell to their respective 
legislatures.  It took pressure off the Brazilian negotiators by giving them an 
excuse for their minimalist position on so-called WTO-plus issues—i.e., those 
that go beyond the scope of existing WTO rights and obligations.  For Brazil, the 
Miami decision seemed to condone a FTAA that simply removed traditional 
border barriers and did not require commitments on new issues like investment 
and competition policy.  At the same time, it allowed US officials to defend 
inaction on US farm barriers because of lack of reciprocity from their Brazilian 
counterparts.  An “Alphonse and Gaston” routine, without the French diplomatic 
flair! 
As a practical matter, the Miami mandate could produce a meaningful result, 
but it probably won’t.  To succeed, the talks will have to produce concrete new 
opportunities for all countries, and particularly for the co-chairs in each other’s 
market.  That means Brazil must negotiate, for example, on services, government 
procurement, and intellectual property issues, and that the United States must be 
willing to improve market access for a number of Brazilian agricultural and 
processed agricultural products. 
To date, U.S. and Brazilian negotiators have been constrained by domestic 
political opposition to liberalization in areas of interest to the other: 
 
•  US officials are reluctant to discuss import-sensitive products like sugar 
(just ask the Australians!), and can’t address Brazilian concerns about 
domestic farm subsidies in the FTAA (since such problems require 
reform commitments from all significant producers in the world 
market)—and won’t be able to do so in the Doha Round until the 
Congress begins drafting the next US farm bill in 2006. 
 
•  Similarly, Brazil is reluctant to offer reforms in services, intellectual 
property rights, investment, and government procurement—not just be-
cause there is little on offer yet from the United States but, more impor-
tantly, because of domestic resistance to reform its own high border and 
regulatory barriers to trade. 
 
As a result, FTAA talks have stalled.  US policymakers have opted to move 
forward with bilateral FTAs with a number of Latin American and Caribbean 
countries, challenging Brazil and its Mercosur partners to catch up when they are 
ready to proceed in the FTAA.  In essence, US officials have opted for a 
“surround Brazil” negotiating strategy rather than an “engage Brazil” approach. 
Brazil has adopted a similar trade strategy; it has signed bare-bones FTAs 
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and is negotiating a free trade pact with the European Union.  To date, the 
Brazilian strategy has scored political points in Latin America but made little 
progress in advancing Brazilian export interests in the major industrial markets. 
The Miami mandate does not preclude the possibility of a comprehensive 
free trade accord among all 34 countries.  Unless the co-chairs of the negotiations 
work more closely together, however, the likelihood is that the ministerial 
directive will lead to a “hollow core” agreement that deserves the deleterious 
banner of “FTAA-lite.” 
 
FTAA:  What Should be Done? 
 
In less than two years, US officials will lose their ability to invoke expedited 
legislative procedures to implement international trade agreements under the 
current trade promotion authority (TPA)—assuming Congress does not veto by 
June 30, 2005 the President’s request to invoke the automatic two-year extension 
of TPA that is already provided in the legislation.  It is highly unlikely that US 
officials would proceed with the FTAA in the absence of TPA or a similar 
congressional mandate to liberalize sensitive US trade barriers.  Negotiators thus 
need to resume work quickly. 
Some countries may believe that the time constraints on the FTAA 
negotiations put them in a good tactical position—since if time is short, then the 
FTAA package will perforce include only those issues on which agreement is 
relatively simple.  It is entirely conceivable that the negotiations will end with a 
whimper—producing a framework for future efforts at substantive reforms.  
While such a result may appease diplomatic objectives, it would fail to promote 
new trade and investment opportunities.  So what should be done? 
First, political leaders need to reiterate their objective of achieving free trade 
in the hemisphere; all FTAA participants except Venezuela have done so in past 
summits and should recommit to finish talks by the first quarter of 2007.  
President Bush recently voiced his determination to follow through with the 
Summit of the Americas commitment at the NAFTA leaders meeting in Waco, 
Texas; President Lula da Silva and other Latin American leaders should do so as 
well.  This political commitment should be embodied in the declaration of the 
next Summit of the Americas in Argentina in November 2005. 
Second, trade ministers need to update the Miami mandate to reflect recent 
events, including the progress on agriculture and other issues in the Doha Round 
of WTO negotiations.  The long-delayed ministerial meeting to be hosted by 
Brazil should be convened by mid-2005 to revive talks in all the negotiating 
groups, including agriculture.  The WTO framework agreed on August 1, 2004 in 
Geneva includes a firm commitment to eliminate agricultural export subsidies 
and to substantially reduce domestic support and border barriers to trade in farm 
products.  Many of the objectives of the hemispheric pact in this sector will thus 
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FTAA negotiators can thus focus almost exclusively on market access problems 
involving specific products traded between Western Hemisphere countries. 
What could be achieved?  The essence of an FTAA accord should be 
improved market access for goods and services.  Contrary to some comments 
from LAC officials, however, such a deal would have to include both 
liberalization of trade barriers and rulemaking reforms in areas such as services, 
investment, government procurement, and intellectual property rights.  Indeed, 
improving access in services often requires domestic regulatory reforms and 
liberalization of investment restrictions.  That said, the following gives an outline 
of what would be needed to put together a comprehensive package of market 
access reforms that would balance the needs of rich and poor countries alike. 
Eliminating all industrial tariffs is likely to be the basis of an FTAA deal, 
with some balance struck between US farm trade reforms and enhanced access to 
Latin American procurement and services markets.  The United States originally 
proposed in the Doha Round eliminating all industrial tariffs within 10 years; it 
should be able to do so on a faster timetable for its LAC partners.  On the other 
hand, smaller and poorer economies--particularly those that rely on trade taxes 
for a large share of their current government revenues--should be afforded longer 
transition periods to implement the free trade obligations.  However, those 
countries should not be granted exemptions from the FTAA disciplines, since 
such “charity” could deter needed adjustments in the domestic economy and 
discourage new investment in those countries. 
On agriculture, tariffs should be phased out over a 10-year period with only 
limited exceptions, and reforms of non-tariff barriers should yield concrete 
market access benefits for other sensitive products (even if some protection is left 
intact in the f orm of tariff-rate quotas).  Trade problems related to domestic 
subsidies cannot be resolved in the context of a regional agreement but could be 
substantially reduced in reforms likely to be accepted in the Doha Round. 
Does this mean that the United States has to offer more quota for Brazilian 
sugar?  Perhaps, but probably not.  Such a concession would elicit a loud 
outcry—not just in the US Congress but also among other sugar-exporting 
nations in the region—against reforms that would threaten the viability of the 
existing US sugar program and thus their sugar quota rents.  The US sugar lobby 
already succeeded in exempting sugar reforms from an FTA with another 
competitive producer, Australia, and is lobbying to extend that precedent to new 
FTAs and to restructure other FTAs currently subject to Congressional review 
(e.g., the Central American FTA).  While reform of the US sugar program would 
yield significant welfare gains for the US economy as a whole, including lower 
prices for US consumers, the politics o f moving toward freer trade in sugar 
would be extremely difficult (as demonstrated in the FTA talks with Australia).  
At the same time, there is little appetite in Latin America for major liberalization 
of US sugar protection, since it would expose them to strong competition from 
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market.  The situation is not quite analogous to the Chinese dominance in textiles 
after the expiry of quotas under the Multi-Fibre Arrangement, but many countries 
in Latin America would lose market share in a more competitive sugar market in 
the United States. 
At the end of the day, I suspect that Brazil will probably not demand much 
on sugar in deference to its foreign policy interests with its neighbors.  This rosy 
conclusion requires, however, that some Brazilian processed agricultural export 
interests (e.g., ethanol) receive some concrete benefits from the deal--which will 
not be easy for US officials and will require a substantial quid pro quo in terms of 
services/IP reforms by Brazil. 
Regarding procurement, FTAA negotiators should be able to agree on 
principles that provide transparency for public tenders and guidelines for open 
tendering. Over time, such rules should be complemented by a commitment to 
negotiate a list of entities whose purchases would be covered by these new 
obligations. 
Regarding services, the preferred outcome would be agreement on a “nega-
tive list” that covers all services subject to FTAA obligations except those expli-
citly listed, but the more likely outcome will simply augment WTO commitments 
on a sector-by-sector basis, with particular emphasis on infrastructure services 
and e-commerce. US negotiators need to take home commitments for substantial 
new trading opportunities in services, because the support of the US services 
lobby is crucial for Congressional support of an FTAA package that includes 
controversial changes in US farm support and protection. Note, however, that 
services reforms also are critical to the economic development strategies of LAC 
countries.  Inefficient financial and telecommunications sectors impose higher 
transactions costs on domestic industries and impede economic growth. 
In sum, the key to success in the FTAA is agreement on a big package of 
market access reforms, including agriculture and other goods and services. That 
means both liberalization of existing tariffs and quotas plus reform of regulatory 
and administrative practices that effectively impede the ability to sell in foreign 
markets (including discriminatory standards and customs procedures, sector-
specific investment reforms, and import relief policies--particularly safeguards). 
The United States and Brazil must lead the way to a comprehensive package of 
trade reforms, or the FTAA will join a long line of failed integration initiatives in 
the hemisphere. 
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Introduction: The European Union in the World 
  
The United States is the only military superpower in the world today, due to its 
huge budget for defence spending, 750 bases in the world, and its technological 
advantage. The United States has enormous power and influence, but not 
unlimited: military power is indispensable in certain situations, but does not solve 
political or social problems. The United States is also very strong economically, 
but not nearly so dominant. The  European Union (EU) has a similar GDP, is an 
equal trading power. Also, East Asia holds 70 percent of foreign currency 
reserves. In addition,  the United States has ballooning deficits. 
In his afterword to “American power and the crisis of legitimacy,” Robert 
Kagan comes to the conclusion that: “Europe is too weak to be an essential ally, 
and it is too secure to be a potential victim.” There is much truth in this quote, 
just like in the following one, again from Kagan: “Europe matters because 
Europe and the United States remain the heart of the liberal, democratic world. 
The liberal, democratic essence of the United States makes it difficult, if not 
impossible for the Americans to ignore the fears, concerns, interests and demands 
of its fellow liberal democracies.”  The EU may not be a global power, but it is a 
global player, a power in the world. True, the EU continues to punch below its 
weight in the United Nations and the international financial institutions. The EU 
provides 37 percent of the UN's regular budget and around 50 percent of all UN 
member states' contributions to UN funds, programs and agencies. Its impact is 
not commensurate with this level of contribution. 
With 25 member states, the Union will comprise 15 percent of the 
membership of the United Nations. It is uniquely placed to formulate, agree and 
carry forward joint positions in the United Nations and the Bretton Woods 
institutions.  EU-25 is potentially a world player, an actor ready to share in the 
responsibility for global security.  
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On the economic level, the EU is already a global player with its population 
of 450 million, its GDP equal to 25 percent of the world. The EU is the leading 
trading power, the first global donor of official development aid (ODA), with 26 
billion USD in 2001 compared to the US 11.4, as well as of humanitarian aid (47 
percent of global assistance vs. US36 percent). In this context, it is  noteworthy 
that unlike some other donors, the European Union does not see ODA as a means 
of securing short-term foreign policy objectives. Note also that unlike US aid, EU 
"aid" refers only to development assistance and does not include military or 
private international assistance.  
In Latin America, the EU is the first or second trading partner for all 
countries. From 1990 till 2002, EU imports from Latin America increased from 
26.7 to 53.7 billion Euros, and exports to Latin America rose from 17.1 to 57.5.  
With the obvious exception of Mexico, the EU is the first investor, particularly in 
nontraditional sectors, thus allowing for considerable added value in the 
countries. After a peak in 2000, European FDI diminished; however, the total 
stock grew from 176.5 billion to 206,1 billion Euros. The EU is by far the most 
important donor of civil aid, more than the United States and Japan together 
(about 60 percent). Since 1996, the EC budget alone (i.e. without individual 
donations from the 15 member states) has totalled more than 500 million per 
year. Latin America receives three times more EU aid per capita than other 
developing areas in the world. To quote the recently adopted European Security 
Strategy  -ESS-:  Trade and development policies can be powerful tools for 
promoting reform. The EU and the  member states are well placed to pursue both 
goals, trade  and  aid. 
The EU is also a powerful political actor, although it still has some way to 
go, even more so as concerns military capacities. I shall therefore concentrate 
more on non-military  policies. To put it simple: the EU certainly has far more 
carrot than stick capacities - but not just because of lack of the latter. It is also a 
matter of approach. And there is an intrinsic value in being a non-military power.  
Take as an example the EU's  role together with some Latin American partners in 
putting an end to civil wars in Central America and in the post-conflict area. In  
our relations with Latin America – including with more "difficult " partners –  
whenever possible, we prefer dialogue, persuasion, cooperation, yet we are not 
naïve: dialogue does not always settle problems in this complex world. But, I 
dare a pun: rather than denouncing an "axis of evil", we try to get “access to evil” 
to change things. Where the United States sees a dangerous world, many in the 
EU, until recently, saw a complex world. But it is also true that a large part of the 
EU population was somewhat unclear if it really wanted a multipolar world or 
one led by the United States, with the EU in a privileged position.  
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The New Situation in Latin America 
 
Democracy has become the normal way of installing governments and doing 
politics. Latin America has made enormous efforts in opening its economies to 
the world. They have the right to expect now that globalisation is not a zero-sum 
game. Latin American countries strongly assert themselves politically as a region 
striving for an active, independent role including as a global actor and the EU 
supported this from the start. Let me stress in this context the coordination 
between the EU and Latin American countries on a number of matters of 
common interest in international fora, in particular the UN system; they are 
becoming more and more regular exercises to sound out common ground. 
There are, however, persistent shortcomings which obviously start having an 
impact on the security situation: continued grave social inequality and exclusion, 
suboptimal economic interrelatedness; regional integration processes seem more 
advanced in Presidential declarations than on the ground. 
  
The European Security Strategy (ESS): The Voice of the European Union  
on Security Matters  
  
We sometimes forget that our ambition to build a common foreign and security 
policy is still in the early stage. We began this task only in 1993, with the entry 
into force of the Maastricht Treaty. Being a relative newcomer on the global 
scene, drawbacks were regrettable, but not altogether unexpected. They did not 
prove that a common foreign policy is impossible, they showed how badly we 
needed one! The European Security Strategy is a direct response to that 
conclusion. We did our homework, and we have achieved a lot in a short time. In 
the security field, we have "someone whom you can phone when you want to talk 
to Europe",  the High Representative Javier Solana. We have created new 
structures, including our Institute for Strategic Studies, and developed new 
capabilities. We have deployed those capabilities in the field, in the Western 
Balkans and in Africa. We have moved from a phase of theory to a phase of 
practice. The ESS is the result of a remarkable convergence of views on security 
issues between EU member states, coming from various historical backgrounds 
and with  a vast array of government coalitions and public opinions on military 
matters. An authentic and distinctive European voice in security issues has been 
confirmed. 
The old “set” of dangers in the world has been enlarged; not only are we 
confronted with failed or failing states, but new dangers are found in the 
combinations of threats: terrorism capitalising on the persistence of regional 
conflicts; criminal organisations acquiring weapons of mass destruction, whether 
through theft or collaboration with States, or through  collapse of State structures; 
collusion between fundamentalists, cyber-terrorists and international criminal 
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security. There are no more borders – neither for threats and crises, nor for 
solidarity and the shared will to create an other world. 
The geo-strategic scene has been transformed. The process we describe as 
"globalisation" has facilitated the easy movement of people, goods and ideas, but 
also of grievances, criminality and weapons. I strongly recommend reading the 
report of the ILO Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalisation, recently 
published. The Union has not stood impassive as the world around it changes. 
The imminent enlargement of the Union is itself a response to the contemporary 
challenges, reinforcing political stability and economic security on our own 
continent. One of the core elements of the international system is the transatlantic 
relationship.  This is not only in our bilateral interest but strengthens the 
international community as a whole.  
What are the major elements of the ESS? 
1.  Responsibility: as the EU grows, we have a duty to assume our 
responsibilities for security – to our own citizens, to our neighbours and, more 
widely, for global security. We could, in theory, walk away from these 
responsibilities – but we could not escape the consequences of doing so. The 
recent horrible attacks in Spain showed EU countries are now part of the terrorist 
battlefield. 
2.  Neighbourhood: I would not go into it here, but for an enlarged EU, 
countries such as Georgia are neither remote nor distant. 
3.  Effective multilateralism: it is not enough to say we support 
multilateralism. We must be prepared to make it work. Making it work means 
extending the scope of international law. It means reforming and strengthening 
multilateral institutions.  Kissinger's recommendation is right, but not only for the 
US policy: “The dominant trend in American foreign policy must be to transform 
power into consensus, so that the international order is based on agreement rather 
than reluctant acquiescence.” 
You are aware that the EU is strongly in favour of promoting rule-based or-
der through international law. Effective multilateralism requires a strong com-
mitment to upholding, developing and implementing international law. It has an 
indispensable role to play in fostering good governance and domestic rule of law, 
thereby making an important contribution to prevent state failure; it helps to ad-
dress the inter-related problems of conflict, poverty, underdevelopment and the 
absence of human security. Where international order is based on agreed rules, 
we must be prepared to ensure the respect of these rules when they are broken.  
In this context, a functioning International Criminal Court is also essential 
for the EU, which strongly encourages Latin American and Caribbean partners to 
join  us in ensuring the principles of universality and integrity of the Rome 
Statute. Like many of them, we see no convincing reason in bilateral non-
surrender agreements on the basis of Art.98.  I note with much interest General 
Hill's remarks on counterproductive effects of the U.S. legislation against those 
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In the light of recurrent financial crises in Latin America, the reform 
discussion within the International Financial Institutions should be strongly 
supported in view of increasing their universal legitimacy and effectiveness. We 
should consider ways to enhance the voice and effective participation of 
developing and transition countries, for example by rebalancing voting powers. 
To quote the Commission on Social Dimension of Globalization: "There is a 
serious democratic deficit at the heart of the system." Others would say, a need to 
reform it.  Let me add in this context, that the EU is also examining Latin 
American and Caribbean proposals for international funds supporting democracy 
or alleviating poverty. 
4. Effective multilateralism also implies fostering closer  regional co-
operation.  Action, coherence and capability will be vital, but will not be enough 
unless Europe strengthens relations with its strategic partners. Threats are never 
more dangerous than when the international community is divided. For this 
reason in particular, the transatlantic link between Europe, the United States and 
Canada is irreplaceable.  For forty  years we were partners for reasons of geo-
political necessity. Today we are partners of choice. As such, we must choose to 
work together to address our shared responsibilities, since none of us, however 
powerful, can deal with all the problems alone. Better co-operation is the key to 
effective multilateralism, and is our best weapon against the threats we jointly 
face.  Regional organisations also strengthen global governance, e.g., ASEAN 
and MERCOSUR can make an important contribution to a more orderly world. 
We encourage and cooperate with them to do so. 
5.  ESS has a comprehensive approach to security; one that pays as much 
attention to the causes of threats as to their consequences. Globalisation brings 
more freedom and wealth, but millions have been excluded from its benefits. 
Globalisation's potential to generate new frustrations must  be addressed. To 
quote again the Commission on Social Dimension of Globalization: "We seek a 
process of globalization with a strong social dimension based  on universally 
shared values, and respect for human rights and individual dignity; one that is 
fair, inclusive, democratically governed and provides opportunities and tangible 
benefits for all countries and people." 
Poverty is not the only source of conflict, nor is it a justification for conflict.  
Indeed, social research shows that it is rather frustrated expectations that cause 
rebellion.  But poverty and deprivation are breeding grounds for discontent and 
anger. A world that is fairer is also a world that is more secure. Security is a 
precondition for development. Democracies do make the world safer. Conflict 
not only destroys infrastructure, including social infrastructure; it also encourages 
criminality, deters investment and makes normal economic activity impossible.  
6. A final theme is prevention, a particularly difficult task, but essential. 
Today's threats are dynamic ones. Left alone, they will become more dangerous. 
In the case of Haiti, there was agreement that this should no longer be allowed to 
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military level, but also because of political sensitivities. I mentioned earlier that 
the European Union is already operative in peacekeeping and police missions, in 
particular in the Balkans and Africa. In Haiti we are in the process of reactivating 
possibly hundreds of million Euros, some of which had been frozen because of 
persistent violations of human and ci vil rights in the recent past.  In Latin 
America, the EU’s assistance covers conflict prevention projects notably in the 
Andean region.  
The EU has an early warning mechanism, a regularly updated watchlist of 
countries. There is general agreement in the EU institutions and member states 
that using all policy areas and achieving the appropriate policy mix is key to 
increasing the Union's impact in international affairs. 
Looking ahead: The EU’s 2010 Headline Goal actually under discussion,  
has the objective that in 2010, the European Union should be able to respond 
with rapid and decisive action in the whole spectrum of crisis management 
operations covered by the Treaty of the  European Union. This would include 
humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping, combat forces including in crisis 
management, joint disarmament operations, support for third countries in 
combating terrorism, and security sector reform. The European Union must be 
able to act before a crisis occurs, and retain the ability to conduct several 
operations simultaneously.  
 
Security Progress in Latin America 
  
Reading the outcome of the recent OAS Special Conference on Security in 
Mexico in October, 2003 shows that our analyses and objectives are very similar. 
Differences lay mainly in capacities, instruments or some priorities. At the EU 
level, there are few contacts with Latin America on security, and mostly in the 
past. (But even US SOUTH COM Chief General Hill complained he had to 
operate with a mere 0.22 percent of the defense budget). However, some of our 
member states are known to have such contacts, to offer advise, help, support and 
intelligence in certain countries, e.g. in Colombia.  A dialogue on confidence-
building measures, agreed between EU and RIO Group Ministers in 1994, had a 
promising start, but was put to rest after few high-level seminars.  
We strongly appreciate the commitments of all Latin American countries, 
such as the Tlatelolco Treaty, making it a denuclearized region. The EU has 
given support to the implementation of the Compromiso de Lima (17 June 2002) 
and the Andean Charter for peace and security and the limitation and control of 
the expenditure on foreign defence. The United Nations Center for peace, 
disarmament and development in Latin America and the Caribbean, in Lima, 
deserves our support. 
Regular conferences of defense ministers of the Americas can be important 
contributions to regional security. Regional confidence-building measures in 
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addition to growing yet insufficient economic interrelatedness. Just recall some 
years ago, during a border conflict between Argentina and Chile, energy transfer 
continued over the Andes just as normal business. This is the kind of concrete 
implementation of the spirit of  joint security perception.  
The EU has actively participated in the meeting of the UN D epartment of 
Political Affairs on Governance of Security sector in Latin America, in early 
2003, and will continue to do so; in this context, the EU Council Presidency 
established first c ontacts with OAS in late 2003.  The EU welcomes and 
financially supports subregional initiatives, such as control and reduction of 
small arms. This is an important, concrete contribution to security - after all, 
there are more daily victims  in Latin America by small arms than, as it were, by 
atomic weapons.  What is needed, is that such initiatives in Latin America are 
effectively implemented. There are some worrying signs of recent resurgence of 
some ghosts of the race towards armament – this would be the wrong answer to 
the wrong kind of today's threat perception.  
I shall now discuss more in detail, and with examples for certain countries, 
some aspects of how the EU is dealing with the political, economic and social 
causes of security problems. 
 
Fight Against Terrorism 
 
Long b efore becoming itself a victim of large-scale terrorist acts, the EU  has 
underlined, with words and actions, its solidarity in the fight against terrorism.  
Following 9/11, the EU regularly assesses risks of terrorism, including in Latin 
America and the Caribbean. In recent agreements with third countries, Political 
Dialogue and/or cooperation on terrorism is foreseen. In addition, the EU decided 
that as an essential clause, non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction 
shall be inserted in future agreements, or added to existing ones. The EU's 
clearing house has a list of what the EU considers terrorist groups. We also have 
good cooperation with the United States.  In the light of the terrorist attacks in 
Spain, as well as of internal reports - made public - on insufficient use of existing 
instruments, the EU has taken more concrete steps end of March.  
The EU is strongly convinced that the fight against terrorism cannot be 
waged at the expense of established, basic, shared values such as respect for hu-
man rights and the rule of law. Not doing so, risks to prolong or create new con-
flicts. This is, for example, the essence of the EU's message to Colombia, which 
was renewed in the EU Council's conclusions on Colombia in January 2004, just 
before President Uribe's visit to Europe. The EU strongly supports President 
Uribe's efforts for political, economic and social reforms, to develop a fully 
functioning democratic state throughout the territory  of Colombia, consistent 
with the rule of law, respect for human rights and international humanitarian law, 
and the welfare and safety of the citizens of Colombia. The EU also fully sup-
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for a negotiated solution to the internal armed c onflict. The EU reiterates its 
willingness to assist a peaceful solution, within the framework of a comprehen-
sive peace strategy the Government should work out. The EU has actively coop-
erated at the 10 July London conference of international support for Colombia. In 
2003 alone, the EU's non-military contributions amounted to some 300 million 
Euros, the figures for 1998-2002 are 556 million Euros - which makes us the 
leading ODA donor.  
On the other hand, the EU recommended to modify the ley alternativa, which 
some wrongly call the law on impunity, and is not at ease with the passing of 
judicial powers to security forces. We consider that the recommendations of the 
London Conference as well as those of the UNHCHR deserve better than being 
rather selectively followed. There is international concern that the paramilitaries 
are just  trying  to buy their way out politically. Any large-scale amnesty, in 
particular if covering serious crimes, would be a very bad signal not only to the 
FARC and ELN. The EU asks Colombia to also respect  the rights of victims, not 
because we are bleeding-heart softies, manipulated by NGO's, as some seem to 
see it, but for reasons of sustainability of the peace process and of  the rule of  
law. Let's be concrete: otherwise, according to reports of the International Crisis 
Group, paramilitary leaders would be on the way to become a new political and 
economic elite: according to the International Crisis Group, in addition to land-
stealing by extortion and forced emigration, landbuying has become a  most 
effective way of drug money-laundering. In fertile areas, 40 percent of the best 
land were acquired this way. 
Various EU countries are part of the Group of Friends. The EU strongly 
supports international good services and efforts, notably by the UNSG and the 
Catholic Church,  to maintain contacts for a peaceful solution with the illegal 
armed groups. We cannot but regret that actually there is little, or even negative 
and provocative response mainly from the FARC. As concerns the ELN, contacts 
are also difficult  – it seems to have lost interest or confidence in Cuba's 
mediating role. 
A final word on the listing of terrorist groups. Unlike the FARC and AU, the 
ELN was not on the EU's list, until the EU Council decided so on April 4 2004. 
This certainly looked inconsistent, but was due to historic circumstances, and 
linked to hopes for humanitarian solutions. We are all in a dilemma: while listing 
such groups is well founded on moral or political grounds and well received by 
the public, political and humanitarian contacts are nearly impossible if they are 
listed. 
 
Drugs  
 
Drugs are not only a continuous threat to life and health, but also to democracy 
and even regional security because of the close links between drug cartels and 
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The European Union is committed to the fight against drugs on the basis of prin-
ciples of co-responsibility, it favors positive, i.e. non-repressive action in pro-
ducing countries, a  global and balanced approach tackling both demand and 
supply. The EU tries to tackle the problem with various instruments and at multi-
ple levels: political or expert dialogue, trade, cooperation. 
The Mechanism for Co-ordination and Cooperation on Drug-related Matters 
between the EU, Latin America and the Caribbean, an initiative that originated at 
the meeting of the European Council in Madrid in December 1995, is the frame-
work for dialogue to deal with the drug problem and related crimes in an effec-
tive and consensual way. At the first EU-LAC Summit 1999 in Rio, both sides 
adopted an action plan.  The Mechanism's 5th high-level meeting was held in 
Cartagena/Colombia on 29-30 May 2003. Over seventy projects or activities are 
under way  in this context. Special attention is given to  four priority areas: de-
mand reduction, money laundering, alternative development and maritime coop-
eration, and to control of precursor chemical diversion, criminal networks and 
exchange of information and experiences on new illicit drug trends, in particular 
synthetic drugs. 
Together with Latin America, we undertake joint efforts to dismantle the 
components of the world drug problem as an important contribution to the fight 
against terrorism.  Some Latin American and Caribbean countries develop 
relations with Europol and with Eurojust. Recently, an agreement was signed 
between Europol and Colombia.  In addition, the EUn has a specialised dialogue 
and cooperation with the Andean Community: Alternative development projects 
are ongoing in Colombia, Bolivia and Peru, a monitoring centre was supported in 
Venezuela. An important project on precursors control is run in the Andean area.  
The EU is more than the United States centred  on  “soft eradication,” linked 
with fostering alternative production.  Drug cooperation projects with Latin 
America and the Caribbean total some 120Meuros. Our Peace Laboratories in 
Colombia are not just a societal utopia, but a concrete way of alternative living.  
To avoid negative impact for these by US fumigation measures, we established a 
functioning dialogue at Bogota. For many years the EU has granted a Special 
anti-drug Generalized System of Preferences to the Andean and Central Ameri-
can countries. This means in reality, that 70-90 percent of Andean exports al-
ready enter the EU tax free. 
Dialogue, trade and aid aspects are also essential components in recent 
agreements with Latin America.  We have c oncluded and put into practice 
“Association Agreements,” which include Free Trade Areas, with Mexico and 
Chile, negotiations with Mercosur are under way and should be concluded this 
year. Central America and the Andean ask for similar agreements. In the light of 
its own experience, we also strongly support regional integration, which not only 
reinforces a  region's impact on the international playing field, but is also a strong 
expression of confidence, mutual understanding, shared objectives, and more and 
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Recent analyses tend  to confirm the EU’s  approach to drugs:  According to 
the Andes 2020 study of the Council on Foreign Relations, the U.S. Plan 
Colombia risks to fail in the long haul, with drug production merely shifting to 
other countries, notably Bolivia. John Heimann, former Comptroller of the U.S. 
Treasury and one of the report's authors, stressed that security issues, drugs, 
corruption, poor land distribution, income inequalities and other problems need 
to be tackled multilaterally; addressing these issues on a country-by-country basis 
is doomed to failure. Lieutenent General Daniel Christman (retired), senior Vice 
President for International Relations of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, said the 
current plan  did little to prevent replanting and affected poor farmers more than 
rich drug cartels. We share t he view of Peter Hakim, President of the Inter-
American Dialogue: Destroying the livelihood of coca growers without providing 
alternatives is likely to be self-defeating and undermining the governments' 
capacity and credibility – including ours!  
Before moving to other subjects, let me stress again our common interest in 
combating drugs everywhere. According to DEA Chief Karen Tandy, U.S. drug 
users supply the international drug trade with 65 billion per year;  the Madrid 
attacks were financed by hashish trade - in this situation, for our own security, we 
all must focus ever more on demand.  
Economic development, social cohesion, democratisation and regional inte-
gration are priorities which most thoughtful policy makers in Latin America see 
as inextricably linked, mutually dependent and have an impact on security. There 
is a certain amount that the EU can do, and does, to help. But since the focus is 
on causes, not symptoms, it is absolutely clear, and only right, to acknowledge 
that real change is in the hands of Latin American governments’ countries them-
selves. 
 
Good Governance and Development 
 
The Joint Council and Commission Statement of November 2000 on EC 
development policy identified institutional capacity-building in the area of good 
governance as one of the six priority areas for EC development policy. Council 
conclusions on governance and development in September 2003 further 
operationalised this approach. The ESS states the following: 
 
The quality of international society depends on the quality of the governments that 
are its foundation.  The best protection for our security is a world of well-governed 
democratic states.  Spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, 
dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting 
human rights are the best means of strengthening the international order. 
 
In all its agreements, the EU negotiated as an essential clause (in terms of the 
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respect of the principles of democracy and Human Rights underpin the internal 
and external policies of the parties. It is worth highlighting that this clause 
originated from requests of Chile and Argentina  in the  early 1990s, to protect 
themselves against any return to dictatorship. We are glad we did not have to 
apply it. 
Meanwhile, we added a clause on Good Governance.  Similar, more 
elaborate clauses figure in the Cotonou agreement with ACP, and were in the 
past applied i.e. on Haiti. Our agreements also include a clause on corruption, 
certainly a worldwide problem all societies have: but the effects of corruption are 
worse  the poorer a country is.  Nobody, and in particular not a democratically 
elected President should not be allowed to get away with hundreds of millions 
stolen from his people or received from drug traficking. Through such clauses, 
the EU is aiming at a worldwide community, a global public opinion supporting 
democracy, human rights and good governance. 
In recent EU-US consultations on Latin America in Washington, ASS 
Noriega stressed that Latin American governments, with income from trade, FDI 
and remittances have considerable means to pass through to their people, and that 
countries with good governance, like Chile, demonstrably  show better 
performance – we cannot but agree! 
In this context, we note an evolution which could have worrying effects on 
regional security, particularly but not only in the Andean area and Central 
America. Old elites and their parties lost confidence, and new, so far  excluded 
segments of society came to power. This is in its own  way a welcome proof of 
democracy, but highlights old and new problems which must be adressed 
urgently. Old elites are out of power, but still have structures links and 
experience.  New elites are in power, but lack efficient underlying structures and 
organisations. There are some risks of undemocratic challenge for power  and 
frustration. True, there is some impact of effects of globalisation to which Latin 
American elites made important advance steps by opening up economies. But not 
all can be blamed on Globalisation.  The EU tries to support good governance 
through the instruments I already mentioned: 
 
-  policy dialogue for defining priority areas on governance-related matters 
on the basis of  each partner country's priorities. 
 
-  development assistance including projects, sector programs, budget 
support and trade agreements. Budget support can be given where 
appropriate, for example to Bolivia, one of the main beneficiaries of EU 
ODA in Latin America: since 1976, this country received over 500 
Meuros from the European Community alone (i.e. not counting aid by 
our individual member states). In recent years, Bolivia got an  average 
300 Meuros from EC and bilateral aid from member states. 
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  -  The Country Strategy Paper for 2002-06  foresees 126 million more; the 
EU also contributes to the  actual budget deficit crisis.  
 
-  The "Country and Regional Strategy Papers" give the countries/regions 
concerned a clear view of what they can expect for a number of years, 
and for which priorities.  Some of these have recently been reoriented 
towards good governance and institution-building. These Papers are 
subject to mid-term reviews, and jointly established with sovereign 
partners who keep "ownership" of their national development strategies.  
Bolivia also benefitted from the HIPC Initiative: since 1998, it received 1,8 
billion USD in debt relief. Phil Chicola of the State Department stressed that the 
country, so rich in gas and more, does have considerable resources -  it must use 
them and quickly decide so. To give a further example: as concerns Peru, at a 
donors' conference held in October 2001 in Madrid, the EU  pledged around 600 
Million Euros in support of the Government's Social Emergency Programme "A 
Trabajar". 
Let me end this chapter with a reference to migration -often an outcome of 
insufficient development and  chances. The EU and Latin America and the 
Caribbean have started a dialogue on this problem, a very real one: in Spain 
alone there are said to be nearly half a million of Ecuadorians.  Spain has started 
to legalise many foreigners at a rythm of up to 1,000 a day. 
 
Equality, Social Cohesion 
 
Social exclusion and inequality are time bombs. I don't want to sound 
sanctimonious or paternalistic: fighting inequality and securing  cohesive 
societies are overriding priorities not only for Latin America but for the EU as 
well. For all our rhetoric about European social policy, visible and unacceptable 
inequalities also remain within European societies. Some 15 percent of EU 
inhabitants (56 million people) in 1999 were at risk of living in poverty and over 
half of those (33 million) suffered from a persistent risk of poverty. It takes me a 
10 minutes walk from my house to enter Brussels' Thirld World; true, it does 
look different from favelas or callampas. 
But the problems of social cohesion are ever more acute in the Latin 
American continent. On a scale of 0 to 100, where 100 represents total inequality, 
Latin America sits at 53.9, much higher than the world's average (38), and even 
higher than Africa! The World Bank estimates that the richest 10 percent of the 
population of Latin America earn 48 percent of total income, while the poorest 
tenth earn only 1.6 percent. And as the Inter American Development Bank has 
pointed out, if income in Latin America were distributed just as it is in the 
countries of South East Asia, poverty in the region today would be only a fifth of 
what it actually is.  This is important not only on humanitarian grounds, but also 
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people means doubling the size of the market; and strengthening the commitment 
of those who are currently marginalised by the democratic system. There is little 
dispute over the negative correlation between inequality and growth. 
As a friendly observer, I believe Latin America can no longer put off social 
and fiscal measures that respond to the needs of a significant part of the 
population. In our cooperation programs, negotiated with beneficiaries, we 
respect a country's sovereignty - but this means in reverse, that how/if they want 
to develop is primarily their choice and responsability. International solidarity 
can be decisive, but not a substitute. The cynic definition of development aid of 
the 1960's “Taxing the poor in the rich countries to pay the rich in the poor 
countries” shall no longer apply. 
The relation between sound economic performance and political stability is 
clear-cut, and works both ways. A worrying recent poll by the Latino Barometer 
indicated that 52 percent of the population in the continent felt that they could 
live under an authoritarian regime if it delivered better economic conditions for 
their daily lives. How to counter this? As former Brazilian president Henrique 
Cardoso said, governments should boost their effectiveness, and citizens must 
learn to demand their rights without violence. I couldn't agree more. 
Cardoso raises the two important questions:  
 
-  First, effectiveness.  It is not enough to set up democratic institutions; 
they must work.  Electoral systems must function properly.  Political 
parties must be truly representative. Government policies should reflect a 
genuine social contract, which includes not just the protection of 
individual rights but also social solidarity to support the most vulnerable.  
The independence of the judiciary must be guaranteed. There are 
sometimes situations difficult to assess and to react to, namely when a 
democratically elected President  is obviously not respecting the rule of 
law. The  German/British  professor Lord Dahrendorf recently raised this 
dilemma - and concluded that, if a choice were to be made, rule of law 
should prevail. 
  -  The second question is the civil, peaceful exercise of political and social 
rights. In democratic societies there should be no place for violence. 
Citizens must feel confident in legal and institutional channels to 
exercise their rights. Violence and social turmoil can be symptoms of a 
lack of an effective political system. The resulting instability further 
discourages investment and growth. 
 
Regional Integration and the EU-LAC Bi-Regional Strategic Partnership 
 
One way to tackle social cohesion can be regional integration. Economic integra-
tion will create a bigger market and attract more foreign investment, growing but 
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and conflict prevention. Closer co-operation can be a catalyst for democracy and 
improved human rights; regional integration is an expression of compatible, and 
even common objectives, giving priority to what unites us. 
Regional integration reduces dependency and vulnerability, and offers 
protection against external shocks. Current trade between Latin American 
countries is weak and declining: according to the WTO, the percentage of intra-
regional merchandise exports in Latin America fell by 10 percent in 2002; 7 
percent in the Andean countries; and an alarming 33 percent in MERCOSUR. In 
2002, intra-regional exports in Latin America amounted to only 15.4 percent of 
total exports (and a mere 6.6 percent in the case of Peru), compared with 40.3 
percent in North America, 48.9 percent in Asia, and 67.3 percent in Western 
Europe. Unless this trend can be reversed, Latin American markets will continue 
to operate well below their potential. We probably need less Presidential 
conferences in Latin America and more seminars of experts on customs, trade 
nomenclature, single export forms etc. We need "efficient", not just legally valid 
decisions in integration, as Peru's MFA  recently set out in his speech on Andean 
integration. To illustrate that individual Latin American countries have limited 
trading clout: Brazil is the number one trade partner for the European Union in 
Latin America, but globally  only our trade partner number fourteen. The EU 
trades more with Vietnam than with Venezuela, more with Kazakhstan than with 
Colombia, more with Bangladesh than with Peru, more with Mauritius than with 
Ecuador, and more with Aruba than with Bolivia. 
Let me add that in the European experience, economic integration without 
accompanying measures for social and regional solidarity risks to create centres 
and marginalised areas, winners and loosers.  Integration should not simply 
follow a commercial logic. The EU is not the consequence of the market, but of 
political decisions. 
The EU-Presidency in the first half of 2004 (Ireland) was an outstanding 
example of the impact of the combined effect of our solidarity instruments and 
sound national policies for development. From some 65 percent of the EU 
average GDP per capita at the moment of accesion just 30 years ago, Ireland has 
skyrocketed to nearly 130 percent. The  EU wants regional integration to be a 
win-win situation. It gives considerable advise and support to such processes in 
Latin America.  However, sometimes we feel like the preacher in the desert. 
 Our bi-regional Strategic Partnership with Latin America and the Caribbean 
was created at the First EU-LAC Summit 1999 in Rio, strongly promoted by 
Spain and Portugal, but with the support by all 15 and through a very active 
German EU-Presidency. This Partnership, as well as our agreements with Latin 
American countries and regions, including our FTA's are not silent on internal 
disparities. Unlike NAFTA, they foresee manyfold cooperation sectors and in-
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Our cooperation assistance ranges from projects on institutional support, 
customs harmonisation, technical norms and standards, statistical harmonisation, 
to the involvement of civil society. 
Besides effective multilateralism, social cohesion is  the major item on the 
agenda of the Third EU-LAC Summit, to be held end of May in Guadalajara. In 
collaboration with the World Bank, the Inter American Development Bank, the  
UNDP, ECLAC, and  relevant experts, we drafted concrete proposals for policies 
fostering social cohesion for approval by our Heads of State Summit in 
Guadalajara, e.g. in areas like social and fiscal policy and regional and 
international co-operation.  Before the  Summit, the European Commission 
intends to launch an additional  €30 million programme aimed at developing 
public administration networks, in particular in the sectors of justice, health, 
education and taxation. 
Let me end with a quote from the ESS: Working with partners: There are few 
if any problems we can deal with on our own.  The threats described above are 
common threats, shared with all our closest partners. International cooperation is 
a necessity.  We need to pursue our objectives both through multilateral 
cooperation in international organisations and through  partnerships with key 
actors. 
The transatlantic relationship is irreplaceable.  Acting together, the EU and 
the United States can be a formidable force for good in the world.  Our aim 
should be an effective and balanced partnership with the United States.  This is 
an additional reason for the European Union to further build up its capabilities 
and increase its coherence. 
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